

Secondly, according to the Prima Pars what intellect knows first is the quidditas rei materialis [I 85 8; 87 3; 88 3]. On the other hand, there are frequent statements that what intellect first conceives is ens [I d 8 q 1 a 3 c; I d 19 q 5 al 2m; De Ente et Ess., proem.; BdeT q 6 a 4; q 1 a 3 ob 3a; De Ver q 1al; Met 1 lect 2 §46; 4 lect 6 §605; Post Anal 1 lect 5 §7; I 5 2 c]. ~~Now these different firsts offer no problem. The two positions obviously fit agree with the view that intellect knows the quiddity before it conceives. On the other hand, considerable ingenuity is required to explain either how ens is conceived without being known or how ens is known first and yet the quiddity is known first. It is, of course, true that the quiddity is an ens, so that knowing the quiddity first is compatible with ens being a first known [Cf I-II 94 2 c].~~ Now it is quite easy to see that if insight is prior to conceptualization then the first known will be the quiddity yet the first concept will be ens; ~~again~~ indeed, unless Aquinas were to use the terms, "insight" and "conceptualization," he could not have found a more effective manner of affirming the priority of insight that by distinguishing between a first known and a first conceived. On the other hand, were conceptualization prior, then ens would have to be not only the first concept but also the first known.

Now if conceptualization preceded conversion to phantasm, it would be necessary to affirm not merely that ens is the first concept but also that ens is the first known; at least, it would be a rather tortuous interpretation that affirmed ens to be conceived yet not known. On the other hand, if insight precedes conceptualization, then there is a first known and understood, namely, the quidditas rei materialis, and later there is a first concept, namely, the natural object of intellect (CG II ), which is ens. Finally, it is quite compatible with this view to say that ens is also a first known inasmuch as a grasp of ens is included in any apprehension of intellect [I-II 94 2 c].

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inner word. If one wonders why Aquinas was more temperate in his affirmations, one has only to recall that the quidditas rei materialis is the proper, proportionate, and first object of human intellect, that this quidditas is not entirely identical with the res [De An 3 lect 8 §706], and consequently that, though the quidditas is known, there still remains the res to be known through the inner word.

Fifthly, a variety of puzzles can be constructed out of the problems of universals. Let us take one based upon the Thomist text. Knowing the quidditas is knowing not the singular but the universal I 86 1. But the inner word is necessary to know the universal CG I 53 §3. Therefore the inner word must be prior to knowing the quidditas, and so conceptualization must be prior to insight. The first statement is ~~in~~ partly true. In knowing the quiddity, the knowing is universal; but the quiddity that happens to be known is objective, concrete, and existing in a particular thing with which it is really though not completely identical. Quote I 85 2 2m. The second statement also is partly true; Aquinas did state that the inner word is necessary to know "rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit" CG I 53 §3. But plainly this universal is not the same as the former: if one knew the concrete quiddity as separated from its material conditions, one would either be in error or else/not/known the concrete quiddity; for it is not separated from its material conditions.

one would/be/

Let us, then, draw the obvious distinctions. First, there is the real thing composed of form and matter. Secondly, man by sense and imagination apprehends this material thing. Thirdly, man by insight ~~grasps~~ grasps the quidditas rei materialis quae sub sensu et imaginatione cadit I 85 5 3m. This insight is "cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata" I 85 1 c cf 12 4 c. Such abstraction may be termed apprehensive: it is parallel to seeing the color of the apple without seeing its smoothness nor its sweetness; it does not involve or imply either an apple or an idea of an apple that has neither smoothness nor sweetness I 85 1 1m; 2 2m; De An 3 lect 8 §717. Fourthly, there is the formation of the inner word of definition; this definition ~~deliberately~~ omits individual matter to express only the quiddity; it presents us with something separated from the material conditions which are necessary for concrete existence; and without the inner word there cannot be such a separation. ~~Fifthly, there is logical reflection on the definition which to apprehend explicitly the properties of the universal which it possesses.~~ Thus, there is the objective quiddity which, in itself, is concrete but as known is object of a knowing that does not know its individual matter. Secondly, there is this knowing, which is apprehensive abstraction. Thirdly, there is the ~~deliberate~~ formative abstraction

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