A POST-HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Hegel's philosophy included both a philosophy of history and a philosophy of religion. As the whole philosophy, so also its parts on history and religion were worked out a priori as the necessary implications of Hegel's dialectical logic.

This position was acceptable neither to the German Historical School nor to its offshoot the History of Religions School. To both it was plain that the study of history and the study of religion had to begin with research and that they reached conclusions only when their respective accounts were verified empirically. For this reason it seemed incumbent upon me, in offering a philosophy of religion to members of the International Association for the History of Religions, to present such a philosophy in post-Hegelian terms.

But if I withdraw entirely from the necessity attributed by Hegel to dialectical logic, I would find it difficult to be philosophic about religion if it were not possible to retain something of his comprehensiveness. And such a possibility I find in shifting attention from Hegel's dialectical logic to a philosophic account of empirical method.

Such a shift I find recommended both on grounds of familiarity and on the authority of R. G. Collingwood who was not only a philosopher but also an archeologist and a historian.

First, on grounds of familiarity, for most scientists will find the notion of a dialectical logic not only puzzling but also mysterious. On the other hand, all scientists have

personal knowledge of scientific method, practical knowledge of what scientists in their field do and, if not a formulated, at least a tacit understanding of methodical procedure. Many, I fancy, would be surprised to hear that such a personal, practical, tacit attainment may be named a philosophy. But not a few, I suspect, would be relieved to discover that philosophy is not so alien to their attainments as they may have been told.

So much for familiarity. Besides it, there is authority, and I quote Collingwood's The Idea of History:

> Philosophy cannot interfere with history according to the Hegelian formula of superimposing a philosophical history on top of ordinary history... Ordinary history already is philosophical history... ... within the concrete whole, which is historical knowledge, philosophical knowledge is a component part.... (201).
>
> .. (history is necessary) relatively to philosophy, as the concrete whole of which philosophy is only the methodological moment.... (201).
>
> .. (history is)... the consciousness of one's own activity as one actually performs it... For even when the events which the historian studies are events that happened in the distant past, the condition of their being historically known is that... the evidence for them should be here and now before him and intelligible to him. For history... lives only as a present interest and pursuit in the mind of the historian when he criticizes and interprets documents, and by so doing relives the states of mind into which he inquires (202).

Now in these phrases Collingwood is following Croce and breaking from Hegel. He wants the philosophy of history to be, not a distinct history superimposed on ordinary history, but the methodological component present in the consciousness that a scientific historian has of his own performance. Moreover,

since Collingwood attributed to history a key role in all science, he considered the methodological component within history to be, not just a "philosophy of ...," but philosophy pure and simple.

Such a position suggests that other sciences are endowed with a "philosophy of ..." inasmuch as historians/thematize their conscious grasp of scientific developments. of science While I would not urge that this is impossible, I do find it cumbrous. It seems more expeditious to discover that the consciousness of every scientist includes a consciousness of the proper method of his subject. Just as the historian needs such a consciousness of historical method, so too do physicists, chemists, biologists, psychologists, exegetes, and so on, need to be effectively aware of the methodical exigences of their respective fields. In this fashion we are led to recognizing as many "philosophies of ...," as there are distinct sciences with appropriately differentiated methods.

Moreover, this multitude of "philosophies of ..." will not be a mere pile or heap of unrelated procedures. For methods and procedures are dynamic, and all share a common dynamism that is proper to our common humanity. It is this common dynamism that grounds the real unity and common philosophy of scientists and, as well, enables them to appeal to men of common sense (cf. Lonergan, 1976-77).

Such in bare outline is my proposal. It will be worked out in two main parts. A first part will treat both the common dynamics discernible in methods generally and the different dynamics in distinct fields of inquiry. The second part will deal with the divergence and the possible unity of results that arise when different methods are employed in the same field, as in religious studies.

Method as General Dynamics: Part One

Method is not to be confused with anything as pedestrian as a recipe, a prescription, a set of directions. For recipes, and the like, lead only to single results. They may be repeated as often as you please, but the repetition yields no more than another instance of the original product. What may be advertized as the New Method Laundry may clean anyone's clothing, but it will never do anything else.

The key instance to method, I feel, lies in the relation between questioning and answering. The questioner, while he does not know the answer, at least intends it. Moreover, the question itself sets a standard that leads to the rejection of insufficient answers; and insufficient answers need not be useless: they may help the questioner to pin down more accurately the precise issue he wished to raise. Further, such clarification may bring to light the existence of intermediate questions that have to be resolved before the initially intended question can be met. There is then an ongoing dynamism in questioning and answering. It heads through insufficient answers to the clarification and, as well, to the distinction of questions; and while this prepares the way to the eventual discovery of relevant answers, those very answers in turn can provide the source and stimulus to a fresh wave of questions.

I have been speaking of this ongoing process as though it occurred between a pair of individuals. But, far more importantly, it can be the common concern of associations of scientists. The members of such associations will have passed successfully through the initiatory ritual of attaining a Ph. D. They will be at home in the technical language which

they alone understand and speak. That language will provide the repository of the novel conceptual systems introduced by the pioneers and the renovators in their field. It provides the instrument through which are handed on the ideals that should govern their thinking and the procedures to be followed in their investigations. It is kept alive and up-to-date through congresses, through journals and books, through schools, libraries, and interdisciplinary undertakings. In this fashion questions raised anywhere can be known elsewhere; they can give rise to an array of insufficient answers that successively beg for a clarification of the issue or issues; and the clarifications will hasten, as far as is possible at the time, the new answers which initial questions may have done more to intimate than to formulate.

I have been stressing what I have noted elsewhere, that a method is not a set of rules to be followed meticulously by a dolt but a framework for collaborative creativity (Lonergan 1972, xi). But now I have to add that (1) questions are of different kinds, (2) each kind has its own immanent objective and criterion, and (3) the objectives stand in an ascending order with each completing what its predecessor had attained.

The first of the kinds is the question for understanding. It arises when one is intelligent enough to experience a lack; one lacks an understanding of some aspect or aspects of the data. As long as that lack continues to be experienced, answers that are proposed and considered will have to be rejected simply because the lack remains. So the objective of the first kind of question is the attainment of an understanding of specified data. The criterion of the attainment of a

proper understanding is that answers are proving sufficient, that questions no longer need further clarification, that the initial lack of understanding has been replaced by an insight that grasps why things are so.

The second kind of question is for reflection. Aristotle remarked that we think we understand when we know the cause, know that it is the cause, and know that the effect cannot be other than it is (An Post II 1). Now the open point in this affirmation is the meaning of "necessity." From the beginning of the fourteenth century, by and large, it seems to have been tacitly assumed that necessary knowledge results from the necessary implication of one concept in another. But such a view cannot, I believe, be foisted on Aristotle or Aquinas. For them the primary object of understanding was the representative image, the example, the instance, in which intelligence grasped the intelligibility of what the image represents. Such a grasp is a conscious intellectual event that, at times, is resoundingly satisfactory. Its formulation in concepts is a further process, equally conscious, and intelligently resting on the content of the insight (Lonergan 1967b 25-44).

It follows that over and above the abstract necessity that may be elicited from the implication of one abstract concept in another, there is the more concrete necessity that may be intelligently grasped in representative images and, under due provisos, in sensible data. For example, one can ask abstractly what is an eclipse. But one may also refer to a concrete situation in which a man, pointing to the darkening of the moon, asks why is the moon darkened in this manner (Cf. Met VII 17). The abstract question demands an abstract answer, and to proceed from the abstract defin-

ition to an actual necessity no number of further abstract necessities are enough. There also is needed an understanding of an existing situation into which the abstractions fit. But if the question is put with regard to a concrete situation in which an eclipse actually is taking place, then an understanding of that situation will grasp not only the cause of the darkening of the moon but also the necessity of that effect.

The third type of question regards responsibility. There are responsibilities intrinsic to natural science, others intrinsic to human science, others to religious studies. Our observations, for the moment, must be confined to natural science. In such science there is a responsibility to the data: it is violated when the data are fraudulently produced. There is a responsibility to intelligence, or reasonableness, and it is neglected when one overlooks the inadequacy of answers and, no less, when one withholds a qualified assent when further relevant questions are not made available. Finally, there is responsibility regarding the possible products of scientific advance. Because knowing is good, advance in knowing is good. Because the products of science can be turned to evil use by evil will, one's own will becomes evil in approving the evil use.

Such are the three questions, and I have said that their objectives stand in an ascending order. For the second question has its origin in an incompleteness of the first question and answer, and the third question has its origin in an incompleteness of the second question and answer. So our hypotheses and theories remedy our previous lack of understanding; but are they just bright ideas, or do they represent the best available opinion of the day? Still

even a consensus in favor of high probability would not preclude a still further question. New knowledge opens up new possibilities, and possibilities may be put to good or evil use; and so the question of responsibility arises out of the question for reflection and the answer to it.

It remains that this triad of questions and answers are only part of the ascensional structure of our intentional activity. Its hidden root is the unconscious, and it is not only the dark abode of primordial desires and fears but also the obscure home of the drive that makes man not merely the symbolic animal but also the self-completing animal. In all animals it is the store of the cognitypes and the dynatypes (Progoff 1973, 182 ff) that release and guide instinctive activity. But in man's sleep there are not only the dreams of the night that correspond to biological tensions but also the dreams of the morning in which the human subject before waking is already taking a stance towards his coming day. Beyond dreams, there is the daytime unfolding of this process that has been studied from different viewpoints by Jean Piaget, Erik Erikson, and Lawrence Kohlberg. Piaget examined operational development and placed its key in a repeated decentering that keeps shifting the center of the subject's activity from himself to his ever enlarging universe. Erikson's approach is from depth psychology and his eight developmental stages are successive and cumulative shifts in what one's identity becomes. Kohlberg, finally, attends to morals, distinguishes preconventional, conventional, and postconventional morality, divides each into two stages, and reveals the defects of each earlier stage as compared with its successor. It happens, however, that the ideas of

all three writers have been brought together in a unitary view in terms of self-transcendence. The author of this work is Prof. Walter Conn, and I have had the privilege of reading it in galleys. The benefit I must leave to the reader to reap for himself, since a brief reproduction is impossible, and a summary cannot be just.

But before closing this first part of my first section, I feel I should indicate roughly not yet the stages but perhaps the successive degrees of self-transcendence. The first is the emergence of consciousness in the fragmentary form of the dream, where human substance yields place to the human subject. The second is waking when our senses and feelings come to life, where our memories recall pleasures and our imaginations anticipate fears, but our vitality envisages courses of action. The third is inquiry which enables us to move out of the mere habitat of an animal and into our human world of relatives, friends, acquaintances, associates, projects, accomplishments, ambitions, fears. The fourth is the discovery of truth, which is not the idle repetition of a 'good look' but the grasp in a manifold of data of the sufficiency of the evidence for our affirmation or negation. The fifth is the successive negotiation of the stages of morality and/or identity till we reach the point where we discover that it is up to ourselves to decide for ourselves what we are to make of ourselves, where we decisively meet the challenge of that discovery, where we set ourselves apart from the drifters. For drifters have not yet found themselves. They have not yet found their own deed and so are content to do what everyone else is doing. They have not yet found a will of their own, and so they are content to choose what everyone else is choosing.

They have not yet developed minds of their own, and so they are content to think and say what everyone else is thinking and saying. And everyone else, it happens, can be doing and choosing and thinking and saying what others are doing and choosing and thinking and saying.

But this fifth stage, in self-transcendence, becomes a successful way of life only when we really are pulled out of ourselves, as, for example, when we fall in love, whether our love be the domestic love that unites husband and wife and children, or the love of our fellows whose well-being we promote and defend, or the love of God above all in whom we love our neighbor as ourselves.

Method as General Dynamics: Part Two

The first part of our consideration of method as dynamics was very general. It included questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, questions for responsibility. But no attempt was made to say precisely what questions were to be asked. Such an attempt must now be made, and so we turn from the core of methods generally to the differentiation of that core.

Such differentiation is a difficult task and one, I am inclined to feel, that has not been squarely met. Aristotle's deductivist view of science could be verified only in mathematics and, indeed, in the mathematics of the ancient world; it followed that subjects other than the mathematical could be given the name of science only by courtesy (Ross, 14). In the modern period, the success of Newtonian mechanics gave the key role to empirical science and, in the course of time, mechanics came to share its prestige with physics, while extending its mantle

over physical chemistry, chemistry, and a statistical reformulation of Darwin's 'chance variations' and 'survival of the fittest.'

Such are the natural sciences. They have been extremely successful. But it is important for us to understand the root of that success and the reason why it does not transfer in any thorough-going fashion to human studies.

Very simply, the natural sciences, in the measure they are subject to quantitative relations, are in close dependence on mathematics. In turn, modern mathematics has vastly purified mathematical thinking by an inststence on clarity, generality, and precision; and it has handed over to physics notions of space, time, and indeterminacy, that profoundly liberate the scientific mind. There is a liberation from the domination of Euclidean imagination and, as well, a liberation from the domination of the mechanist determinism that reigned from the heydey of Newton's triumph through the first quarter of this century. As the mathematician, so too the natural scientist can now avail himself of freely constructed yet internally coherent systems.

But a parallel liberation can be bestowed on human studies. One way to this goal is the quantification of statements about human beings. An alternative way is to have philosophy do for human studies what mathematics does for natural science. I may presume that you are familiar with the former procedure, and so I may be content to indicate what the latter entails. In 1923 George Santayana published a book entitled Skepticism and Animal Faith. The pair were considered opposites with skepticism the lot of an elite and animal faith the lot of the masses. But neither animal faith nor skepticism is compatible with the general dynamics of method: animal faith asks no questions, and skepticism answers none. For me the real alternatives are animal faith and critical philosophy. On the one hand, animal faith is the fate

fate of everyone who learns in childhood to speak his mother tongue, who may entertain no doubt about all he believes he knows, but who never has found out for himself and in himself just what are the events that come together to constitute human knowledge. On the other hand, in the measure that one finds out for oneself and in oneself just what these events are, one not merely is a critical philosopher but also one successful enough to be liberated, especially from animal faith in some unknowable thing-in-itself.

I may be asked just what events do come together to constitute human knowing. Very schematically, there are three: first, the givenness of the data, which is the objective of research; secondly, a cumulative series of insights into the data, which respond to the question for intelligence and yield a hypothesis; thirdly, a probable judgment on the adequacy of the insights.

At this point there may return the notion that human knowing is not a threefold compound but a single simple act at least in the field of our own consciousness. Certainly many have thought of consciousness as an inward look, an instance of what they may name introspection, and it is by such a look (they might claim) that we are aware of the givenness of the data, the occurrence of insights, the sufficiency of the evidence. But to my mind this is just a fresh avatar of the intuitions attributed to animal faith. For I believe that the data of sense and the data of consciousness are parallel. The data of sense do not constitute human knowledge but only a first step to such knowledge. Similarly the data of consciousness are not an instance of self-knowledge but only a first step towards attaining such knowledge. All our intentional acts also are conscious acts. But to advert to them as conscious, we have to deemphasize the intentional and heighten the conscious side of the act. Only when that is achieved can we proceed to gain insight into the relations that unify our conscious acts and then to pass judgment on the validity of the relations.

We have been speaking of the structure of human knowing and the nature of human consciousness only as a preliminary to indicating our main point, namely, that man's world is a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value, and so a world that includes all mathematics but is not to be mastered within their scope. After all, mathematics embraces only one of the many different fields of meanings.

To this end we propose to speak of the four basic functions of meaning: it is cognitive, efficient, constitutive, communicative. It is cognitive. Human knowledge is discursive, a matter of questions and answers, and so one's knowledge is no better (and no worse) than the questions one can raise and the answers one can give. The world of the infant is no bigger than the nursery, but the world of the adult extends from the present back to its past and forward to its future. It includes not only the factual but also the possible, the ideal, the normative. It expresses not only what one has found out for oneself but also what we have managed to learn from the memories of other men, from the common sense of the community, from the pages of literature, from the labors of scholars, from the investigations of scientists, from the experience of saints, from the meditations of philosophers and theologians. It is within this larger world that we live out our lives. To it we refer when we speak of the real world. But because it is mediated by meaning and motivated by value, because meaning can go astray and evaluation become corrupt, because there is myth as well as science, fiction as well as fact, deceit as well as honesty, error as well as truth, that larger world is insecure.

Besides being cognitive, meaning is efficient. We work but our work is not mindless. We imagine, we plan, we investigate possibilities, we weigh pro's and con's, we enter into contracts,

we have countless orders given and executed. Over the world given us by nature, there is an artificial, man-made world; it is the cumulative, now planned, now chaotic, product of human acts of meaning.

A third function of meaning is constitutive. Just as language is constituted by articulate sound and meaning, so social institutions and human cultures have meanings as intrinsic components. Religions and art-forms, languages and literatures, sciences, philosophies, histories, all are inextricably involved in acts of meaning. What is true of cultural achievements, no less is true of social institutions. The family, the state, the law, the economy are not fixed and immutable entities. They adapt to changing circumstances; they can be reconceived in the light of new ideas; they can be subjected to revolutionary change. But all such change involves change of meaning — a change of idea or concept, a change of judgment or evaluation, a change of the order or the request. The state can be changed by rewriting its constitution. More subtly but no less effectively it can be changed by reinterpreting the constitution or, again, by working on men's minds and hearts to change the objects that command their respect, hold their allegiance, fire their loyalty.

A fourth function of meaning is communicative. What one man means can be communicated to another in many ways: intersubjectively, symbolically, linguistically, incarnately. But a rich store of common meaning is not the work of isolated individuals or even of single generations. Common meanings have histories. They originate in single minds, but they become common only through successful and widespread communication. They are transmitted to successive generations only through training and education.

Slowly and gradually they are clarified, expressed, formulated, defined, only to be enriched and deepened and transformed, and no less often to be impoverished, emptied out, deformed.

The conjunction of both the constitutive and communicative functions of meaning yield the three key notions of community, existence in the sense of Existenz, and history.

Community is not just a by-product of a geographical frontier but the achievement of common meaning. Such common meaning has four degrees. It is potential when there is a common field of experience, and to withdraw from that common field is to get out of touch. Common meaning is formal when there is common understanding, and one withdraws from that common understanding as misunderstanding and incomprehension supervene. Common meaning is actual inasmuch as there are common judgments, areas in which all affirm and deny in the same manner; but common meaning is diluted as consensus fails. Common meaning is realized by decisions and especially by permanent dedication, in the love that makes families, in the loyalty that makes states, in the faith that makes religions.

As it is only within communities that men are conceived and born and reared, so too it is only with respect to the available common meanings that the individual grows in experience, understanding, judgment, reponsibility, and so comes to find out for himself that he has to decide for himself what to make of himself. Such is the existential moment.

It is momentous, for it can be authentic or unauthentic, and this can happen in two distinct ways. There is the minor authenticity or unauthenticity of the subject with respect to the tradition in which he was raised. There is the major authenticity or unauthenticity that justifies or condemns

the tradition itself. As Kierkegaard asked whether he was a Christian, so divers men can ask themselves whether they are authentically religious, authentically philosophers, authentically scientists. They may answer that they are, and they may be right. But they may answer affirmatively and still be mistaken. On a series of points they will realize what the ideals of the tradition demand; but on another series their lives diverge from those ideals. Such divergence may be overlooked from a selective inattention, a failure to understand, an undetected rationalization. What I am is one thing; what an authentic Christian or Buddhist is, is another, and I am unaware of the difference. My unawareness is unexpressed. I have no language to express what I am, so I use the language of the tradition that I unauthentically appropriate, and thereby I devaluate, distort, water down, corrupt that language.

Such devaluation, distortion, dilution, corruption may occur only in scattered individuals. But it may occur on a more massive scale, and then the words are repeated but the meaning is gone. The chair remains the chair of Moses, but occupied by scribes and Pharisees. The theology is still scholastic, but the scholasticism is decadent. The name of science may be invoked but, as Edmund Husserl has argued, all significant scientific ideals can vanish to be replaced by the conventions of a clique. So the unauthenticity of individuals becomes the unauthenticity infecting a tradition. For a subject to take the tradition uncritically is for him to realize what objectively is unauthentic but for him subjectively is thought authentic.

So we come to history in its radical difference from nature. Nature unfolds in accord with classical and statistical laws. But history is an expression of meaning, and meaning is open

both to enduring stationary states, to development, the fruit of authenticity, and to aberration that matches the unauthenticity of its source.

A sound development calls for heightened attention, a new insight into the situation, a workable proposal for a changed course of action, and a responsible decision on the matter. Such a sound development not only is an improvement on the previous situation but also a change. Change is apt to awaken further attention, open the way to fuller insight, to a still no less workable proposal, to another responsible decision. As the former change, so this change invites still further change. Progress has begun and it may continue. So Arnold Toynbee in his A Study of History — which I have found less a narrative of events than a repertory of ideal types — has depicted a series of challenges and responses with a creative minority taking the lead and the rank and file only too happily accepting that leadership.

But Toynbee also depicted the creative minority ceasing to be creative and becoming merely dominant. He has listed a series of manners in which this shift may come about. But I wish to suggest that our present analysis also throws light on the matter. For it should seem that the creative minority was creative because it hit upon a cumulative sequence of relevant insights. But in such a sequence the point can be reached when immediate benefits (or advantages) are small and the long-term benefits, though great, not only are distant but also difficult to depict and communicate. Then wise counsel does not easily prevail, compromise proposals are highly attractive, responsible decisions fail to win acceptance. The creative minority wishes to remain in the saddle; it can choose to become a merely dominant minority; to go along with the apologists

that praise such practical wisdom; to be lulled into the easy security of philosophies that stand on the unreasoning and so irrefutable basis of animal faith. The shift may occur gradually enough to pass unnoticed, but once it has occurred, consistency becomes a force working for its perpetuity.

Such a change in the leadership involves a change in the social situation. As long as creativity was in charge, the situation was becoming increasingly intelligible. The implementation of insights in a situation not only modifies the situation but also suggests still further insights and so still further complementary changes. In contrast, when intelligent proposals are mangled by compromise, their implementation results in an objective surd. It does not make sense. It calls not for further insights but for further compromises. Only with great difficulty can that call be resisted by a leadership that already has preferred dominance to creativity.

In brief, besides progress there also is decline. As progress rests on authenticity, on the self-transcendence of men and women ready to be attentive, to grow in intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, so decline rests on unauthenticity. Basic decisions are shirked. Judgments lean towards superficiality. Difficult insights are ignored. Problems are referred to committees.

I once remarked that the wheel of progress not only turns but also rolls along. But the wheel of decline has a similar but opposite momentum, and a far greater power of acceleration — until things just fall apart.

Philosophy of Religion

Up to now I have been attempting to elucidate what might be meant by the phrase, philosophy of ..., and I have been doing so by speaking of "method of ..." and first I spoke of methods in general as an ongoing dynamic, and secondly of the possibility of matching the liberation of natural science through mathematics by using not mathematics but philosophy for a liberation of human studies. What has made natural science successful has been the Galilean proposal to mathematicize nature; what can make human studies no less penetrating seems to be, not the mathematization of man's world, but the discovery that it is a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value. For it is through meanings that we come to know man's world. It is through meanings that we communicate concerning man's world. It is through meanings that we transform the world of nature into either a more excellent or a more deficient human world. It is through the meanings we accept and the values we embrace that we constitute both ourselves and our communities, our authentic and unauthentic traditions, our heady bursts of progress and our headlong periods of decline, of breakdown, of dissolution and decay.

In all this our aim has been an account of a philosophy of religion, and so we have now to compare the respective relevance of divers methods to the study of religions. Historically, then, the methods of natural science have been applied in this field; the methods of history also have been applied; and if any problems remain after viewing such work, we have to ask whether an appeal to philosophy would be of avail.

First, with regard to the relevance in religious studies of the methods of the natural sciences, I cannot do better than recall the opening remarks of Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith at a public lecture in the University of Toronto in January 1968. He acknowledged that much fruitful energy had been devoted to exploring man's many religious traditions and to reconstructing the history of the overt data on man's religious living. Both in detail and in wide compass the observable forms had been observed and the observations had been recorded. But he went on to claim that a further, a more important, and a more difficult question must be raised. To live religiously is not merely to live in the presence of certain symbols but, he urged, it is to be involved with them or through them in a quite special way — a way that may lead far beyond the symbols, that may demand the totality of a person's response, that may affect his relation not only to the symbols but to everything else, to himself, to his neighbor, to the stars.

This special involvement, commitment, engagement, Professor Smith claimed, pleads to be elucidated. If it both inspires and is inspired by religious traditions, religious beliefs, religious imperatives, religious rituals, still it is distinct from them. Members of the same religion are not all equally committed to their religion. The same man may be at one time indifferent to religion, at another profoundly concerned, at a third vehemently hostile. The question is, then, what makes religion come alive? What has happened when it withers and dies? (Lonergan 1970, 45)

In brief, the methods of natural science have contributed much to religious studies, but their contribution is incomplete. What is wanting is an account of the meaningfulness of relig-

ious tradition, belief, imperatives, rituals: not indeed of the meaningfulness that would meet the requirements of a logical positivist or linguistic analyst, but of the meaningfulness that can demand the totality of a person's response. Again, it is the meaningfulness, that is, expressed by a historian of religion, read by those for whom the religion has come to life, and by them recognized as an account of their own commitment.

But what is that meaningfulness? How is it reached? How is it investigated?

It is, I should say, the meaningfulness of striving to become self-transcendent and of making progress on the way. It is the emergence of the self not only from the consciousness of the dream into waking consciousness but into intelligent consciousness that gradually promotes us from being animals in a habitat to becoming human beings in a universe, into the reasonable consciousness that judges in accord with the evidence, into the responsible consciousness that makes its way from individual and group egoism beyond the bias of 'omnicompetent common sense' to the consciousness of one in love — in love with the family, in love with fellow citizens in this world, in love with God above all.

How is it reached? The process begins with socialization, acculturation, education. Its culmination is within religion. Both the Judaic tradition (Deut 6 4; Lev 19 18) and the Christian command followers to ".. love the Lord your God with all your heart and all your soul and all your mind and all your strength... and to love your neighbor as yourself" (Mark 12 29 ff).

Nor are the Judaic and Christian traditions singular in this respect. Friedrich Heiler has listed seven principal areas of unity to be discerned in all the world religions: in Judaism,

Christianity, Islam, Zoroastrian Mazdaism, in Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism. But what he devoted eleven pages to narrating, I must compress under seven brief headings with apologies for the omission of many a nuance and qualification (Heiler 1959). The reality, then, of the transcendent, the divine, the holy, the Other. Next, the divine while transcendent also is immanent in human hearts. Thirdly, this reality, transcendent and immanent, is for man the highest good, the highest truth, righte usness, goodness, beauty. Fourthly, the reality of the divine is ultimate love, mercy, compassion. Fifthly, the way of man to God is universally the way of sacrifice, repentance, discipline, prayer. Sixthly, as they seek God, so too they seek their neighbor's well-being, even the well-being of their enemies. Finally, while religious experience is endlessly manifold, the superior way to God is love.

A special fruitfulness seems to reside in the study of ascetics and mystics. Not only did Prof. Heiler write a fundamental work on prayer (Misner), but Raymond Panikkar in a volume of Concilium, devoted to fundamental theology, advocated a turn in the same direction. If we wish a theology, he wrote, that has its ground free from the influence of particular places and times, particular cultures and viewpoints, we have to have recourse to the wordless prayer of the mystics representing the world religions. We have to ask them to dialogue, not to clarify their differences from one another, but to let shine forth the interrelatedness constituted by the peace they experience as distinct from any words they may silently or vocally utter (Panikkar 1969).

In somewhat similar fashion the foundations envisaged in my own Method in Theology are simply religious conversion

in the sense of a total commitment to religious self-transcendence.

There remains a crucial issue on which, I feel, something must be said, for sooner or later it is bound to confront anyone who investigates the history of religions on the basis of his personal self-transcendence. I shall attempt to state it as briefly as possible in terms of three currently accessible views: materialism, immanentism, critical realism.

My starting point was our questions and answers, and it probably has not escaped you that such a basis fits in very neatly with Feuerbach's contention that man's notion of God is a projection on the sky of idealized human qualities. We seek understanding, and God is all-intelligent; we seek sufficient evidence for our judgments and God is all-knowing; we seek moral excellence and God is goodness and love.

I must be content with two observations. First, such seeking is not mere quality but potentiality and finality; and it is potentiality and finality not confined to some category but, on the contrary, scorning any arbitrary burking of questions.

Secondly, I note that the word, projection, recalls the cinematic projector and before it the magic lantern. But the slide or film does not experience, does not inquire intelligently, does not judge on the basis of sufficient reason, does not decide freely and responsibly. In brief, a projection does not differ from George Santayana's animal faith.

So much for a materialist option. Next, I propose to consider both the immanentist and the critical realist options simultaneously, not because the two do not differ, but because one can say much about religious experience without opting for either side of a philosophic difference.

Dr Eric Voegelin has explained that he got into problems of religious understanding one winter when, at an adult education institute in Vienna where he grew up, he followed weekly lectures by Deussen, the philosopher who translated the Upanishads (O'Connor 153 f). Dr Voegelin is but author of a work in many volumes on Order and History; his parerga include incisive essays on Greek philosophy and the New Testament. He has set aside the common but strange assumption that reason, for Plato and Aristotle, was much the same as the deductivism of late medieval Scholasticism, seventeenth-century rationalism, nineteenth--century idealism. His contention has been that reason in the Greek classic experience was moral and religious; in Athens the appeal to reason was the appeal of men in an age of social and cultural decay seeking a way to recall their fellows from darkness and lead them towards the light (Voegelin 1974). His account of religious experience centers on the struggle in the soul and it draws freely on both Plato and the New Testament (Voegelin 1971). He acknowledges pulls and counter-pulls. To follow the former puts an end to questioning. To opt for the latter leaves questions unanswered and conscience ill at ease. The former alternative is what Voegelin means by a movement luminous with truth, or again by existing in the truth, or again by the truth of existence. The latter alternative is existence in untruth. As he contends, this luminosity of existence with the truth of reason precedes all opinions and decisions about the pull to be followed. Moreover, it remains alive as the judgment of truth in existence whatever opinions about it we may actually form. In other words, there is an inner light that runs before the formulation of doctrines and that survives even despite opposing doctrines.

To follow that inner light is life, even though to worldly eyes it is to die. To reject that inner light is to die, even though the world envies one's attainments and achievements (Lonergan 1977 , 7).

Voegelin holds that such experiences, while valid symbols and legitimately made the basis of a "saving tale" to guide our lives, are not to be handed over to hypostatizing and dogmatizing. "There is no In-Between other than the metaxy experienced in man's existential tension toward the divine ground of being; there is no question of life and death other than the question aroused by pull and counter-pull; there is no Saving Tale other than the divine pull to be followed by man; and there is no cognitive articulation of existence other than the noetic consciousness in which the movement becomes luminous to itself"(Voegelin 1971, 75).

A little later we read: "Myth is not a primitive symbolic form, peculiar to early societies and progressively to be overcome by positive science, but the language in which the experiences of divine-human participation in the In-Between become articulate. The symbolization of participating existence, it is true, evolves historically from the more compact form of the cosmological myth to the more differentiated form of Philosophies, Prophecy, and the Gospel, but the differentiating insight, far from abolishing the metaxy of existence, brings it to fully articulate knowledge. When existence becomes noetically luminous as the field of pull and counter-pull, of the question of life and death, and of the tension between human and divine reality, it also becomes luminous for the divine reality as the Beyond of the metaxy in the participatory event of the movement. There is no In-Between of existence as a self-contained object

but only experience experienced as part of a reality which extends beyond the In-Between" (76).

Let me now attempt to say what I make of this. First, I shall quote and comment. I quote: ".. there is no Saving Tale other than the divine pull to be followed by man." What is this divine pull? We have explicit references to John 6 44: "No man can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him," and to John 12 32: "And I shall draw all men to myself, when I am lifted up from the earth" (77). The context then is not only biblical but Joannine.

Next, I quote: ".. there is no cognitive articulation of existence other than the noetic consciousness in which the movement becomes luminous to itself." I ask: What is the movement of noetic consciousness and when does it become luminous to itself? For Voegelin "nous", whence the adjective, noetic, is in the classic experience moral and religious. But in the present context the religious component becomes far more emphatic. For in this movement of consciousness there is ".. a mutual participation (methexis, metalepsis) of human and divine; and the language symbols expressing the movement are not invented by an observer who does not participate in the movement but are engendered in the event of participation itself. The ontological status of the symbols is both human and divine" (75). So Voegelin appeals both to Plato who claimed that his myth of the puppet player was an alethes logos, a true story, ".. whether received from a God or from a man who knows" (Laws 645B) and, as well, to the prophets promulgating their sayings as the "word" of Yahweh. In brief, we are offered an account of revelation.

It is, however, an account of revelation or inspiration that can meet the needs of a philosophy of the history of religion. For as Voegelin further remarked, "The symbolization of participating existence... evolves historically from the more compact form of the cosmological myth (the reference is to ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia) to the more differentiated form of Philosophies, Prophecy, and the Gospel, but the differentiating insight, far from abolishing the metaxy of existence, brings it to fully articulate knowledge" (76).

~~One may ask whether one is not to confuse~~ Further than I was used to identify this differentiating insight with its fully articulate knowledge ~~and the repudiated~~, on the other hand, with the dogmatizing and doctrinalization that V. repudiates. ~~There are grounds for such an interpretation~~ For later Voegelin speaks (88) of ".. the loss of experiential reality through doctrinalization." Now the luminous experience of existing in the truth is indeed an instance of experiential reality, and a doctrinalization that abolishes the one also is the loss of the other. In that case doctrinalization ~~seems~~ may be associated with what Newman would have named merely notional apprehension and merely notional assent, which do imply an exclusion of real apprehension and real assent (Newman).

There remains the repudiation of Voegelin's "hypostatization." It seems to me fully justified if applied to Gnostic constitutions of the pleroma through the designation of abstract names, or even, if anyone wishes, applied to the Hegelian dialectical deduction of the universe through an interplay of opposed Begriffe. But behind such applications there is a far deeper issue, and on it I can now do no more than invite you to an examination of Giovanni Sala's comparison of my cognitional theory with Kant's, and of William Ryan's comparison of my intentionality analysis with that of Edmund Husserl. The seminal work seems to me to be Le Blond 's Logique et méthode chez Aristote.

Please insert "Heiler" p. 29 bottom on p. 28 after Conn
" add Progoff (from p. 8) after Panikkar below.
" Newman, p27

Bibliography

Collingwood, R. G.

1940 1956 The Idea of History, Oxford University Press

Conn, Walter E.

1981 Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence, Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press

Le Blond, J. M.

1939 Logique et Méthode chez Aristote: Paris, Vrin

Lonergan, Bernard

1967 Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press

1970 "Religious Commitment," A Pilgrim People: A Vision with Hope, edited by Joseph Papin, Villanova, PA: The Villanova University Press

1972 1979 Method in Theology, New York: Seabury Press, London; Darton Longman and Todd

1976-77 "The ongoing genesis of methods," SR/Studies in Religion, 6/4, pp. 341-55

1977 "Theology and Praxis," Proceedings: Catholic Theological Soc. of America, vol. 32

Misner, P.

1974 "Heiler, Friedrich," New Catholic Enc., 16: 203.

O'Connor, Eric, ed.

1980 Conversations with Eric Voegelin, Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers / 1976

Panikkar, Raymond

1969 "Metatheology or Diacritical Theology as Fundamental Theology," Concilium 46: 43-55

Ross, Sir David

1949 Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics, Oxford 1949, p. 14

Ryan, William F. J.

1973 "Intentionality in Edmund Husserl and Bernard Lonergan," International Philosophical Quarterly, XIII, 2, 173-190

Sala, Giovanni

1971 Das Apriori in der menschlichen Erkenntnis: Eine Studie über Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und Lonergans Insight, Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, Band 97, Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain

Voegelin, Eric

1971 "The Gospel and Culture," Jesus and Man's Hope, edd. D. G. Miller and D. Y. Hadidian, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, pp. 59-101

1974 "Reason: The Classic Experience," The Southern Review, 10: 237-264

Heiler, Friedrich

1959 1962 "The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Cooperation of Religions," The History of Religions, Essays in Methodology, edd. M. Eliade and J. Kitagawa, Chicago, pp. 142-53.