

HORIZONS AND TRANSPOSITIONS

Prof. Gerald McCool of Fordham University has recently given us a quite thorough study of the reasons that led Pope Leo XIII to write the encyclical, Aeterni Patris, and thereby to impose the doctrine of Aquinas upon Catholic teaching of philosophy and theology (McCool 1977). Moreover to his book he has added an article on twentieth-century Scholasticism, on its initial vigor, and its decline since the pastoral council, Vatican II (McCool 1978).

Both the book and the article are relevant to our topic. For the word, horizon, denotes the range or field of a person's interests and knowledge, and Fr McCool's studies have set before us not only many different persons but also not a few different horizons and even not a few changes of horizon.

Now a change of horizon takes us out of the field of deductive logic. As long as one is simply logical, one remains within the same horizon. As soon as one changes one's horizon, one begins to operate in virtue of a change in one's basic assumptions. Such a change may be just a jump but also it may be a genuine transposition, a restatement of an earlier position in a new and broader context.

Our present concern is to illustrate the notion of genuine transposition. So first we ask whether there was anything genuine about the process that transplanted the gospel from the religious soil of Palestine to the arid context of Greek speculation. Next we shall ask what constituted the golden age of Scholasticism and what led to the breakdown of theology in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Finally we shall ask whether there were oversights in the nineteenth-century resurgence of Thomism that account for the debacle that followed the pastoral council, Vatican II.

Finally, be it observed that as a change of horizon cannot be demonstrated from a previous horizon, so the genuineness of transpositions cannot be a simple logical conclusion. What is basic is authenticity. It is a summit towards which one may strive and, only through such striving, may one come to some imperfect participation of what Augustine and Aquinas named Uncreated Light.

The Transition from a Palestinian to a Hellenistic Horizon

It has long been a commonplace for the followers of the History of Religions School that the high christology of the church emerged under the dominance of a Hellenistic milieu. In the recent decade, however, the commonplace has been attacked both on its Palestinian and its Hellenistic front.

Martin Hengel, a specialist in comparative studies of Judaism and Christianity, in his inaugural lecture at the University of Tübingen in 1973 (revised and published in German in 1975 and translated in English in 1976) has maintained that the letters of St. Paul to Galatians, I and II Corinthians, and Romans

- a) are the earliest, certainly authentic Christian documents we possess,
- b) teach a high christology, and
- c) are expressed in language of Palestinian origin.

While his scholarship cannot be summarized, I must be content to repeat his contention that, if high christology emerged under the dominance of a Hellenistic milieu, then more happened in the first two decades of Christian history than in the subsequent seven centuries (Hengel, 2).

Eric Voegelin, a historian and not a metaphysician, has written a highly illuminating article entitled "Reason: The Classic Experience" (Voegelin 1974). I quote:

I shall not deal with the "idea" or (with) a nominalist "definition" of Reason but with the process in reality in which concrete human beings, the "lovers of wisdom" as they styled themselves, were engaged in an act of resistance against the personal and social disorder of their age. From this

act there emerged the Nous as the cognitively luminous force that inspired the philosophers to resist and, at the same time, enabled them to recognize the phenomena of disorder in the light of a humanity ordered by the Nous. Thus, Reason in the noetic sense was discovered as both the force and the criterion of order.

I have been reproducing the second paragraph of Voegelin's article in The Southern Review. It states clearly and succinctly his viewpoint. For him the Sitz im Leben of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy was personal morality and social order. Yet to reach that interpretation of the high point of Greek philosophy one has to be familiar, from personal experience, both with what Michael Polanyi refers to as "tacit knowledge" and with the symbols and signs of the transition from what is tacit to what is explicitly expressed. Or again one has to be aware both of Fr. Doran's primary process and of the intermediate zone that lies between it and his secondary process. Or to speak with Wittgenstein one has to place Polanyi's tacit knowledge as the starting-point for one's trying to show what as yet one cannot say. Or finally, with Vernon Gregson and Fr. Doran, one has to grasp how exactly they describe my book, Insight, when they name it a set of exercises in intellectual therapy.

Now let me briefly recall how my own intellectual therapy has advanced since writing Insight, before I proceed to a brief outline of key elements in Voegelin's earlier and longer paper on "The Gospel and Culture."

Traditionally "nature" is an immanent principle of movement and rest. But for present purposes we are led from such generality to what is more specific and multiple. We distinguish in man a series of horizontal processes traversed by a vertical process. Each horizontal process has its own principle yielding moments first of movement and then of rest on the successive levels of sensitivity, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. The vertical process rises from an undifferentiated eros (commonly referred to as the unconscious), influences in turn each of the horizontal processes, and finds its proper goal beyond them in a self-transcending being-in-love that reaches from the home to the civil community only to find its anchor and its strength in the agape of the New Testament.

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The basic horizontal process is the spontaneity of our sensitivity. Undifferentiated eros, pregnant with dreams or fantasies, memories or anticipations, is oriented by our perceptions of persons or things, and is powered by our feelings of desire and fear. But spontaneous vitality can shift to give place to the wonder and detachment of intelligence. Such a pause is in itself tacit, but it may come to be expressed in such questions as why, what, how, how often, what for. Whether tacit or expressed, the wonder tends to insight and its emergence may be manifested merely in a quiet smile or [^] in an Archimedes shout of triumph.

The occurrence of one insight normally leads to the occurrence of further complementary insights, and it may do so tacitly

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~~This process begins from outer stimulus and continuously~~ returns to it. But our responses proceed from the spontaneity of our sensitivity: our perceptions of persons and things, our feelings of desire and fear, our memories, our anticipations, our fantasies. But if such spontaneity is the most conspicuous component in our consciousness, it is far from the whole of it. The data of sense give rise to the wonder of intelligence, a wonder that in itself is tacit but may come to be expressed in questions such as what, why, how, what for, how often. Whether tacit or expressed the wonder tends to insight which may be manifested merely in a quiet smile or in a shout of triumph. ~~The occurrence of one insight normally leads to the occurrence of further complementary insights, and it may do so tacitly~~ or explicitly: tacitly in the genesis of common sense; methodically and elaborately in the genesis of science. There is a tacit process of learning by watching others, endeavoring to imitate them on our own, failing perhaps and watching some more until we have acquired the skill, mastered the technique, made successful performance into a routine. There is an explicit process when we formulate just what the insight adds to the data and select from them as much as is needed for the recurrence of that insight, when we go on to work out the presuppositions of the insight and to deduce its implications, when we undertake elaborate processes of testing that may eliminate unnecessary suppositions or add others that are needed, that determine whether the consequences all follow whenever the data needed for the insight are present, and whether they may equally follow when some of the conditions are dropped.

On the accumulation of insights a new principle supervenes. There is the pause of reflection, which ceases to be tacit and becomes explicit when we ask, Is that possible? probable? certain? In philosophy, such questions demand elaborate answers. In the sciences there is a continuity in which reorganizations and even revolutions preserve what is sound in previous work so that, if the new explains more than the old, it has a claim to greater probability. In common sense abstract principles give place to reassuring proverbs; universal affirmations and negations are not very seriously entertained; amusement at mistakes discourages their repetition; and familiarity with

one's daily tasks, with relatives, friends, acquaintances, with the spontaneous process of teaching and learning (that silently goes forward in any group and field) give birth to the security to which Macbeth appealed when he addressed, "Thou sure and firm-set earth on which I tread."

The addition of reflection and judgment to accumulated insights places us in a world of greater or less truth and reality and then there supervenes the question for responsibility. It takes successive forms. The self-regarding form asks, What is in it for me? The legalistic form asks, What does the law say, what does it imply, what does it enforce? The strictly moral form raises the question of value, Are my goals worth while? Are my decisions making me a person that is worth while? (Conn 1978, Morelli).

Such are the successive horizontal processes of discrete principles of movement and rest. But running through them all is the vertical drive from undifferentiated eros to agape. It transmutes our sensitivity from a biological function into the carrier of artistic inspiration, into an instrument of practical and theoretical intelligence, into an embodiment of wisdom's concern for the true and the good.

I have been attempting an explicit summary of a contemporary context for Voegelin's account (1974) of the classic (the Platonic and Aristotelian) experience of reason. But that paper followed on another and longer paper entitled "The Gospel and Culture" (1971). There he asks why Christianity could come to dominate the decaying ecumenic empire of Rome and the subsequent history of Europe yet today experiences an inability to gain a hearing in the modern world (51). His answer comes out of the introduction to the Dialogue with Trypho. Justin had tried to live by many philosophies but set them aside when he discovered in Christianity, not something opposed to Philosophy, but Philosophy in its state of perfection (60). But what Justin could discern, our age cannot, for if the answer is still available, still the question has been lost. We ask about the meaning which must be given to the fact of existence, but existence is not a fact. Rather it "... is the non-fact of a disturbing movement in the In-Between

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of ignorance and knowledge, of time and timelessness, of imperfection and perfection, of hope and fulfilment, and ultimately of life and death (62 f.).

On the ultimate, life and death, he stressed the ambiguity disturbingly stressed by Euripides ("Who knows if to live is to be dead, and to be dead to live"), by Jesus (whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses his life for my sake will find it), by Paul ("If you live according to the flesh, you are bound to die; but if by the spirit you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live"). In brief, "There is a direction in existence; and as we follow it or not, life can be death, and death be life eternal... The question expressed by the double meaning of life and death is the question of every man's existence, not only of the philosopher's... It is a question buttressed by the authority of the representative death suffered by Socrates for its truth. Plato's Apology concludes with the ironic parting words to the judges: 'But now the time has come to go. I go to die, and you to live. But who goes to the better lot is unknown to anyone but the God, (66 f.).

In the Gospel of John, when a group of Greeks approach the apostles with the Greek names, Philip and Andrew, in the hope of speaking with Jesus, the symbolic meaning of life and death is applied to the divine sacrifice. "Most solemnly I tell you, unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains only a single grain, but if it dies, it bears much fruit. Who loves his life loses it, but who hates his life in this world, keeps it for life eternal. If anyone serves me, he must follow me, and wherever I am, my servant will be too." And some verses later: "And I, when I am lifted up from this earth, will draw all men to myself" (68 f.).

~~Voegelin at this point this symbolism of life and death~~

Voegelin considered this double meaning of life and death as the symbolism engendered by man's experience of being pulled in various directions and his need to choose between them. For Plato "when opinion leads through reason (logos) toward the best (ariston) and is more powerful, its power is called self-restraint (sophrōsunē), but when desire (epithumia) drags us (helkein) toward pleasures and rules within us, its rule

is called excess (hubris)" (Phaedrus 238A). The pulls are in conflict, dragging us up or down. "A young man may be 'drawn (helkein) to philosophy' (Republic 494E), but social pressure may divert him towards a life of pleasure or towards success in politics. If he follows the second pull, however, the question of meaning is not settled for him, for the first pull continues to be experienced as part of his existence. By following the second pull he does not transform his existence into a question-free fact, but into a recognizably questionable course of life. He will sense the life he leads as 'not his own true life' (495C) — he will live in a state of alienation. The play of the pulls thus is luminous with truth. By following the wrong course one does not make it the right one, but slides into existence-in-untruth. This luminosity of existence with the truth-of-reason precedes all opinions and decisions about the pull to be followed. Moreover it remains alive as the judgment of truth-in-existence whatever opinions about it we may actually form" (71).

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For Voegelin, terms seeking (zētein) and drawing (helkein) do not denote two different movements but symbolize the dynamics of the tension of existence between its human and divine poles. In the one movement there is experienced a seeking from the human and a being drawn from the divine pole. Such experience is prior to the emergence of what we call Classic Philosophy. "Only from the travail of this movement there emerges man as the questioner, Aristotle's aporōn and thaumazōn (Met 982b18) and God as the mover who attracts or draws man to himself, as in Plato's Laws X or Aristotle's Metaphysics" (71).

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Now this experience of being at a loss and wondering is not something peculiar to a few fourth-century Greeks. It does not fit into the rationalistic segregation and separation of the natural and the supernatural, so that we can speak of Plato and Aristotle as merely pagans, and banish their thinking from the Christian religion pure and undefiled. For the ascetical and mystical tradition that belongs to the upper reaches of Christian thought and practice has a millennial familiarity with the pulls and counter-pulls that constitute the tension of Christian existence, of their ambiguities, of the need for a discernment of spirits if one is to follow the call of God's grace, even of different rules to be applied under

different circumstances.¹ *Monergon 1977*

There seems to be some evidence, then, for the claim of Justin Martyr that Christianity is philosophy in its state of perfection though, of course, this is true only of philosophy in its original sense, namely, the love of wisdom. But it still may be questioned whether we have to go beyond existential truth and wisdom and include the commitment to some sort of metaphysics implicit in the Greek councils and the better Scholastic writers. But while we shall be directly be concerned with this issue only in the third part of our paper, it remains that something be said at once on the issue that gives rise to metaphysical thought.

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In a collection of Ancient Near Eastern Texts relating to the Old Testament and edited by James B. Pritchard (1950), there is included the translation of a hymn to Amon as the Sole God. It is taken monotheistically by Voegelin in his paper on "The Gospel and Culture" where Amon is the God above the cosmic and national gods, the source of their dignity and power, but unknown not only to men but even to these known gods (83ff.). It is this unknown God that is for Christians the Father of Jesus Christ and by them identified with the Creator God of the Old Testament, but by Gnostics, at least in their anti-semitic writings, set in opposition to ~~him~~ and above him.

^ Yahweh

Now it also happens that John A. Wilson, who translated the excerpts from Egyptian texts, also contributed to a symposium held at the University of Chicago and published by the university press in 1946 (Frankfort 1946). In the chapter in which he discusses the Amon hymn, he begins with the question whether the ancient Egyptians acknowledged any difference of substance among men, gods, and other elements of the universe. His personal answer was that a man seems "to be one thing and the sky or a tree another. But to the ancient Egyptian such concepts had a protean and complementary nature. The sky might be thought of as a material vault above the earth, or as a cow, or as a female. A tree might be a tree or the female who was the tree-goddess (Frankfort 62). After several further examples he notes that his "line of argument will be that to the ancient Egyptian the elements of

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the universe were consubstantial.... The first claim for the argument that the elements of the universe were of one substance is the principle of free substitution, interchange, representation. It was very easy for one element to take the place of another. A person who had died wanted bread... he might be supplied with real loaves... but if stealing occurred, then a wooden loaf of bread might do, or a picture of bread, or even the written or spoken word, bread (63). Eventually he turns to the Amon hymn, and he admits that it has been considered a prime document for the thesis of essential monotheism. But he would preface such an interpretation by insisting that it is not a matter of a single god but of a single nature of observed phenomena in the universe, with the clear possibility of exchange and substitution. With relation to gods and men the Egyptians were monophysites: many men and many gods, but all ultimately of one nature (66).

Obviously between these scholars there is some difference of opinion. But I should say that it is underpinned[^] by Polanyi's tacit knowledge but by the pre-metaphysical and the post-metaphysical expressions of tacit knowledge. The premetaphysical expression is mythical. The post-metaphysical is controversial. It exhibits the need for Paul Ricoeur's twofold dialectic, a dialectic of suspicion in search of the unauthentic, and a dialectic of recovery that uncovers the authentic.

But there is no easy solution. To recognize and acknowledge the authentic one already must be authentic. If already one is unauthentic, such recognition and acknowledgement is beyond[^] one's effective reach. Such is the moral impotence of man, the concrete fact of original sin, not the remote origins of original sin (peccatum originale originans), but the present fact (peccatum originale originatum). To confront that issue as the basic issue is to come to grips with St Paul to the Romans, chapters five, six, seven, and eight (Lonergan 1974: 118, n.7; 133).

From the New Testament to the Greek Councils

The councils in question (Nicea, Ephesus, Chalcedon, Constantinople III) involved a transposition from the vocabulary of the New Testament and, more fundamentally, from its viewpoint. While the precise nature of that transposition has been given many interpretations, not a little light may be thrown on the matter by recalling the opposite shift envisaged by Pope John XXIII when he announced that Vatican II was to be a pastoral council.

His intention he explained to the assembled bishops at the solemn inauguration on October 11, 1962. There was no point, he said, in their gathering together merely to repeat what anyone could find in familiar theological handbooks. Equally there was no point in going over ancient decrees and clearing up this or that obscurity to satisfy the interest of antiquarians. What was desired was advertence to the distinction between the unchanging deposit of faith and the changing modes of its presentation to meet the needs of different times. What was required today was a fresh presentation, one that met current needs, one that fitted in with the teaching office of the church, a teaching office that in the main was pastoral.

When the first session was over and Pope John was responding to the Christmas greetings of the curial cardinals and prelates, once more he harked back to his inaugural address. Undoubtedly he said a first duty of the council was fidelity to the deposit of faith and of the church's teaching. But this duty was not fulfilled by any wrapping of one's talent in a napkin and burying it in the ground. The business of the council, he had insisted, was not the discussion of this

or that topic in the fundamental doctrines of the church. It was not any elaboration of the teachings of the Fathers or of ancient or modern theologians. That sort of thing can be done very well without holding a council. What was expected was a leap forward (un balzo innanzi) that would set forth the faith in the mental forms and literary style of modern thought while satisfying the requirements of the teaching office — an office that predominantly was pastoral (AAS 1962, 1963).

Clearly during the first session some difference of opinion had been ventilated if, after that session, Pope John felt a need to repeat what he had said at its beginning. On this matter I find particularly clear and penetrating an article by M.-D. Chenu, O. P., written in January 1963 just a few weeks after the first session of the council closed. In April of that year it appeared in the review, Parole et mission, and a year later it was included in a two-volume collection of Fr. Chenu's writings (Chenu 1963, 1964).

He recalled that for the Archbishop of Genoa, Cardinal Siri, the term, pastoral, did not mean mere smiles and condescension. First and foremost, it meant presenting the truths revealed by our Lord. Further, since every council had conceived its aim to be the presentation of revealed truths, the term, pastoral, could not be the distinguishing mark of any council.

Fr. Chenu felt that some such opinion underlay the work of the preconciliar committees. Theirs had been the task of putting together the suggestions, the requests, the complaints of the bishops, and of presenting initial drafts, named schemata,

for the council to approve, modify, or reject. In fact the council had rejected more than one of these schemata, pronouncing them to be abstract and scholastic and neither biblical nor pastoral nor ecumenical.

What then does 'pastoral' mean? For Fr. Chenu difficulty arises from putting the cart before the horse. If one begins by clarifying the meaning of 'doctrine' and then sets about explaining the meaning of 'pastoral', one tends to reduce 'pastoral' to the application of doctrine and that application to the devices and dodges, the simplifications and elaborations, of classical oratory. But what comes first in fact is the word of God. The task of the church is the kerygma, announcing the good news, preaching the gospel. That preaching is pastoral. It is the concrete reality. From it one may abstract doctrines, and theologians may work the doctrines into conceptual systems. But the doctrines and systems, however valuable and true, are but the skeleton of the original message. A word is the word of a person, but doctrine objectifies and depersonalizes. The word of God comes to us through the God-man. The church has to mediate to the world not just a doctrine but the living Christ.

God speaks in the prophets, he spoke in his Son, he still speaks today in scripture and tradition, in the biblical movement, the liturgical movement, the catechetical movement, the ecumenical movement. First and foremost he speaks to the poor, to the poor in the undeveloped nations, to the poor in the slums of industrialized nations. And if the word of God is not preached to the poor, then the church has failed. So it was in the word of God preached to the poor — a theme so lucidly and powerfully set forth by, among others, Cardinal Lercaro — that the bishops assembled in council together discovered and collectively

responded to the momentous meaning of the phrase, a pastoral council.

Alive, personal, communal, the word of God also is historic. As the old covenant, so also the new names a dispensation, an economy, an ongoing disposition of divine providence both emergent in human history and carrying it forward to an ultimate, an eschatological goal. With its origins in the distant past and its term in an unknown future, its scope extends to the ends of the earth and its mission to all men. Once more there comes to light the complete inadequacy of attempting to begin from doctrines and then attempting to flesh them out into living speech, when it is living speech that, from the start, alone can be at once concrete and alive, interpersonal and communal, historic and ecumenical.

Let me add just one more point from Fr. Chenu's account. An ideology can be expressed in the propositions of a doctrine, in the premises and multitudinous conclusions of a system. But the words of a pastor, of a shepherd of souls, are far more than any ideology. They are words spoken in faith and awakening faith. They are words of salvation, a salvation that is God's gift of himself, of his peace and joy, of his eternal hope.

The Medieval Rise and Fall of Scholasticism

I would attribute the medieval rise of scholasticism in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries to the emergence of a theological method and I would attribute the medieval fall of scholasticism in the the fourteenth century to the decline of method and the dominance of deductive logic. Such is, so to speak, my thesis. I hope to develop it under five headings, namely:

- (1) the initiators
- (2) the emergence of method
- (3) the problem of coherence
- (4) the turn to Aristotle
- (5) the ambiguity of the Posterior Analytics.

The initiative, I believe, may be attributed to three men St Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Abailard, and Gilbert de la Porrée.

^b Anselm was the thinker. His interest centered on all the profoundest problems in Christian theology: the Trinity, the end of the Incarnation, the fall of the angels, original sin, divine foreknowledge and predestination, grace and liberty. But his solutions were brilliant constructions without a solid underpinning in revealed sources or in theoretical exploration (Lonergan 1971: 6 - 9).

^{to} Abailard was the investigator. His Sic et Non was a series of one hundred and fifty-eight propositions, and each of them he undertook both to prove and disprove by appealing to the scriptures, the Fathers, and reason. His emphasis in this work underscored what was lacking in Anselm: a critical review of tradition.

Gilbert de la Porrée established a cardinal point in what was to be scholastic method. He set forth the conditions for the existence of a question: a question exists when solid grounds from scripture, tradition, or reason can be advanced to establish both an affirmative and a negative answer.

Taken together the three initiators offer the speculative originality of Anselm, the positively grounded problems of Abailard, and the technical rule of Gilbert, when these three

are added to the practice of the monastic schools of reading followed by reflection (lectio and quaestio), we are at the origins of scholastic method. The lectio was clarified by glosses, extended by commentaries, organized by collections of passages taken from different sources but bearing on distinct topics. Such collections were known as Libri sententiarum. A number of them came into existence, but the most celebrated was Peter Lombard's, and on it commentaries were written up to the time of Estius at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

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The commentaries were not modern in their style. They did not aim at the historical reconstruction of the original meaning of the texts. They simply applied to the selected materials the technique of the quaestio. With regard to any particular topic several questions might be distinguished. They were enunciated. In turn their existence was established by listing authorities or reasons first for a negative answer (Videtur quod non) and then for a positive answer (Sed contra est). There followed a statement of principles for a solution (Respondeo dicendum) and finally an application of these principles to each of the authorities or reasons that showed the question to exist.

There resulted a method. For it attracted a group of specialists following a common procedure in a determinate field of investigation (Lonergan 1975: 166 - 169). Its results were ongoing and cumulative: previous solutions often were only partial to give rise to further questions that were to be tackled by later writers; and the later writers could complement their predecessors yet, by that very fact, give rise to new questions. The process has been exhibited in detail by the writings of A. M. Landgraf on early scholastic opinions on grace and by O. Lottin on early scholastic accounts of liberty.² So we find that the questions Aquinas raised in his Scriptum super sententias stand at a notable distance from those suggested by the text of the Lombard under consideration. Between the text and the commentary there had occurred a century-long process of refinement, development, transposition.

It remains that the method needed to be complemented by some overarching vision. It yielded solutions that reconciled endless apparent oppositions. But of itself it was powerless to make the many solutions coalesce into some coherent whole of precisely related meanings expressed by appropriately univocal or even analogous terms. To offset the multiplicity of basic issues there was needed at least some preliminary but comprehensive view which might interact with the many solutions and, by modifying them, also modify itself into the wanted synthesis.

The solution to this superordinate issue seems to have come simply from the cultural ecology of medieval Europe. Besides Christian thinkers there were Arabic scientists and philosophers, and behind them both was the heritage from ancient Greece. Moreover, it was first through translations from the Arabic that Christian theologians came into contact with

Aristotle, ~~and Plotinus~~. And as Greek thought moved into an Arabic horizon by translation into Arabic, so also there was a Latin and Christian horizon that had a twofold need to cultivate Greek achievement. The first and more obvious need was apologetic. The second and more fundamental was to provide scholastic method with its overarching vision.

The first of Aristotle's works to be accepted by the theologians was his logical Organon. But through the thirteenth century there was an ever deeper penetration of Aristotelian categories into Christian theology. Three examples will suffice. A traditional view had been that, since justifying faith supposed free consent, baptized infants were freed from guilt yet did not receive justifying faith. But early in the century a papal document, after recalling the traditional view, added the opinion of some that baptized infants not only were freed from guilt but also received the habit, though not the use, of justifying faith (DS 780). Early in the fourteenth century the second opinion had become the more probable view (DS 904).

Again, throughout the twelfth century theologians had been at a loss to say what was meant by grace: everything was a free gift of the creator. As that was a somewhat preposterous account of what scripture meant by grace, several less general views were proposed, but none that coincided with the later view of

the supernatural habit or act. At the same time there was a grave problem of reconciling human liberty with the necessity of divine grace: if man was free, grace could not be absolutely necessary; and if it were absolutely necessary, man could not be free. A series of ever better proposals early in the thirteenth century culminated in the solution of Peter the Chancellor of the University of Paris who posited an entitative disproportion that set grace above nature, faith above reason, charity above friendliness, and merit before God above the good opinion of men. Nature, reason, friendliness, the good opinion of men resulted simply from being human. But grace, faith, charity, and merit before God were the free gift of God's love for those he ^{is} his own children. Faithful love of one person for another is a gift of oneself to another. Even in men and women, however much supported by natural spontaneity, principally it is the fruit of a free and personal decision. What principally is true of human love, entirely is true of divine. Such is the meaning of God's grace as supernatural— even though current English usage is apt to equate the "supernatural" with the spooky (Lonergan 1971: 13-19).

Finally, the high point of medieval scholastic method was reached in the writings of Aquinas. For over twenty years he wrote and rewrote. On some topics his opinion at the end was much the same as it had been at the beginning. But on others there can be discerned a series of stages. First on one aspect then on another the thought of his predecessors was clarified, adjusted, partially transformed. Eventually a whole set of interlocking issues would be so modified as to constitute a new position. In the end a coherent set of new positions was reached to constitute a new paradigm for inquiring minds (Lonergan 1967, 1971).

As Max Planck has testified and Thomas Kuhn has exemplified, new paradigms provoke resistance. What is true of the twentieth century, also was true of the late thirteenth where the work of Aquinas led to the explosive controversy between Augustinians and Aristotelians. The plaint of the Augustinians at its boldest was that Aquinas used Aristotle as though he were a Father of the Church (Lonergan 1964 49). But if the issue is judged by its results, it would seem to lie in the fact that, while Aquinas appealed ultimately to wisdom, his opponents appealed

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to the notion of science (epistēmē) set forth in the Posterior Analytics.

In the latter work (I, 2) it is said that we think we understand when we know the cause, know that it is the cause, and know that the effect cannot be other than it is. This descriptive account of understanding is immediately transposed into the technical language of Aristotle's scientific syllogism (sullogismos epistēmonikos, sylogismus faciens scire). Such a syllogism reveals a predicate to pertain necessarily to a subject when its premises are "true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further related to them as effect to cause" (McKeon 112).

But how do we acquire knowledge of such premises? Aristotle met this issue in Post. An., II, 19. His conclusion was that knowledge of primary, immediate premises is "neither innate in a determinate form, nor developed from some higher states of knowledge, but from sense-perception. It is like a rout in battle stopped by first one man making a stand and then another, until the original formation has been restored. The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process" (McKeon 185) and such constitution will be by way of intuition (Ibid., 186).

However, the contemporary reader, familiar with the reformulation of Euclidean geometry (Hilbert) and with the invention of n-dimensional geometries of any curvature (Riemann) will feel that in mathematics as in the sciences intuitions ~~yield not certitude but only hypotheses subject to verification and even radical revision.~~ are just insights; they are not intrinsically certain; they may be revised; they admit alternative views. Even Gödel's argument that a formalized deductive system either admits further developments or else is inconsistent or incomplete has been thought to rest its final generalization on an insight.

One should not, I think, leap to the conclusion that Aristotle's position precludes such a view. He distinguished conclusions as science, premises as principles grasped by intellect (nous), but the truth of principles he reached by wisdom (McKeon 1027; Aristotle 1140b31ff.; 1141a7, 17 ff.).

Such is the position in the Nicomachean Ethics. But it is presented in an even more fundamental fashion in the Metaphysics where the importance of wisdom becomes the ground of the importance of philosophy, the love of wisdom. The topic is recurrent in the first four books, but a single sample has to suffice on the present occasion.

It is right also that philosophy should be called knowledge of the truth. For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action... Now we do not know a truth without its cause; and a thing has a quality in a higher degree than other things if, in virtue of it, the similar quality belongs to other things as well... so that which causes derivative truths to be true is most true (for they are not mere sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the being of other things), so that as each thing is in respect of being, so it is in respect of truth. (McKeon 712 f.; Aristotle 99b19-31).

This passage is a source of such once familiar Latin tags as propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis, and sicut est ordo rerum in esse, ita et in veritate. From them follow the Thomist contention that "to know what is meant by being and not being, by whole and part, and the other consequents of the meaning of being (from which are constituted first principles) pertains to wisdom." (Lonergan 1967b: 73, 68).

Now this basic concern with wisdom and with the love of wisdom is not to be expected as the principal motive of the Augustinian-Aristotelian controversy that exploded at the end of the thirteenth century in the Correctoria fratris Thomae and the Correctoria corruptiorum fratris Thomae. Again one misses such concern in the distinction between the potentia Dei absoluta and the potentia Dei ordinata which inquires about divine omnipotence as though it could lack the ordering derived from divine wisdom. It contributes to an understanding of the fourteenth-century breakdown of scholastic method which degenerated first towards skepticism and eventually into decadence. (Congar 1968: 137-143).

Let us conclude this section on the rise and fall of medieval scholasticism with a note on the similarity and the difference of the notions, horizon and wisdom. Horizon is the field of one's interests and knowledge. Wisdom, and more modestly philosophy, has the function of ordering all things and passing judgment on them. Horizon is the more general term; its range may be extended or contracted; its interests may be ruled by self-interest or, to a greater or lesser extent, by values, by what really is worth while. Wisdom regards all that exists to exclude human aberrations, and its judgments are not swayed by "what's in it for me" but endeavor to conform to what truly is of value. The rise and fall of medieval scholasticism was a succession of horizons. The rise culminated, in the judgment of many, in the wisdom of Aquinas. The fall would seem to have been brought about by an initial contentiousness followed by an overmastering concern for the scientia stricte dicta set forth in the greater part of Aristotle's posterior Analytics.

^ to note

It may not be amiss, ^ that such a concern was not dominant in Aquinas' own thinking. His most personal work, I feel, was his Contra Gentiles. It begins with a sequence of chapters on wisdom that justify the plan of the work. There are objects of human knowledge and objects of faith. Some arguments are demonstrations and others are only probable. He proposes to demonstrate what can be demonstrated. He will combine arguments from authority and probable arguments where this is possible, notably in the third book in which he treats the end of man, the vision of God, divine providence, divine law, and the grace of God. Finally, where faith rests only on authority, he attempts to understand how what is revealed might be so, that thereby revelation be shown not necessarily to involve a contradiction. This is the procedure in the fourth book which treats of the Trinity, the Incarnation, original sin, the sacraments, the resurrection of the body, the final state of men and women.

^ in theology

Some Elements in a Transposition to the post-Vatican II Horizon

The second vatican Council was explicitly a pastoral council. At its inception Cardinal Siri of Genoa voiced the opinion that all councils had been pastoral, that the function of councils was to set forth truths revealed by God, and the function of pastors was to transmit conciliar decisions from their pulpits. It was a view that did not prevail, and perhaps the most eloquent exponent of the contrary view was Fr M.-D. Chenu, OP, who objected that the eminent Cardinal was putting the cart before the horse. What comes first is the word of God. The task of the church is announcing the good news, preaching the gospel. That preaching is pastoral. It is the concret reality. From it one may abstract doctrines, and theologians may work the doctrines into conceptual systems. But the doctrines and systems, however valuable and true, are but the skeleton of the original message. A word is the word of a person, but doctrine objectifies and depersonalizes. The word of God comes to Christians through Jesus Christ, the Son of God. The church has to mediate to the world not just a doctrine but the living Christ (Chenu 1964).

Now I feel that Fr. Chenu's position is unanswerable, and in fact I include the pastoral function as the crowning speciality in my Method of Theology. But I would suggest that an outstanding characteristic of the post-vatican II horizon is a certain disregard of doctrinal issues. No doubt, my own déformation professionnelle gives me an excessive sensitivity to such disregard but, at the same time, I am inclined to fancy that not a few among you will feel that the pastoral office would suffer if we simply jettisoned our doctrinal past.

A first issue is secularism. Aquinas sharply distinguished philosophy and theology, but he did not separate them. In fact, the finer points of his philosophic thought have to be dug out of his theological investigations. But the separation of philosophy and theology was brought about very effectively by Descartes with his doctrine of methodic doubt. The one necessary step towards sound philosophy was to doubt everything in the sense of supposing nothing that could be questioned.

Descartes found the indubitable in the fact that he thought and from that fact he felt he could conclude to his existence.

Kant took the matter a step further. His Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason (1793) is secularist. It not only separates philosophy from theology; it denies that there is any need for a being superior to man if man is to recognize his duty and, as well, it denies that there is any need for any motives other than the moral law itself for man to fulfil his duty (Copleston 1960).

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Now from a variety of causes secularism had been gaining ground from the end of the middle ages and one can detect a trace of it in one of the provisional schemata of the first vatican Council. There one can read an anathema against anyone who denied that through created things God's existence could be known with certainty by fallen man (Lonergan 1974). In the final draft the words "by fallen man" were omitted, and common doctrine has it that the council was considering not a question of fact but a question of right, a question that regarded the capacity of human reason as such and not a question that settled the conditions under which this capacity could be actuated.

The significance of the point comes to light when one shifts one's thinking from human nature to the existential human subject, from the conditions of possibility assured by human nature to the conditions of actuality permitted by the aberrations of human history. The former was the viewpoint of vatican I. The latter is the question that becomes uppermost when one turns from abstract human nature to the concrete task of preaching the gospel to all nations. Human nature is capable of wisdom, but mankind in its historical existence is open to the conviction that talk about wisdom is a flight into fantasy. Nor is this true only of our own day. The ancient Stoics were inclined to expound their doctrines in terms of what the wise man would say or do. Their opponents would ask, Where does this wise man live? Will you introduce him to us? And, as I have already contended, we have to be prepared to use Paul Ricoeur's double dialectic, a dialectic of suspicion to eliminate what appears excellent but is fraudulent, and a dialectic of recovery that uncovers what really is excellent underpinning a position that has become deformed.

that

A second point comes out of Voegelin's paper on "Reason: The Classic Experience." Aristotle somewhere asked whether an inquiry should begin from what is first in itself or first for us. He answered that we have to begin from what is first for us, not from the sphericity of the moon which can be deduced from its phases, but from the phases from which the sphericity is deducible. But the Scholastic tradition by and large has been wont to consider "being" first, though "being" is not first for us but first in itself. I think a clarification can be had from Voegelin's contention that Classic philosophy began [^]the pulls and counter-pulls of existential experience. From that base can be developed the love of wisdom that is philosophy. But that base is not explicit but rather tacit knowledge. It becomes explicit only ~~in contemporary intentionality analysis~~ in the practical rules for the discernment of spirits and, theoretically, only in contemporary intentionality analysis. But, now that it is in the open, it supports the view of (1) beginning from a phenomenology of coming to know as a series of acts and [^]using that as a basis for an epistemology that explains why such acts constitute knowledge to conclude [^]with a metaphysics of proportionate being that is critical in the sense that its terms and relations have their empirical counterparts in the [^]terms and [^]relations of cognitional theory.

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A third point is the recognition of the breakdown of the ideal of science expounded in the Posterior Analytics and echoed by Aquinas in such statements as "science is concerned with the universal and the necessary." In fact, modern science is concerned mainly, not with the intelligibility of the necessary, but with the intelligibility of the possible. Science proceeds through hypotheses to more or less probable theories. Again, while natural science aims at theories that are universally valid, it is no less concerned with the further determinations that bring about an ever closer approximation to the concrete, and it reserves a notable role for statistical laws which speak simply of concrete events that are likely to occur.

A fourth point is the recognition of history as a Wissenschaft. I use the German term because it embraces not only physical science but also hermeneutics and history. In English it happens that the word, science, has come to be preempted by physicists,

chemists, biologists, and the like. Since possession is said to be nine points of the law, let us distinguish human studies and human science. Human studies have their basis in hermeneutics and history. Human sciences follow the positivist precept that one reaches a scientific understanding of man only if the same understanding may be applied to robot or at least to a rat.

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Now history, as a department of human studies, made a slow entry into Catholic thought. The first to be received were the church historians. Next came patristic and medieval studies. The last to be welcomed into the fold were biblical scholars who in 1943 in the encyclical Divino afflante Spiritu received a long-denied official recognition.

The reason for these delays and piecemeal recognitions lay in the new notion of critical or scientific history. On the old view history was a matter of distinguishing between credible and incredible testimonies, piecing the credible testimonies into a continuous narrative, and consigning the incredible to the wastebasket or the flames. On the new view history was not a matter of beliefs at all. Its model might be said to be the detective who finds all testimonies to be false and all clues to be planted, seeks the cause of these multiple deceptions, and finds their author to be the criminal. However the point to this model is simply to underscore the point that the historian is not a believer but a highly intelligent investigator. The first part of his investigation is devoted to a detailed study of his sources, of their strengths and weaknesses, of relying on them where he finds them reliable, and relying also on their weaknesses as indirect evidence for the opposite of their views. Only when such critical work is completed, does he attempt to write his narrative; and even then the task of writing will often provide an occasion for revising his critical conclusions.

A fifth and final point is method. The word has two quite different meanings. On the common meaning a method is like the recipes in a cookbook, and its characteristic is that, if one follows the method, then ideally one obtains

always the same results. A recipe for lemon pie yields lemon pies and no one expects it to result in a chocolate cake. But the function of a method in an academic discipline or science is to yield a cumulative series of different and better results. Copernicus' speculation on the celestial orbits led to Tycho Brahe's measurements of the successive positions of the planet, Mars. Galileo's experiments led to the formulation of the law of falling bodies. Newton's generalization yielded a planetary system that accorded with Copernicus' view of the celestial orbits.

Further, just as Aristotle's Posterior Analytics set the mould for all deductivist systems, so method sets the mould for all modern sciences and academic disciplines. They all have their principles, but the principles change, and the change is brought about by the method that earlier had led to the principles.

Again, just as the Aristotelians acknowledged the existence of different subjects and conceived their development as an effort towards a deductivist presentation, so too they subsumed all subjects under the principle subject, metaphysics, which was the science of being as being. In like manner, empirical method as developed in the natural sciences can be expanded into a generalized empirical method that yields an "Ongoing Genesis of Methods" (Lonergan 1976-77) to meet the exigences of different fields of inquiry and, at the same time, calls for interdisciplinary studies that move the many fields towards a unified view.

Such, I believe, is the contemporary situation and it was to help fit theology within that situation that I spent a number of years trying to work out a Method in Theology (Lonergan 1972, 1979). But to elucidate that effort calls for a different occasion.

points
However, I think it a fitting conclusion to this and previous, to quote Irenaeus of Lyons, bishop and martyr, who remarked that facility in discourse does not show greater faith and little ability to speak does not prove that one's faith is less. I thank you.

Notes

1) I quote notes 47 and 48 from Lonergan 1977.

On this topic for a brief account, Sacramentum mundi, II, 89-91. For a fuller treatment, Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique, articles on "Consolation spirituelle" (II, 1617-34), "Démon" (III, 141-238), "Direction spirituelle" (III, 1002-211), "Discernement des esprits" (III, 1222-91).

On the key to discernment in the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, consolation without a previous cause, a notable study recommended with a preface by Karl Rahner is: Harvey D. Egan, S.J., The Spiritual Exercises and the Ignatian Mystical Horizon (St. Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1976).

2) Bibliographies of Landgraf and Lottin on these topics in Lonergan 1971, pp.149 f.

3) For a fuller treatment, Lonergan 1967b, chapter II.

4) Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, I, 10, 3; Harvey I, 94-96.

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