

Question: How do you evaluate David Tracy's *Blessed Rage for Order*? As the discussion group engaged in dialectic, comparing *Method* with *Blessed Rage*, we focused on the difference between changing historical contexts (in your position) and the possibility of changing truth (in the Process position). Is this the crucial difference between you?

Lonergan: Well, it is *a* difference. Whether it is the crucial difference – I'd have to do a thorough study of his position, because there are a lot of things there connected with him – there's an external difference: he teaches a different type of class than I do; I believe the largest religious group at Chicago Divinity are Catholics, but they're only a smaller fraction of the total group. And he has to talk to ... Schubert Ogden, who has been teaching there before, and he taught process philosophy and changed their philosophy, and Tracy has to try to teach theology. So that's one point. But there's a great deal of concern that saying things that can be immediately understood ... and so on, very much on the level of communication and helping people to move into theological positions.

Question: The concluding sentences of Section 4 in the chapter on Foundations, p. 281, are: 'The era dominated by Scholasticism has ended. Catholic theology is being reconstructed.' These sentences were written in the late 1960s or early 1970s. Has the context in which they were written changed significantly? Or are you addressing an historical context much longer than a decade or so?

Lonergan: I'm addressing a historical context much longer. It goes back to the Middle Ages. They started out on a method in the Middle Ages of seeking the coherence of all the elements in Christian tradition and reconciling them with one another, because they didn't all talk the same language. That was the basis of the investigation of sources, the Books of Sentences in which they picked out key statements and divided them up into topics. Peter Lombard's four books of Sentences were divided into distinctions, and each distinction dealt with a set of related topics. And the distinctions weren't finely drawn. The first book, for example, goes back and forth between God as one and God as triune. Thomas straightened that out. But he wrote 100 years later. So the problem is a theology that can include hermeneutics and history, not consider them auxiliary disciplines. The tradition view is that science is one science; it's about God and all things in relation to God. What we do is put history and interpretation right into the theology. It's a thing you have to learn along with your theology. Why? Because in the nineteenth century the notion of history developed enormously. Again, the

notion of science: science ceased to be *de universalibus et necessariis*. Modern science is not that notion at all. That's the notion derived from Aristotle. Modern science gets as much to the concrete as possible. Secondly, it goes by approximations and statistics, and so on, to really reach the concrete, but it wants to be able to reach the concrete. It builds concrete bridges and houses and so on, in all the other senses of concrete besides cement. Further, it's not necessary. It's verified possibility. And you have to solve the critical problem. In other words, you have to justify your metaphysics, reduce it to observable data, and where are the observable data; they're the data of consciousness. It's a generalized empirical method: cognitional theory. Out of cognitional theory, you move to epistemology, and out of epistemology you move to metaphysics. But the fundamental difficulties in contemporary theology are cognitional theory and epistemology. Process theology, like all modern philosophy, has not got a ... notion of ... and judgment. It has more of it than most, but still ... In Kant *Urteilkraft* comes up in the third critique. He was dealing with necessary propositions in the first. They 're not judgments; they're self-evident. He introduces the a priori to make them self-evident. The contingency of Euclidean geometry that is one geometry out of many is unknown in Kant's day. It was discovered in the course of the nineteenth century.

Question: On p. 318 there is this sentence which has troubled members of the discussion group. 'In both Barth and Bultmann, though in different manners, there is revealed the need for intellectual as well as moral and religious conversion.' The sentence occurs with the context of a discussion on the importance of intellectual conversion. But the question arises: is this a judgment on Barth and Bultmann as subjects? Can one distinguish oneself as subject from one's position adopted in Public writings? Do Barth and Bultmann illustrate the lack of religious and moral conversion as well as the lack of intellectual conversion?

Lonergan: The ambiguity is in the 'as well as.' It doesn't mean that there is revealed the need for religious, moral, and intellectual conversion but of intellectual conversion in addition to moral and religious. I made no dispute Barth's or Bultmann's morals or their being religious and what follows on that. The need for intellectual conversion regards them as subjects as well as what they say. Barth is fundamentally a fideist. Insofar as he doesn't want proof or demonstration, I can agree entirely on that, but it can fit into a coherent account of your theology and all other subjects.

'Can one distinguish oneself as subject from one's position adopted in public writings?' Well, it depends on whether you're writing as a relativist or a skeptic or not. If you're writing as a relativist, you're not committing yourself to what you

say, which is one position out of many. 'It seems to me,' 'I'd be inclined to say,' 'Perhaps this is it.' And so on.

'Do Barth and Bultmann illustrate the lack of religious and moral conversion?' Well, not very well, not directly.

With regard to being reconstructed [seems to be a reference back to the second question]: The constructions of the past are being transposed. The fundamental transposition is from the priority of metaphysics to the priority of cognitional theory in the total buildup. Why? Because your metaphysics, if it's first, can't be critical. If it comes out of cognitional theory, then you can justify the structure of your metaphysics by the structure of your knowing, and you find the structure of your knowing in yourself. It's the way your own activity in coming to know is structured.

Question: On p. 320 you suggest that 'human psychology and specifically the refinement of human feelings is the area to be explored in coming to understand the development of Marian doctrines.' Have you in your own work made such an exploration or do you know of another theologian who has followed this suggestion in a way that is compatible with your intent? Would you describe more definitely the 'known unknown' which leads you to make such a suggestion?

Lonergan: 'Have you in your own work made such an exploration?' Well, it's a very brief exploration. The story about Ephesus is that after the doctrine was defined, the people immediately went on to theological conclusions. The second part of the 'Hail Mary' was added then. 'Holy Mother, Mother of God, pray for us sinners, and so on.' They prayed to the Mother of God, Theotokos. If you think of her as the Mother of God, particularly Mother of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, you can go from the relation of the Son to a mother and conclude that perhaps things don't stop with her being the Mother of God. There might be further things. I follow that lead, that psychological lead, to some extent in an article on the Assumption that appeared in *Collection*, p. 75.

Question from audience: On the second to the last page of the chapter, you characterize yourself as a Roman Catholic with quite conservative views on religious and church doctrines. What exactly do you mean by that?

Lonergan: Well, I accept, you know, the Trinity, the Incarnation, grace, the sacraments, and so on. The *Osservatore Romano* carried three article reviews on *Method*, and they liked that! When I put it that way, they say he really means what he says! After all, I published in Latin treatises on the Incarnation and the Trinity in Rome.