

M5B October 4 1979 Q&A on chapter 4 of *Method in Theology*

(This should precede M5A.)

**Question:** Would you comment on the second full paragraph on p. 106? ‘Though not the product of our knowing and choosing, [the love of God] is a conscious dynamic state of love, joy, peace, that manifests itself in acts of kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control.’ And the first statement is indubitable. Since the experienced love of God is grace, it is of course not the product of our knowing and choosing. Second, could you however say more about how our acts of knowing and choosing interact with the love of God to produce such fully human and free acts of kindness, goodness, and so on?

**Lonergan:** Well, one has to distinguish between the change from potency to form, from the blind eye to restored sight – the eye is potency for seeing, and sight is the form by which you can see whenever you open your eyes – and the transition from form to act, from your closed eyes to the act of seeing. You have the sight, but you’re not looking yet. Also you can distinguish between the change from being in sin to being in love, which is from potency to form, and the change from being in love to acts of love, which is the transition the question is about: how does one go about – how our acts of knowing and choosing interact with the love of God to produce such fully human and free acts. In other words, what the question presupposes is that being in love with God is a datum, and it has results only insofar as we advert to it and try to understand what it is and go on to formulate our understanding and then reflect and weigh the evidence whether or not our understanding is correct. And after that we go ahead and use this new experience to elicit acts of love and kindness and so on. But that’s presupposing that God’s gift of his love is something like Schleiermacher’s feeling of total dependence. It’s the datum of religious experience, which as in any case of empirical knowledge provides the base from which you proceed to understanding and to judgment and to decisions. But if this gift of God’s being in love is a form, a habitual grace, it’s like sight, and when the occasion arises, you go into the act. You have your eyes closed, and someone shouts at you, and you look. So it’s the distinction between being in love to acts of love, and on the other hand being in sin to being in love. On being in sin there’s a glorious passage in Evelyn Waugh’s *Brideshead Revisited*. There’s this old Catholic family, and the girl in the family gets into a wrong marriage, and she dilates for two or three pages on the strength of Evelyn Waugh’s style on what it is to be in sin, like she was always in sin, and she had a very radical jerk in her life and needed to get out of it. Her experience of being in sin is what the grace of justification puts an end to. It’s a radical transformation. On the

other hand, when you are in love, there's no deliberating going on, you just go ahead. I think I told the class here before that after I finished theology, and before I did my doctoral studies, I had a year devoted to the renewal of one's spiritual life. I was doing Lenten ministry, and I was at ... in Scotland, and ... was the seat of some Scottish laird whose family at the time of the Reformation had acquired his land from the monastery, and he was converted, and he wanted to have a just title to his land, and he got a compensation from the Holy See. He couldn't pay all the debt that had been accumulating over centuries, so the compensation was that he build a church and a presbytery for a Catholic parish at ... And it was the only church for seven towns around, and it was a coal-mining district. The part of the parish that I worked in was known as Bonnyrigg. It was two miles away, and I went on a bike. There was one case where the mother was a very staunch Catholic and her daughter was quite determined she was going to marry a non-Catholic. And the mother wouldn't tolerate the very thought of that and would put her out of the house and never speak to her again, and so on and so forth – and would I speak to the daughter, since she had done everything and never gotten any results. Well, I did what I could, but no matter what I'd say to her, she'd say, 'Well, I'll ask him.' They were already two in one flesh as far as choosing was concerned. She was not going to listen to anyone without finding out what he'd have to say about it. She no longer had a mind simply of her own. She was in love. There was no need of argument on that score at all. She could coherently ask him and find out what he thought about it, but that's as far as it would go, as far as she was concerned. I give this as an example of what's meant by being in love.

Now (**question resumed**), to what extent must we come to know God's love and choose on the basis of the understanding and judgment of this experience in order to perform such acts?

**Lonergan:** Well, in Thomas you have the habit of quoting Augustine, 'Qui creavit te sine te non iustificabit te sine te.' He who created you without consulting you will not justify you without consulting you. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 113, a. 6, points out that in the same instant there is infused justifying grace, being in love with God, et elicitur actus fidei et poenitentiae, and there is elicited the act of faith and repentance, and there is granted the remission of sin, in that order. They occur simultaneously. But the infusion of grace is what leads to the act of faith and repentance. And the act of faith and repentance leads to the remission of sins. But they occur simultaneously. Once you get the grace to do it, it's like falling off a log. But the act is free. It's not deliberate. There has been deliberation previously. You've been praying to God to get out of this hole. On the preparation for justification: there's the Council of Trent against the Lutherans, the sixth session,

chapter 5, in Denzinger-Schönmetzer – Denzinger was a compiler of conciliar documents in the nineteenth century, and the 32nd edition of 1963 by Herder was edited by Adolphus Schönmetzer, an incredibly learned man who never had to teach a class because he stuttered, so he was able to devote his life to research; he lived with us at the Gregorian – the Council declares that the beginning of justification in adults has its origin from the prevenient grace of God through Christ Jesus, that is, from his vocation, by which they are called not because of any merits they possess – they're sinners – a vocation that those who have been turned away from God by their sins, by his awakening and helping grace are disposed by assenting and cooperating freely to turn themselves, to prepare themselves for justification. It's the process in an adult of preparing for justification, the purpose of a mission, the annual mission in a parish. And when God touches the heart of man by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, man neither does nothing at all of himself nor can he without God's grace move himself by his own free will to accept God's grace. And so it just sets down the two negatives: it's not this, and it's not that. And so in scripture one reads 'Be converted to me, and I will turn to you.' It reminds us of our liberty. And when we answer 'Convert us, Lord, and we will be converted to you,' we confess that God's prevenient grace will bring us to justification. And in Thomas, the infusion of grace is the 'motio moventis,' the movement produced by the mover, the acts of belief and repentance are the movement of the moved, and the reception, the forgiveness of sin, is the result of the movement. And since it's all spiritual, it all occurs in the same instant. Seeing is instantaneous. You have to take time to walk across the room, but it doesn't take time to see across the room, as far as we know; they tell us that it's  $3 \text{ by } 10^5$  kilometers per second that the light travels – that was not part of the Aristotelian analysis of sight. So, the sixth session of the Council of Trent, chapter 5, on preparation for grace. The preparation for grace, the acts of freedom and so on, consist in the gradual process from which successive prevenient graces gradually dispose a person to change his life. I did my dissertation on this topic in Aquinas, Grace and Freedom, and this passage in Aquinas is handled on p. 55, the infused habit as a premotion. I think it was the first time that historical methods were applied to interpreting Thomas on grace. There was a lot of fighting on what he held before that.

**Question resumed:** To put this question in terms of St Ignatius Loyola's consolation without a cause, I'm concerned with the movement from a consolation without an object to the action that has an object.

**Lonergan:** Well, in Aquinas objects are defined in terms of causality. He distinguishes moving objects – color causes sight, sound causes hearing – and

terminal objects. Well, you have immanent objects and terminal objects. The image is an immanent object. The imagination produces what is imagined. Perceiving produces the percept. What you see – really, you look at a tall building, and what you see is what you see in a photograph of it, which ... You'd have to hold your camera at a very skillful angle not to get that effect, or have a special lens. But we see it the way ... rectangular, and then the same for color. For centuries the German College students in Rome wore red cassocks, and everyone saw them as red. But there were all sorts of shades of red depending on the number of times the cassock had been washed. So there was the real color – everyone saw the same real color, red – and the color as seen the way the artist sees things. The artist doesn't see the stereotypes. That's why he gets the new view of things.

So there are moving objects, immanent objects, and terminal objects, reality known through judgment, value realized through right decision. So when Ignatius says 'without a cause,' according to Rahner, he means 'without an object,' and not without an object simply, but without a *known* object. It's a conscious dynamic state, being in love with God. But that doesn't mean that it's known. The unconscious for Jung, for Stekel, for Horney is something that registers in the person's consciousness. They know about it, but they don't know it. It's different from the Freudian unconscious, which emerges only in the dream state as displacement: if you dream of lions that you're not afraid of, it's not really lions that you're dreaming about; and condensation: all sorts of things combined into a single image. St George and the dragon is the image of all the advantages of standing on your feet or being on horseback, up in the light, and the dragon all the disadvantages of falling, and they're all condensed in a single image, very coherently, but they can be condensed by the unconscious without any coherence whatever. You get that in some of Shakespeare's more magnificent passages: condensation of incoherent images. (Example from Macbeth.) So it's conscious. It has an implicit immanent reference because it's without restrictions. It's with my whole heart and whole soul and all my mind and all my strength: *amare Deum super omnia*, love God above all things, so that nothing is ever preferred. It has its own characteristic, and it's because of that characteristic that by reflecting on it one can recognize that it's out of this world. I think it's Ricoeur talking about the parables. Why are they religious? Well, there comes a point in the parable where something that's out of this world turns up, and you know it isn't an ordinary father that he's talking about. The bad son, the man who has inherited and goes off and wastes it, comes home and receives everything. The father's delighted to have him and gives the brushoff to the elder son who has always done just what he was told, and so on. Well, where's this father? Have you met him? You're pulled out of this world ... So you have this being in love. It is conscious, and consciousness is

not enough to constitute knowledge. For it to constitute knowledge, one has to advert to its unrestricted character, understand that unrestricted love is for unrestricted perfection, conclude that being in love unrestrictedly is love of God, and that's a whole process. But it isn't that process that's part of justification. Justification is the infusion of the form that brings about the transformation of one's life. It can occur instantaneously, as in the conversion of St Paul, and it can be dragged out over years. There's been a long preparation for it. One gradually loses this attachment and that and the other one. What gives rise to charity, joy, peace, gentleness, kindness, and so on (Galatians 5.22) is the infusion of the form. It's like the transition from blindness to sight, the infusion, and the consequent acts are the spontaneity of being able to see. And it's a change of will. Operative grace – my study was on 'gratia operans' – what occurs in *gratia operans* is God changing your willingness. In other words, you mustn't conceive liberty as standing in a perfect and perpetual equilibrium like the scale with nothing on it and you have to make a decision and ... You have to think of the scale as gone wonky. And that's what has to be straightened out. The need for grace is a defect of liberty. The need for grace is moral impotence. It's an incapacity to do what is right. To be virtuous, a man must possess wisdom and virtue. But how does he get them without yet having acquired wisdom and virtue?

**Question from audience:** You mentioned some time back the *De veritate*, where St Thomas precisely on this question switches his mind. In other words, he begins with the idea of moral impotence.

**Lonergan:** In the *Sentences* he argues against moral impotence. He says, 'If he's free, he can do it. You're denying liberty. If you say he can do it for a short time but not for a long time, well, if he does it for a short time, he's that much stronger. And if he can do it for another short while, he'll be still stronger. And so he can work his way out of it.' And so on and so forth: he has lots of arguments on it. In *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 12, he changes his mind.

**Question from audience:** In terms of horizons, you speak of being in love as belonging to a fifth level of consciousness. [**Lonergan:** Yes.] In 'Horizons and Transpositions' you mention not only the four levels but also a vertical drive from undifferentiated eros to agapē. Could you relate this a bit to what we've just been talking about?

**Lonergan:** Well, the eros there is the unconscious, the source of desire and fear. And that is what has a finality, a vertical finality, so that your sensations become percepts, and your percepts give rise to questions, and the questions give rise to

insights, and in your efforts at formulation the unconscious will shoot up something that doesn't agree with that formulation, and you'll correct it. And you go on to make a judgment, and you're inclined to think it's this, but contrary instances will occur to you. And suddenly you say, 'Well, let's not rush it. It's a serious matter' ... Our imaginations express the thrust, the upward thrust, from the unconscious to the love of God. It's a vertical finality.

**Same questioner:** Is this a movement upwards towards love, from the human point of view, or – what I'm trying to relate is being in love at the fourth and fifth levels

**Lonergan:** Well, it's emergent probability: 'disposita materia elicitur forma.' When matter is disposed, you can get the higher form. The hierarchy theory in modern thought – Pattee, *Hierarchy Theory*, published by Braziller, New York about 1973 – in the article by Pattee (he's the editor, but there's one chapter he himself wrote) the problem is, What goes on in the cell? Everything that's chemical is going in accord with all the laws of chemistry. But all the laws of chemistry put together don't get to the existence of the cell and the functioning of the cell. How do you effect the transition from these chemicals to the cell? Pattee's theory is, by introducing a constraint. You don't get the laws of chemistry functioning freely. Statistical laws begin to emerge. And if you get the exactly right constraint, you'll get the material disposition for those to come in a cell. And anything in evolution is that sort of thing, emergent probability, *Insight* chapter 4. In chapters 2 and 3 we did classical and statistical laws. Well, what sort of a universe is there in which you have both kinds of laws, classical and statistical? Well, the thing about classical laws is that they hold, other things being equal. Heavy objects fall, sure, provided nothing prevents them from doing so. This table is heavy enough, and we're all heavy enough, but we don't fall. Something prevents us from falling, the chairs, the floor. Well, how often does it happen that the law operates, and how often does it happen that it doesn't? All that's statistical. The law of the lever tells you how the lever works. But statistics will tell you how often levers work. Insurance companies want to know just how often they won't work.

**Question (same questioner):** Is the *agapē* in this vertical process identical with the grace?

**Lonergan:** Yes. It is grace. Human perfection is not humanistic. It's not man by himself, on his own. That was fought out with the Pelagians in the fifth century. The Pelagians held a series of positions: man doesn't need grace; or if you say he needs grace, well the grace is the law; and if you say it isn't just the law, well God

gives you good will, but virtue is a matter of good performance, and that depends on your liberty; and so on. Augustine's doctrine on *gratia operans* – it wasn't on *gratia operans* but on *Deus operatur* and *Deus cooperatur*, God operates that we will the good, and he cooperates that we perform the good. So both come from God ... And Anselm in his *De gratia et libero arbitrio* said once there were men so wicked as to deny the existence of God's grace, but today the problem is that people can't understand how we can have liberty. It was a problem that Anselm didn't solve. He solved it verbally, so to speak, trying to find a solution in Augustine that wasn't there: sometimes we're free from sin and at other times we're free from justice; it's by God's grace that we're free from sin, and it's by sin that we're free from justice. That sort of alternative ... dialectical debate, wasn't solving the problem. It's a big question.

**Question:** Is there an experiential grounding of grace as above nature, revelation above reason, and so on?

**Lonergan:** Well, it's faith that's above reason, charity above good will, merit before God above the good opinion of your neighbor, your neighbor's good opinion of you. Is there an experiential grounding for this? Well, 'experiential' means either grounded in knowledge, especially the commonsense knowledge of 'the man of experience' as opposed to the learned man or the scientist lost in the clouds so that nobody can understand what on earth he's saying – that's one meaning of 'experiential' – it can also be taken to mean, as it is taken in *Insight* and *Method in Theology*, as pertaining to the data, to what is given to sense or given to consciousness. Now the 'above' in 'grace is above nature' and so on is not commonsense knowledge. Common sense doesn't know what is meant by nature and what is meant by grace, and while it knows that a man's head is above his feet while he's standing, still that isn't the sense in which 'above' is used. 'Above' may denote a spatial relationship on the analogy of the fact that when a man stands his head is above his feet, but metaphorically it means any instance of the relation of subsuming to subsumed. That is, two elements are distinguished: the subsuming is one order, and the subsumed is the other order. The subsuming goes beyond the subsumed. Questions for intelligence go beyond the data of consciousness or the data of sense, preserves it – it doesn't interfere with the data at all; intelligence increases your attention to the data; it invents all sorts of words so that you can name all different aspects of the data, so that scientific observation, so far from being a simple matter of opening your eyes, is something that takes a good long time to learn. My brother went into engineering, and he said, 'You may think you can draw a straight line but get on a drawing board – So, preserves it, reorganizes it – becoming a scientist or becoming a historian, and so on, reorganizes your perceptions; you notice all sorts

of things that otherwise you wouldn't notice and wouldn't be able to talk about; directs it to the end of the sublating, to the finality of the sublating, and includes it within a larger whole. This relation of sublating to sublated is found in the relations of intellectual activity to sensible activity, of reflection and judgment to intellectual activity, of deliberation, decision, and action to cognitional activity, and of God's gift of his grace and all that follows from it to all that precedes. So that's what 'above' means. It's the relation of sublating to sublated. What is nature? Nature is a heuristic notion. The nature of  $x$  is what you would know if you understood  $x$ . The nature of electricity is what you would know if you understood what electricity is. The nature of life is what you would know if you understood what life is, and so on indefinitely. It's a heuristic notion. It arises whenever you ask the question 'What is it?' and use that question as a tool for arriving at answers. It's insofar as you're asking these questions that you have a tool; you're finding out the answer if you know what you're looking for. 'Natural' means what pertains to the constitution of  $x$  or follows from the constitution of  $x$  or is due to, demanded by, the constitution of  $x$ . It pertains to the constitution of  $x$ , to the constitution of man, body and soul, and so on; or what follows from the constitution of man, his activities, corporal, biological, sensitive, intellectual, judicial, moral, religious; or what is due to, demanded by the constitution of  $x$ : you have to have a whole lot of conditions fulfilled, you have to have a human ecology if you're going to live a human life; if you haven't got a human ecology, well that's what happens when the cosmonaut ship goes to pieces; if you no longer have a human ecology, you're caput!

So the nature of the data of consciousness is constituted by the four levels of experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding. It makes possible human self-transcendence, what follows from it, namely, awareness of self and others, understanding them in their intelligible relationships, affirming such understanding to be correct, deciding that self-transcendence *is* the human good, chapter 2. It's a relatively concrete, specific answer to the question 'What is the good?' The Aristotelian definition, 'The good is what everything seeks,' is a little too general. And thirdly, it creates an exigence, a demand, sets up something that is due for human self-transcendence insofar as this lies within the proportionate capacity of conscious human activity. It is proportionate to active human power. 'Above human nature' is what is beyond the proportion of active human power, though not necessarily beyond the proportion of receptive human power, known as obediencial potency if you've read Karl Rahner. The moon can be the agent of reflecting the sun's light. That's natural to the moon. It's within its proportionate power. Its matter can be receptive to becoming the matter informed by a human soul. But that is its receptive power. Our capacity for divine grace is not an active power but a



receptive power. One has experiential grounding of the sublation of man's natural powers of self-transcendence by the gift of the Holy Spirit flooding our hearts with God's love, inasmuch as one is conscious of the limitations of one's native powers of self-transcendence and of the difference made by God's grace. The experiential grounding is in each person, in which the two terms under comparison are both there. You find it in yourself provided it's there to be found. God may put it there; I don't; just as the teacher never makes people understand; he just makes signs: perceptible signs with his hands, and all the expressions of the whole use of language. But they're all just signs. There's an emergent probability that understanding will arise, and as in all matters of probability, the probability increases according to the number of instances and the length of time available. So as Napoleon said, 'Repetition is the strongest of the figures of speech.' I'm quoting him saying that from a remark made by Charles Boyer, who was reviewing a book by Garrigou-Lagrange, which was about the fifth book Garrigou had written on the same subject. He said, 'Now there's no need for me to say what Garrigou-Lagrange does in this book, for as Napoleon so well put it, 'Repetition is the strongest of the figures of speech.'

**Question:** Why does it reflect a naive realism to speak of projecting, for example, projecting religious experience into what is external, spatial, specific, and so on, in the context of the hierophanies and the earlier stages of human development?

**Lonergan:** For the naive realist, knowledge is understood on the analogy of ocular vision, and so the real is the valid part of the already out there now. The rest is mere imagination. If you make a mistake, they say you're imagining that. Nonetheless, the naive realist does not invalidate the intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility of his own activities. He hasn't got ocular vision backing him up when he understands something somehow, and says it's as plain as the nose on your face, and all the rest of it. But it isn't plain in that sense. He's neither stupid nor silly nor amoral. If he attempts to validate such activities, he will speak of a 'spiritual eye' that apprehends such realities or their ground in the already out there now. You see the particular, but intellect sees the universal. And his adversaries, who are no more philosophic than he is, will claim that he projects these qualities upon the already out there now. So naive realism is a false presupposition, and saying that things are projected is taking him at his word.

**Question:** Manfred Frings writes of Max Scheler, 'He intends to go beyond Kant in a similar sense as Kant went beyond Aristotle, when with an unmistakable argumentation he rejected teleological ethics, i.e., all ethics of goods and purposes ... Scheler's nonformal ethics of values presupposes Kant's refutation of all ethics

of goods and purposes.’ This is Frings in his book on Max Scheler, p. 105. And at the end, well, I speak about ends and so on, does this mean that you follow Aristotle here rather than Kant or Scheler? Would you clarify the issue of teleology in Aristotle, Kant, Scheler, your own position?

**Lonergan:** Well, let’s begin with Kant. No, let’s begin with mechanist determinism, an extrascientific philosophy held by scientists to the effect that reality is matter in motion, and the motions are governed by Newtonian mechanics, the necessary laws, immutable laws, of Newtonian mechanics. Mechanist determinism was very quietly dropped from the successful attacks of Einstein’s relativity and quantum theory. The deterministic part went out with quantum theory, which was fundamentally statistical, and the mechanist part – well, electrical theory, but Einstein was the generalization getting the same invariants into electromagnetics as was had in Newtonian mechanics ... Now mechanist determinism conceived causes and effects as prior and posterior in time: the cause first, and then the effect. The effect is not prior to the cause; that’s true. But the cause is a cause at the same time that the effect is being produced, and not before. And still worse were final causes. That’s the future causing the present, exerting a pull on the present, which is ridiculous.

Now Kant wanted to give the same solid foundation to ethics that he’s given to Newtonian mechanics. And so he proclaimed a formal ethics in which the a priori premise of all genuine moral principles was, ‘So act that the maxim governing your action can be made the universal rule valid in all human action.’ So his principle is a premise or a precept, and that’s the principle of all purely formal ethics. It’s a deductivist’s world, putting morality on the firm basis of deductions from precepts. That’s purely formal morality, and against that Scheler proceeded. He wanted a material ethics of value. It arose with hermeneutic phenomenology. Scheler and Heidegger were related in general characteristics of their work, and Heidegger had considerable praise for Scheler. Scheler died before Heidegger got beyond his initial phase of *Sein und Zeit*. Frings is concerned to use Scheler to complete Heidegger on *Dasein*, to bring in the person and the values of the person. And it’s ontology. Principles can be logical or ontological. A principle is first in an ordered set, and the set may be logical, as the genera and species in Porphyry’s tree, or for deductivists, from premises to conclusions. Or it can be ontological, and the ontology can be hermeneutic phenomenology. That’s what Scheler gives us. So the hermeneutic phenomenology is something quite different from Aristotle. Aristotle made judgments. Phenomenologists are bottled up in their inability to make a judgment. Heidegger had to off to poetry ... from Kant on. So Scheler found values in his hermeneutic of the human person, which he conceived as an a priori of the

ethical. So he found an a priori. Kant found an a priori in a precept. Scheler found one in a phenomenology of the person. Aristotle was empirical. He tells us the facts. For him virtue is in the mean. And where is the mean? It's where the virtuous man puts it. So unless you already have virtuous men, you haven't got an ethics. His ethics exists inasmuch as virtuous men exist. People know well enough what he's talking about.

When Pius XI published 'Casti Conubii,' Will Rogers was credited with the comment, 'At least you know what he means!' Well, people know what Aristotle meant by that.

Now, Aristotle places the end of human acts in what he calls *eudaimonia*, eudemonism. This can be misrepresented as the lowest level in Kohlberg's stages of moral growth, the stage of the child, what I want and what I don't want. And the second stage is the stage of law.

[Tape shifts to M5A, Lonergan is back to Aristotle.]

He said, 'Not in the vulgar notion of loving yourself' in the sense of a selfish person. But he argued in favor of self-love on the grounds that it is self-love to will for oneself the finest things in the world. And the finest things in the world are wisdom and virtue. And without wisdom and virtue you can't be a friend to yourself or to anybody else. And one can add to that the comment – I think I came across it in ... – that it's bad to have Voltaire for an enemy, but it's worth to have Rousseau as a friend. If you lack wisdom and virtue, you can't be much of a friend to anybody.

My own position is a matter of learning everything I can from everybody I read and trying to put them together. The people that helped me a lot are Plato, Aristotle, Augustine (especially his early dialogues at Cassiacum when he was under the influence of the Platonici), and then, when I was studying theology at Rome, there was a Greek, an Athenian who had entered the Sicilian Province of the Society and had done his philosophy at Louvain, at a time when in the Jesuit scholasticate Maréchal taught psychology and the other professors taught Maréchal. I picked up Maréchal from him and learned about the discursive nature of human knowledge, that you know, not by taking a look but by making right judgments. And so on. I put things together. And then from Thomas – I did my dissertation on Thomas, and I did another thing on the *verbum* that restored elegance to the Thomist account of intellect. It had been taken over by the Scotist theory, where intellect intuit concepts, intellect is a sort of sausage machine where

the sensible object makes an impress on the intellect, and this impress becomes expressed, and that's the concept; and when you get several concepts, you start comparing them, and when you see that they fit together intelligence emerges; that's intelligence. And that's just the opposite of Aristotle and Thomas, where first there's the phantasm, and then you grasp the species *in* the phantasm, but you also receive the species in another sense on your intellect, which is the place of intellectual memory; and you express that in a definition, and that's the *verbum*. That's one *verbum*; he has two *verba*. The concept, the definition, is one; and the judgment is another. And he has a third, the *verbum spirans amorem*. The Logos that proceeds from the Father is *Verbum spirans Amorem*, from which proceeds the Holy Ghost, spirated love. And that's that.

(Proceeds now to lecture.)