

Questions for October 4

- 1.) Would you comment on the second full paragraph on page 106?
It reads:

Though not the product of our knowing and choosing it,
the love of God is a conscious dynamic state of love,
joy, peace, that manifests itself in acts of kindness,
goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control (Gal. 5:22)

Since the experienced love of God is grace, it is, of course,
not the product of our knowing and choosing. Could you, however,
say more about how our acts of knowing and choosing interact
with the love of God to produce such fully human and free acts as
kindness, goodness, etc.? To what extent must we come to know
God's love and choose on the basis of the understanding and
judgement of this experience in order to perform such acts? To
put this question in terms of St. Ignatius Loyola's consolation
without a cause, I am concerned about the movement from a
consolation without an object to the action that has an object.
Can one properly move spontaneously from the experience of God's
love to the action? Or is a process of reflection on the experience
and on one's life situation important before one can truly make
free acts based on the experience?

- 2.) Is there an experiential grounding of the notion that grace is
"above" nature, revelation "above" reason, and so on?
- 3.) Why does it reflect a naive realism to speak of projecting-
for example, "projecting" religious experience onto what is
external, spatial, specific, etc.?
- 4.) Manfred Frings writes of Max Scheler: "he intends to go beyond
Kant, in a similar sense as Kant went beyond Aristotle when he
with un-mistakable argumentation rejected teleological ethics,
i.e. all ethics of goods and purposes (Güter und Zweckethik).
Scheler's non-formal ethics of values presupposes Kant's
refutation of all ethics of goods and purposes." (Max Scheler, p.105)

Scheler has influenced your discussion of the human good.
(cf. p.33,n.4; p.40,n.12) But in your discussion of the structure
of the human good, you speak of "ends" and more particularly of
terminal values chosen by authentic subjects.

Does this mean that you follow Aristotle here rather than Kant
or Scheler? Would you clarify the issue of teleology in:

- a.) Aristotle
- b.) Kant
- c.) Scheler
- d.) your own position?

1. a "Since the experienced love of God is grace....

b "Could you however....

Distinguish:

change from potency to form (habit): blind eye to restored sight
change from form to act: from sight to seeing

change from "being-in-love" to acts of love: Dalmeith, I'll ask him
change from "being-in-sin" to "being in love": Evelyn Waugh, Bridesh

c "To what extent....

Augustine: "qui cravit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te"^s

Aquinas: in eodem instante et infunditur gratia iustificans,
et elicitur actus fidei et paenitentiae, et habetur remissio
peccatorum: sum theol 1-2 113 6 Grace et freedom pp 55 ff.

Distinguish Schleiermacher: exper^pience of total dependence
is the empirical basis of religious living: awareness, understanding,
judgment, decision, living

On the other hand, Aquinas: justification occurs inasmuch as

habitual/

a) the motio moventis is the infusion of/santifying grace

b) the motus mobilis ~~is~~ consists in consequent acts of faith
and repentance

c) the perventio in finem is the remission of sins

d .. concerned about the movemnet from an action without an
object to an action with an object

In Aquinas objects are defined in terms of causality:

there are moving objects, color causes sight, sound hearing, etc.

there are immant objects: image is object of imagination,
percept of perceiving, concept of conceiving, truth of judging

there are terminal objects: realityknown through true judgment,
value realized through right decision

Rahner's interpretation of Ignatius is that "without a cause"
~~xxxxx~~ does not mean "unxcaused" but "without a known cause"

I. e., "being-in-love" is conscious, but consciousness is
not enough to consitut~~e~~ knowledge; one has to advert to its
unrestricted character, understand that unxrestricted love is
for unresptrictd perfection, conclude that "being-in-love without
restriction" is love of God.

But this process is not prior but subsequent to the fact
that "being-in-love without restriction" gives rise to Xtian
charity joy peace kindness gentleness etc

x Preparation for justification: DS 1525.

.en

2 "Experiential" may mean

- a grounded in knowledge (especially commonsense knowledge)
eg "man of experience" as opposed to "learned" "scientific"
- b pertaining to the data, to what is given to sense, or given to consciousness

"Above" may denote

- a a spatial relationship on the analogy of the fact that when a man stands his head is "above" his feet
- b metaphorically, "any instance of "sublating to sublated" ie two orders of elements are distinguished where the sublating goes beyond the sublated, preserves it, reorganizes it, directs it to the sublating end or finality, includes it within a larger whole

"Nature" is a heurikstic notion: the "nature" of x is what you would know if you understood x

"Natural" means what pertains

- a to the constitution of x, or follows
- b from the constitution of x, or is due to, demanded by,
- c the constitution of x

The "nature" of the data of consciousness

- a is constituted by the four levels of exper. underst. judg. decid
- b makes possible human self-transcendence

awareness of self and others

understanding of them in their intelligible relationships

affirming such understanding to be correct

~~judging~~ deciding that self-transcendence is the human good

- c creates an exigence for human self-transcendence in so far as this lies within the proportionate capacity of conscious human activity

so is proportionate to active human power

Above human nature is whatever is beyond the proportion of active human power though not necessarily beyond the proportion of receptive human power.

The moon can be the agent of reflecting the sun's light but its matter can be receptive of becoming the matter informed by a human soul.

One has experiential grounding of the sublation of man's natural powers of self-transcendence by the gift of the Holy Spirit flooding our hearts with God's love, inasmuch as one is conscious of the limitations of one's native power of self-transcendence of the difference made by god's grace

3 For the naive realist, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ knowledge is understood on the analogy of ocular vision and so the real is the valid part of the "already out there now"

None the less the naive realist does not invalidate the intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility of his own activities: he is neither stupidⁿ or sillyⁿ or ~~xxx~~ amoral.

If he attempts to validate such activities, he will speak of a spiritual eye that apprehends such realities or their ground in the "already out there now" (traditional Scholasticism)

And his adversaries who are no more philosophic than he is, will claim that he projects these qualities upon ~~2~~ "the already out there now."

4 A principle is a first in an ordered set

Ordered sets may be logical such as Porphyry's tree of genera and differences or deductivist chains from first premisses to ultimate conclusions.

Ordered sets may be ontological and the ontology may be of the reality manifested by true judgments or again of the part of reality manifested by hermeneutic phenomenology.

~~Kantianism~~

The mechanist determinism that interpreted Newtonian mechanics in a manner satisfactory to materialists suffered from the delusion that the notion of final cause is absurd because it conceives such a cause as a future reality exerting a pull on the present.

Mechanist determinism, an extra-scientific philosophy, assumed that causes and effects were related as prior and posterior in time. Final causes violated this rule and so were ridiculed out of existence.

Kant (Copleston, VI, 2, pp 101 ff) proclaimed a formal ethics in which the a priori premise of all genuine moral principles was: So act that the maxim governing your action can be made the universal rule valid in all human action.

phenomeno/

Scheler found worth, value, in his hermeneutic/~~an~~alogy of the human person which he conceived as an a priori of the ethical.

Aristotle was empirical: for him virtue is in the mean, and the mean is where it is placed by the virtuous man; his ethics exists inasmuch as ethical men exist.

QQ Oct 4, 1979

4

Aristotle's end in human action is eudaimonia

It is misrepresented as the lowest level in Kohlberg's stages in moral growth

It includes philia, friendship, and Aristotle argued in favor of self-love on the ground that it is self-love to will for oneself the finest things in the world, wisdom and virtue, and without them one can be a genuine friend neither to oneself or to anyone else.

Cf. It is bad to have Voltaire for an enemy but worse to have Rousseau for a friend. Lanson, Hist litt française.

Question #1 on memo sheet - J.A.

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Questions 2 & 3 on mimeo sheet - J.P.

QUESTIONS for Method in Theology

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Jon PARSONS

Question #4 on mimeo sheet

Manfred Frings writes of Max Scheler: "he intends to go beyond Kant, in a similar sense as Kant went beyond Aristotle when he with unmistakable argumentation rejected teleological ethics, i.e. all ethics of goods and purposes (Güter und Zweckethik). Scheler's non-formal ethics of values presupposes Kant's refutation of all ethics of goods and purposes." (Max Scheler, p.105)

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