

2960ADTE070, transcription of 29600A0E070. The transcript treats only the Q&A part of the recording. After the questions have been treated, Lonergan begins lecturing on chapter 3 of *Method*. That part of the recording has not been transcribed here.

The questions, as with the 2959ADTE060, are from 20 September 2011. They may be found in their complete form in 29600DTE070.

Question: (Picks up from 2959ADTE060.) On page 10 of *Method* it is said that ‘But as reflectively and critically conscious, the subject incarnates detachment and disinterestedness, gives himself over to criteria of truth and certitude, makes his sole concern the determination of what is or is not so ...’ In another context you say that ‘this possibility and exigence become effective only through development.’ What do you see as the conditions, psychological or otherwise, that render this achievement of making what is or is not so one’s sole concern possible?

Lonergan: Well, you find out by doing it, and when you don’t succeed you inquire what went wrong. You are the criterion. You possess the rationality. You don’t have to be told to pay attention to the evidence; you pay attention to the evidence, though you may not do so in the expert fashion that scientific interest and so on may bring you to.

Question: On page 32 you state that ‘Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise.’ I am concerned with elucidating the meaning of the phrase ‘as originator of values in himself.’ What does this mean? Is there such a thing as immanently generated values, and if not, what is the meaning of ‘originator’? Are not value formations subject to the same social dynamic as belief formation? Do we not select from ‘a common fund of tested’ values? The context of the passage seems to deal with culture as a matrix for meaning and value, but the relation is clearly not as simple as culture offering and man selecting. Culture conditions man’s selecting. It seems important to view the idea of the originating of value in the perspective of vertical liberty, the selection of an existential stance and the corresponding horizon; but still, that selection too is not completely the work of the subject. What then does the term ‘originator’ mean? [This is the question as submitted in writing. Lonergan did not read the whole question.]

Lonergan: The meaning is the same as responsibility. Man doesn’t create the world in which he lives or the city in which he lives or the people with whom he

lives. And so on and so forth. There are all sorts of things that are beyond his control. And there are lots of things about himself that are beyond his control, that he didn't have any say about. But there are things for which he is responsible. And he can be very conscious that he's responsible. 'I don't care what you say to what I'm doing or what I'm not doing ...' It's awareness of that responsibility, in judgment. One finds in oneself what ... And unless one finds it, one won't know. One will not have a real apprehension of it. One may have a notional apprehension of it. One may repeat the words. But the foundations of method are not in repeating words. Then it is operational when you're practicing method. But it's also operational when you're learning method. You're learning who you are and what you do. You're learning something about the operator and what it is to be an originator of values. And I think that takes us through that. [RD: There are more points made here in L's written notes, found at 29600DTE070.]

L. asks 'Are there any further questions on chapter 2?'

Question: On p. 21, could you distinguish more clearly for me between the critical function of method and the dialectical function? The descriptions are pretty close, and I wasn't sure.

Lonergan: The critical function is the scandal that philosophers disagree. The dialectical function goes about solving the critical problem. It picks out oppositions and reduces the oppositions to their sources. Dialectic in chapter 10.

Questioner: So the critical function recognizes the existence ...

Lonergan: and is scandalized. All the other sciences come to agreement, not right away but in time. Every big jump forward in science is terrifically difficult at the start. Kuhn's account of the structure of scientific revolutions: some oddball comes out with a new theory, and everyone smiles. And a few more oddballs join him, and a few more. (Goes through the Max Planck story again. Then: and if that happens in physics, what can you expect in theology?)

Question: Towards the bottom of p. 29, you're talking about mystical experience, and you mention that 'he drops the constructs of culture and whole complicated mass of mediating operations to return to a new, mediated immediacy ...' You mention this again on p. 77. What is this mediation? I notice on p. 77 you talk about the mediation of the one who objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method. Could you explain a little bit more what ...

Lonergan: Well, mediation – what you touch, what you see, what you hear is immediate. But your operations can be mediated by images. You can talk about the Boston Common even though you're out at Boston College. And you can talk about it very intelligently. You know the streets and so on. That's all mediated. Now, our knowledge of God is mediated. It may be mediated from internal experience. It may be mediated from philosophic argument. But there is a stage of prayer in which you're not using any other things, and that's what I'm talking about there. And what it is, well, you've been doing prayer for some time and you may find out – but there's no guarantee, of course.

Question: But it seems to be just immediate. Why do you use the word 'mediated'?

Lonergan: Oh, I see. Well, as a matter of fact you're in love. And being in love is with some *one*. But you know the some one through your being in love. And insofar as that takes you forward totally, your ultimate concern is all you've got. All cultural constructs become irrelevant ... There's a lot of literature on this. There's a course on it. Harvey Egan ... I can't give a course on this.

Question: This ties in with something you said last week about sublation. Mystical level. This question occurs in line with tacit knowledge. You mention in your paper 'Horizons and Transpositions' – you refer to Voegelin and Wilson on interpreting the god above all gods in Egyptian mythology. You mention there the difference of interpretation was a matter of pre-metaphysical and post-metaphysical tacit knowledge.

Lonergan: To raise questions of reality in any exact manner is doing metaphysics, whether you know it or not. But the questions can be raised before anyone knows anything about metaphysics. To say that the Egyptians had no distinctions between gods and men means that they didn't advert to the significance of comparative negative judgment. What is a real distinction? Well, there's been a long dispute among Scholastic theologians and philosophers whether there is a real distinction between essence and existence. And if you think that the real is what's already out there now, there can't be. And if you think there's a real distinction between *A* and *B* when the reality of *A* is not the reality of *B*, there is a real distinction. It depends on what you mean by reality. Tertullian holds that the Son is the same God as the Father because he's not separated. Athanasius held that the Son is distinct from the Father because he's Son and not Father, and the Father is Father and not Son. He was doing comparative judgments, negative judgments. To go from one to the other is solving the critical problem. It's the root of all the differences. And the

root of that is that we live in a real world before we learn to talk, and the criterion of reality that we have before we learn to talk has a profound influence on what we mean when we *do* talk. And when we come to do philosophy, we wonder what on earth people are asking about ...

Question: In terms of sublation, take a mystic like Thomas Aquinas. He had mystical experiences of God, and yet at the same time he had this pure desire to know in the sense of human knowledge. He followed the stages, and when he reached the upper stage, the highest level, the two knowledges would not come together. There would be a gap.

Lonergan: Well, it depends. They may or they may not. St Teresa was split. She'd be in an ecstasy and doing business ... not missing a trick.

Question: One step backwards. You said that even when you're speaking from the fourth level of consciousness about God as that with whom we are in love in an unrestricted way, that's still a mediated reality.

Lonergan: God is not ... in other words, you're not having the beatific vision.

Questioner: OK. If you take 'The Form of Inference' and chapter 19 of *Insight*, where the proof goes according to the inference 'If A, the B, But A ...' When you were speaking earlier in this section about proofs and you're expanding that from just the intelligibility of the world, which is what chapter 19 concentrates on, to intelligibility, truth, and morality, am I right that even with that expansion, when you're talking about knowledge of God in the technical sense of knowledge as in *Insight*, you're still talking about an inference in some way.

Lonergan: No, I don't mean an inference; I don't mean an inference. (Questioner: All right.) But to *know* that it's God that you're in love with, you are using some sort of inference. Or you're believing someone who tells you that's what it is. The importance of the spiritual director, in other words. You can say that it's tacit knowledge, eh? ...

Question: On p. 50, you mention that a good of order which is truly good – Is there a good of order which is not truly good?

Lonergan: Well, some people would say that the Gulags in Russia are not truly good. Or some would say that capitalism is not a good order, or that capitalism as understood at the present time is not very good, and most economists would agree.

I was in contact with economists at MIT in 1972, and like the economists here, they don't know what to do about it. The good of order is what Plato was trying to say in the Republic.

Starts to lecture on chapter 3, about 19:50 into the recording. Confirms Buytendijk as source of phenomenology of the smile. Indicates Collingwood's *Principles of Art* is 'superior to Langer' on aesthetic experience (not on work of art). And Gadamer on play.