WHAT IS LEVI-STRAUSS UP TO?

Claude Levi-Strauss has the distinction of bringing together
modern anthropology and modern linguistic analysis. First,
then something musxt be said about modern anthropology. Secondly,
something must be added about linguistic analysis. Thirdly,
an acoount must be given of the transfer of linguistic tech-
xixx niques to anthropological study, of the insights that
arise from this transfer, of Levi-Strauss's views on human
science and on structure. A final word will bear on the
existence of the object of struxcturalist study.

Modern Anthropology

In this section I depend on an article written for the
French review, Etudes, in 1967 (pp. 163-169) by Louis Millet.

Arion
Boston University
New Series 3/4
November 1978
Cyrus Hamlin
The Limits of Understanding:
Hermeneetics and the Study of Literature

Louis Millet

In the decade, 1910-1920, knowledge of human customs took
a new turn. During that period Bronislaw Kasper Malinowski
(1884-1942), professor at the University of London, introduced
empirical method into the study analysis of cultures. He
went to study on the spot, among others, the Melanesians.
He showed the originality of their culture, which forms a
coherent whole, a system of beliefs and actions. Thus, the
circlet of KOULA, in which a necklace of shells received
from a different island was to be transmitted to still further
islands along a determinate route that governed these religious
and gratuitous rites. But with the circulation of ceremonial
objects there were associated trade and alliances and the like.

In 1928 Margaret Mead published a study on adolescence
on the isle of Samoa. From it emerged the conclusion that
adolescence gave rise to a crisis, not as had been thought,
because it was psychologically natural and even tied in
with physiological needs, but because of the social situation
that does not recognize adolescence as a distinct stage inter-
mediate between that that of the child and that of the adult;
for when the transition from the child to the adult is not
marked by some rite of initiation, it will not be apprehended
concretely and so will give rise to a crisis.

In the period between the two world wars, American
anthropologists showed by cumulative observations that
personality was modeled on cultural forms, with different
personalities endemic in different cultures. The first
works on linguistics, during the same period, showed
that each language is a particular system of pure differences,
a totality of signs in which it is the whole thexuxuxingxufx
uxnhxnfxthnxpuxtnx that endows with meaning each of the
parts. Again, to speak a language is to utter a series of
phunumux sounds named phonemes. Their number, in any given
language, is a special selection out of vast extent of
the sounds man can utter. So it is that a child in learning
its mother tongue loses the ability it previously had
to pronounce any of the sounds belonging to other languages..

As every other social structure, a linguistic structure
is a particular system differging from the others both
in its matter (sounds) and in their meaning. Traddutore,
traditore. To translate is to betray.

Man is an incomplete animal. For a man is determined
by his culture. ttxtx This determination is effected by
the long process of education which transmits and gives (hands on)
as natural the cultural models.

Culturalism teaches that mankind escapes biological and,
in particular, racial determinisms. The prohibition of incest
is universal, but its formps are t relative and variable; it is
not simply natural but becomes cultural. Human sexuality is
no more than a tendency not differentiated by nature and so
only culturally does it become functional. One can say as much
about nourishment, association, struggle, regression, death.
These facts have biological data as their matter but their form
comes from a ᵪultural system. It may be that such systems are
limited in number; t but what counts here is each system rests
on values and the institutions are interpretations of the values.
As linguistic meanings, their determination comes from inter-
dependence with other cultural elements. It is an interpretation
given a function by the culture as a whole. A stable culture
gives firm interpretations.

But do stable cultures exist? As languages, so cultures are
alive by their variation. In the sphere of life variation gives
rise to new species. In the sphere of human life variation
changes cultures and gives rise to history. But species do
not know one another, while cultures interpenetrate. Cultural
anthropology has drawn attention to the relativity of values,
the source of mutual incomprehension; so one can account for
the permanence of traditional customs under the varnish of
colonization; but the opposite fact of xxextange communication,
exchange, mutual influence is no less real. For Bergson
the closed society is a principle of explanation but never
in fact a reality.

In brief, the systems of reflations named cultures are
in relation with one another.

This will be better understood if we take into consideration
contemporary cultural psychology esp. in U. S. since 1945.

The works of Linton, Kardiner, which converge with those
of Karen Horney, explain the process of inculturation. A set
of institutions train the child from its birth, lead him to
adopt manners of conduct and of belief etc.; such are the
primary xxxxxx institutions; once such conditioning has been
acquired, the individual has interiorized the personality
that is basic in a given type of culture. Subsequently, he
will proceed to react against xxx this basis; personal existence
comes out of the past but also it has its own originality.
In this fashion the basis and variations are complementary;
and so culture is subject to change; it is historical.

The historical dimension will be better understood, if
one adverts to the fact that the basis is not a reality that
exists but an abstract construct. Its elements are statistically
slected medians or means; such a selection can hardly be found
to exist in any single person; hence the structure of the
most elementary society reveals the coexistence of heterogeneous
systems.

If a contemporary hindu ascetic or red guard were brusquely
transplanted in Paris (not to be objects in a fair but to live
there) they would be unable to retain their custommary ways
and still be regarded as normal; they would differ too much
from the average Parisian; such a difference is deviance.
But we also know deviants that do not come from India or China
but more and more are produced by our own society. Formerly
society protected itself by interning them; today, under pretexts
of philanthropy which hide perhaps fear, it tries to maintain
its normps without excluding its deviants. Relativism supports
this effort.

Deviants are of different kinds. Neurotics in general
are incapable of adaptation. The exigences of the group
wound them, crush them. They tyrn in on themselves; try
to reject certain values and to reduce the number and the
implications of the remainder; their lives become impoverished;
their relations with others diminish; they become wlled in.
In contrast, think of the insurgent who is neither unadapted
or in revolt; he wants to put more life into existing values;
insurrection is always forward.. it is always a moral event;
it is not the work of a solitary: it is a resurrection.

Socrates, Jesus were of their place and time, but they still
call us to rise toward the city that they would renew.

Tradition is transmission, from age to age. Centuries
pass, and nothing changes.∎ Generations multiply in vain;
each started from the same point; and the grossness of
earliest times kept persisting; the human species was old,
but man was still a child. Right up to our own century
small and isolated groups have managed to remain outside
history; their cultural system is with its set rigidity
played the part of instincts. For them culturje was an absolute;
it was unquestioned; how it change whenx variation was not
experienced.

Cultural relativism expresses above all the surprise
of the Occidental when he witnesses the enormously different
customs of other peoples. But a primitive cannot be a
relativist. His culture consists in the lack of outside
relations and of variations.

Relativism then is a historical notion. It describes
history. It ends with a new type of comparison, far more
radical than ancient chronicles. The modern mind admits
the relativity of beliefs, rites, ways of life. This is
not scepticism, when the very notion of truth is just a
feature in a particular culture.

Millet feels that cultural anthropology is merely a
human science. More cannot be expected of it.

Linguistic Structuralism

J D Gauthier's notes on structuralism

Structuralism is a variety in La nouvelle critique which
divides along philosophic lines

It is marxist, psychoanalytic, structuralist or formalist,
 existentialist, or thematic (organized network of obsessions).

Terms (Robert)

 structure: is the way a building is constructed; by extension
the internal relations of the parts of a building from the
viewpoint of architectural technique, or of plastic beauty

 structuralism (Petit Larousse): a linguistic theory that
considers a language as a structured set in which their mutual
relations define the terms.

 cf. Hilbert's implicit definitions; Lonergan's Insight

 strucurel: concrete type of organization directly perceptible
in reality

 structural: any arrangement that in human signs gives rise to
meaning

Eg "red" and "green" through their contrast mean "stop" and "go."

The function of the structuralist is to recover the rules
governing the appropriate use of signs; one reconstructs signs
by placing them in the context of their usage, their functioning;
the reconstructing is a developed understanding of the sign.

 Criticism of a work is a refabrication of the work not for the
sake of a copy but for the sake of understanding.

 There emerges a homology, an analogy of functions, between
the original and its reconstitution.

 Hence structuralism is neither a school nor a movement, (for
structuralists differ from one another in their approach)
but an activity, a regulated succession of mental operations
(Barthes).

 Saussure in his Cours de linguistique générale distinguished
a horizontal axis of simultaneous objects and a vertical
axis of successive objects. Synchronie, diachronie.

 NB relevance to anthropology which studies cultures that
do not write and so leave no history. Structuralism makes
possible a notable study of races, of the behavior of human
groups, of popular stories, of the religious myths of other
civilizations. Barthes sees its application in fashions of
dress and of cooking. Gauthier adds film, television, advertizing.

Meaning (signification) as the intentional link between a sign
or word and what it means.

Besides the relation of sign to signified, there is the
codified implication of the position of this word or sign to
other words or signs.

Synchronic elements are said to be syntagmatic

Diachronic elements are said to be paradigmatic

Critical analysis is to be conceived solely from a scientific
viewpoint. It is not to follow the traditional methods of
philological or historical investigation, or to study literary
groups.

The work itself is to be the center of attention. Its production
is to be described technically. It is not to be understood on the
basis of the writer's biography, of his inspiration, of his mind.
It is to be concerned with the "code" by which the author
reveals himself by writing. Thus, literature reverts to
Aristotelian rhetoric.

For Barthes, according to Pages, there is a distinction between
syntagmatic figures (ellipsis, suspension, repetition,
suppression of connectives) and systematic figures of
substitution (metaphor, allegory, play on words, irony).

The substitions use a different word to denote the object meant.

Syntagmatic figures modify sentence structure.

The dimensions of a work are the Aristotelian

inventio - the subject-matter

disposition -the plan

elocutio - the style.

Structuralist criticism finds in Aristotelian rhetoric the first
attempt to investigate the literary object.

This approach to literature (which eliminates the biography of
authors, the philological commentaries on texts, the history
of periods) reverts by an analysis of writing (its rules of
usage and of composition) to a linguistic science that yields
a real comprehension of a work or more exactly an access to
the intelligible in a natural object.

Lanson, Gustave, L'analyse du texte

Structuralist Anthropology

Sanche de Gramont on Claude Lévi- Strauss

CLS "an ethnologist who has spent more than half his 59 years studying the behavior of North and South American Indian tribes. The method he uses to study the social organization of these tribes, which he calls structuralism, has flowered into a movement with many exotic blossoms. It is being applied indiscrimately to areas for which LS never intended it. It has sprouted into a full-fledged philosophical doctrine whose impassioned partisans insist that all of human knowledge must be re-examined in its light."

"Structuralism, as LS has used in his ethnological research, is essentially a way of answering the question, 'How do you play this game?' Imagine someone who has never seen a playing card, watching a rubber of bridge. By observing the way the cards are played, he should be able to reconstruct, not only the rules (or structure) of bridge but the composition (or structure) of a deck of cards.

"In the same way, the ethnologist observes how marriages are arranged within a tribe and is able to extrapolate certain laws (or structures) that govern the tribe's social organization.

"'Structuralism' says CLS, 'is the search for unsuspected harmonies. It is the discovery of a system of relations latent in a series of objects.'"

"XX.... LS believes you can study a tribe the same way a biologist studies an amoeba."

"The variety of experience in the life of a social group s seems to defy analysis. Precisely for this reason LS chooses to study primitive societies because they are more static than our own. And within these societies he picks what he calls "crystallized" social activities like myths, kinship laws, and cooking practices. Aside from being unchanging activities of unchanging societies, they are activities at the brink of consciousness -- a member of some Brazilian tribe never stops to wonder why he cooks his meat a certain way or believes a myth about a man turning into a jaguar. This is the type of subconscious, taken-for-granted process, which

of Polanyi's tacit knowledge

LS believes lends itself best to scientific investigation."

"LS derived structuralism from a school of linguistics whose principal exponent is Roman Jakobson. Very simply, these linguists study the relations among words, rather than the relation of each word to the object it designates. It is not the meaning of the word which concerns them, but the patterns which the words form. The structure of a language is its grammar, t and through this kind of analysis, a linguist should be able to discover the grammar of a language he cannot speak, in much the same manner that a cryptographer is able to unscript decipher a code thanks to recurring patterns of digits."

"In addition, the modern linguists if agree that there is a ground plan for the languages in the world. Every language in every society has the same fundamental properties. Thus, LS says, 'just as the discovery of DNA and the genetic code led biologists to use a linguistic model to explain a natural phenomenon, I use a linguistic model to explain cultural phenomena other than language. I try to show that the basic structure of language observed by the linguists in a great many other activities.'"

also recurs

"He (LS) is not concerned with the story a myth tells, but in the way the symbols used in one myth become converted into another set of symbols telling the same story. This is the grammar or code of myths⊗ Once he has unraveled hundreds of South American myths using different symbols and sensory codes (one deals with what is heard, another with what is seen) and found that they all can be reduced to a central idea, the discovery of fire h by man, he is also able to reduce the mechanism of the primitive mind to a certain number of recurring types of mental operations. In the same way, the laws governing social organization, which he discovers, whether they have to do with gift-giving or marrying off one's daughter, also illustrate the workings of the human mind spirit."

_Ⓧ_
O transformation
O functions

"Primitive man in organizing himself into social groups passes from a natural to a cultural state. He uses language, learns t cook his food, and accepts various laws that ensure the survival of the

group. All these activities set him apart from the animal.
Structuralism postulates that inx achieving this passage from
nature to culture man obeys laws that he does not invent.
These laws are inherent in human nature, which is everywhere identical
, since it is no more than the mechanism of the human brain.
The cerebral cortex, like a computer, responds to the outside
world, according to limited number of categories..."

"With LS the whole human xxxdxxxxx tradition goes down
the drain. Instead of a free spirit, responsible for its decisions,
we have man responded to programmed circuits called structures.
The individual conscience is no longer relevant. The whole body
of Western thought from Plato to Descartes to Sartre, which held that
knowledge of the world begins with knowledge of oneself, belongs
in the natural history museum, alongside the witchdoctor's
headdresses."

"LS is the advance man for an age in which the human sciences
will have caught up with the natural sciences. Soon, if he is right,
a psychologist will be able to chart a human life as accurately
as now he measures the progress of a rat sniffing its way through
a labyrinth toward a piece of cheese.

"History too goes x down the drain, because it is seen
as merely a form of our own society's mythology, a collective
delusion irrelevant to the scientific study of man.. "

"The sudden popularity of structuralism has little to do
with Levi-Strauss's own specific research. It is in part a fad,
the French intellectual's equivalent of the hula hoop On another
level it is a reaction against centuries of rhetorical philosoophers
and historians, and an awareness that today knowledge of man cannot be
divorced from the great scientific advances. Finally, it is
a specific attempt to discredit Jean-Paul Sartre as an outdated
thinker and to relegate existentialism to the philosophical garbage can.'

"His three mistresses were Marxism, psychoanalysis, and
geology. From the first he learned that understanding consisted
in finding common properties among a variety of incidents. Freud
taught him that beyond rational categories there existed forms
of behavior more valid and more meaningful. In geology he had
the example of a science which discovered laws amid the great
xxxxx tumult of nature."

↑ Ferdinand

78 "A word or term is always a differentiation within a larger
systematic whole of logical-linguistic space, which is called
by the linguist Fernad de Saussure, the Langue."

79 "Given that the relation between sign and significance is,
ə with qualifications, arbitrary, what Lévi-Strauss discovers
is that in the langue concrète of the primitive reason, specific
things in the world are used as symbols in their langue: primitives
think the world, and thus logical space and natural space have
the same locus..."

79 "The kinds of linguistic analysis most discussed by Jakobson
and Lévi-Strauss are the metaphoric and the metonymic. The meta-
phoric may be crucial in polemics and moralizing largely domin-
ated by metaphoric and part-total or synecdochic meanings,
while moderns live in a world dominated by time and a causality
of contiguity and correlation, or metonymy; the latter seem to
live in science and history, while the primitives live in kxkk
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx timeless symbolic mythopoiesis. Of course
both sorts of humans live in both sorts of meanings, plus two more
kinds of meanings delineated as follows:

"A metaphor taken seriously does not reduce to a simile...
the metaphor leads to insight and discovery not to reductions
back to separate spheres which have similarities. When heat and
light are said to be both forms of motion, this is metaphoric
discovery, and does not deny that motion is the basic factor
behind both heat and light. The opposite of metaphoric meaning
is prosaic acceptance of appearances and conventions as they
separately exist. Metaphors tend to lead to synchrony rather
that diachrony -- the reality discovered is not in time in quite
the way exemplars are."

Literal meaning analyzes specific differences... Totemic
differentiation is literal, although symbolic: bears are different
from wolves, elk, crows, etc., and thus one can have a different-
iated system of clans, as well as a differentiated ecosystem in
nature. The opposite of literal differentiation is ambiguity
and vagueness...

Metonymic meaning analyses pairs of things as continuous or
in some other way correlated with one another... Principia

mathematica of Russell and Whitehead is metonymic linguistic
analysis par excellence. The next-to relations are completely
xp separated from content in the terms, which is declared
irrelevant. Repeated correlations become the basis of science;
nonrepeated contiguities are the stuff of history; supposedly
the modern paradigmatic sciences are these. The opposite of
of metonymic correlations, for metonymists, is chaos...
It should be noted that the middle Ages worked in a basic metonymic
/80/ scheme but a vertical one: stones or hell at the bottom,
then k vegetables, animals, the world, man but in though not of
the world, the angels, archangels, and at the top the Trinity.
Locke and Kant developed a kind of downward metonymy, in
which real essences or the Ding-an-sich always unterlie all
next-to levels of scientificmetonymic structuring. Hume and
his followers made the metonymies "horizontal" or basically
temporal and diachronic.

Then there are families of meanings. Wittgenstein pointed
out that "games" form a family, neither a literal species,
nor an arbitrary collection, nor a metonymic series. Other
later thinkers have suggested that the same sort of familial
analysis can be given to ultimate terms, such as "justice" or
"property" or "art" or "knowledge." Family meaning applies
almost too obviously to families of humans where, say, all
Kennedy's or Churchill's bear relational resemblances but
different similarities occur more markedly between some members
than others, and no one characteristic runs throughout.
... families of furniture.. of motor cars.. of myths... So
The opposite of the familial meaning is the strange or foreign
meaning: foreign cars, wines, terms .. One has to get out of
one's family to be truly human and to discover the human...

There is a fifth language of meaning, but it is not linguistic:
that of music.

The general thesis of Lévi-Strauss is that all four kinds
of linguistic meaning are necessary for understanding and
achieving the logos which is the ultimate structure of culture
and nature. Using all four.. man can dimly apprehend
the existence and the knowability of the natural world and the
cultural worlds. What is wrong with modern cilization is not
only its obvious injustices, but its reliance on various
metonymic analyses tothe exclusion of metaphoric and familial

analyses. What was lacking in preliterate cultures was any
emphasis on metonymy at all; totems and metaphoric symbols and
synecdochic parts absorbed their energies, and they became prey
to the mass metonymic culture of the Western World. Since logic
is based on cultural as well as natural reality, the disappearance
of primitive tribes is a genuine loss of meaning in the world.
On the other hand, modern complacent metonymic meaning, such
perhaps/81 as exemplified most obviously/by Bertrand Russell's writings
is a kind of logical aphasia, such as that that exhibited by
brain damaged persons. Levi-Strauss, by beginning with _langue_
as the basis of human expression and communication, can accept
all the kinds of human meaning and linguistic
analysis: none are ruled out on the bases of not being scientific
or ordinary or democratic or contemporary or whatever are the
usual philosophic justifications are for looking upon a certain
areas of meaning with disdain or moral concern or civilized
repulsion or brain-damaged giggles.

L-S, _The Elementary Structures of Kinship_

82   ... Exploration of the problems of exogony and endogamy takes
him through 400 pages of factual and metonymic logistic analysis
of various marriage systems of primitive cultures...

Then about page 490 there is a great methodological change.
Basic semantic moves which were suggested at the beginning are
now affirmed literally and conclusively. The nature of man is develop-
ed in exchange, in which society also develops. A woman is a symbol
as well as a living thing. The exchange of women, of economic goods,
and stories... is not just characteristic of human beings, it
it is the essence of humanity. Therefore the incest taboo is
not a derivative prohibition within society; it is the basic
requirement of society itself.

... A woman is not only a biological thing par excel-
lence, since she can produce more humans, she is also the symbol
above all symbols, since she unites groups and brings about
kinship and clan relationships, and ultimately, through the
peculiar unions of marriage, brings about the union and yet the
differentiation of nature and culture, and makes pre-human animals
into human beings. (what follows should precede.)

The transformation from nature to culture is the transformation
of things from space-time events in their singularity to symbols
in their necessary community. A woman is not only... (as above)

LS differentiates three levels of exchange, or human-creating
relationships: the marriage relationship, exchange of economic goods,
and talking proper. All three are necessary both to preserve
societies and mankind and to create societies and mankind. The
primitive cultures understood this better than modern scientific
civilizations, where private acquisition tends to overshadow
exchange in the economic sphere... Although the private is required for
exchange, exchange / 83 / and reciprocity are the essence of culture
and the source of the real and the ideal in human life.

83

Totemism

The linguistically organized inter-relationships of natural species
and kinds of things are taken as the homologous basis for totems.
Totems not only identify one's own clan, xixx college, club,
army division, favorite baseball team, they also differentiate
that group in a social order which includes other groups with
their totems... The logic of totemic identification and differentiation
does not come from some primitive superstitious nonsense or
mysticism, it comes from the very differentiated and yet identifiable
nature of things themselves.

The Savage Mind

The taxinomic classification of natural things is applied to the
cultural ordering of social groups in totemic classification,
which, when related to the diachronous problems of clan exogamy,
leads to twofold, fourfold, and sixfold kinship and totem orders.
The endogamous caste system is related to exogamxxamous clan systems
as an opposite type of application of natural kinds.

IIn chapter five... the ultimate logical notions of categories,
elements, and numbers are derived from the given notion of differentiatio
n... kxxdxxivLS derives all these basic logical principles from differ-
ently organized symbolic systems.

LS xj insists that thought must begin with observation of
the world, and then the symbolic results of such observation can
be dialectically pushed to the furtherest limits of questioning.

Le Blond's list of Lévi-Strauss's books.

147   At Paris, in France, and even abroad, the current prestige of
        structuralism is attached to the name of Professor Claude
        Lévi-Strauss. His influence is extensive and profound.
        It is accounted for by the scientific value of his work,
        by his competence in directing the work of others, but above
        all by his open and winning humanity. It also is reinforced
        by the interest (which is not without ambiguity) excited by
                                                      more and more
        his "sciences humaines" to which the university is/extending
        an official place. Further must be noted the exceptional liberty
        of spirit with which Cl. Lévi-Strauss did not hesitate to express
        his doubts - and more - about the modern myth of progress,
        and as well questioned xkxxxxxxx the accepxted primacy of
        history.

Tristes tropiques⊛
Anthropologie structurale
La pensée sauvage
Le Cru et le cuit
Le Miel et les cendres
Totémisme
"Critères scientifiques des disciplines sociales et humaines" in
Aletheia mai 1966

⊛ Given a privileged place among L-S's books becausexx,
in the course of these xx ethnographique studies, the
author reveals his views on the vocation of the ethnograpfher
as he conceives x it.

Jean-Marie Le Blond

      knew him in the late 30's

      doctoral dissertation at Sorbonne entitled Logic and Method
in Aristotle

      journeyed with from Paris to ~~xxxxxx~~ Saint-Malo, and thence
by steamer to the island of Jersey,

      volunteered to provide chaplain services to French
workers conscripted to work in German x factories during second
world war

      later editor of Études

148 "The name science is no longer more than a fictive appellation
that denotes a large number of quite heterogeneous activities;
of these only a few are properly scientific." L-S

      For L-S science means natural science and even mathematics.
He grants that this implies that man is regarded not as a subject
but as an object. The subjectivity of phenomenology he found
stifling.

149 "In so far as the human sciences succeed in doing properly
scientific work, any distinction between the natural and the
human is going to be attenuated." L-S. Aletheia p. 175

      On this L-S is not dogmatic. He proposes it as his option,
as "a philosophic hope which has not yet been confirmed" L-S.

      L-S regards as the privileged type among the human sciences
linguistics in its most formal aspect. I assume that this aspect
is from Ferdinand de Saussure's procedure of concentrating
on the patterns of relations between words and neglecting
the relations of words to the objects they denote.

      L-S does not aim at being a linguist such as de Saussure
or Martinet; but in his study of man he takes from linguistics
his model of science for three reasons: (1) "Linguistics has
a universal object ~~language~~, articulated language, which is
known to all races of men; (2) its method is homogeneous; (3)
apart from some secondary divergences, the method rests on
certain fundamental principles which all linguists regard as
valid.

150   It is because of his method that C-L remains rather indifferent
to the content which the forms embrace. What gives interest to the
classifications he sets up is x not their content but the ingenuity
of the use to which they are put, and it is that usage that reveals
the mx proper role of human intelligence. By taking these represent-
ations which seem to us to be a minor matter, allegedly primitive
peoples have exercised genuine intelligence, they even have manifested
what is most profound in intelligence.

"The aim of this book, L_S has written, is to show how empirical
categories, such as raw and cooked, fresh and rotten, moist and
burnt, which can be defined with precision by ethnographic observation
alone, and in each case by placing oneself within the horizon of
a particular culture, nonetheless canm serve as xmxix conceptual
tools for bringing to light abstract notions and linking them together
in propositions." L-S (Le cru et le cuit, Paris Plon 1954, p. 9.

151   More radically, L-S bases human reality in the unconscious.

"If, as we believe, the unconscious activity of mind consists
in imposing forms on a content, and if these forms are basically
the same for all minds, ancient and modern, primitif and civilized,
... it is necessary and sufficient to reach the unconscious
structure, underlying each institution and each custom, to obtain
a principle of interpretation valid for other institutions and
other customs, naturally on condition that one pushes the analysis
far enough." L-S Anthropologie structurale, p. 28.

While there does exist in human languages and institutions
an experienced meaning (un sens vécu), conscious and connected
with liberty, still that meaning is not the good meaning, that is,
the more profound and the more real.

"Marx and Freud have taught us that man attains meaning only
by entering into the viewpoint of meaning. With that we agree.
...   But one should add that such meaning is not the good meaning;
superstructures are vain operations (des actes manqués) that
socially have met with success." L-S Pensée sauvage pp 115-36.

"Phenomenology seemed wrong to me (me heurtait) inasmuch
as it postulated continuity between what is lived and what is real...
To reach the real one must begin by setting aside thm what is lived,
though later on one has to integrate it in an objective synthesis
stripped of all sentimentality." L-S Tristes tropiques

L-S's option for the infrastructures (Marx) and the uncon-
scious (Freud) fits in with his refusal to rank the civilized
above the primitive and indeed his sympathy for neolithic man.
"J'ai l'intelligence néolithique." Tristes Tropiques p.44
152 Music and mythology confront man with virtual objects subsequent
whose shadow alone is actual, with conscious approximations ///
to truths which inevitably are unconscious." L-S Le cru et le cuit p. 23

Structures

The points made so far, and also made by L-S himself, are:
zeal for strict science, primacy of linguistics in human studies,
attachment to abstract combinations rather than to the contents
that are combined, and the role of the unconscious in the life
of man.

No doubt there are in human societies conscious structures
which first catch our attention: men draw up constitutions,
establish customs, posit norms. They test them with criticism,
ratify them, or modify them. But such conscious structures
are superficial; they do not reveal man in his depths.

"Conscious models -- commonly called norms -- are the
poorest of all, because their function is merely to perpetuate
beliefs and usages rather than to bring to light their source.
So it is that structural analysis runs into a paradoxical situation
well known to linguists. The xppxxmmkxxtxxmtxxx clearer the
apparent structure, the more difficult becomes the task of
grasping the deep structure; for the models that are conscious
stand between the observer and his obje c t." L-S Anthropologie
structurale, p. 308.

L-S hw follows von Neumann's definition of models.

"Models, like games, are theoretical constructions which
suppose a definition that is precise, exhaustive, and not too
complicated; also they should xixm correspond to realxity
in all respects that bear upon one's current research."
L-S Anthropologie structurale,"p. 306. Anthropologie struct.

Since deep structures are unconscious, they cannot be
verified directly. Hence the importance of the correct model.

"On peut en effet One can conceive many different models
each in its own way apt to describe and explain a group of
phenomena. None the less, the best will always be the true model

that is, the one which, besides being the simplest, will satisfy
the double condition of not appealing to facts other than those
considered and of accounting for all of them." L S, Anthr Str 307 f.

"Following Rousseau, and in a manner that appears more
decisive, Marx taught that social science was erected not on the
events than physics on the level of sensibility: the end in con-
structing a model, studying its properties and the various ways
it reacts in a lboratory, is afterwards to apply one's observations
to the interpretation of what empirically goes on and may differ
greatly from one's anticipations." L-S Tristes Trop. 49 f.

Deep structure lies beyond the models. It is as it were the
pole of their convergence. It is sketched by the most suitable
model. But it cannot be verified by observation. There can be
no question of bringing the unconscious into consciousness in the
hope of having a better look at it. It remains the object of
an exigence. It cannot be the object of an observation even
though it were only approximative.

M. de Gandillac noted three features in the structure:
coherence, shape, and vision. Coherence inasmuch as the
structure is the organization of an ensemble and it caracterizes
every society right down to the family which is the social atom.
Shape means the permanence of the structure, its conservation
through changes of extent, volume, color. Vision denotes
objectivity aimed at beyond the construction of the model.

It is clear that structure does not include in itself
the note of process, genesis, although one can speak of genetic
structures and constant procedures of production.

FinALLY, structuralism is not practical.

"There are those who think of social science as preparing
pupils for professional activity and considering problems
with a view to practical intervantion.

"But human sciences on the contrary are outside each
particular society. Whether they seek to adopt the viewpoint
of some particular society, or the viewpoint of an individual
within any society, or finally, aiming at a reality immanent
in man, they take their stand away beneath every individual and every society."
L-S Aletheia p. 208

What is not practical, is contemplative. Praise of
contemplation, Tristes Tropiques, pp. 448 f.

4 **Has Structuralism a Real Object**

Ira Progoff, <u>Depth Psychology and Modern Man</u>, McGraw-Hill Paperbacks, 1973 (Julian Press 1959, 1969) pp. 118, 119, 184

The enacting images, or dynatypes, and the formative images, or cognitypes

"Jakobson did not invent structuralism. He improved a method introduced around 1910 by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, and perp|etuated by the Russian school known as "formalists." But LS who has collaborated steadily with Jakobson.... was the first to apply structuralism to ethnology."

bibl. states Saussure's Cours de linguistique générale was first published posthumously in 1916, 4th edition Payot Paris in 1949. English trans by Baskin in Phil Libr in 1960.