Questions for Symbol & Analogy Seminar, 10/21/77:

A. These questions seek a further grasp of the relationship of cognitive meaning and constitutive meaning (1) as they are expressed in doctrines, and (2) as they derive from other ways of knowing:

 Re. cognitive meaning: Both historical facts and doctrines (e.g. I Cor 15:3ff: "that Christ died for our sins...that he was turied, that he was raised on the third day") function cognitively; they deal with knowledge: a "historical fact" may be reached when events are known through judgments that grasp the virtually unconditioned (<u>Method</u>, p. 202); doctrines "express judgments of fact" (p. 132). But doctrines and historians arrive at the facts in different ways. Is there, then, the possibility of conflict between the honest historian's judgment and the facts of doctrines?

2) Re. cognitive and constitutive functions of meaning: The same meanings which function cognitively also function constitutively so as to determine the being-becoming of every believing Christian. If the reasonably concluded facts of a historian were to differ from the facts of the Creed, could Christians still authentically base their lives on that belief statement?

3) Re. constitutive meaning: Please clarify the notion of constitutive meaning in a consideration of a) human institutions (e.g. a courtroom),
b) the human being and c) God. a) The courtroom is what it is by the meaning people attribute to it; yet it includes physical realities like benches, walls, bar, etc. It is an intelligible reality but is itself not intelligent.
b) Human beings are what they are through the meanings which they embody, both by accident of birth and by--hopefully-ever increasing responsibility for themselves; yet they, too, are physical "givens," bodies apart from which they do not exist, so it seems that there is more to them than sheer meaning. They are both intelligible and intelligent. c) God is fully constituted by meaning, is pure meaning; in God intelligence and intelligibility fully coincide.

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B. Only in ourselves and in our own conscious experience do we recognize the structures of consciousness articulated in Lonergan's operator, operations and subjects of consciousness. For if we are to objectify human subjectivity, the only agent subject available to our experience is our own selves.

Does this mean that we do not know anyone else but ourselves as subjects, that we cannot know others as subjects? If through self-appropriation we can articulate to some degree what human subjectivity is but if we cannot verify these elements of subjectivity in others, how can we know that these others are indeed subjects? And if to be a human being is to be a subject and if we cannot verify the subjectivity in others about us, do we even know if these others are really human beings?....

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This line of reasoning works us back into a solipsistic position. There are a number of issues confused here: objectification of subjectivity (one's governet), recognition of subjectivity (in others) and affirmation of subjectivity (in self and others). Where did this reasoning go wrong? Would you clarify these three issues as they relate to one another.

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1 Historical technique; nature and limitations MT 195 f. Two components in historical knowledge MT 245-47 judgments of fact, of causal connection jugdgments of value Meinecke, Becker History as technique is incomplete 246 first task of dialectic; add evaluation second task: confront gross differences Thwology in its first phase is incomplete if only research, interpretation, and historicao technique 247 Becker on Bernheim's rule 221-224 Becker, Collingwood, Marrou 203-208 2 Doctrine (Durandus OP, Petrus Olivi OFM) NCE 10, Notes, theological, Forman Vat II, On divine revelatione, Abbott p 119. Newman reprehended for view on question, Would it be wrong to doubt that Tobias' dog wagged its tail? Conflict between history and doctrine 3 History conceived as technique, based on value-free judgment, easily runs into conflict with religious doctrines which have a basic component in value judgments Esp. "Theology and Praxis" read at plenary session of CTSA in June and wll appear in 1977 Poroceedings of CTSA Doctrinal hermeneutics 4 ingenda of juridical or legal hermeneutics: favorabilia amplianda, odiosa restr in general, what was the main issue, what the intention, DS 1980 Cognitive meaning: what is meant; the meaning as corresponding to 5 the meant and so true, or else not corresponding and so false Constitutive meaning: the meanings you entertain and teh values you appreciate as constitutive of your mentality, of the context within which further development has to worm its way All meaning subsists not simply in itself 6 but in identity with the infinite being or in non-identity with the rest of a finite being words in articulate sound, courtrooms in buildings furniture, constutitive meaning of men and m women in humna bodies Dstinguish subject as subject and subject as object 7

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Each subject is conscious of self as subject No subject is conscious of another as subjects

Each subject can advance from self-consciousness to selfknowledge, and then what is known is the subject as object The subject as subject is never known; it is given in the first of the threem stages (experiencing) by which we come to know

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In the measure that subjects work out a satisfactory account of the types of operations constitutive of subjects, they can discern whether other objects also happen to be subjects