

Two extremes have been defined, but between them man oscillates. He cannot settle in the world-of-sense, for the pure desire to know is as much a part of his spontaneity as any ~~other drive; it raises questions, he becomes involved in~~ other drive; questions arise and man becomes engaged by his own intelligence and reasonableness in the issues of the universe-of-being. But, no more can man settle in the universe-of-being; for though judgments remain with us, they remain in a habitual background of knowledge; at any moment no more than a single judgment can be made, and can yield only some general aspect or some minute detail of a universe habitually known to be indefinitely rich and complex. As man is a knower, so too is he one that progresses in knowledge, that answers questions not to rest in contemplation of the known but only to raise further questions and so advance to a fuller known that, as a whole, is not possessed. Knowing is process that rises from experience through questions to answers only to revert through further questions to experience and begin once more the ascent. The orientation that is constituted by the pure desire to know emerges upon the orientation of the animal-within-a-world-of-sense; it ~~adds~~ transforms that initial orientation by heading man towards a universe-of-being; but it does not settle man within the universe as the animal is settled in the world of sense; on the contrary it is an intermittent oscillatory movement through which we come to know more and more of the universe-of-being not, indeed, with the possessiveness of full contemplation but by the half-grasp that consists in a habitual context of judgments.

There is a further complexity. Man is an actor as well as a knower, so that knowing is but one of his activities. Besides the true, there is the good. Besides knowing, there is conduct. He is involved, committed, engaged by experience, intelligence, reasonableness. But his experience includes desires and their satisfactions. His intelligence grasps the systematic harnessing of manifold desires to manifold satisfactions by a complex series of orders, domestic, economic, political, and cultural. As the satisfaction of desire is a good, still more so is the achievement of the intelligible order that makes possible and generates and concretely includes an indefinite series of satisfactions. But about such systems men dispute, about the ordering of sex and love, about the ordering of the economy, about the ordering of states, about education, science, philosophy, religion. Systems are manifold possibilities. Rule them all out, and man is poorer than the most miserable of primitives who exhibited some evidence of intelligence. Accept the very best, and many desires must go unsatisfied for the system can be realized only through restraint, only through making satisfactions conditioned by ~~performance~~ performance, for it is that conditioning that secures the proper performance at the proper time and place. Man, then, is involved in the inevitability of choice. If he chooses, it will be just a matter of fact. What he chooses, will be merely what in fact is chosen. But it also is a fact that he is involved, engaged, committed; he cannot annul desire, though he can tend to that negative ideal; he cannot banish the intelligence that grasps practical orders of human action; he cannot proscribe the manifold of possible systems; he cannot avoid intermittent moments of reflection in which rational consciousness deals with the realm of action, employs its categories of praise and blame, deliberates upon absolute and relative values, and ends up with a reasonable or a rationalized choice or ~~asfusaiktexhæssax~~ or with a reasonable or a rationalized refusal to choose.

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Still, this universe-of-being seems strange and unfamiliar. In all probability the reader will ask whether or not the universe-of-being is some airy realm of essences or the real world that I see and touch. Clearly, in so far as the real world means the merely visible and palpable, there are excluded the intelligible unities and systematic relations grasped by understanding and, as well, the groundedness that is reverse to the obverse reasonableness of judgment. On the other hand, inasmuch as it is true that I am visible and palpable, the universe of being includes my visibility and palpability; ~~but~~ it includes them, not as merely seen nor as merely touched, but also as conceived and, principally because they are affirmed. Again, visible and palpable objects are within space and time; but the universe of being is not within space and time; if there is space, then it is a being and within the universe of being; if there is time, then it is a being and within the universe of being. Space as falling within experience is not yet known; it is known only if, as well, it is conceived and affirmed to be; and then it is known, not as the contained of beings, but as a determination within the universe of being.

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One reaches the central issue by going back to the question, Is the universe-of-being to be identified with the real world? We know very definitely what is meant by the universe-of-being. It is whatever is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. It is the objective of the pure and unrestricted desire to know. But what is meant by the real world? What is meant by reality? Is it what exists or what does not exist? What is meant by the world? Is it everything, or some things, or nothing? If the real world is what is known by intelligent grasp and reasonable judgment, then the real world is identical with the universe-of-being. If the real world is not what is so known, then it is not identical with the universe-of-being.

For most men, I believe, the real world is not identical with what I have named the universe-of-being. Nor is it difficult to say what they mean by the real world. Macbeth appealed to the "sure and firm-set earth on which I tread." Conceivably the appeal was directed to a being known in a set of affirmations such as, There exists an earth, It is solid, I am walking on it, I can rely on it. ~~But in all probability the appeal was simply the emotional expression of a single feeling of security, a feeling generated apart from asking and answering questions, a feeling generated in the same manner as in the frisking colt that also treads the earth and experiences its reliability. But in all probability Macbeth's exclamation supposed both types of knowing, both the knowing of an intelligent and reasonable man, and the knowing of an animal that neither inquires nor reflects. In all probability, if Macbeth were asked whether he were talking about some being, he would have been puzzled; and if he were asked what he was talking about, he would have shrugged and pointed to the earth. What, then, is the world of sense? It is the experienced as experienced. It is the experienced apart from inquiry and insight, apart from formulation and reflection, apart from grasp of the unconditioned and judgment. Into it we are born. Within it we move about. With it we are familiar. About it we can have no doubts, for doubts arise only if questions are asked, and the world of sense is prior to any questioning.~~