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is radically different from

"Yes" of judgment. Clearly enough, the existence of this isomorphism vastly simplifies the transitions of the conscious subject from one type of knowing to another. At one moment vital anticipation is dealing spontaneously with a situation. At the next, the pure desire has initiated full cognitional process. There has emerged a radical shift in the orientation of consciousness. Experience as incarnate has given way to experience as the materials for inquiry and reflection. But, though the changed orientation involves a change in the whole content of the known, it does not immediately involve any change in the structure of the known. "Body" becomes "thing-for-us"; sensible differentiation becomes conceptual differentiation; vital validation becomes reasonable affirmation. There is a one-for-one correspondence that allows the subject to move easily from one orientation to the other and back again. Only when full cognitional process has turned from description to explanation, only indeed when explanation has gone far enough to set fundamental problems, does there come the revelation that the knowing sought by science is not the knowing already possessed by the successfully functioning animal. Description is isomorphic with elementary knowing merely because description deals with things-for-us. Explanation eliminates such isomorphism by dealing with things-themselves, by discovering that the correct invariance resides, not in the structure of elementary knowing, but in the expression of principles and laws.

The argument has gradually been edging towards a critical notion of objectivity.

It began from a principal notion that implicitly defined object and subject by a suitably patterned set of correct judgments. It complemented this principal notion by distinguishing the aspects of experiential, normative, and absolute objectivity that emerge in the process towards a set of judgments.

ordinarily/

Secondly, in its entirety the foregoing meaning of the verb, to know, and its was set to one side, and quite another meaning was introduced. There exists an elementary knowing that is constituted within the unfolding of extroverted, vital anticipation. In elementary knowing 1) the object in general is the extended, spatially located, temporally enduring body; 2) knowing is the confrontation in which the body is seen and other determinations from other senses are integrated with the seen; 3) the confronted body is not apparent but real inasmuch as it supplies the focus for sustained action; 4) the subject is what anticipates bodies, confronts them, acts upon them or suffers from them.

~~Thirdly, between these extremes there were recognized elementary practicality and artistic creativity. Elementary practicality accepts the normative objectivity of full knowing, only to regard full knowing as a mere instrument for biological purpose. It reinforces the pure desire with animal drive but, by that very fact, it constricts, constricts, distorts the pure desire with the blinkers of non-intelligent, non-rational utility. It is to be noted that elementary practicality is not the intelligent self-interest alleged to exist on philosophic grounds by utilitarian theorists; it is the de facto self-interest that knows what it wants and how to get it without wasting time on the superfluous question whether its aim is intelligent and reasonable.~~

Part 7 230