Question for Myth and Theology seminar, 3/31/77:

0

С

You said in class that once we recognize in our own lives a myth as myth, it is no longer a myth for us. What does this mean? For if true, it raises further questions:

If we only know myth when it has ceased to be myth for us, then we do not really ever know myth but only the broken shell of dead myth. This same applies to the myths of other peoples. Then how can we ever know what myth is?

What of Riccour's second maxvid? Riccour would allow that myth even known as such can still function as myth, though not in all the same ways as previously (e.g., the etiological function falls out).

If we had a proper understanding of $myth_p$ would this not allow myth to operate better in our lives rather than less? (The presupposition here is that with our pseudo-sophistocated understanding of myth we prevent myth from functioning in our lives and so are in the situation which Eliade decries near the end of his Sacred and Profane.)

It seems that recognizing and understanding myth as such should not prevent myth from still functioning. Analogous cases would be the discovery of Reason among the Greeke (of. Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience," p. 238), the staking out of interiority in your works, the definition of compunction by the theologians. Loss myth differ from these? If so, how and why?

This question comes from the discussion group and Prof. Bill Shea.

0

Myth and Theology, 3/31/77

0

С

· · ·	Myth and Theology, 3/31/77
	Myth, mystification, demystification, mythologize, demythologize, second naivete
	Clear understanding always requires transition from ordinary language
·····	and introduction of some measure of systematization
·	Distinguish
·	1) Undifferentiated or less differentiated consciousness
	2) Differentiated or more differentiated consciousness
	3) Transition from (1) to (2)
	In (1) there is one mode of apprehension, one set of procedures,
	one set of criteria
······	In (2) there are two modes of apprehension, two sets of procedures, two sets of criteria
	In (3) there is an early period in which the original criteria prevail,
·	a latex period when the second set of criteria alone prevail, and
	an intermediate period of doubt and hestitation /the people in Plato's cav
	(1) illustrated by the man in the street, the average man, woman, etc.,
·····	(2) illustrated by Aristotle's first for us and first in itself,
ndiffer-	by Eddington's two tables, by Ricoeur's second naivete, origin coordin
ent/	(3) the man dragged out of Plato's cave, blinded by the light,
	gradually adjusted to it, killed when he \mathbf{m} returns and tries to
	teach his fellow prisoners his new truth
· · ·	in the early period the original criteria prevail: the earth
	really is flat, the sun really moves across the heavens, theoretical
	physics is not statement of fact may but a speculative construction to guide us in manipulating matter
	in the later mum period the original criteria and the apprehension
	they justified x are just so much primitive ignorance; man became
	rational when B Newton deduced the orbits of the moon and of Mars,
· · · · · · · ·	when Darwin wrote the Origin of Species, the Descent of Man, when
	Freud explored the human psyche
······ ·	(1) is the case of myth and mythologizing
	(2) is the case of demythologizing, second naivete
	(3) is the case of mystimitication when original criteria prevmail
·	and of demystification when the later crieria alonge prevail
· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	Note that second naivete is naive inasmuch as understands the power
	significance utility of the symbolic; but it is not naive inasmuch
	as in distinct realm of conmesciousness it has come to understand symbols
7	in a manner unknown to i original a naivete.
<u> </u>	G

С

Myth and Theology, 3/31/77

С

Crossan pp 9, 40 The crucial question; five ways of story; knowledge of reality Constitutive meaning: man is the self-completing animal in the individual: reality of drifter, of self-actualizing person in the group: the accpeted social arrangements and cultural legitimations are constitutive of the/reality of the group /socio-cultural reality change them and you change the group The actuality of existence: the actual constitutive meaning of ind/group The truth of existence, the order of the soul (vs order of society) subjectivity: an immanent principle of movement and of rest of movement: questions for intelligence, reflection, deliberation of rest: in so far as satisfactory answers are reached satisfactory: no further questions on the same issue Voegelin, "The Gospel and Culture," # II, pp. 66-76; zetein. 'elkein Alienation, the lie in the soul: burking further qq., doubts, qualms of conscience Conversion: from the lie to the truth of existence putting off the old man and putting on the new; dying to the old The CONSTANT in history: equivalences of experience and symbolization constant of experience: the actuality of existence via constitutive meaning and its norm in subjectivity; the occurrence of alienation and of conversion The Variable in history: differentiation of x consciousness and deformation of consciousness differentiations: pneumatic, noetic, scientific, historical, modern philosophic, from clinical psychology Historiogenesis: The Ecumenic Age pp 59-113 Let us speak of the Saving Tale 1. It reveals socio-cultural reality in so far as it is effective 2. It does not make claims to truth in the sense in which differentiated consciousness makes such claims #f or disclaimers 3. It will be superseded inasmuch as it narrates what later narrators will pronounce false. I would advance a fuller hermenetuic of revcovery than Voegelin 4. seems to: the saving tale means no more than the normativeness of questioning and x answering.

0

2