

scientific revolution by combatting it, first in the name of the inspiration of scripture against Galileo, then in the name of Aristotle and realism, and finally in the hope of working out a viable Neoscholasticism. But if many have given up on Neoscholasticism, it remains that there is still to be devised something to put in its place. What Scholasticism achieved in the middle ages and what Neoscholasticism aimed at in our days was that "aliqua mysteriorum intelligentia" (DS 3016) that made it possible to think of the mysteries as in some manner meaningful. What their breakdown has entailed, is that the mysteries of faith, beginning from the Incarnation and the Trinity, are found meaningless: the bold pronounce their traditional formulation meaningless; the subtle discern in them an admixture of Christian doctrine and the Heideggerian forgetfulness of being; nor is there any general consensus to expound and vindicate them for the theological basis for a consensus/longer seems to exist.

Again, we have acknowledge the historical revolution, first, by tolerating the employment of its techniques in patristic and medieval studies, then quietly admitting them into the history of the church, of its theology, of its doctrines, and finally by allowing their relevance/scriptural studies. But if it has become fashionable to repeat that man is a historical being, one still may wonder how many really grasp the implications of that statement. For if man is a historical being, then understanding man is not understanding an abstract nature but understanding a concrete history. But to this point we return in # 4.12 below.

3.1 I have said not a little on the nature of philosophy and theology in my studies of Aquinas on grace and on the Trinity and in my two books, Insight and Method in Theology.

In general philosophical studies should be a necessary part of preparation of candidates for the priesthood and of the training of the Jesuit in so far as they are relevant

(1) to the spiritual and apostolic life of the priest and/or Jesuit, and

(2) to the task of preaching the gospel to all nations, that is, to all classes in each nation or culture.

a/ I fail to discern any such relevance in what may be called abstract philosophy. It sets forth what can be known in the natural light of reason. It is relevant to man in the state of pure nature. It is/theologians' conception of philosophy that reserves to theology man as he is and has been, as existential, as interpersonal, as historical. It may even claim to rest on analytic principles that need not be verified and so are indubitable premises whence indubitably follow a notable list of theses complete with the solution to misguided objections.

Next, there is a certain relevance to specialist studies of the history of philosophy. For the philosophers of the past have influenced both believers and non-believers, both theologians and their opponents. But as long as such study remains in indirect discourse, asserting no more than what A, B, C, and so on happened to have thought and said, it makes no immediate contact with the religious and apostolic life of the future priest or Jesuit and so can hardly be said to prepare him or to form him in any immediate fashion.

they/ Thirdly, I happen to distinguish between analytic propositions and analytic principles. Analytic propositions are true by definition; in other words the propositions are true in virtue of the very definitions of the terms/employ; so granted the definitions, the propositions cannot help being meaningful though also tautologous. In contrast, analytic principles are analytic propositions whose constituent terms have themselves been verified empirically; in other words, analytic principles possess not only meaning but also reference. Cf INsight, pp. 304-9.

On this showing philosophy would be conceived as verifying its basic terms in man's inner conscious operations and verifying its basic relations in the dynamism that carries consciouenss from one operation to the next. The fruit would be an intentionality analysis of man's experiencing, inquiring, reflecting, deliberating. That analysis would not be a mere hypothesis subject to radical revision, for any possible revision that can plausibly be entertained would involve the very operations and interconnections set forth in the analysis. Cf. Insight, pp. 276-7, 304, 335-6. From the intentionality analysis,

which thematized what one is doing when one is knowing and deliberating, there would follow an epistemology, thematizing why doing that was knowing, whence would be derived a metaphysics of proportionate being, thematizing what one comes to know when one does it.

Such is the basic procedure as I conceive it. How it contributes to the spiritual and apostolic formation of the future priest and Jesuit, will come to light in my answers to the subsequent questions, ## 3.2 - 5.

3.2

Here the basic principle seems to me to be that human development occurs in two distinct modes. If I may employ a spatial metaphor, it moves (1) from below upwards and (2) from above downwards.

It moves from below upwards inasmuch as it begins from one's personal experience, advances through ever fuller understanding and more balanced judgement, and so attains the responsible exercise of personal freedom.

It moves from above downwards inasmuch as one belongs to a group and so owes allegiance to one's home, one's country, one's religion. Through the traditions of the group one is socialized, acculturized, educated to become in time either a member of the tribe or clan, or an inheritor of the classicism of ancient Greece and Rome, or a participant in the modernity familiar with the variety of human cultures and literatures, the achievements of modern mathematics and science, the expertise of the contemporary exegete and historian, the reflections of philosophers and theologians.

The two modes of development are interdependent. Only through the second does the first take one beyond the earliest prehistoric stages of human development. Only through the first is there any real assimilation and appropriation of the second.

Such interdependence, as it supposes distinction, so too it opposes separation. In philosophy, particularly in its basic phase of cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, the overwhelming emphasis is upon personal appropriation of one's own intelligent and responsible being. In theology, particularly with regard to the mysteries of faith that

Aquinas relegated to the fourth book of the Contra Gentiles, the major emphasis is on the Christian tradition. But differences in emphasis are one thing. Systematic separation is quite another and, as it seems to me, it is less a product of Christian prudence and wisdom than of Cartesian universal doubt and of the eighteenth-century enlightenment's identification of tradition with prejudice and abuse.

For a fuller account of my notions on this issue, may I refer the reader to my paper on "Philosophy and Theology" in Proceedings, American Catholic Philosophical Association, 46 (1970) 19-30, reprinted in my A Second Collection (London and Philadelphia 1974) pp. 193-208. And further to the earlier lectures on Philosophy of God and Theology (London and Philadelphia 1973).

4.11

I believe that this question does not admit any absolute answer in the sense that one cannot assign a minimum content of philosophic studies for everyone without making assumptions about the composition of the apostolic group in which he will function.

On the Aristotelian view a science is a habit, like familiarity with Euclid's Elements, that can be tucked into the mind of the individual. But in contemporary fact a science resides, not in each and every individual competent in that science, but only in the whole ongoing and constantly developing group. No mathematician knows all modern mathematics, no physicist knows all physics, no historian knows the whole of human history, and the same holds for any other field that has been cultivated systematically by specialists. Hence, Thomas Kuhn, in the Postscript to the second edition of his The Structure of Scientific REvolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 176) stated that if the book were being rewritten he would have to begin from the notion of the scientific community.

Now if single sciences reside not in the minds of individuals but in the resources of scientific communities, still more so does the complete circle of all scientific fields have its locus in the totality of scientific communities. Still, this totality is a mere object of thought unless the several scientific communities are in communication, unless they possess members working on the margin between distinct fields, unless interdisciplinary studies

flourish.

But there is needed something at once more radical and more comprehensive than interdisciplinary studies, as commonly they are conceived, if theology is to be granted the complement and the help that traditionally was derived from philosophy. For in the Aristotelian-Scholastic view of things, philosophy was conceived as the Grund- und Gesamtwissenschaft. It was not merely one subject among others. It provided the ground of all others. Its basic terms were the general notions which the basic terms in other subjects made more specific. So the implications of philosophy held for all other fields, and a knowledge of philosophy constituted an entry into all other fields, and so the theological ancilla enabled the theologian to pass from his own proper domain into the domains of others.

were/ This former state of affairs cannot be restored. The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century was the rejection of Aristotelian hegemony on two main points. It was a demand for autonomy. The sciences had discovered in empirically established correlations a far more relevant and fruitful source of basic terms and relations than Aristotle's metaphysics could supply. Moreover, there/loud complaints against Aristotelian verbalism. The Posterior Analytics started out well enough by stating that we think we understand when we know the cause, know that it is the cause, and know that the effect cannot be other than it is. But this realistic beginning straightway gave place to an account of the nature and the properties of the demonstrative syllogism. Where the Scholastics argued and claimed to demonstrate, the new scientists made it a rule to entertain no questions that could not be settled by an appeal to observation or experiment.

Still if empirical science has vindicated its autonomy against the logical implications of an over-ambitious philosophy, it has been able to do so only in the name of its method. But methods vary from subject to subject and they keep developing over time. They need foundations. A philosophy that presents the foundations of methods as they are and holds out the promise of working out the foundations of methods as they may become is the new source of a needed

basic and total science. For a method is a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations that yield ongoing and cumulative results. In the general case that pattern is the pattern revealed by intentionality analysis of human cognitive and deliberative activities. By appropriating the reality of his own consciously dynamic being the philosopher is in possession of the entry into the methods of every methodically cultivated field and, as well, of the resources for bringing to light the limitations of any given method, the relations between the methods of distinct fields, the ways in which particular methods may be further developed.

It is of utmost importance to advert to the essential difference between the old and the new basic and total science. The old was related to other sciences as the general to the particular in the familiar logical fashion. The new is related to other sciences only through the experiential, intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness of persons who (1) consciously perform the operations of the particular method and (2) in this performance advert to the general pattern that is immanent in the particular.

This essential difference involves special techniques in the formation of those learning this approach; but to this topic we return in #4.21.

From the essential difference there follows the special significance of the proposal. It is a proposal to add to specialists the new category of generalists, and in that category to distinguish between minor, major, and full generalists. Minor generalists are specialists in two or more cognate fields: thus among the natural scientists, besides physicists, chemists, biologists, there also are physical chemists, biophysicists, and biochemists. Similarly, in human studies besides psychology and sociology there is social psychology, besides researchers, exegetes, historians, critics there is an easy though often partial shifting of roles as exegetes revert to textual criticism, historians to interpretation of documents, and both exegetes and historians to the criticism of their own and others' views.

Major generalists are concerned with the relations between different sets of cognate disciplines. Such would be the

unsettled relations between the natural sciences and human studies, between human studies that aim at general conclusions (sociology, psychology) and human studies that are concerned to reconstruct the particular constructions of the human spirit down the ages (interpretation, history). To the same area belong investigations of the notion of value-free science, of the relation between judgments of fact and judgments of value, of the possibility of a method that was empirical yet led to a discernment between true and mistaken judgments of value. See my Method in Theology, ch. 10.

The full generalist finally would possess some specialist competence both in the mathematical and natural sciences and in human studies. He would have conducted an intentionality analysis of his own operations in both these notably distinct fields. On that philosophic basis he could provide help and direction to minor and major generalists.

by one/ It is time to return to the question put in #4.11: Is there a necessary (minimum) content for the philosophical studies to be done/who will be a priest and a Jesuit?

I began by urging that, what is necessary for any individual will depend on the community in which he works. The basic reason for this is that modern sciences and disciplines have their locus not in the mind of the individual but in the relevant scientific community; further, that the totality of such sciences and disciplines have their locus in the overall interdisciplinary community; finally, that this overall community attains its unity through its generalists, minor, major, and full.

Now in a group in which generalists are simply lacking, there arises the problem presented by Edmund Husserl in his Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften, namely, that the more specialized and so the more subdivided any field becomes, the greater is the danger that it will be guided not by any philosophic foundation but by the conventions of a clique. Moreover, were any philosopher to attempt to remedy this sad situation, his proposals would be regarded as the fruit of some other convention-ridden clique and so of no relevance to the cliques already in existence.

the/ It follows that a basic and total science will be effective in a community only when a sufficient number and variety of generalists exist in the community and are accepted by the community. It further follows that once such an effective number and variety of generalists is attained by a community both as a whole and in its several regions, there is much good work that can be done by/inclusion within the community of specialists who are not generalists and of non-specialists who from the nature of the case cannot be generalists. For among Christians and particularly among Jesuits a lack of competence can always be supplemented by the humility of those that are ready to respect and follow competent leadership.

Hence, I should say that the minimum necessary requirement is not so much philosophic training as basic human training that issues in intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. By religious conversion, which is basic, I mean the acceptance of God's gift of his love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us (Rom 5, 5). By moral conversion I mean the determination to guide one's decisions not by satisfactions but by values, by what is worth while. By intellectual conversion I mean an understanding of the difference between the world of immediacy, in which the infant lives, and the world mediated by meaning and motivated by values, into which the child, the adolescent, the adult gradually enters. Further, I mean not only an understanding of the difference but also a grasp of all the symptoms of infantile regression, which takes the real to be the immediate, and the meaningful to be the unreal or abstract or controversial etc.

4.12

The modern world has been dominated first by one and now by another theory of the dynamics of history. From the eighteenth century came the liberal doctrine of progress. From the nineteenth came the Marxian doctrine of dialectical materialism.

It is my conviction that if Catholics and in particular Jesuits are to live and operate on the level of the times, they must not only know about theories of history but also work out their own dynamics. The eternal precepts of the moral law, while rich and detailed in prohibitions, are of

are of extreme generality in their positive content. The consequence is that, unless we thematize the historical dynamic of Christian living in this world, we shall be like the gallant Polish cavalry, armed with machine guns, waging an unequal battle against opposing tanks.

Elsewhere and at some length I have indicated the main lines of this dynamic. It is dialectical in the sense that a dialectic emerges in the concrete, in action, and in contradiction. It unfolds in three successive approximations. The first approximation determines what happens when people are ever attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible. The second approximation adds what happens in so far as people are inattentive, or obtuse, or unreasonable, or irresponsible. The third approximation raises the question of the conditions of recovery or redemption.

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The first approximation is progress. There is cyclic and cumulative process that results as concrete situations give rise to insights by which are grasped new courses of action; the new courses of action change the existing situation; and the changed situation gives rise to still further insights that bring to light the defects of earlier procedures and the manner in which the defects may be remedied. So the cycle keeps turning and at each turn the mistaken elements in earlier enterprise are corrected and better undertakings are discovered.

The second approximation is decline. For the first approximation can result only if people really are attentive to the results of previous action, only if they are intelligent in devising remedies for previous mistakes, only if they are reasonable and responsible in their decisions to act and to cooperate. But such attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility are distorted or even blocked by the egoism of individuals and groups and by the bias of practical men of common sense who mistakenly suppose themselves to be omniscient, scorn the warnings of those who take a longer view, become involved in short-sighted and even contradictory projects. For in the measure that men are inattentive, obtuse, unreasonable, irresponsible, both their actions and the resulting situations will be equally marked by unintelligibility

and irrationality. The more unintelligible and irrational situations become, the less possible becomes the emergence of new insights, for all that intelligence can grasp in the situation is its lack of intelligibility. With creativity blocked, the body social becomes the victim of warring egoisms and blundering short-sightedness. Amoralism raises its ugly head. It proposes to be practical, to be effective, to get things done. It sets aside the final causes of the moralists and appeals to the efficient causes of modern science. Such science in politics, in economics, in warfare turns out to be techniques of oppression and liquidation: it is the liquidation of the opponents of Machiavelli's Principe; the liquidation of the feudal remnants blocking the full expansion of bourgeois liberalism; the liquidation of the bourgeoisie to provide a discontented intelligentsia the opportunity to mastermind the dictatorship of the proletariat.

There remains the third approximation. Liquidation of individuals, of classes, of nations, does not go to the root of the matter, for the problem keeps recurring as long as inattentiveness, obtuseness, unreasonableness, irresponsibility continue producing and augmenting the objective social surd. What alone goes to the root of the problem is the new man, converted intellectually, morally, religiously. For the new man will have to be a man of faith, for reason that takes its stand on violence has destroyed its credibility. He will have to be a man of hope, for only hope can release people from the hopelessness of warring egoisms and blundering-shortsightedness. He will have to love God above all and to love his fellows as himself, for even-handed justice becomes merely destructive once injustice has penetrated the fabric of a society.

Cf. Insight, pp. 217-244; 627-630; 688-703; 718-748.

foregoing/ The/analysis proceeds in terms of ultimates: the conditions of possibility of the actual human person are attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility; the contradictory to these conditions is inattentiveness, obtuseness, unreasonableness, irresponsibility; man's salvation even in this life is the other-worldliness of the theological virtues of faith, hope, charity.

Now both the liberal doctrine of progress and the communist doctrine of dialectical materialism stand in explicit disregard of other-worldliness. The liberal is a secularist keeping the church out of politics and religion out of education. The Marxist is a militant atheist. From the nature of the case their doctrines, apart from incidental exceptions, can be no more than some compound of progress and decline.

In the liberal position this compound may be discerned in Adam Smith's metaphor of the "invisible hand" that produces a harmonious synthesis out of the manifold and independent initiatives of capitalist enterprise. One element in this principle of synthesis is what in Insight (chapters 4 and 8) I have named emergent probability,^(*) which, as it functions

(*) Briefly: there are combinations of both classical and statistical laws which yield a conditioned series of probably emerging and probably surviving schemes of recurrence and within the ecologies so provided, a further conditioned series of probably emerging and probably surviving subatomic particles, atoms, compounds, molecules, crystals, larger bodies, plant and animal species. Granted sufficiently large numbers and sufficiently long intervals of time, even the least probable entities attain a notable probability. Finally, specifically human process emerges inasmuch as human intelligence (1) takes advantage of the products and schemes of recurrence of natural process and (2) discovers or invents in the potentialities of nature further schemes of recurrence of its own. Capitalist initiative is the discovery and the implementation of economic schemes of recurrence; and in so far as the discoveries rest on the potentialities of natural process and the discoverers also have some knowledge of what their predecessors have done and their contemporaries are doing, there is a certain probability that the metaphorical "invisible hand" will produce a harmonious synthesis of enterprises.

in natural process, so also is extended by further schemes of recurrence discovered and implemented by human ingenuity. The other element, however, in the actual working of Smith's

the/ "invisible hand" is that the motivation for the capitalist process was entrusted to "enlightened self-interest," i.e. an interest which very easily was interpreted as "really profitable" and eventually degenerated into/normative criterion of maximizing profits. So the capitalist process was handed over to individual and group egoism; egoism is a bias that generates inattention, obtuseness, unreasonableness, social irresponsibility; and what appeared to be a "scientifically" efficient and efficacious motivation, in fact was simply an engine of decline.

the/ A similar compound of progress and decline may be discerned in the Marxian position. Basically Marx was reacting against his predecessors and, while his reacting was sound, his implementation was faulty. First, from Hegelian idealism he moved to world historical praxis. This was a real advance but its benefit was compromised by Marx's elementary confusion of realism with materialism. Secondly, he turned the Hegelian dialectic upside down; but while the Hegelian dialectic was unsatisfactory, what it needed was to be turned inside out; so far from introducing movement into logic, logical operations had simply to be incorporated within the larger context of methodical operations. Thirdly, he had a sound and, as it would seem, original intuition into the real nature of capitalist profit, but he expressed it emotionally and confusedly in terms of exploitation and surplus value. Its accurate expression is in macroeconomic terms, e. g., M. Kalecki, Selected Essays on the Dynamics of Capitalist Economy, Cambridge University Press 1971, especially chapters 1 - 4. Finally, he has become world-famous because communism has come to dominate many great peoples, but this, it happens, is the crude communism that "... would cause Marx, if he could see it, to pronounce his favorite four-letter word," if I may cite the remark of Eric Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution, Durham N. C.: Duke University Press, 1975, p. 245. On the Marxian notions of "socialistic man" and of "crude and true communism," see ibid. pp. 288-291.

In the light of the foregoing we may turn to the question, "Is a thorough presentation permitting an understanding of Marxism an essential element in the preparation of priests today?"

Let me say:

- (1) that a thorough presentation is to be given specialists in the philosophic shift from theory to praxis, in political theory, in economic theory,
- (2) that these presentations, unless they occur within an explicit and well understood theological context, will be not Christian but secularist,
- (3) that it is both desirable and necessary that as many candidates as possible should be taught
 - (a) a philosophy that moves easily and spontaneously from theory to praxis,
 - (b) that the praxis envisaged be, not the logical application of universals to particulars, but the positive dynamic of human creativity and freedom in which men individually make themselves and collectively make the world in which they live,
 - (c) that such a positive dynamic is still-born, whether it fails to acknowledge man's need of the grace of Christ Jesus our Lord, or it makes a principle/ the evils of egoism and of arrogance, or it is uninformed by fully up-to-date technical knowledge of economics, of political theory, of philosophic praxis,
 - (d) that in the past perhaps the chief failing of Catholics has been the lack of technical knowledge and, indeed, the lack of awareness of the need of technical knowledge. See Christian Duquoc, Ambiguïté des théologies de la sécularisation, Gembloux: Duculot, 1972, pp. 103-128.
 - (e) that particular significance attaches to Eric Voegelin's five-volume study of Order and History, inasmuch as the first three volumes thought of history as linear development, the fourth volume begins by renouncing this attempt and shifting to the view that the locus of real significance lies in the movements of spiritual renovation that recur sporadically. Confer Arnold Toynbee's shift from a center in civilizations in his first six volumes of A Study of History to a center in world religions in his last four volumes.

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4.13

We have conceived philosophy in the contemporary context as the basic and total science that by its understanding of ongoing and cumulative methods provides the key both to self-appropriation and to the appropriation of one's tradition.

Self-appropriation^o is personal development from below upwards. It is (1) experiencing one's experiencing, understanding, judging, evaluating, loving, (2) understanding one's experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, evaluating, loving, (3) establishing the limits to the possibility of revising the foregoing^g understanding, (4) passing through the existential moment when one finds out for oneself that one has to decide for oneself what one is to make of oneself, and (5) ~~and~~ surrendering oneself to the invitation to let one's being be being-in-love in the threefold mode of love of those nearest one, love of one's fellow men and women, and love of God above all.

When self-appropriation culminates in the first two of the three modes of being-in-love, it is simply philosophic; when it culminates in all three, there emerges the at least anonymous Christian philosopher.

The appropriation of one's tradition is development from above downwards. It occurs in two modes. The first is spontaneous: it begins from birth and it continues pretty well up to the end of undergraduate studies. The second emerges in the measure that more and more one does things for oneself, finds out for oneself, decides for oneself. It reaches its critical moment in existential decision, and thereafter may follow the critical appropriation of one's tradition in the study of mathematics, of the natural sciences, of the generalizing human sciences, of the interpretative reconstruction of the constructions of the human spirit (the Geisteswissenschaften), and of the assembly of functional specialties constitutive of a contemporary theology.

Within this general scheme there is a manifest interdependence between the two modes of development, between self-appropriation and the appropriation of one's tradition. In particular, there can be a self-appropriation that works from the spontaneous appropriation of one's tradition; and

there can be a far more sophisticated appropriation of one's tradition if one becomes oneself a specialist in its mathematics, its natural science, its human science and human studies, and its theology. But between these two, between the undergraduate and the sophisticated appropriations of one's tradition, there is an intermediate case which is more satisfactory than the first and more generally accessible than the second. This intermediate case arises inasmuch as specialist fields can be presented in more than one manner, inasmuch as the teacher's emphasis is less on the objects of the specialty and more on the subject's operations in coming to know the objects and to deal with them. For just as a greater attention to the objects is essential to producing specialists, so a greater attention to the operations is essential to producing generalists.

Accordingly, in the appropriation of one's tradition a threefold distinction may be made. Besides the customary undergraduate courses in which teachers and students do what they can, one can distinguish between more advanced work for specialists and more advanced work for generalists. The more advanced work for specialists aims at producing specialists in mathematics, natural science, human science and human studies, or theology. The more advanced work for generalists aims at understanding the operations performed by the specialists. Its real goal is understanding the specialists' methods, but the methods can be adverted to and understood only by one oneself performing the relevant operations, and one can oneself perform the relevant operations only with respect and so attention to the relevant objects. More at #4.21.

In the light of the foregoing we can turn to the question, "What is the place (if any) of the human sciences, and their relationship to the study of philosophy?"

If the philosopher is the generalist, and the generalist is the man who can reenact in himself and so understand the methodical operations of the specialists, then clearly the human sciences have their contribution to make. Indeed, the omission of any of the larger divisions of special study would lead to ignorance of the methods employed in that division, and such ignorance throwing out of proportion and

out of balance the generalist view of his own field.

It remains that different subjects have different contributions to make. Mathematics provides an ideal starting-point, because mathematicians have a full awareness of the presuppositions and implications of their statements; because their basic concepts form closed sets in which basic relations are implicitly defined by basic terms and, vice versa, basic terms are implicitly defined by basic relations; because the fact of insight and its pivotal importance is dramatically illustrated by the logical defects of Euclid's Elements and by the elaborate rituals of formalization that are needed if no unformulated insights are to be inadvertently introduced.

Next come the natural sciences and primarily physics. Where mathematics illustrates the crystallization of developing understanding, physics illustrates understanding in process of development. There come to light the nature and function of heuristic structures, the differentiation of statistical from classical heuristic anticipations, the possibility of combining classical and statistical laws to yield schemes of recurrence and of arranging schemes of recurrence in conditioned series in which the emergence of earlier schemes increases the probability of emergence and of survival of later schemes to yield the already mentioned world view of emergent probability.

Thirdly, there comes for consideration the spontaneous development of human intelligence, that may be named common sense, that differs from the methodical developments of mathematics and science not only by its spontaneity and its universality but also by its greater or less admixture of common nonsense. Now what is common to all instances of common sense is not content but procedure. It is not content for the common sense of one village is slightly different from the common sense of the next; the common sense of one region is strange to the common sense of another; while the common sense of another country and language is simply the oddity of foreigners. What is common is a spontaneous learning, learning by watching others and imitating them, learning by the trial and error of inadequate insight, learning by make-believe play and by work, learning by coming to master

the ordinary language of one's place and time.

Fourthly, there are the interpretative reconstructions of the constructions of the human spirit. The constructions of the human spirit are the world of nature as mediated by cognitive meaning, the world of man as constituted by the meaning man gives to his own living, that is, by man's existential self-understanding, and finally the world of both man and nature as modified or transformed by the operative meanings that guide human action. By and large, such meaning is just commonsense meaning and only in the obvious cases is it the product of mathematical or scientific or philosophic method. Hence the reconstruction of such meaning is by an extension of common sense, by the opening up and reaching out of one's own spontaneously developed common sense to include within itself the commonsense assumptions, the commonsense way of speech, the commonsense style of action of quite another place and time. Such is the work of the linguist, the antiquary, the researcher, the exegete, the historian.

Now as one's own common sense, so also one's reconstruction of the common sense of other places and times is a spontaneous development of intelligence. It is not an explicitly formulated and regulated procedure, as that of the mathematician or of the natural scientist. It follows that its assumptions with regard to knowledge and reality, with regard to morals and religion, will coincide with the assumptions already functioning in one's own common sense. There results a twofold relativity: there can be a divergence between investigator's assumptions and those of the persons or groups being investigated; and there can be a further divergence between the investigator's assumptions and the truth about knowledge, reality, morality, religion.

So it was that in my Method in Theology, after a seventh chapter on interpretation and after eighth and ninth chapters on history, there was introduced a tenth chapter on dialectic in an attempt to work out something like a methodical procedure for dealing with philosophic, ethical, and religious differences.

The reality of this problem may be illustrated by the relativism, to which Wilhelm Dilthey's disciple, Ernst Troeltsch, appears to have succumbed, or by the radical lack of commitment

that Leo Strauss has criticized in Max Weber. Strauss wrote:

I contend that Weber's thesis necessarily leads to nihilism or to the view that every preference, however evil, base, or insane, has to be judged before the tribunal of reason to be as legitimate as any other preference. An unmistakable sign of this necessity is supplied by a statement of Weber about the prospects of Western civilization. He saw this alternative: either a spiritual renewal ("wholly new prophets or a powerful renaissance of old thoughts and ideals") or else "mechanized petrification, varnished by a kind of convulsive sense of self-importance," i. e., the extinction of every human possibility but that of "specialists without spirit or vision and voluptuaries without heart." Confronted with this alternative, Weber felt that the decision in favor of either possibility would be a judgment of value or of faith, and hence beyond the competence of reason. Natural Right and History, Chicago University Press 1953, p. 42.

Clearly Strauss and Weber do not agree. No less clearly, their basic divergence is on the range of the competence of reason. Weber considers judgments of value or faith to be beyond the competence of reason. Strauss considers reason to be omniscient and so concludes to the nihilism of a position that regards good and evil preferences to be equally legitimate before the tribunal of reason.

On this issue I personally have changed my position. In Insight I viewed the good metaphysically as the intelligible. But in Method in Theology time enters into the picture: there is the intelligible that already exists and already is good; there is also the intelligible that is the object of deliberation, /evaluation, of a choice that is yet to be; it is the object not of judgments of fact but only of judgments of value; and the two types of judgment differ radically.

Hence, I should say that Weber and Strauss are speaking of "reason" in quite different senses. Strauss thinks of reason in terms of the very traditional view that "bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse." Weber thinks of reason in terms of empirical science, and he knows that empirical science does not teach morality or ground faith.

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