

scientific revolution by combatting it, first in the name of the inspiration of scripture against Galileo, then in the name of Aristotle, and finally in the hope of working out a viable Neoscholasticism. But if many have given up on Neoscholasticism, few draw the necessary conclusion that logic is only the static and partial component within the larger dynamic whole, method, and that method is to be subsumed, not under a static metaphysics, but under a dynamic yet basically invariant cognitional theory.

Again, we have acknowledged the historical revolution, first, by tolerating the employment of its techniques in patristic and medieval studies, then by admitting them into the study of ecclesiastical, doctrinal, theological history, and finally by allowing their relevance to scriptural studies. But if not a few will repeat that man is a historical being, few perhaps really understand the implications of this statement: for if man is a historical being, then understanding man is not understanding an abstract nature but understanding a concrete history.

But to this point we return in #4.12 below.

3.1 My answer to this question is somewhat complex. For it can be in the light of what I think of the nature of philosophy (and of theology) only if I begin from the nature of religion (3.11), its relation to culture (3.12), variations in culture (3.13), variations in philosophy (3.14), variation in the need of philosophy (3.15), the contemporary crisis in the Society (3.16).

3.11 Only the needs of preaching the gospel to all nations could justify a claim that philosophy was a necessary part of preparation for the priesthood and/or the training of a Jesuit.

Moreover, the gospels themselves and the early history of the church and much of its expansion reveal that philosophical study is not an intrinsic constituent of the Christian religion in its foundations, which are Christ his apostles and prophets, or in its ongoing tradition, which has molded its history.

It is clear, however, that incidentally in the writings of the Fathers and systematically since the rise of Scholasticism philosophy has played an important role in Catholic thought and

teaching and, consequently, in the formation of its future thinkers and teachers.

The question before us, as I understand it, arises from the breakdown of Neoscholasticism since Vatican II, from the consequences of the general failure to find any substitute for it, from the general dis-ease brought about by these consequences.

Personally I must say that I consider these consequences of the utmost seriousness. What Scholasticism achieved for the middle ages was that "aliqua mysteriorum intelligentia eaque fructuosissima" (DS 3016) that enabled Catholics to find the mysteries in some manner meaningful. What the breakdown of Scholasticism has entailed, is that the mysteries of faith, beginning from the Incarnation and the Trinity, are found meaningless; they are pronounced meaningless in their traditional formulation by the bold; they are left undefended by any general consensus because the theoretical basis of consensus no longer exists.

3.12

There is, then, de facto an intimate connection between the mysteries of faith and some form of philosophy. There are those who place this connection in the blunder of the Council of Trent that imposed upon the Roman Church a number of philosophic opinions as though they were matters of faith. Others find the blunder at an earlier stage, suggesting that the Council of Nicea introduced into Christianity a Heideggerian forgetfulness of being, that is, a formula that included such forgetfulness along with biblical teaching. Cf. Bernhard Welte, 'Die Lehrformel von Nikaia und die abendländische Metaphysik,' in Zur Frühgeschichte der Christologie, Quaestiones disputatae 51, Freiburg: Herder, 1970. Pp. 100-117, specifically p. 115.

Such views seem to me to involve the fallacy of many questions. I would prefer to begin from the relation between religion and culture (3.12) then turn to the variations in culture (3.13) to the variations in philosophy (3.14) and so to variations in the need of philosophy in religious formation.

Now in our revealed religion there is the interaction of an internal component, divine grace, and an external component, divine revelation. Divine grace is the result of God's immediate action upon the life of the individual.

As an immediate action it is not mediated and so varied by differences in human culture. In contrast, divine revelation is God's entry into the world of man as mediated by meaning: it is mediated through the successive strata of Hebrew religion and language, through the later Aramaic, through the diversity of Palestinian, Syriac, Greek, and Latin Christians, through the whole subsequent expansion of the church. As soon as any part of the church either ascends to its own past or moves outward to other parts, it discovers cultural diversity and, unless it can also discover identity in differences, it will find itself impelled to conclude to religious diversity. What holds for its own past and for its present contemporaries, also is a factor in its projects for further religious expansion. Preaching the gospel to each class in each of the many cultures of the world primarily is a matter of finding in the ways of thought and speech of those classes and cultures either what corresponds to Christian meaning or else can be transformed by some sort of metaphorical usage into such Christian meaning.

In brief, the one religion is diffused and developed, not by imposing a single language and culture upon mankind, but by a transcultural creativity that finds or invents new expressions for the ongoing life of the Holy Spirit in the church.

3.13

This unity in multiplicity and diversity partly became obscured and partly counteracted by the classicist notion of a single standard culture for the whole of 'cultured' mankind. But from a philosophic viewpoint such classicism knows about human nature but ignores human historicity. It argues that men are instances of a nature that remains ever the same, that human problems and their solutions are ever substantially the same, that any contrary view expresses the depravity of an itch for novelty.

But while there is a measure of fundamental truth in such contentions, they are not the whole truth. The many cultures of mankind have developed under different circumstances, in different manners, at different rates, with varying degrees of success and failure, of authenticity and aberration. The many lines of development of the many cultures each

yield social units that are not uniform and standardized but multiform and stratified. Similarly, the individuals in the strata are not so many replicas the ideal type proper to the respective strata but rather so many variants that in varying degrees participate in its excellences and its defects.

of/ A full account of such diversity would be a cultural history of the human race. But what is relevant for our discussion of philosophic diversity is a relatively simple matter that distinguishes six differentiations of consciousness, six different ways/moving towards knowledge of one's world and orienting oneself within it, and consequently six major cultural differences.

The first is ordinary language. It is unknown as yet to the infant who perforce lives, not in a world mediated by language, but in a world of immediacy. On the other hand, ordinary languages are a vast multiplicity. Some are spelt out in alphabets, catalogued in dictionaries, regularized to some extent by grammars, enshrined in literary compositions. But all this is subject to endless variation, while living language, actual usage, is ever on the move. Such language is what enables the child to learn at home and from his peers. It is the medium by which he learns at school. It is the vehicle through which he is introduced to other domains whose meanings lie beyond the resources from which ordinary language springs.

A second differentiation is the pneumatic. For Eric Voegelin this primarily is illustrated by Hebraic religion. For a theologian that held that God gives all men sufficient grace for salvation and that for salvation the one sufficient grace is charity (1 Cor 13), the pneumatic differentiation of consciousness emerges in all those that accept God's gift of grace and live by his Spirit.

A third differentiation is the noetic. Again, for Voegelin this is the differentiation that emerged with Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. With Plato it involves the duality of the world of the Ideas and the world of phenomena. With Aristotle the duality remains but it is reconciled by the distinction between what is prior for us, the objects of sense, and what is prior in itself, the causes discovered by intelligence. Just as the

pneumatic differentiation of consciousness brings about the Pauline separation between the spiritual and the unspiritual man (1 Cor 2, 11-16), so the Greek distinction between the world of ordinary language (common sense) and the world of philosophic language and discovery brings about a further differentiation of consciousness. As the unspiritual man does not fathom what the spiritual life is about, so too the man in the street is mystified by philosophy.

A fourth differentiation is the late fruit of modern science. While the scientists of the seventeenth century liberated themselves from the graver impediments of Aristotelian theory of science, it was only the work of Riemann, of Einstein, of Heisenberg that brought about a full liberation. The symbolic expression of that liberation has become Eddington's two tables: to common sense his table was solid, continuous, heavy, with the familiar colors and contours; but to the scientific mind the same table was mostly empty space with here and there an entity now conceived as a particle and again conceived as a wave.

A fifth differentiation is the historical. As formulated by August Boeckh, it aims at the interpretative reconstruction of the constructions of mankind. Where nature operates in accord with natural laws, man by his intelligence constructs the forms of his activities, by his value judgments discriminates between possible alternatives, by his freedom and responsibility brings about the courses of action of his good pleasure. Where the natural scientist by his intelligence discovers what in nature is intelligible but not intelligent, the human scientist by his intelligence has the task of reconstructing what the intelligence of other men already has constructed and realized. So there arise the distinction formulated by Wilhelm Dilthey between the Natur- and the Geisteswissenschaften.

A sixth differentiation is the methodical. Its prehistory lies in efforts to set forth systematically the nature of scientific knowledge, and in this the high point is perhaps Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Its emergence occurs when inquiry shifts from the nature and goal of science to the procedures to be followed when one is doing science. So modern natural science came out of Francis Bacon's concern

with practical results, Galileo's directive that nature was to be mathematized, the Royal Society's rule that no questions were to be entertained that could not be resolved by an appeal to observation or experiment. However, the mere fact that a set of methodical rules is formulated, put into practice, gains the prestige of success, also implies that it advances in clarity and precision and by that very advance reveals its inherent limitations. So it was that on the basis of the work of the German Historical School in the nineteenth century Dilthey was able to formulate the distinction between natural science and human studies. Finally, the mere existence of two rather disparate types of method gives rise to more fundamental views that reflect on method and pronounce on the nature of human knowledge. So positivists claim that all valid human knowledge is the product of the methods of natural science. So relativists conclude from the priority and multiplicity of Weltanschauungen that human knowledge is never simply true, never more than what can be expected from within a given world view. So the field of human studies is divided in accord with the different lights of metamethodological views. Behaviorists would study men as they study animals. Clinical psychologists know that man is significantly different but divide and subdivide as their basic assumptions and procedures differ. In sociology there have been distinguished the behaviorist, the functionalist, the voluntarist, and the intentionalist (phenomenological) schools. In hermeneutics and history solid achievement is marred by basic ambiguities that can be resolved only by going back to their origins in philosophic opinions and doing for philosophic thought what hitherto the philosophers have not succeeded in doing for themselves.

The six differentiations each involve radical differences: (1) there are the infants that do not speak and are confined to a world of immediacy, (2) there are those that do speak and live in a world mediated by meanings that are ordinary in the sense that they are this-worldly, (3) there are those whom religion pulls beyond the meanings of everyday, (4) there are those whose wonder advances them from the love of myth

to that love of wisdom named philosophy, (5) there is the new science of the modern world and (6) man's new historical apprehension of his being and, finally, (7) there are those that combine two or more of these differentiations and so are led to reflect upon them, to investigate their compatibility, their complementarity, their validity, their relative merits. In this fashion philosophy finds a new basis, a new set of questions, a new style, a more concrete relevance.

3.14

So we come to variations in philosophy. It rises out of Presocratic profundity in the movement that originated with Socrates, flowered with Plato, culminated with Aristotle.

In Aquinas one may find both the conjunction of the noetic differentiation with the pneumatic and, as well, the sharp separation of the latter from the former. The conjunction appears in his theological works. The sharp separation emerges in that intensification of his spiritual life that led him to set theological endeavor aside and regard his achievements as straw.

As there are differentiations of consciousness, so too there are deformations of the differentiations. Such deformations of course are numerous enough, but the one most relevant to our purpose has been described by Konstanty Michalski in his La philosophie au xiv^e siècle: six études, edited and introduced by Kurt Flasch, Frankfurt: Minerva, 1969. My surmise is that this deformation had its root in an over-zealous devotion to Aristotle's logical works and an incomprehension of the far more supple and nuanced procedures of other works.

The genesis of modern science was involved in a contest against Aristotle, and the object of their reproach is found at its clearest in the Posterior Analytics. The new scientists wanted to deal not with words but with reality. In the Posterior Analytics we find that Aristotle began by stating that we think we understand when we know the cause, know that it is the cause, and know that the effect cannot be other than it is. Clearly he is concerned with reality. But forthwith he mediates concern with reality by concern with his scientific syllogism, and thereafter he is setting forth a theory of