

scientific revolution by fighting against it, in the name of the inspiration of scripture, then in the name of Aristotle, and finally in the hope of working out a viable Neoscholasticism. But if many have given up on Neoscholasticism, few draw the necessary conclusion that logic is but a minor part and the static component in a dynamic method, and that method is to be subsumed not under a static metaphysics but under a dynamic cognitional theory.

Again, we have acknowledged the historical revolution, first, by tolerating the employment of its techniques in patristic and medieval studies, then by admitting them into ecclesiastical and theological history, and finally by allowing their relevance to scriptural studies. But if not a few will repeat that man is a historical being, few perhaps really understand the implication of this statement: for if man is a historical being, then understanding man is not understanding an abstract nature but understanding a concrete history.

To this point we return in #4.12 below.

3.1

This question is to be considered, I believe, not on the basis of abstract and a priori analysis, but on the basis of historical tradition.

In the Greek Orthodox Church, I have been told, the priests are farmers and theology is taught by laymen in the universities.

Considerable support that the Roman Catholic Church and the Jesuit order should adopt the Greek model could be obtained both from anticlerical sentiment and from the egalitarian mass-mind. Further support is to be expected from one-sided appeals to the example of the apostles, the saints, the martyrs, the uncounted priests and Jesuits who did great things for Christ without any philosophy and little theology beyond the catechism.

However, success in the foreign missions has been quite limited. Fruits on the home front have become more and more a diaspora if not a ghetto. And if the theology and philosophy of the Catholic past have failed to keep living on the level of the times, one also has to ask whether this failure is a good thing and, if not, what is its source.

The existence of this questionnaire and the projected committee meeting in September 1977 suggest that the failure is not a good thing.

If this suggestion be accepted, then another may be added. The failure seems connected with a simplistic classicism that knows about human nature but ignores human historicity. In effect, it assumes that man is not a historical being but an instance of a nature that remains ever the same, that human problems and their solutions are ever substantially the same, that any contrary view expresses the depravity of an itch for novelty.

While a relativist historicism is to be rejected, the recognition of man's historicity is a recognition that human cultures differ, that they develop under different circumstances, in different manners, at different rates, with varying degrees of success, with contrasting results. Moreover, as cultures, so individuals too within each culture do not all attain the highest achievement of the culture but participate in that achievement in varying degrees with a consequent stratification of the community.

Such diversity was known to St. Paul who acknowledged many members in the one body of Christ and diverse gifts and functions in the members. It still was true when the Society of Jesus was founded and the uomo universale was the expression of the human ideal. But such diversity is still more complex at the present time. Aristotle conceived science as a habit to be tucked inside the mind of an individual, but today no one man knows the whole of mathematics, no one knows the whole of physics, no one knows the whole of scripture, no one knows the whole of theology. Science today resides not in the individual but in the scientific community. The curriculum of all the sciences resides in a still larger body, in the interdisciplinary community that emerges when the several scientific communities supplement one another's findings, correct and qualify their conclusions, seek an integration of the results obtained in different fields.

Accordingly, I would say that in our age of specialization in which single subjects such as philosophy, theology, divide and subdivide, in which effective knowledge resides not in individuals but in scientific communities and ultimately in the interdisciplinary community, under such circumstances the important thing is to ask, not what each priest or Jesuit

is to be taught, but rather how to provide each region and each higher cultural unity with the set of specially trained men that will collaborate effectively (both through their personal attainments and through their respect for the attainments of their peers) in dealing with the issues that arise in their region and, again, in each of the higher cultural unities to which the regions belong.

So we are led to ask, What are the issues with which they will have to deal. Obviously there are the issues that arise in preaching the gospel to all nations. But these issues are manifold and diverse, as manifold and diverse as the great world cultures, as the stratification within the great cultures, as the multiplicity of preliterate peoples and those barely beyond their attainment.

To conclude, my answer to question #3.1 would be to distinguish between an invariant core requirement for every priest and Jesuit and, on the other hand, a variable complement that was a function of the culture of the people he was to serve and the range of decisions with which he might be entrusted.

The core I would place in intellectual, moral, and religious conversion: intellectual conversion I would conceive as a grasp of the differences of the world of immediacy (in which the infant lives) and the world mediated by meaning (which varies with one's command of languages, of sciences, of history, &c.); moral conversion I would conceive as the transition from a life motivated by satisfactions to a life motivated by values; religious conversion I would place in the acceptance of God's gift of his love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us.

The variable component I would place in a grasp of the implications of the foregoing (a) in terms of the culture of the people one serves and (b) within the scope of the decisions to be entrusted to one and (c) with the expectation of help from the scientific and interdisciplinary communities to which directly or indirectly one has access.

May I note that I believe that the root of philosophic problems lies in confusing the world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning, that the root of moral problems lies in allowing satisfactions to interfere with judgements of value,

and that the effective acceptance of all values comes with the acceptance of God's gift of his love (Rom 5, 5).

The variable requirement results from the startification within cultural regions, the diversity of different regions, the diversity of levels of competence for dealing with the issues of cultural classes and regions and, further, of the relationships between diverse cultures.

Finally this attention to cultural diversity comes from my conception of theology as mediating between a religion and a culture.

3.2

I have outlined the various different manners in which theological study stands in need of philosophical studies in a paper, 'Philosophy and Theology,' read before the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Easter week 1970, printed in the Proceedings of the Association, 46 (1970) 19-30, and reprinted in my A Second Collection (London and Philadelphia 1974) pp. 193 - 208.

I have devoted three lectures to the differences between the teaching of philosophy to future priests who will study theology and to future laymen not expected to study theology in my Philosophy of God and Theology (London and Philadelphia 1973).

4.11

I should say that the necessary minimum content of philosophical studies to be done by one who will be a priest and a Jesuit would be a compound of the core component, which is invariant, and of the variable component as determined by the candidates' probable or possible future work and office.

However, I do not believe that attending to minimal requirements satisfies the Jesuit ideal or does justice to the capacity and potentiality of candidates. Ad maiorem Dei gloriam means ever greater achievement, and we shall aim at that by promoting all possible excellence.

Just last month I was reminded of this when visited by a young black from South Africa (where blacks are not thought to enjoy a privileged status). He questioned me about my thought pertinently and very intelligently for a notable period of time, and he grasped my answers with ease.

Hence, while I am ready to grant that there is no point in teaching philosophy to candidates who will not profit from it yet may prove to be useful priests and Jesuits, still my main contention is that they can prove useful only if they are loyal members of a larger community that commands their unquestioning respect and is fully competent to provide them with a leadership and direction that they are incapable of securing from their own resources.

It is here that we touch upon what seems to me the basic weakness of the contemporary Society. Constitutionally and historically its leadership was confided to its professed members. Yet in my fifty-four years as a Jesuit I have witnessed an every increasing disregard and ridicule of the profession, and this progress culminated in the open hostility to the profession and the attempt to abolish it in CG 32.

Now I think the grounds for this hostility are patent. The profession, perhaps especially as it had come to be conceived in the course of the nineteenth century, had ceased to be a vehicle for genuine leadership. It was a carry-over from the Renaissance ideal of the uomo universale into an age that increasingly was an age of specialists. It was odious to Jesuits who were specialists in their respective fields but not professed. It was an occasion of amusement to Jesuits who were both professed and themselves specialists. It was odious to some and amusing to others, not because of their pride, but because it had in its specific implementation become an anachronism. Once it had provided the Society with an institutional instrument for leadership. But in its actual functioning it had become the vehicle for perpetuating a respectable incapacity for understanding the scientific and historical revolutions, for grasping their radical character, for opening minds to more than piecemeal concessions towards dealing with the ever graver problems of the twentieth century.

Now to deal with those problems will demand specialists, but specialists alone are not enough. There also are needed generalists, and if I borrow Ludwig von Bertalanffy's word, I do not wish to employ it in his predominantly mathematical meaning. I would use it to denote the interdisciplinary middlemen that have a basic understanding of diverse specialties,

grasp their respective procedures, techniques, achievements, limitations, succeed in relating them to one another both from the viewpoint of cognitional operations and from the viewpoint of objective results.

From the latter viewpoint serious beginnings appear to have been made both within the field of non-living things and with regard to the transition from the non-living to the living; see Howard H. Pattee, Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of Complex Systems, New York: Braziller, 1973. Again, clinical psychology from the beginning of this century has been concerned with the interface between conscious and non-conscious human processes. Further the theory of emergent probability worked out in my book, Insight, see index s. v., and complemented by Philip McShane in his Randomness, Statistics and Emergence (Dublin and London: Gill and Macmillan, 1970) provides a basic scheme recurrent (1) in cosmic evolution from the subatomic order through atoms, molecules, crystals, /to the largest bodies of matter, (2) in the emergence of living forms and their ecologies, and (3) in the "invisible hand," discerned by Adam Smith in the spontaneous harmony of independent human initiatives, but relevant to the whole process of human discovery and development.

solids, /

As integration from the viewpoint of results is concerned with objects, so integration from the viewpoint of operations is concerned with subjects. Here the basic division is between cognate and disparate aggregates. Thus physics, chemistry, and biology in all their ramifications have developed procedures and criteria that involve essentially only operations on the levels of experience, understanding, and judgment

grasp their respective procedures, techniques, achievements, limitations, succeed in relating them to one another both from the viewpoint of cognitional operations and from the viewpoint of assured results, and thereby reveal their interdependence and complementarity and so liberate simple specialists from the illusion that they and they alone have the last word on everything pertaining to their field. Such "generalists" do not exist merely in science fiction. Work in the field of the non-life sciences and in the transition from non-living to living things seems to have made quite serious beginnings, as summarized in Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of Complex Systems, edited by Howard H. Pattee, New York: Braziller, 1973. Work in clinical psychology is concerned with the interface between non-conscious and conscious human process. The theory of emergent probability worked out in my book, Insight, provides a basic scheme of cosmic evolution from the subatomic through atoms, molecules, crystals, solids, to the largest bodies of matter and, again, from the lowest to the highest forms of life with their ecologies. Moreover, with man, emergent probability provides the materials for discoveries not only for making things but also for the ever better organization of human performance. See Insight, Index, s. v. Emergent probability; also Philip McShane, Randomness, Statistics and Emergence, Dublin and London: Gill and Macmillan, 1970.