

Magister Gotefridus de Fontibus, Les Philos Belges, II

Quodl. IV, q. 1 (longa), pp. 229-33

Utrum in Deo sit idea propria et distincta respectu cuiuslibetsingularis.

231: "Nec addit individuum super speciem aliquod pertinens ad rationem et essentiam eius in tali specie. Una ~~ratio~~ et eadem ~~idea~~ idea, quae est ipsius speciei per se, est et omnium individuorum sub specie."

233: "Similiter, immo multo magis [quam angelus], Deus per ideam perfecte repraesentantem naturam aliquam, sic perfecte ~~illig~~ intelligit illam ut intelligat omnia illa quae habent aliquo modo ordinem et habitudinem ad naturam illam"

"Negare enim Deum cognoscere singularia distincte est inconueniens, sed ponere quod hoc fiat per unam ideam rationale videtur."

232: reference to Augustine Ad Nebridium, Epist XIV, PL 33, 80.  
God creates man by the ratio hominis; ~~ka~~ "at ut populus fiat, quamvis et ipsa sit una ratio, non tamen hominis ~~mak~~ ratio, sed hominum."

Quodl. IV, q 2 (longa), pp 233-41

Utrum ponere res praedicamentales esse aeternas secundum esse quidditativum sit ponere mundum esse aeternum.

Quodl. IV, q 8, (longa), pp. 257-8.

Utrum voluntas humana contineat duas potentias sicut intellectus humanus.

There is need of agent intellect for material and particular to be known immaterially and universally; but spiritual apprehension by intellect suffices for act of will, no matter how this act of will is conceived.

Quodl. IV, q. 1 (longa), pp. 229-33

Utrum in Deo sit idea propria et distincta respectu cuiuslibetsingularis.

231: "Nec addit individuum super speciem aliquod pertinens ad rationem et essentiam eius in tali specie. Una ~~max~~ et eadem ~~ifex~~ idea, quae est ipsius speciei per se, est et omnium individuorum sub specie."

233: "Similiter, immo multo magis [quam angelus], Deus per ideam perfecte representantem naturam aliquam, sic perfecte ~~illig~~ intelligit illam ut intelligat omnia illa quae habent aliquo modo ordinem et habitudinem ad naturam illam"

"Negare enim Deum cognoscere singularia distincte est inconveniens, sed ponere quod hoc fiat per unam ideam rationale videtur."

232: reference to Augustine Ad Nebridium, Epist XIV, PL 33, 80.

God creates man by the ratio hominis; ~~ne~~ "at ut populus fiat, quamvis et ipsa sit una ratio, non tamen hominis ~~ex~~ ratio, sed hominum."

Quodl. IV, q 2 (longa), pp 233-41

Utrum ponere res praedicamentales esse aeternas secundum esse quidditativum sit ponere mundum esse aeternum.

Quodl. IV, q 8, (longa), pp. 257-8.

Utrum voluntas humana contineat duas potentias sicut intellectus humanus.

There is need of agent intellect for material and particular to be known immaterially and universally; but spiritual apprehension by intellect suffices for act of will, no matter how this act of will is conceived.

M. de Wulf et J. Hoffmans,  
Les Quodlibets cinq, six et sept de Godefroid de Fontaines,  
Les Philosophes Belges, Textes et Etudes, tome III,  
Louvain, 1914

Quodl. V, q. 8, pp. 29-32

Memoria.

Utrum intellectus agens sit imaginis certa pars quae dicitur //

p. 31: The transition from habitual to actual knowledge in the intellectus possibilis is effected by the agent intellect and phantasm. Hence agent intellect part of the "parens" or efficient cause of actual knowledge. cf correction of mis~~ite~~betati

In Quodl VI q 7 p 172

ibid. q 10, pp 35-40

Utrum intellectus agens efficit aliquam dispositionem circa phantasma

p. 40: "proprie loquendo actione intellectus agentis non fit aliqua dispositio formalis in ipsis phantasmatis quasi in materia sed solum fit dicta sequestratio vel arbitratio vel remotio prohibentium et huiusmodi, quo facto virtute ipsius intellectus agentis et in eius lumine fit informatio intellectus possibilis ab ipsa intellectione talis cognoscibilis sive a specie intelligibili quae aliquo modo in lumine intellectus agentis continetur virtualiter."

ibid. q. 9, pp 32-34

Utrum intellectus agens habeat operationem in aperta visione essentiae divinae.

p. 34: without agent intellect just as without possible intellect, the soul would not be capable of any act of intellection

Lumen gloriae needed in possible intellect, but grace perfects, does not supplant nature. Agent intellect needed not to illustrate object but to illustrate dispose perfect possible intellect.

Quodl. VII, q. 8, pp. 377-87

Utrum eadem cognitione cognoscatur de Deo si est et quid est.

p. 379: "... quadruplex est rei cognitio, sicut etiam quadruplex est rei entitas sive unitas, scilicet numero, specie, genere, analogia sive proportione, secundum Philosophum, quinto Metaphysicae"

p. 380: analogy includes not only ens to ens but also ens to non-ens (negation is somehow, and so ens); further, you can mean, signify, both what is and what is not; hence nominal definition according to this analogy

p. 381: knowing whether something exists is knowing something about its quiddity;

full specific knowledge supposes knowledge of existence.

"Ex his patet quod istae cognitiones, scilicet quid est nominis et si est et quid est sunt idem cum cognitionibus quibus cognoscitur aliquid vel secundum proportionem vel secundum genus vel secundum speciem. Nec sunt plures modi cognoscendi rem..."

381-382 Knowledge of individual not intellectual but sensible.

Quodl. VII, q. 11, continued.

382: Two modes of knowledge: immediate, quasi intuitive, natural, as in seeing a color and in sense knowledge generally; or else by inquiry and investigation by reasoning and discourse.

Former intuitive mode had of God in beatific vision.  
Latter, discursive mode had in this life.

383 Same knowledge in this life by which we know both  
si est Deus et quid est Deus.

Some seem to hold that all we know is truth of proposition that Deus est; but laborious investigations aim at showing more; and even Deus (? nominally defined)/is part of knowing quid est (this last p. 384)

est

384ff Argues from our analogous knowledge of God to conclusion that we know quid est Deus in this life; proceeding from more to less confused

386: "Et ex praemissis patet quomodi intelligendi sunt quidam articuli (1) ab Episcopo Parisiensi condemnati qui tamen praedictis contrarii videntur. Unus enim sic dicit: Deum in hac vita intelligere possumus per essentiam; error alius dicit: de Deo non potest cognosci nisi quia est sive ipsum esse. Error primus enim non potest stare cum secundo nisi aliquo modo distinguatur de cognitione qua cognoscibilis est Deus per essentiam et haec distinctio expraedictis satis est manifesta"

(1) Denifle et Chatelain, Chart. Univ. Paris., t. 1. Opinions ducentae undeviginti etc., n. 36, p 545 et n. 215 p. 555

Magistri Gotefridi de Fontibus, (de Wulf & J Hoffmans)

Quodl. VII, q. 5, pp. 299-336

Utrum suppositum addat aliquam rem supra essentiam vel naturam.

300 calce: "... est quaerere quomodo se habeant quidditas et habens quidditatem ad invicem, ut per quidditatem intelligatur essentia, per habens quidditatem suppositum."

301 med: "... utrum homo addat aliquid supra humanitatem et hic homo supra hanc humanitatem et quid sit illud."

301: reasons for distinction: unum de alio non praedicatur; suppositi est agere, non naturae; "Filius Dei assumpsit in unitate suppositi aeterni naturam humanam, non autem hominem"

302: addition is not of accidents; then suppositum would not be unum per se; sundry arguments...

"oportet quod suppositum importet et significet quendam modum se habendi quem consequitur ex hoc quod subest ipsi esse et proprietatibus sine quibus natura actu non existeret nec suppositum ageret."

303: argument for real mode; matter as matter and matter as extended involve not only addition of extension but change of mode of matter

305: rejection of this view begins calce of 305  
argument agst real mode to top of p 308

308: "Unde idem est quod intelligitur et significatur principaliter per utrumque (ie nat and supp); sed alius est modus significandi et intelligendi prout intelligitur et significatur per nomen abstractum essentiae et per nomen concretum suppositi.... Nam etsi diffiniatur humanitas, quaedumque ponentur in eius diffinitione sub nominibus abstractis ponentur in diffinitione hominis sub nominibus concretis et e converso, ut patet, si pertractetur diffinitio tam logica quam naturalis; quare et caetera."

This is accurate up to a point: nature is ens quo, suppositum is ens quod (more fully, subsistens distinctum). Godfrey is off beam because he does not admit real distinction.

Magistri Gotefridi de Fontibus (de Wulf et Hoffmans)

Quodl. VI, q. 6, pp 133-48.

Utrum veritas de re quae est apud intellectum se habeat in ratione informantis vel moventis.

142: "Sed loquendo proprie de veritate sive de adaequatione, prout scilicet veritas dicit rationem cuiusdam adaequationis specialiter importantis notificationem sive manifestationem apud intellectum, sic solum invenitur in re comparata ad intellectum et e converso, et sic dicitur veritas adaequatio rei et intellectus et hoc secundum rationem manifestativam et declarativam quasi active ex parte rei et secundum rationem manifestationis et declarationis quasi passive ex parte intellectus.... videtur quod simpliciter et formaliter sit veritas solum in intellectu et solum virtute et causaliter in re."

144: practical intellect special case; distinctions.

135: "Praeterea si negetur, sicut a multis (1) negatur, talis species et dicatur quod saltem in intellectu nostro ad hoc quod actu intelligat est tantum ponere ~~ista~~, sicut ipsum intellectum, actum intelligendi et rem ipsam quae intelligitur, quae licet secundum suum esse particulare ut existit in seipso non se repraesentet intellectui ut ipsum possit movere at actu intelligat, tamen ut existens secundum suam similitudinem in phantasia virtute intellectus agentis circa phantasmata operantis et abstractionem facientis; et etiam re non existente manentibus tamen eius phantasmatibus, sic disponuntur phantasmata virtute huiusmodi intellectus agentis, quod ex hoc resultat repraesentatio rei cuius sunt, secundum modum cuiusdam abstractionis, ut sic possit esse obiectum intellectus, quod tamen ut sic non habet esse in intellectu formaliter et subjective, sed virtualiter et effective, quia ab ipso ut sic causatur actus intelligendi in ipso intellectu -- ..."

(1) v.g. Henricus a Gandavo, Quodlibetum V, q. xiv; Quodlib. XI, q. 5, etc.

: Utrum voluntas potest se movere per  
Quodl. VI, q. 7, pp. 148-72 aliquam dispositionem dato quod non  
potest sine dispositione.

150: "Respondeo dicendum quod aliqui (1) ponunt quod voluntas  
etiam absque dispositione superaddita seipsam movere potest;..."

(1) Opinio Henrici add in marg C. -- Henricus de Gandavo,  
Quodl. XIII, q 11 (tom. II, fol 535 R, 540 V, 541 R). *11. appetibile = causa sine qua*

See also Gotefridus, Quodl VI q1, p 99 when description of opinion attributed to Henry appears  
165: In footnotes: Responso ad Henricum, add 2a m. C.

BL. The controverted opinio Henrici is not that of Aquinas  
Dist. between spec and exerc of act, betw will of end & of means  
are not drawn. The controverted opinion may be roughly summabized  
as: will is rational appetite; as rational it causes its act;  
as appetite it receives it. Added distinction: esse tale either  
formaliter or virtualiter.

Godfrey argues basically from impossibility of same thing  
in same respect being in potency and act. Addition of disposition  
is only to attack the more difficult.

158: To make the appetibile apprehensum anything less than  
the efficient cause of the act of will is to open the door to  
what later is named occasionalism

This fundamental viewpoint is sustained.

Cf. 170 on the necessity of maintaining metaphysical  
principles in the midst of the obscurity regarding the soul  
and its various potencies.

160: "et ideo non bene videntur dicere qui (1) dicunt quod  
voluntatem esse passivam et ipsam esse liberam non stant simul,  
ac si ponentes eam moveri ab objecto nitantur destruere  
libertatem arbitrii."

(1) Henricus de Gandavo, Quodl. IX, q 5 (tom II, fol 159 V-160  
et fol 161 V in fine.

161: The will moves all potencies regarding exercitium actus;  
"sed a nulla alia habet sic moveri." voluntas "moveret efficiendo,  
mota tamen ab objecto apprehenso a ratione deliberativa non  
determinata"

Dominium sui actus does not lie in will alone to exclusion  
of the ratio by whose object it is moved.

"Unde etiam ab aliquibus (2) bene dicitur quod homo  
habet dominium super actus suos eo quod habet deliberationem  
de suis actibus."

(2) Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 82, a. 1 ad 3m.

"Potest enim homo intelligere cum vult et quae vult.

Praesente autem objecto voluntatis a nullo potest prohiberi  
actus voluntatis volendi. Sed cum voluntas est in actu volendi,  
potest esse impedimentum respectu actuum aliorum. Universaliter  
igitur tam in voluntate quam in aliis dicendum est quod nihil  
moveret se ipsum, non obstantibus praemissis objectionibus vel  
quibuscumque aliis quas vidi; et hoc praecipue propter rationes  
activi et passivi, ut iam allegatum est prius, quia, si de  
ratione ~~activi-et-passivi~~ potentiae activae ~~et-pass~~ secundum quod  
huiusmodi est posse agere in aliud secundum quod aliud, passivae  
autem est transmutari ab alio secundum quod aliud, patet quod  
in quolibet genere entis oportet activum et passivum esse  
realiter distincta."

Magister Gotefridus de Fontibus (de Wulf et Hoffmans; Phil Belg, III)

Quodl. VI, q. 1, pp 92-110.

Utrum, intellectu et voluntate existentibus perfectis habitibus gloriosis, Deus posset se abstrahere.

ion

93: common supposition of necessity of supernatural elevation  
this supposition is perhaps not altogether evident because  
"eo quod talis natura, in suis/naturalibus/puris est capax  
beatitudinis quae consistit in praedictis actibus voluntatis  
et intellectus, licet ad huiusmodi beatitudinem ex se et  
virtute suorum naturalium principiorum non possit pervenire."

94: necessity of supernatural habits may be de congruo  
naturally creature \* is ad imaginem Dei inasmuch as  
capable of God

"Unde sicut materia prima est in potentia ad omnem formam  
naturalem recipiendam immediate, sic videtur quod intellectus  
creatus est in potentia ad recipiendum cognitionem cuiuslibet  
intelligibilis quo capax est immediate, si ipsum intelligibile  
sit praesens in ratione obiecti; et quia illud idem secundum  
rem quod est obiectum intellectus in ratione cognoscendi est  
obiectum voluntatis in ratione diligendi, similiter etiam  
videtur quod voluntas sit in potentia ad recipiendum immediate  
omnem dilectionem quae voluntas sit in p cuius est capax,  
praesente diligibili in ratione obiecti."

Since this not commonly admitted, since question remains  
in any case whether or not supernatural habits necessary,  
Godfrey passes on.

NB failure to grasp intrinsic necessity of elevation  
from specification of act by object; also, conditions of  
knowledge are "potency, present object qua object", ie drawn  
from Platonist contact concept of knowledge.

94: distinction between potentia Dei absoluta et ordinata.  
absoluta is what Aquinas would oppose to hypothetica  
(God need not have created) but also what would result if  
God withdrew his/consensus in any given case (disposed body  
and soul not infused p 95

95: "prout dicitur quod de potentia absoluta posset Petrum damnare"  
"Cuius ratio est quod Deus propria et libera voluntate  
et non ex aliqua necessitate agit absque mutatione sui scdm  
formam suae voluntatis aeternae"

"Si vero loquamur de potentia Dei in ordine ad suam sapientiam  
et praescientiam, sic non posset se abstrahere dicit modo."

96: Contradiction in terms to say that God loved beatifically  
and not known beatifically; will supposes act of intellect.

Suppose act of knowledge, is will's act necessary.

Argument from Augustine's statement that will necessary  
to join parent to offspring, object to intellect.

Discussion of Aegidius's position to p. 99.

causality/



Magistri Gotefridi de Fontibus, quodl VI, q. 1, continued  
Phil Belges, III, 99.

99: "Et ideo circa hoc est ulterius considerandum quod quidam (1) ponunt quod voluntas non movetur proprie ab objecto, sciãicet per se et directe, sive ut a causa movente per se, sed indirecte et improprie, sciãicet metaphysice ut a causa sine qua non. Hoc autem posito, videtur quod in libera potestate voluntatis sit diligere Deum vel non diligere."

(1) Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet XIII, q. 11, ed 1518, tom II fol 535 R; Quod IX q 5 tom II fol 360 R in medio.

101: If object no more a cause of will of end than of will of means, then nonsense to say that object causes former necessarily but not latter.

102: Note opinion of Henry of Ghent with regard to necessity of willing perfect object. 103 Godfrey reflects this because non velle and nolle are not equivalent; this supposes point but not distinction made by Aquinas with exercit and specif actus

103: "Et videtur esse dicendum quod hoc est impossibile. Nam praesente objecto sub ratione objecti potentiae reducibili in actum per ipsum, potentiae quidem sufficienter dispositae et nullo modo impeditae ad hoc quod reducatur ad actum, non potest non esse actus. Sed illud quod est ipsa bonitas summa per essentiam, esse praesens intellectui sub ratione summi boni et summe diligibilis est ipsum esse praesens sub ratione objecti ipsi voluntati, cuius objectum, ut dictum est, est bonum apprehensum sub ratione boni. Ergo Deum se offerre intellectui sub hac ratione ad cognoscendum, est etiam offerre se voluntati sub hac ratione ad diligendum. Unde Commentator..."

107: "Sed quia concedere Deum posse aliquid quod tamen non possit, non sic derogat eius potentiae quia hoc non contingit nis ex impossibilitate ex parte rei, sicut negare eum posse aliquid quod potest quia hoc contingeret ex defectu suae potentiae; quado sermo est de his quae Deus facere potest, debemus esse largissimi in concedendo eum posse omne illud quod non multum manifestam contradictionem includit. Et ideo licet praedicta opinio videantur probabiliter dicta, tamen ita esse non assero; sed videtur quod, illis non obstantibus posse dici contrarium; nam si actus et inclinatio voluntatis sit aliqua res et qualitas absoluta in voluntate licet in ea fundetur essentialiter relatio realis ex dependentia quam habet ad objectum, sicut etiam dicitur de actu intellectus, videtur quod, licet actus intellectus voluntatis non possit esse sine actu intellectus, tamen virtute divina posset esse actus prior intellectus sine posteriori voluntatis, licet hoc non possit fieri virtute naturali."

Magister Gotefridus de Fontibus, Phil Belg, de Wulf & Hoffmans, III

Quodl V, q 3, pp 12-16

Quid est illud positivum quod sub<sup>s</sup>ternitur est subtractum negationi quae importatur in hoc nomine innascibilitas quae est notio Patris.

14: speaks of processions as "productio."  
idem q 4 p 16;

Quodl. V, q 4, pp. 15-16

Utrum verbum in divinis sit solum personale soli Filio conveniens vel sit aliquod verbum essenziale in divinis.

15: Respondeo dicendum quod verbum dicit aliquid emanans ab intellectu et operatione ipsius intellectus. Unde secundum Augustinum (De Trin XV cap 28 et 38)...//et secundum hoc de ratione verbi est quod sit quaedam notitia quae procedat ab intelligente.

/16/

16: et quia actus intelligendi non perficitur sine conceptu aliquo emanante ab ipso intelligente, ideo intelligere ~~ka~~ essenziale Dei non potest esse sine verbo producto et concepto.

16: non est verbum ibi / (in divinis) realiter nisi personale.

Quodl. VII, q 3,

287: "Quia ergo natura divina de qua quasi fit productio, in quantum ipsa est quae per productionem producto communicatur a producente...."

Quodl.

Quodl V q 8 p 31

Verbum is, apparently, actual knowing of possible intellect or possible intellect as informed by actual knowing. Production of verbum is efficiently from agent intellect and phantasm, dispositively from habits in possible intellect.

Magister Gotefridus de Fontibus, Les Phils Belges, III

Quodl. VII, q. 4, 287-99

Utrum Spiritus Sanctus possit dici procedere per modum voluntatis, si non procederet a Filio sed a solo Patre.

293 last paragraph.

"Unde, ponendo quod Filius procedat per modum intellectus et Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis, ponitur quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Filio; nam oportet amorem procedere a Verbo, eo quod nihil amatur nisi verbo cordis concipiatur; unde sicut si non esset realis processio personarum nec realis distinctio earum ab invicem, tamen, ut dictum est, essent secundum rationem intelligendi notitia procedens per modum intellectus et amor procedens per modum voluntatis et hoc secundum rationem intelligendi nisi intelligeretur procedere a notitia procedente secundum rationem intelligendi; ita etiam, posita distinctione personarum non potest esse nec intelligi quin Spiritus Sanctus, qui est amor et procedit per modum voluntatis, procedat a Filio qui procedit per modum intellectus. Immo, etiam nisi essent naturalis ordo et origo trium potentiarum anime in una mentis essentia et actuum etiam dictarum potentiarum inter se, sic videlicet quod naturali ordine primum habeat esse in mente memoria et, mediante illa, intelligentia et, mediante utraque, voluntas; et ita etiam adaptando de actibus non esset in anima imago trinitatis, ut patet ubique per Augustinum; et sicut si intelligentia non oriretur a memoria non distingueretur ab ea, ita etiam ~~voluntas~~ si voluntas non orietur ab utraque, non distingueretur ab eis. Et ita etiam suo modo de actibus est dicendum."

NB Adversary is Henry of Ghent, Quodl V q 9 tom I fol 167 as appears from references on pp 288, 294

M de Wulf et A Pelzer,  
 Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines,  
 Les Philosophes Belges, Textes et Etudes, tome II.  
 Louvain, 1904.

Introduction. III. Le caractère "reporté" des quatre premiers  
 Quodlibets. pp xv et xvi.

Quodl. I, q. 7, pp 18-21

Utrum intellectus possibilis ad ipsum actum intelligendi  
 sit aliquo modo activus, sive utrum ad ipsum se habeat  
 aliquo modo in ratione causae efficientis et agentis vel  
 solum in ratione recipientis et patientis.

Sol: idem scdm idem non in potentia et actu.

Quodl. I, q. 9, pp22-23; cf Quodl IX q 19 et X q 12

Utrum intellectus possibilis necessario informetur aliqua  
 specie intelligibili alia ab ipso actu intelligendi, quae  
 sit necessaria ad hoc quod ipsa operatio intelligendi eliciatur.

"non apparet sufficiens motivum (affirmandi)" p 23

Quodl II, q 5, pp 85-88

Utrum angeli superiores intelligant per universaliores species  
 et pauciores quam inferiores.

Does not grasp that species is principle of understanding  
 and so that more things, different in themselves, can be  
 understood properly by fewer species.

Quodl. VIII, q. 2, pp. 18-33 of *Quodl. VI q. 7*:

Utrum subiectum possit esse immediatum principium praecipue effectivum alicuius sui accidentis.

18f: Adhoc posset

Argues from Aristotle Averroes Augustine that neither in the material nor the immaterial orders can the same thing be both agent and patient in the same respect.

19f: Insists on universality of principles: ens, actus, potentia

20: Henry of Ghent, Quodl X, q 17, vol II fol 227<sup>v</sup> appeals to distinction between actus imperfecti and actus perfecti. Godfrey argues this to be irrelevant.

20f: Henry of Ghent, Quod X, q 9 fol 426<sup>r</sup> appeals to distinction between "being in act in one respect" "being in potency in another respect"

Godfrey argues that one can say this about anything, material or immaterial; no reason and no experiment will prevent one claiming that what is in potency is also somehow in act virtute

sine/

21: Henry of Ghent, Quod X q 9 fol 426<sup>r</sup>, says that the will sometimes acts and sometimes does not because of the "causa/qua non" ie the object being present; that this does not hold of other agents.

Godfrey answers that the indifference of will arises from the fact that finite good can be regarded either as good or as defective.

22: Praeterea, esto

Godfrey has seen no reason or argument advanced by anyone that will exclude occasionalism in material things and yet leave the will with the autonomy Henry desires.

23: Reverts to distinction of four causes.

Argues that one cannot find an instance in which "aliquid idem quod respectu eiusdem sit activum et passivum"

23: Sed aliquibus

"ratione unius scdm rem poterit agere, et ratione alterius scdm rem etiam in ipso existentis poterit pati"

Godfrey lists instances, in animals, intellect, will, concludes p 25 (Sed omnia talia reducenda sunt in motorem alium; what causes will of end causes will of means; what causes knowledge of ~~xxx~~ principles, causes knowledge of conclusions)

25: Item, alio modo etiam dicunt

Initial affections in will, species in intellect, enable them to produce acts in themselves

26: "Sed ista non valent; immo universaliter est dicendum quod, ubicumque aliquid existens in potentia ad aliquem actum fit in actu scdm illum, oportet quod agens et patiens differant re et subiecto, et cum hoc situ et loco in corporalibus."

Les Philosophes Belges, Textes et Etudes, Tome IV, Louvain 1924

Le Huitieme Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, par J Hoffmans,  
(volume also contains 9th and 10th w tables of all three and  
(no distinct title pages)

Quodl. IX, q. 13, pp. 254-57

Utrum ad hoc quod habens caritatem possit mediante illa  
elicere aliquem actum meritorium requiritur nova motio et  
influentia Dei vel Spiritus sancti animam moventis.

254: Distinguishes absolute possibility and possibility of acting  
perfectly firmly perseveringly. No special influence for former  
needed, but needed for later.

254: "sicut re constituta in esse suae naturae et in his quae  
ad operationem eius requiruntur habitis supposita generali  
influentia divina qua haec in esse constituuntur, conservantur,  
et ad suas operationes diriguntur et applicantur, potest res  
quaelibet suam propriam operationem et naturalem operationem  
exercere ~~sua~~ absque alio speciali influxu, ita etiam anima  
in esse supernaturali per gratiam constituta ipsa existente  
perfecta et informata his quae ad spirituelem operationem  
requiruntur, puta virtutibus gratuitis, et habita opportunitate  
operandi per praedictum influxum generalem quo Deus ista in esse  
constituit, conservat et ad operationes sibi convenientes  
dirigit et applicat, potest operationem meritoriam elicere;  
immo omnis operatio, quam ut sic se habens elicit, est meritoria,  
secundum/illud Genesis (IV 4) quarto: respexit Dominus ad Abel  
et ad munera eius; per quod insinuatur quod primo aliquis in  
esse gratuito constituitur quam gratuitam operationem operetur  
et quod, ex eo quod in esse gratuito constituitur, possit  
in operationem gratuitam."

/255/

Quodl. IX, q. 19, pp. 270-81

Utrum intelligere fiat in recipiendo speciem aliquam.

200f: First opinion. Intellect is a form and so it has an operation, just as heat is a form and has the operation of heating. The object is not cause of intelligere but the term of that action. There is no species whatever. Intelligere est actio exercita.

271: Second Opinion. Intellect is in potency; all action proceeds from form; as form of transient action is similar to object (effect), so form of immanent action is a similitude of object. "Intelligere est actio exercita. Sed ad hoc quod possit elici ab intellectu, requiritur aliqua species impressa."

Godfrey denies that intelligere is actio exercita; meaning seems to be an action terminating at object the way /ectum heat of fire terminates at heated. 273 Est perfectio informans intell-  
273: He also denies that intellect with species impressa could be efficient cause of a perfection received in itself.

273: Third Opinion. The necessity of the species is the imperfection of the moving phantasm, just as the imperfection of the sensible object ~~is~~ makes necessary a species impressed on the organ. There is no process from imperfect to perfect without introducing an intermediary.

274: Apprehensive power is per se in potency only to act of knowing; therefore per se object produces in apprehensive power nothing but act of knowing.

It is per accidens that something else produced in sensation; per se all that is produced is the sensation.

There is no per accidens on intellectual level ~~but~~ because intellect has no organ

275: This does not exclude that a habitus be left consequently to the acts; but it does exclude anything produced in intellect prior to the acts.

275: Godfrey

a Intellect receives nothing but the intelligere.

b "Etsi intelligere non consistit in receptione alterius speciei a se ipso realiter differentis, consistit tamen in receptione speciei pro tanto quod ipsum intelligere est quaedam formalis perfectio et sic quaedam species intellectum perficiens et informans et rei intellectae assimilans."

c "Unde cum intelligere comparatur ad intellectum possibilem ut ad subiectum in quo est et quod perficit non potest poni quod respectu actionis intelligendi intellectus possibilis habeat ratione agentis."

~~This would imply 1) that intellectus agens et possibilis differ not re but ratione 2)~~

Arguments are: 1) that agent and possible intellect differ re and not ratione 2) that in any case the object is the moving and acting principle.

276: "Sed obiectum est quod habet rationem efficientis et moventis, licet non habeat quod sit obiectum nisi in virtute eius quod habet rationem intellectus agentis; et intellectus possibilis simpliciter habet rationem passivi et receptivi."

Really: object is agent; possible intellect is patient.  
Scdm modum significandi: object is subject of verb in passive voice; possible intellect is subject of ~~is~~ transitive verb in active voice.

"Cum ergo manifestum sit quod obiectum non habet rationem vere et realiter passivi respectu actus intelligendi, ut scilicet huiusmodi actus in ipso fiat agente intellectu, /277/ ipse etiam intellectus non habet vere et realiter rationem activi respectu eiusdem actus, ut scilicet ab ipso effective fiat in alio, scilicet in obiecto. Et sicut ipsum obiectum non dicitur pati actum intelligendi nisi solum secundum denominationem ita etiam intellectus non dicitur ipsum agere nisi secundum denominationem."

277: idem prosequitur.

278: "Some would admit that "visus... et est videfaciens et videfactus"

Godfrey: "... color qui videtur est videfaciens et oculus qui videt est videfactus."

279: Why are videre, intelligere, etc. referred to in terms of action and passion and not treated simply as formal perfections?

Dealbatio is the same generic type of formal perfection as albedo; calefieri as calidum esse. They are regarded as formal perfections once the process has reached its term; but then they are no longer action-passion. But videre intelligere are not processes but formal perfections, yet they are not so independent of agent as to remain without presence of object. Because of this exigence of object-agent they resemble action-passion and are not simply formal perfections.

280: Intelligere is actio manens in agente, because its subject and recipient is what is denominated as though agent; "sicut e converso intelligi est passio manens extra passum, id est non extra illud quod vere est subiectum ~~receptivum~~-susceptivum et passivum eius, sed extra id de quo enunciatur sub modo passivi..."

One might also say that the Philosopher wished to exclude the mistaken notion that knowing was by extramittendo.  
Cf Met. Theta, 9, 1051a.

280: "Immo omnis actio est forma aliqua impressa passivo ab agente" Godfrey's negation of real distinction appears.

281: Intelligere is unlike actio-passio because actus perfecti, but it is like actio-passio because it lasts only as long as agent-object present and productive of it; the latter is the decisive point.

Intelligere is actio manens in agente, because it remains in subject of intellectus agens; this cannot be extended to sense ut sensus agens, a doubtful procedure

Intellegerere is actio because "quasi tendens in alterum non ut in subiectum sed ut in terminum"



Utrum verbum mentale formetur in intellectu ab ipso intellectu vel ab alio.

359: The same thing cannot be both recipient and efficient cause of the same effect. Therefore the possible intellect cannot both receive and produce the verbum. But it receives the verbum which is a notitia; and so it cannot produce it. Further, one cannot say that it receives incomplete knowledge or verbum and then, of it self, perfects it; if its knowledge is incomplete, it has to revert to the object to complete it.

"... verbum de quo intendimus est id quod significatur verbo vocis." This is not a subsistent nature (universal) as Plato thought. Nor is it any concrete thing, for things are all singular. Therefore it must be what is conceived or understood of the thing. Quotes in confirmation Augustine De Trin IX c 10 PL 42 969 allusion, and Aristotle Met III 7 1012a that verbum is diffinitio.

Opinion: "quod quid est autem non differt ab eo cuius est nisi secundum rationem"; but verbum is the quodquid est, definition; therefore verbum is really identical with the thing and differs from it only ratione. Further, the verbum is not ~~the~~ something inhering in and informing the intellect as does the act of understanding; for what informs the intellect is not identical with the res extra, and cannot be predicated of it; but the verbum is the object of the act of understanding and can be so predicated.

360: Answer: there is nothing that is neither an act of intellect nor a singular thing existing extra.

Further, as adversaries admit, verbum is formed by a real true action by the object and the agent intellect; but there is a real distinction between agent and patient; therefore verbum is not the thing

"... videtur esse tenendum quod verbum realiter non est nisi notitia vel actus intellectus formatus ab obiecto et intellectu agente."

There is nothing to objection that diffinitio is complete determinate explicit knowledge of what the specific name is incomplete indeterminate implicit knowledge. There is an imperfect verbum corresponding to the nomen speciei diffinibile, and a perfect verbum corresponding to the diffinitio.

Again, diffinitum can mean either the thing defined or the verbum concept of the nomen speciei diffinibile. In the former sense the diffinitum is not the verbum; in the latter it is.

Quodl. X, q. 12, con'd

361 Supposing verbum to be notitia of material object, that it is not object but effect of object, we propose to show that the possible intellect is not per se et proprie the efficient cause of the verbum but, quantum ad materialia, the object in virtue of the agent intellect.

Proceeds to argue against species.

Opinion: "Neque etiam, sicut dicunt quidam..."

The agent intellect and the object produce a species in the possible intellect; the possible intellect so informed has the power of conceiving and effecting in itself a verbum; which accordingly is notitia actualis genita; while the ~~species~~ informed intellect is by the species the parent and the notitia habitualis.

Godfrey: The efficient cause, eg iron, has to have the form of heat, before it can heat something else. But what is heated does not have to have the form of heat to-be-heated to be able to be heated. But the possible intellect is not the agent but the recipient, and so it has no need of species as form of operation.

Godfrey: Aristotle never posited species in intellect in the sense of a disposition that is a similitude of the thing, distinct from the act of understanding, and the formal ratio of the possible intellect's producing becoming of itself in the act of intellection. For Aristotle the species is identical with the actus intelligendi.

362 Godfrey: Even admitting the species as distinct from and disposing to act of intellection, it remains that the act will be attributed to the object as agent and to the possible intellect as disposed subject.

The opposite opinion leads to occasionalism. With equal reason one can say with regard to every principal cause that it produces a disposition in the recipient and then the recipient induces in itself the act and perfection. If one distinguishes between corporeal and spiritual, I deny; and I don't see that you can prove anything.

Further, in the beatific vision there is a most perfect verbum but there is no species; nor can the divine essence however simple and intimate to the soul replace the alleged functions of the species; for the divine essence is subsistent while the species essentially is an inherent form.

Second Opinion: "Neque etiam sic potest dici, sicut dicunt alii, quod respectu primi actus intelligendi confusi et indeterminati sit intellectus possibilis passivus; sed illo informatus conversione sui ipsius super illum actum et super obiectum et, negotiando circa hoc ad explicationem partium essentialium obiecti, quasi concipit et format in se ipso notitiam determinatam et perfectam illius eiusdem quod cognoscebat prius secundum notitiam confusam et imperfectam quae habet rationem memoriae et parentis; et hoc habet nomen verbi."

Godfrey: This will not hold wherever knowledge is without discourse as in the beatific vision and as, according to Aristotle, in the knowledge of the separate substances which cannot be defined (Met VIII c 10 1051b) and either are known simply or simply unknown.

362 f Godfrey's second answer.

Just as the possible intellect is passive with regard to initial confused knowledge, so also it is passive with regard to subsequent distinct knowledge. For the subsequent knowledge is from further appeals to distincter phantasms. The subsequent knowledge is potentially in the prior, but there has to be an agent reducing that potency to act. Though componere and dividere sound like actions, still the possible intellect is passive with respect to enuntiations just as much as with respect to simple apprehensions.

363: Instat of Second opinion

Unless the complexum is from the possible intellect, one cannot account for error. If the complexum is caused by the object, and error in the complexum involves an error in the object, which is nonsense. This is not the precise argument which rather is the possibility of both affirming and denying.

Nor can the complexum be attributed to the agent intellect, for it irradiates uniformly, as does light. But if agent intellect is uniform, if the object is determinately so or not, then the only possibility of accounting for both affirmation or negation is to appeal to the possible intellect informed with simple apprehension.

Godfrey: If the possibility of affirming or denying cannot be explained by the agent intellect, cuius est omnia facere, much less can it be explained by the possible intellect, cuius est omnia fieri. The habitudo inter simplicia is in the same subject as the simplicia, first as cause, second as recipient.

364: The explanation of the anomaly, according to Godfrey, is that opposites ~~are~~ in the real order are not opposites in the mind. Contrariorum est eadem disciplina. The mind knowing one opposite by affirmation knows the opposite by negation; but it cannot both assent and dissent.

Quodl. X, q. 12, con'd: Godfrey's theory of verbum and imago.

364: The notitia actually informing the possible intellect and actually perfecting it is the verbum.

It proceeds from the known thing in virtute of the agent intellect: the agent intellect pertains to the integrity of the imago. The thing as present, as apt to move the possible intellect and effect actual knowledge, in virtute of agent intellect, is the notitia habitualis or potius virtualis. It can be said to be the memoria. It has the relation to the verbum of parent to offspring. Quotes Augustine, every thing we know to be generates in us knowledge of itself; and knowledge is from both knower and known. De Trin IX #12 PL 42:970 18

Sedm aliquid sui human intellect forms and produces its verbum, namely in virtue of agent intellect. This does not hold for all verba but only ~~for~~ with regard to things that are intelligible in potency and have to be made intelligible in act.

365 There is a twofold knowledge both of material things and of immaterial things known through knowledge of material things. The first is indeterminate and confusus; the second determinate. The first is by abstraction from phantasm; the second is from imperfect knowledge through composition and division the investigation of the determinate and atomic species; and this is the perfect verbum.

365 But the beatific vision requires special consideration. There there is no abstraction as in proceeding from potential to actual intelligibility. There is no process from confused to determinate knowledge. The relevance of agent intellect disappears.

As to the objectionx that the imago exists, it is to be born in mind that according to Augustine there also is multiplex dissimilitudo. Because our verbum inheres in our minds, it cannot be produced by the potency in which it inheres but there must be posed some other active principle.

Les Philosophes Belges, Textes et Etudes, Tome V, Louvain 1932  
J. Hoffmans, Les Quodlibets onze-quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines.

Quodl., XII, q. 1, pp. 79-82

Utrum Deus possit potentias animae passivas reducere in actus suos absque suis obiectis faciendo visionem sine visibili et sic de aliis.

79: God can produce any absolute entity while not producing any other given entity; but he cannot produce an entity that by its relations involves the existence of some other entity and without also producing the other entity.

80: Now the acts of the potencies of the soul per se and essentially include a relation to the other, and so cannot be without the other.

The necessity of an object for vision involves is not only the necessity of an efficient cause for the vision but also the necessity of a term for the seeing. God could illuminate the atmosphere without creating and conserving some luminary, for the illuminated atmosphere is related to the sun as to its efficient cause but not as to a term.

"Propter quod videre non dicit actum simpliciter absolutum sicut lucere, sed actum transitivum, non ut in subiectum sicut actio transiens extra, sed ut ad terminum sicut actio manens intra."

God can produce the seeing but not be the seen; but what produces seeing has to be both agent and object

81: There can be "album" without there being "aliud album"; there cannot be "album simile" without there being "aliud album"

There can be the scibile without the scientia, the visibile without the visio, because the relation is rationis; but there cannot be scientia without scibile, visio without visibile because the relation is real.

81f: Godfrey argues that if the potency were the efficient cause of its own act, there would not be the intrinsic dependence of the act on the object, and so there would not be the relation in the act that necessitated the existence of the object.

Potency as efficient cause especially in will is attributed to many; editor refers to Henry of Ghent, Quodl IX q 5, fol 360 R.

Quodl. XII, q. 5, pp 100-105

Utrum Episcopus parisiensis peccet in hoc quod omittit corrigere quosdam articulos a praedecessore suo condemnatos.

101f: Attack on a number of articles.

102f: Highest praise for Aquinas: Tu es sal terrae

103: Bishop is eminent in law, sufficient in theology; cannot correct without advice and doctors divided; he might withdraw his support of previous condemnation; I don't see how he avoids sin in this but I do not condemn him.

Articles were wise enough at their time; reaction against excess; but they have lost utility.

*removed from canon law*

Quodl. XIII, q. 3, pp. 190-213

Utrum aliqua substantia creata per se ipsum absque aliquo alio sibi addito possit esse principium immediatum alicuius operationis et praecipue transeuntis extra.

191: Responsio. Dicendum quod nulla substantia potest esse principium activum alicuius operationis vel etiam cuiuscumque perfectionis in ipsa existentis nec per se ipsam nec per aliquid additum; quoniam, cum ipsa substantia etiam cum aliquo sibi addito carens aliquo actu vel aliqua perfectione habeat rationem subiecti et sit aliquid in potentia respectu talis actus, respectu illius non potest habere rationem agentis, alioquin idem esset activum et passivum respectu sui ipsius, cum tamen debeant haec realiter esse distincta.

This exaggerated application of "quidquid movetur" is perhaps the mind of Godfrey. Aristotle makes allowance for doctor curing himself.

191: First opinion.

Attributed in marginal note in mss. VR to Jacobus Augustiniensis.

Since form is educed from potency of matter, tota but not totaliter it is in the matter, ie it is in matter not actually and completely but potentially and; this potentiality of form is really distinct from the subject and from the matter.

Efficienter the external agent effects the actual form from the potential; but formally the subject in virtue of the potential form "agit se ipso ad educationem talis formae."

Hence Anselm posits aptitudes in the soul by which it formally moves itself though efficiently it is moved by object.

So also Simplicius distinguished between absolute and relative actions: relative, respective, action is in aliud scdm quod aliud; it is efficient; absolute action is not in the other as patient but manens in agente; it is formally acting.

192: Same principles applied to heating. Gold heats itself formally.

"... cum actio absoluta non sit in aliud scdm quod huiusmodi; quae dicitur absoluta non a privatione respectus, sed a privatione oppositae passionis sibi correspondentis."

Action as such requires only a principle; passion requires both a recipient and a principle.

192: Second opinion.

Attributed in margin in mss. VR to frater Amandus.

Form is that by which a thing is and that by which it acts. The potencies of the soul are forms by which the soul acts; the operations in the potencies are efficiently from the forms as instrumental agents; the soul is the principal agent.

"... intellectus primo recipit speciem determinatam ab obiecto determinato et per eam intellectus determinatus ad determinatum obiectum effective elicit actum determinatum respectu illius obiecti; et ideo effective habet actus intelligendi et entitatem suam et speciem in naturam sua a potentia animae eliciente.

The intellectio asini and the intellectio hominis are of the same species because they have the same efficient principle, the potency; they differ only numero because of the interruptio temporis; they have a merely accidental determination from the object.

applied to substantial  
as well as accidental  
forms.  
p200 and  
p202 calc.

de  
Magister Godefridus <sup>de</sup> Fontibus, Phil Belges V, Louvain 1932.

Quodl XIII q 3 con'd

Refutation of second opinion p. 193 (Sed iste modus) to 196  
Refutation of first opinion p. 196 (Quae etiam dicuntur) to 204 calce

193: (Unde cum sit)

The four causes are really distinct

"... forma respectu eius in quo est non potest esse activum respectu illius, sed solum respectu alterius ab ipso distincti; aliquin idem respectu eiusdem esset causa formalis et agens vel efficiens"

194: The act of intellection stands to its object not only as effect to cause but also as measured to measure; its dependence is essential.

195: On first opinion the intellectio hominis no more differs from the intellectio asini than from a repeated intellectio hominis Etc., Etc.

196: Refutation of first opinion

"respectu eius in quo est nullo modo potest dici aliquid actio realiter"

197: Immediate basis of actio and passio is the movement in which they are founded. It is true that in the agent there is a principium actionis; but this is not immediately and per se the basis of actio. It follows that there can no more be an actio without a passio, than there can be a passio without an actio.

Either what is from the extrinsic agent is actio and what is in the patient is passio, or else there is no extrinsic agent but only a causa sine qua non.

198: Some (Henry of Ghent Quodl X 9 fol tom II fol 427<sup>r</sup>

XI 6

455<sup>v</sup>

XIII 11

535<sup>r</sup>

not too unreasonably with regard to will acknowledge that there cannot be action ~~ixm~~ without passion, and so coherently hold that the same act of will with respect to the will is both action as from it and passion as in it. They limit themselves to this single blunder. But the upholders of the first opinion add another blunder, namely, that there are actions without corresponding passions.

198: The appeal to Arist Met IX to defend the distinction of relative and absolute actions is invalid. Met IX clearly holds that action is in aliud scdm quod aliud. The De anima which treats the operations of soul exproffesso clearly holds them to be passions.

199: Alqui famosi doctores (Henry Ghent Quodl X q 9 [II 427<sup>r</sup>]  
Quodl XII q 26 [II 504<sup>r</sup>] ~~Quodl IX q 14 [II 115<sup>v</sup>]~~)

though they make the will the cause of its own action or perfection, at least distinguish and say that the will as having a vis activa produces the act and do not try to make out that the potential volition produces the actual volition, which involves aliquid gignit se ipsum.

Henry [Quodl IV q 14 [I 115<sup>v</sup>]] has a doctrine of seminal principles in matter; but one can hold this, without the added nonsense of saying that the recipient acts formally.

*inchoatio formationis*

Quodl. XIII, q. 3, con'd.

200 Quod autem hoc

The ultimate point is that it destroys the distinction between different types of cause ~~justas~~ to call the formal cause efficient. It is just as much nonsense to speak of "acting effecting formally" as to speak of "informing efficiently"

201 Item quod

Si there are any absolute actions, they are calere, lucere, currere; they regard neither a patient nor a term.

If videre is an actio, you have to say that videri is a passio.

Item si

If a transitive verb in the active voice is actio, then matter's appetere formam and matter's recipere formam are actiones.

A pari, a transitive verb in the passive voice will be a passio, and so videri and intelligi are passiones.

esse/

202 "Sicut enim percutiens respicit percussum ut terminum et ut subiectum percussiois, ideo dicitur/actio quia in quantum respicit aliud ut terminum ad quem; et dicitur transiens extra in quantum respicit illud ut subiectum in quo. Ita etiam videns respicit per se obiectum ut terminum, et ideo videre dicitur actio. Sed quia illud non respicit ut subiectum, sed eius subiectum est illud ~~xxx~~ quod sub ratione agentis denominat, ideo dicitur manens in agente, id est in ~~qs~~ eo quod per modum agentis denominatur, licet non sit vere agens. Et quia haec aliis perfectionibus non conveniunt, ideo nec de talibus debent dici."

204 Godfrey acknowledges that animal moves itself inasmuch as one part moves another and the two are really distinct.

207-209: The real distinction denied.

Real distinction based on disregard of analogy and disregard of abstract and concrete modes of signifying the same thing.

Essentia est indifferens ad esse et non esse: the notion of essence is indifferent, C; any real essence is indifferent, N. essence in potency excludes esse and essence in act includes esse. One might as well say that essence is indifferent to essence in potency and essence in act and therefore really distinct from both.



Les Philosophes Belges, Textes et Etudes, tome XIV, Louvain 1937

Dom Odon Lottin, O.S.B.

Le Quodlibet XV et trois Questions ordinaires de Godefroid de Fontaines.

Quodl. XV, q. 2, pp 6-11

Utrum idem sit voluntatem moveri quantum ad determinationem actus et quantum ad exercitium.

10f: The proximate cause of the act of will is always the apprehension of the intellect. But once the will is in act with respect to an end, since it moves all potencies quoad exercitium actus, it is the applicans of the object presented by the intellect to the will. There is no real distinction between determination and ~~sp~~ exercise of act of will, but there is a difference in the reduction of the act of will to its proportionate causes; the intellect itself causes the specification determination; the applicans of the intellect causes the occurrence of the act of will. The first act of will has its exercitium reduced to fortune or God

Quodl. XV, q. 20, pp. 72-74

Utrum sequatur quod si grave movetur effective a generante, quod movetur effective a forma sua.

73: The substantial form of the heavy thing is neither the agens, movens nor the principium activum of the local movement of the heavy thing.

74: The accidental form, gravitas, is not the agens; some say it is the "principium activum illius motus, non quo grave moveat se, sed quo generans vel conservans gravitatem in gravi movet grave; nec videtur eis inconveniens, si gravitas sit principium eius immediate quod non sit principium passivum eius, quia motus localis non recipitur in gravi per gravitatem passive, sed per quantitatem, et videtur eis quod non oportet quod subiectum formae dicatur movere ad omnia illa quorum principium est forma, imo dans formam vel conservans debet dici causare tam formam quam omnia consequentia eam"

Others hold that the the grave by gravitas moves the air which moves the grave, so that accidentaliter per accidens "gravitas est principium motus quo grave movet se mediate et quasi accidentaliter per accidens"

Godfrey does not choose between either of these