

perhaps even/

some of them/

further,

weaker/

As the repeated condemnations of Aristotelian tendencies both at Paris and at Oxford provided welcome ammunition to reinforcement to Augustinian argument, so also they proved a strong deterrent to the existence and to the articulateness of Aristotelians. In a question redolent of academic freedom Godfrey of Fontaines in 1295 discussed publicly "Utrum Episcopus parisiensis peccet in hoc quod omittit corrigere quosdam articulos a praedecessore suo condemnatos" [Quodl XII q 5, Phil Belg V 100-105, ed Hoffmans Louvain 1932]. He admits that the articles were rightly condemned because of the excesses at the time they were promulgated; but he does not think that they still should be enforced; for they do not seem to him to be coherent; others prohibit at Paris what the rest of the Catholic world allows; the simpliciores among the students ~~are~~ think Thomas Aquinas' works under official suspicion; and the duller professors buttress their ~~sillier~~ opinions by invoking the ~~are~~ condemnations; finally, less than justice is done to Aquinas to whom alone our Lord might say what he said to the Apostles together, "Tu es sal terrae." Some twenty years later in a similar public question John of Naples affirmatively answered ~~the~~ "Utrum licite possit doceri parisius doctrina sancti Thome quantum ad omnes eius conclusiones" [Jellouschek Xenia III 88-101]. A completely satisfactory solution was had on February 14, 1325, when the Bishop of Paris revoked the condemnations in so far as they were adverse to the doctrine of Aquinas [Jellouschek, p 84 f., note 8; citing Denifle-Chatelain, Chartularium, II, 280 ff, §338.]

Occasionalism VI 7 (3, 158) VII 2 (4, 222) $\times 12$ (4, 362)

Metaphysical princ. VI 7 (3, 170) ; VIII 2 (4, 18) ; XIII 3 (5, 193) (5, 200)

Irrelevance of actus puri imperfecti VIII 2 (4, 20)

Actus subjecti VIII 2 (4, 26)

Objectus passivus, knowing not actus IX 19 (4, 275f)

Modus significandi in actibus IX 19 (4, 278)

Everything possible $\times 12$ (4, 362f)

Limites blanda of things ~~that~~ "accetia" ut "actum ut passivum" XIV 3 (5, 198)

Actus appetiti XIV 3 (5, 201)

Magistri Gotefridi de Fontibus, Les Phil Belges II,

Quodl. Ixxx III, q. 1 (longa), pp. 156-77

Utrum creatura possit dici ens ratione suae essentiae,
cum ipsa non est non ens quantum ad esse existentiae.

159 calc: "et hoc quidem aggregatum sive essentia ex materia
et forma constituta est in potentia ad esse simpliciter actuale,
quod habet essentia sicut receptum et participatum a prima
essendi causa./*/In omni ergo re sive simplicis essentiae sive
compositae creatae erit compositio realis essentiae et esse
sicut volunt aliqui propter istas rationes"

/*/ add: quae est esse purum non participatum.
Thus Godfrey knows exactly idea of real distinction.

161: "Patet igitur primus articulus scilicet quod non est
aliquid in re quacumque quod sit esse solum absque appositione
determinatae rationis essendi."

The meaning seems to be that universals are universal
in virtue of intellect, that there are no universals a parte
rei, least of all is there any universal being or oneness that
is just that.

162 calc: "Cum ergo nihil potest esse extra rationem entis,
sub nulla una ratione significat ens id quod significat."

163: "Ex praedictis igitur patet quod esse causatum in universitate
entium causatorum non est aliquid unum ratione, sicut neque
entitas vel essentia est aliquid unum ratione in universitate
entium creatorum, nec est aliquid a Deo creatum in rebus quod
sit esse tantum ab essentiis rerum participatum, quod quidem
esse participatum sit eius proprius effectus..."

"Cum autem... unum secundum omnes non dicit aliquam rem
additam, videtur etiam quod ens sive esse non dicat aliquid
realiter additum ei de quo dicitur."

164: "Patet igitur secundus articulus, scilicet quod non est
ponere in rebus aliquid unum secundum rationem quod scilicet
sit essetantum, ex quo patet quod esse, licet unam vocem dicat,
in diversis tamen diversum est et diversam rationem etiam
importat. Non enim dicit nisi essentiam et entitatem uniuscuiusque,
quod tertio proponebatur."

177: "... teneamus ut praedictum est quod esse et essentia id
idem sunt, ita quod quantum intelligitur de essentia tantum
intelligitur de esse. Et ideo cum ponitur res non existens
ponitur simpliciter non ens, ita etiam quod secundum esse
essentiae non potest dici ens; et sic patet veritas et solutio
quaestionis praemissae."