

Bernardus Claromonensis

Schmaus, *Liber propugnatorius*, pp

pp. 230-33, note 53, with long quote from Bernard of Claromonte

Quellenverzeichnis, p, XV.

Bernardi Claromonensis impugnationes contra fratrem
Aegidium contradicentem Thomae super primum sententiarum,
Cod. Vat. lat. 772.

p. 230. d. 13 fol 11^r

p. 231 ad calcem

"Necessarium est autem, ut, ex ~~is~~ quo tales actus essentiales
habent secundum rationem ordinem ad invicem, actus etiam notionales
quae sunt generatio, qui est verbi, praesupponens actum essentialium,
qui est intelligere, et processio amoris praesupponens actum
essentialium, qui est velle, habeant ordinem inter se, et per
consequens oportet, quod persona procedens per generationem et
personam procedens per spirationem non aequae immediate, sed
quodam ordine procedant a Patre.... Ergo quantumcumque inter
intelligere et velle in Deo sit tantum ordo et distinctio
rationis, inter processiones tamen erit ordo et distinctio
realis."

Does this presuppose the view of Henry of Ghent as held
by John of Paris?

See p. 330* long addendum on authenticity of the Impugnationes;
perhaps by ???

Reversion to premature via doctrinae (Persons, nature, relations w or wt bonum sui diffusivum) by way of emptying out psychological content and dealing with metaphysical categories.

Durandus

Schmaus.

125: "In der Thomasschule lebt das per modum naturae kräftig weiter. Ja es scheint geradezu, als ob die Schüler des hl. Thomas in dieser Frage vorzugsweise aus dem Sentenzenkommentar des Meisters geshöpft hätten.

Instances Thomasinus, Romanus, Petrus de Tarantasia, Hannibaldus de Hannibaldis, John of Paris.

126: James of Metz, long citation from d 10 on pp 126-29 note 48. James admits per modum intellectus et voluntatis exclusively with regard to order of processions.

ad fin p 128: "sed quia una est per modum intellectus, quae est prior alia per modum voluntatis, quae accipitur ut posterior secundum nostrum modum intelligendi"

129: Durandus I d 6 q 2 cited p 129 note 49.

"Si autem attendatur ordo productorum et productionum, sic Filius dicitur procedere per modum intellectus, Spiritus autem Sanctus per modum voluntatis. Cuius ratio est, quia in imagine creata, quae attenditur secundum potentias et actus naturae intellectualis, prima emanatio est secundum intellectum, alia autem sequens, in qua terminatur emanatio /130/ manens infra (sic) naturam intellectualis est emanatio pertinens ad voluntatem. Primo enim est cognitio boni. Deinde ex hoc oritur amor boni et ibi sistit emanatio inter naturam intellectualis et ex hoc arguitur sic: Illud quod in divinis procedit prima emanatione, procedit per modum intellectus ad intra. Aliud autem, quod procedit secunda emanatione et ultima, in qua terminatur omnis emanatio divina ad intra, procedit per modum voluntatis, quia sic est in imagine creata... sic intelligenda sunt, quae dicuntur circa materiam istam de modo processionalis divinarum personarum et verba doctorum, quae videntur insinuare, quod intelligere et velle ea diligere sint rationes emanationum divinarum. Hoc enim dicunt solum secundum quamdam adaptationem ad ea quae inveniuntur in imagine creata."

Schmaus adds: "Auffallend mag man es finden, dass in der von Johannes von Neapel und Petrus de Palude zusammengestellten Liste von Abweichungen des Durandus von Thomas der behandelte Lehrpunkt nicht zur Sprache kommt: Cod Vat Lat 6736 fol 113r."

same

129f: James of Lausanne; same ideas as Durandus; less clear in quote.

130: "Überraschend ist, dass bei so namhaften Thomisten und so überzeugten Gegnern des Durandus wie Johannes von Neapel und Hervaeus Natalis die Formel per modum intellectus alles psychologischen Gehaltes entleert ist."/notes 51-52 pp 131-35.

See proof/

Hervaeus Natalis

Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibeta undecim cum octo ipsius profundissimis tractatibus, Venedig 1513. [Schmaus p. XXII]

Schmaus, Liber propugnatorius, p. 203.

"... in dem Traktat De personis divinis in der Quaestio, Utrum Spiritus sanctus aliquo modo procedit per modum naturae. Die Frage ist zugleich eine gründliche Auseinandersetzung mit Heinrich von Gent."

Quotation runs from pp. 203 - 214.

p. 213 post medium

"... in illis entibus immaterialibus, in quibus r ealiter differt intelligere et velle, sicut est omnis creatura immaterialis, productio amoris et omnis affectio sive aliud, praeexigit sibi praeviā productionem cognitionis. Productio autem cognitionis vel saltem omnis eius, quod ad actum cognoscendi praeter intellectum pertinet, non praeexigit sibi-praeviā-productionē-cognitionis. necessario aliam productionem primam, et ideo in natura intellectuali illud, quod producitur raeintellecta alia productione, habet rationem amoris, illud vero, a quo procedit, habet rationem intelligentiae vel boni cogniti sive etiam verbi, et quia in divinis Filius procedit ab uno solo, scilicet a Patre, Spiritus vero sanctus procedit a duobus, scilicet a Patre et a Filio procedente, ideo secundum rationem intelligendi productioni Filii praeintelligitur productioni Spiritus Sancti, productioni vero Filii nulla raeintelligitur, et secundum hoc dicitur Spiritus sanctus procedere per modum voluntatis sive amoris et Filius per modum intellectus."

Ar. Aug. Conflict.

James of Viterbo

334-46

J. Benes, *Div Thom Placentiae*, 1927/334, Text on divine knowledge of possibles; affirming they possess an esse cognitum distinct from God and apart from esse in effectu.
Text from Bibl Ottob lat 196 fol 80 f; Vat lat 982 fol 11 ff;
Vat lat 772 fol 71 f.

J. Koch, Jakob von Metz, Arch HDLMA 4(1929) 169-232

210: "... noch zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts eine nichtthomistische Tradition im Pariser Dominikanerkloster lebendig war."

cf. conclusion p118 Phares de Alvernia → James of Metz → Durandus

214: James of Metz: different theories of species intelligibilis result from different theories of the immanent act.

214 note 4

James II Sent (B) d 17 q 1 a 1, Ba 61ra "Est ergo prima opinio, quod species necessario re miritur ad actum intelligandi, quia dicunt, quod intelligere quod est actus manens in agente, est effective ab intellectu possibili, et hoc mediante specie"

214 note 5

Vgl. Correctorium fr. Jacobi, II Sent. q. 10, M 163rb "art. primo recitat opinionem Thome..." Die Formel "actus manens in agente est effective ab intellectu" ist aber sicher nicht im Sinne des hl. Thomas. Herveus selbst entwickelt später eine klarere Theorie des immanenten Aktes; vgl. Quodl. III, q. 8 [edit by J Koch, Monasterii 1929]

214 note 6

James: "secunda opinio est, quod intelligere non est effective ab intellectu possibili nec per se nec mediante specie, sed est ab obiecto, denominat tamen intellectum per modum actus immanentis" L.c. 61rb-va [cf sup note 4]

215 note 1

James: "Alii autem dicunt, quod intelligere non est ab intellectu, sed solum ab obiecto radicaliter; sed tamen requiritur [61vb] ibi species res ectu alicuius obiecti et respectu alicuius non. Et sic salvant multa, sc. recursum ad fantasmata et dicta doctorum... Ita est ex parte illa: quedam obiecta non habent in se principium sufficiens respectu actu intelligendi, et ideo indigent specie... Deus et alia aentia immaterialia non egent specie." L.c. 61vb. This is James'view.

215: Durandus ist hier radikaler; indem er augustinische Gedanken aufnimmt, schreibt er dem Intellekt eine ursprüngliche Aktivität zu. Damit der Erkenntnisakt zustande kommt, genügt es, dass das Objekt dem Intellekt im Phantasiebild gegenüber ist; das Objekt ist causa sine qua non.

215: Das Verbum mentis identifiziert Jakob ebenso wie Durandus mit dem geistigen Erkenntnisakt und lehnt die Theorie der thomistischen Schule ab, dass das Verbum das Resultat des Erkenntnisprozesses sei, nämlich ein vollkommenes Wesensbild, das für die fernere Erkenntnis gleichsam als Spiegel dient.

216 note 8: Hervaeus did not treat the nature of Verbum in his Commentary on the Sentences. Durandus attacked his De Verbo.

216 text and note 1: Pertrus of Alvernia identified the Verbum with the object. Cf Godfrey

216 text Hervaeus on Verbum in Correctorium fr. Jacobi.

"Contra: de ratione verbi est quod sit aliquid productum per operationem intellectus. Alioquin Verbum in divinis non haberet ex processione sua, quod esset distinctum supposito ab ipso Patre; sed actus intelligendi non est aliquid productum per operationem intellectus, ymo solum est ab intellectu sicut operatio ab operante; ergo impossibile est, quod actus intelligendi sit proprie verbum" M 155rb

"Ad 4am dico quod verbum ponitur non propter cognitionem qua procedit, sed propter eam que sequitur. Nam cum primo apprehendo res confuse, intellectus meus per actum discendi format ipsum verbum cuius formationem sequitur cognitio expressa. Et hoc est satis clarum." M 155va

Ar. - Aug. Conflict.

John of Murro

Jean de Murro, OFM, (ob 1312) (cf Matthew of Aquasparta)

L'oeuvre scholastique du cardinal/
Ephrem Longpré, Jean de Murro, O.F.M. (ob. 1312), Mélanges
Auguste Pelzer, Louvain 1947, pp. 467-92.

Life, pp. 468 ff.
Textes, pp. 486-92.

1. Originaire de Morrovalle et provincial des Marches en 1272
2. 1283, Bachelier des Sentences à Paris
3. 1285, one of six to whom Peter Olivi presents his defence
4. 1288, 31 dec, Master in Theology at Paris
5. 1289, 1290: Regent in Paris
6. 1291-96 succeeds Guillaume de Falgar as Lecteur au Sacré-Palais
7. 1296 (14 mai)--1304 (5 juin) Master General of Franciscans
8. 1304-12 Cardinal Bishop of Porto et de Sainte-Rufine

His view on will cited by Godfrey of Fontaines, Phil Belg 3, 159.

p. 488: "Et ita patet quod liberum arbitrium non est potentia sed habitus, id est habilitas naturalis potentiae voluntatis, ideo aliquando liberum arbitrium improprie accipitur pro voluntate dico quod essentia huius habitus est in voluntate sed non exit in actum nisi adiutorio et dispositione rationis, et propter hoc dicitur esse in ratione, non quod sit ibi per essentiam sed ut in disponente." lines 89-96 (cited from in 2 Sent d 25 q 4)

Q. D. : Quaeritur utrum obiectum voluntatis moveat ipsam ad actum volendi finem. pp 488-92.

First opinion: ".obiectum nullo modo movet voluntatem nisi metaphorice sicut locus movet locatum, non quia locus influat in mobile.... sed ex quia tamen, si non est locus,.... sed quia non est locus ad quem moveatur. Sic voluntas non moveatur nisi obiecto cognito, non quia aliquid recipiat ab obiecto sed quia non habet obiectum ad quod movetur." p 488.

John argues from Anselm that will receives a habilitas from the object presented by intellect.

Second Opinion: "... obiectum causat volitionem in voluntate nec potest aliquid velle nisi moveatur ab obiecto quia voluntas, sum sit in potentia ad suum actum, non potest ipsum agere in se ipsa nec ipsa nuda nec ipsa sub aliqua affectione, quia totum, scilicet voluntas cum affectione, est in potentia ad actum volandi et ita idem esset in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem." p 490

John argues that will is principle of its acts, otherwise it would not be free; the will without habilitas is subiectum, but the will with habilitas is the movens; there is no need for movens and motum to be distinct locus et subiecto, for the animal moves itself by its soul; what is repugnant is to be in potency to being motum formaliter and at the same time being actu motum; self-movement is excluded in alteratio proprie dicta but not in alteratio spiritualis, hence angels cause acts of knowing when they please; hence also phantasm and agent intellect in same subject as possible intellect still moves possible intellect. p 490

John attributes to object the production in will of a habilitas over and above natural acquired infused habits; it is per modum fluxus not per modum manentis; it provides optional specification for acts of will, just as species in intellect provides (not optional) specification for acts of intellect. p 491

John of Naples

Schmaus, Liber propugnatorius.

John of Naples, Quaestio disp. XIII: Utrum Spiritus sanctus distingueretur a Filio, si non procederet ab eo.

132* line 11 ff: "Hoc etiam tertio probatur. Amor enim est aliquid procedens a notitia. Secundum enim Philosophum in fine III de Anima voluntas ab intellectu seu ab obiecto cognito, quod idem est, ad actum suum movetur et inclinatio etiam rei ad bonum procedit a forma, per quam res habent naturam suam et speciem; et patebit hoc etiam per ea, quae infra dicentur: Si enim Spiritus Sanctus a Filio non distinguitur, non procedit ab eo, ut infra probabitur."

138* line 1 ff: "Praeterea hoc ipsum patet ex dictis tenentium opinionem contrariam. Dicunt enim, quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus distinguntur ad invicem per hoc, quod Filius emanat a Patre per intellectum ut verbum et Spiritus Sanctus a voluntate ut amor. Sed amor necessario procedit a verbo sic, quod amor non esset amor, nisi a verbo procederet, sicut apparet in trinitate animae intellectivae creata, sicut Augustinus dicit in principio IX de Trinitate, quod nihil diligimus nisi cognitum, et sicut Philosophus dicit in fine III DE anima, quod voluntas ad actum suum ab intellectu movetur. Spiritus ergo Sanctus non posset distingui a Filio ut amor a verbo, sicut ipsi dicunt, nisi ab eo procederet."

132 note 51 ad fin: [Ex Quaest disp. XXX: Utrum distinctio realis personarum divinarum emanationum sit accipienda penes principia vel penes aliquid aliud...."]

simul

"Sed ad haec ambo ~~est~~ at dicendum est, quod una emanatio dicitur esse per modum intellectus et naturae et alia per modum voluntatis, non quia principium unius sit natura vel intellectus/alterius voluntas, ut procedunt argumenta, sed propter solum ordinem originis, qui est inter personas emanantes et per consequens inter earum emanationes: modus enim emanationis naturae et intellectus est, quod non necessario aliam emanationem ante se praesupponat, et per oppositum emanatio voluntatis necessario praesupponit aliam emanationem, sc. intellectus; nihil enim diligitur nisi cognitum. Secundum atudem hunc modum emanationes divinae non distinguerentur, si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio."

223 text calce: same citation with different punctuation.

See long citation pp 433-39 note 100 on proprietas and relatio.

Ar.-Aug. Conflict.

John Quidort of Paris

1. J.P. Müller OSB, La these de Jean Quidort sur la beatitude formelle, Mélanges Auguste Pelzer, Louvain 1947, pp. 493-511.

Contains following texts

- a John, In IV Sent., d. 49 (pp 497-502) "Deinde queritur in quo actu consistat beatitudo formaliter" A reportatio.
- b Hervaeus Natalis, ~~QuædixVixqxs&xtpp505*xz~~ Account of John's opinion
- c From Tractatus de Beatitudine, q. 4 (pp 503 f)
- c Jean de Pouilly, Quodl V, q 6 (pp 505-7) Account of John's opinion

John's six elements in beatitude represent a supposition of something like Henry of Ghent's theory of knowledge.

p. 498 Lines 57-66

"... ad defensionem opinionis distinguo de visione, quod est duplex visio, vel una dupliciter sumpta: una est visio nuda divine essentie, qua Deus videtur, sine medio enigmatico, que respondet vel succedit fidei. Et hoc est primum quod occurrit in beato et se habet ad beatitudinem antecedenter et causaliter, nullo tamen modo essentialiter, immo penitus est citra beatitudinem. Alia est visio reflexa, qua Deus videtur non sub ratione essentie soleum, sed sub ratione summi boni habitu et illapsi in modum quo videt beatus se tenere Deum quem summe amat. In quo statim quiescit, nec ultra potest plus appetere. Et in hac pono beatitudinem."

use of

John's conceptualism appears in/distinction between Deus ut terminus, ut finis, ut beatitudo. (p 499 lines 97-120)

Deus est terminus a quo et ad quem omnis creaturae "sub absoluta ratione essentie" Dei

Deus sub ratione boni absolute est finis omnis creaturae

Deus sub ratione boni habitu in propria effigie est beatitudo rationalis creaturae

On distinction itself Met Delta 17 1022a 11

Influence of Henry of Ghent on theory of will appears in second and third elements (love of nuda essentia, desire to hold it)

p 498 f lines 70 ff.

"Primum est aperta visio divine essentie correspondens fidei. Et ex hac consurgit amor ardentior, quia naturale est, quod ex praesentia amati consurgat amor,... Et ex hoc tertio datur motus desiderii tendentis ad perfectam intentionem rei amate per totalem transformationem amantis in amatum sicut ex ferro et igne fit unum. Quarto est terminus illius motus, scilicet tentio spiritualis sicut amplexatio. Quinto est perceptio et visio istius intentionis, quando se convertit intellectus super hanc. Sexto est quietatio sequens, quod vocamus delectationem vel fruitionem. Et haec omnia sunt in amore sponsi et spouse, nisi quod sunt ibi distincta secundum momenta temporum, sed hic fiunt in instanti et solum natura sunt distincta, quia divine nature."

NB Occasion was not working out and applying Henry but defending Thomas against Augustinians who placed formal beatitude in will.

p. XVII

John of Paris, In primum librum sententiarum, Ced.-B.-~~B.~~-III,-13,
God. B. III. 13, der Universitätsbibl. in Basel.

p. 199 note 33 cites I q 27 a. 4: Utrum Spiritus sanctus procedat per modum amoris. Fol 50 ra.

p. 200 in footnote 33 carried from p. 199.

"... in nobis autem invenimus duplē processum, scilicet notitiae declarativae de notitia simplici et amoris incentivis de amore simplici et notitia simul, quia licet invisa possimas diligere, incognita tamen nequaquam secundum beatum Augustinum. Notitia simplex dicitur, qua cognoscitur aliquid secundum quod definitum incomplē significatur, sicut si cognoscimus hominem absolute ut significatur hoc nomine homo. Notitia distinctiva seu declarativa est, qua cognoscitur definitum cum sua definitiva ratione, sicut cum cognosco hominem explicite prout significatur per animal rationale mortale et ista notitia oritur ex prima. Primo enim considero hominem absolute, prout significatur incompleto termino et haec notitia simplex est et confusa. Ex hoc consurgit quaedam alia consideratio, quia cogito, quod non est accidentia, et ideo concludo quod est substantia. ~~et~~ Postea considero, quod non est anima substantia incorporea, et ideo concludo quod est substantia corporea. Postea considero, quod non est substantia inanimata, et ideo concludo, quod est animal. Postea considero, quod non est animal irrationale, et tunc finaliter concludo, quod est animal rationale mortale. Unde ista notitia sic declarativa consurgit ex notitia simplē et confusa et ideo dicit Philosophus secundo Physicorum, quod confusa sunt prius nobis nota. Alius processus est processus amoris de notitia simplici et amore simplici, sicut, quando considero sic hominem primo diligo eum, et considero ultra eum esse substantiam animatam sensibilem rationalem, tunc ex tali notitia et amore simplici consurgit quidam maior ardescens amor, quo plus diligo eum et amplector ei convenientia et detestor et repellō novica. Isto modo similiter in divinis est duplex processus, nisi quod in hoc est differentia in nobis et in Deo, quod in Deo non est discursus inquisitionis de una notitia in aliam, sicut habet esse in nobis. Est ergo in divinis intelligere quasi istum duplē processum, unum per modum naturae- notitiae et iso modo prodit verbum a Patre, quia, quando Pater intelligit se esse, tunc est quasi quaedam notitia simplex, sed quando convertit se supra intellectum suum tali simplici notitia informatum secundum nostrum modum intelligendi quasi consurgit inde quaedam maior notitia, qua apprehendit se intelligere, et quod essentia sua est illud, quod intelligitur, et ratio intelligendi omnia alia, tunc est quasi notitia declarativa consurgens ex notitia simpli, quae vocatur Filius, verbum, seu imago Patris. Ex ista autem notitia consurgit quasi quidam amor simplex quod Deus amat se, ex quibus, notitia scilicet et amore, quod voluntas informatur, consurgit quidam inardescens seu uniens amor, qui zelus dicitur, sicut de minori flamma consurgit maior, non de elicitive sed de naturaliter et iste amor inardescens, quo amplectuntur omnia convenientia et repelluntur nociva, vocatur Spiritus sanctus. Sed sciendum quod processio amoris de amore et verbi de notitia in sex differunt...."

Sic de Schmaus, Liber propugn., p 626 f and ut 92.

Schmaus, Liber propugnatorius

Odo Rigaldi

Odo Rigaldi,

In primum librum sententiarum,

Cod. lat. 14 910 der Bibl. Nationale in Paris (Quellenverzeichnis/

xviii)

d. 10, fol 28ra - 29vb near end of 29va. Schmaus pp 183-85 note 6.

Utrum sit necessarium ponere tertiam personam, scilicet Spiritum sanctum in divinis.

p. 185 note circ med, paullo ante Fol 29vb.

"Ad primum ergo obiectum dicendum, quod si duarum relationum extrema nullum haberent inter se ordinem, bene condedo, quod oporteret esse quattuor extrema. Sed in proposito extrema habent ordinem inter se. Unde licet oporteat, quod sint quattuor secundum rationem, tamen sunt tria secundum rem. Amor enim, cuius processio supponit notitiam et etiam ipsum noscentem, noscens autem est quia generat notitiam, a noscente autem et (H: est) notitia procedit amor et ideo extrema generationis et processionis habent inter se ordinem et ideo non oportet, quod sint quattuor nisi tantum secundum rationem, sed possint esse tria secundum rem."

procedit/

Richardian elements in the passage. Note that "noscens autem est quia generat notitiam".

ibid. p. 185 note 7 Fol 34rb. No appeal to above to justify distinction of generation and procession; difference between nature and will.

p. 119 note 25; fol 30ra.

"... in divinis non potest esse nisi duplex exitus. Cum enim omnis exitus sive motus sit naturalis sive voluntarius aut violentus, cum violentus non datur in Deo, quidquid exit ab eo aut exit naturaliter aut voluntarie. Et quod queritur quare non est ibi processus vel exitus secundum primum, quod est ratio, dicendum, quod haec questione est de nomine tantum. Secundum enim rem tu habes, quod /118/ quaeris. Processus enim rationis non est nisi duplex vel, sicut notitia procedit ab alia, et sic producitur Filius et est ille processus naturalis, quia naturale est menti gignere notitiam, vel est processus rationis, sicut a ratione exit vel intelligentia procedit aliquid, et ille processus est per voluntatem et hoc modo procedit Spiritus sanctus a Patre et Filio."

Still clear that quoad expressionem, per modum naturae, is dominant.

Petrus de Palude

Petrus de Palude, In primum librum sententiarum, Cod. B. II. 21
der Universitätsbibliothek in Basel. Schmaus, Lib propugn XVIII

p. 135 (Schmaus, Lib Propug.)

"Er (Petrus) gehört zu den wenigen Autoren zu Beginn
des 14. Jahrhunderts, welche die Zeugung als Denkakt charakteris-
ieren oder wenigstens in ihm begründet sein lassen."

p 136 note 54 (which begins p 135) from d 10 Fol 71v.

"Secunda conclusio est, quod aliquo modo in nobis sunt
productiones et aliquo modo non secundum diversas opiniones.
Ubi sciendum, quod, si verbum et amor in nobis sunt aliqua
distincta re ab intelligere et velle, tunc, licet ista, scilicet
verbum et amor producantur in nobis, tamen intelligere et velle
non sunt productiones immediate ipsorum, sed principia pro-
ductionum, sicut calere est principium calefaciendi, non autem
ipsum est caleficere. Similiter et ipsum intelligere non est
dicere verbum vel formare, sed principium dicendi. Si autem
verbum et amor sint ipsi actus intelligendi et volendi, tunc
secundum rem intelligere est productio verbi eo modo, quo ipsum
intelligere facere (take as hyphenated) est intelligere et
verbum formare et sicut caleficere secundum rem est ipsum
calere. Et haec videtur verior opinio. Sic igitur in divinis
intelligere et velle semper est idem secundum rem quod dicere
verbum et spirare amorem. Sed secundum rationem differunt,
sive in creaturis differentia re absoluta sive non...."

NB If velle = spirare amorem, we are in the line of
thought of Henry of Ghent and Scotus.

Thomas of Sutton

Thomas of Sutton, Quodl. I, q. 17
Schmaus, Liber Propugn., Anhang, pp. 23* - 29*

Utrum verbum mentis sit ipse actus intelligendi vel
aliquid per actum intelligendi formatum.

1. Cites Aristotle De Gen et corr., Top., Phys., Pol., De an.,
Metaph., Ethic.

Cites Simplicius and Averroes.

Cites Augustine Damascene Anselm.

2. Intelligere : verbum :: operatio : operatum. :: pati : qualitas.

a Caught in the complexity of the term, operatio, and so thinks
of the quality, verbum, in the operation, intelligere, as the
quality, lumen, is in the operation, illuminatio.

b Caught in the psychological complexity and fails to distin-
gish the act of defining thought from the act of intellectual
grasp as two acts.

p. 26* lines 9 - 17 (after distinguishing perfect and imperfect verbum)

"Sed cum per discursum intellectus accepit successive
partes definitionis, tunc subito accipit coniunctim intuendo
omnes partes definitionis per ordinem et illud acceptum sic
est verbum perfectum et illa intuitio ~~sic est verbum perfectum~~
omnium partium simul est formatio verbi et simul formatur
et formatum est, sicut simul medium illuminatur et illuminatum
est, et verbum in modico differt ab illa perfecta intuitione,
sicut lumen, quod est terminus illuminationis, in modico differt
ab illuminatione."

p. 28* lines 23-36.

"Ad primum argumentum dicendum, quod verbum formatur ab
intellectu, sed non tanquam a principio activo, sed tanquam a
principio passivo, et tu dicas: Formare verbum est agere. Si
igitur intellectus format verbum, intellectus est activus. Ad
quod dicendum est, quod formare verbum secundum Aristotelem et
Commentatorem non est agere nisi secundum similitudinem et
figuram dictionis sicut sentire et verum est, quod verbum est
ab obiecto active. Sed tamen non potest dici, quod obiectum
format verbum, sicut non potest dici, quod obiectum intelligit.
Pati enim non attribuitur agenti nec operatio, quae consequitur
ad passionem. Formare autem verbum vele est pati vel consequitur
ad passionem. Quod intelligere sit pati secundum rem, expresse
dicunt Philosophus et suus Commentator et etiam Simplicius
Super praedicamenta."

p. 27* line 12 f.

"... et est inter eos (Godfrey, Henry, Giles on real distinct)
controversia magis in verbis quam in sententiis."

c Caught in backwash of double Thomist development. Aquinas
went beyond Aristotle in distinguishing species impressa from
intelligere (metaphysical advance) and in distinguishing
intelligere from verbum (psychological advance w metaphysical
consequence of two acts, one causing other, so that formare
verbum adds real relation to intelligere.)

Sutton appeals to Aristotle to bring formare verbum into
category of pati, act, when it is exercise of efficient causality.

William of Ware

Gulielmus Guarra (of Ware), In I Sent., d. 27, q. 3.
Schmaus, Liber propugnatorius, Anhang, 253* - 271*

Quaeritur, utrum verbum, secundum quod est pars imaginis et perfecte repraesentat Verbum increatum, sit terminus intellectonis vel principium eius.

p. 264* line 26 (author's solution)

"Ideo ad quaestionem istam dicitur quod, sicut calefactio actio et calefactio passio et calor idem sunt re absoluta, sicut intellectio actio et intellectio passio et calor idem verbum sunt idem penitus re absoluta ita, quod verum nihil aliud est quam ipse actus intelligendi, ut recipitur in potentia, quod patet ex hoc, quod verbum non est species nec terminus, ut supra probatum est (first two opinions). Relinquitur, quod sit actus. Istud probatur per multas auctoritates...."

p. 270* line 21 (after giving auctoritates and giving and solving obj)

"Ista opinio videtur probabilis, quia huic verbo sic dicto convenit definitio Gandavi superiorius data. Nam verbum est actus cui est terminus intellectualis operationis, non maxima tamen realiter distinctus, emanans ab agente secundum actum et manens in agente et est declarativus ipsius objecti."

Schmaus refers to Henry, Quodl VI q. 1; Summa a 54 q 10.

See Gulielmus ibid second opinion second part, p. 259* line 10f.

p. 254* line 2 ff (first opinion; similar to Thomas of Sutton's)

"... et sic sunt tres opiniones de verbo, quarum prima est quod verbum sit species informans intellectum et formalis ratio intelligendi. Est enim secundum istos sic dicentes considerare in anima duplē actum, scilicet perfectum et imperfectum vel sub aliis verbis actum collativum sive inquisitivum et actum intuitivum ita, quod verbum est terminus actus inquisitivi et imperfecti et est principium actus perfecti et intuitivi ad modum, quo dicimus, quod habitus moralis est terminus actus imperfecti et principium actus perfecti, et imaginatur isti, quod intelligentia primo informata specie intelligibili rei primo intuetur rem et iste actus est imperfectus nec assimilatur perfecte rei-intelligibili---Sed-e-um-m-e-n-s-e-st-informata adhuc est verbum, quia mens sic informata non est certa, utrum assimiletur perfecte rei intelligibili. Sed cum mens est informata sic, convertit supra se intelligendo conformitatem suam ad rem extra et gignit de se aliam speciem numero, quae quidem species secundo generata de se ipsa sic informata prima specie dicitur verbum, ita quod ista repraesentat rem perfecte et conformitatem animae ad rem et est ista species sic generata verbum et principium actus reflexi et est terminus actus primi. Istud ultimum additum est dictum in summa breviter."

NB Sutton does not go on to question of truth judgment.

Gulielmus Guarra, In I Sent d 27 q 3, con'd
Schmaus, Liber propugn., Anhang, 253* - 271*

p. 258*, line 6 ff. (second opinion).

Aliis non placet ista opinio et dicunt, quod verbum non est species nec actus, sed terminus actus, aliquid utique fabricatum ab intellectu veluti quoddam ideolum, in quo intellectus speculator rem ipsam extra, et necessitatem huius sumunt ex tribus: Primo ex hoc, quod omnes actus et omnis operatio habet aliquem terminum secundum Philosophum V Physicorum [224b 1], quare similiter et actus intellectus habet aliquem terminum. Alias si non haberet, non esset actus distinctus et finitus. Sedcum sit actus in agente manens, necessario terminatur ad aliquid intra et illud terminativum actus est verbum repraesentans rem extra.

Item nulla potentia operatur, nisi habeat obiectum praesens sub aliqua separatione. Alioquin operaretur in nihil vel circa nihil. Sed intellectus intelligit res absentes per essentiam. Ergo habet aliquod obiectum apud se, in quo res absens presentatur. Ideo propter perfectionem actus et assertiam obiecti requiritur terminus intra, ut patet de idolo in speculo.

Item sicut se habet operatio transiens extra ad obiectum extra, sic se habet manens intra ad obiectum intra. Sed operatio transiens non potest esse, si non sit obiectum extra. Ergo similiter operatio manens intra non potest esse, nisi sit aliquod obiectum intra in ipso intellectu. Huiusmodi est verbum. Exemplum huius ponitur tale: Sicut quantumcumque ponitur, quod species coloris esset in oculo meo, si non esset color oppositus visui in eo, non possem videre, sic quantumcumque species sit in intellectu, non potest habere intellectionis actum, nisi sit aliquid intra obiectum ei.

Alli autem addunt ultra et ostendunt primo, quomodo sit verbum, et secundo ex hoc ostendunt, quid/page 259*/ sit verbum. De primo sic: Cum intellectus sit potentia passiva ad praesentiam ipsius quidditatis expressae in phantasmate per operationem intellectus agentis patitur intellectus possibilis ab obiecto et generatur in ipso intellectu simplex notitia de quidditate rei expressa in anima et hac notitia habita anima est in actu, per quam ulterius operando circa rem dividendo et resolvendo, componendo et definiendo acquirit sibi perfectiorem notitiam de obiecto, scilicet notitiam declarativam ipsius rei, formando in se expressam similitudinem ipsius obiecti, quae quidem notitiae declarativa verbum dicitur. Unde definiunt verbum: Verbum est terminus intellectualis operationis emanans ab agente secundum actum manens in agente alterius declarativum. Modo per istas sexparticulas in definitione positas excluduntur ista per ordinem: Per hoc quod verbum est terminus excluditus principale obiectum, quod est causa efficiens verbi, quid verbum paritur a cognoscente et/cognito secundum Augustinum IX De trin. c. 8 "Nascitus autem verbum, cum excogitatum placet aut ad peccandum "aut ad recte faciendum. Verbum ergo nostrum et mentem de qua "gignitur, quasi medius amor coniungit."

Per hoc autem quod dicitur intellectualis operationis excluditur amor a ratione verbi, qui est actus voluntatis liberae. Per hoc quod dicitur emanans ab agente excluditur res ipsa, quae est terminus simplicis intelligentiae, quae non est emanans a mente. Per hoc quod dicitur secundum actum excluditur simplex notitia, quae non est ab agente secundum actum; est enim simplex notitia primus actus. Per hoc autem quod est manens

Gulielmus Guarra, In I Sent., d 27 q 3, confid.
Schmaus, Liber propug, Anhang p. 259*

in intelligente excluditur verbum vocale, quod extra profertur et non manet intra. Per hoc, quod verbum est declarativum alterius excluduntur a ratione verbi perfecti omnes conceptus, qui sunt inter primum et ultimum, qui non sunt perfecte declarativi sicut verbum.

30 Ad quaestionem ergo, cum quaeritur, utrum verbum sit ratio formalis intelligendi, dicunt, quod per comparationem ad actum non est ratio formalis. Nam verbum non mediat inter actum et potentiam. Per comparationem vero ad obiectum est ratio formalis intelligendi verbum et mediat inter actum et obiectum est id, quo actus tendit in obiectum.

p.260* 5 Unde sicut calefacere transiens in exteriorem materiam habet unum terminum ~~inter~~, scilicet ipsum calorem et alium extra scilicet ipsum calefactibile, ita operatio intellectus, sed scilicet intelligere, potest habere unum terminum ~~intrus~~, ipsum scilicet verbum quasi quoddam idolum formatum ad hoc, quod sit perfectus actus, alium terminum extra, scilicet ipsum obiectum principale 10 quod repraesentatur in verbo, et sicut calefacere terminatur ad calefactibile mediante calore, qui est quasi terminus ~~intrus~~, ita intelligere terminatur ad obiectum extra mediante verbo, quod est terminus ~~intrus~~, et quemadmodum calor existens in semine ex se est indeterminatus ad hoc, quod producat determinatum effectum, et determinatur per ipsam vim animae in semine existentem 15 ad productionem determinati effectus, sic ipse intellectus ex se est indeterminatus et determinatur per ipsam speciem ad hoc, quod producat verbum determinatum, quia anima de se est indeterminata ad omne verbum et determinatur ad hoc vel ad illud per hanc speciem vel per illam ita, quod determinata species 20 determinat ipsum intellectum ad determinatum verbum formandum, quae quidem species secundum se sine verbo formato sufficit ad cognitionem quae est de re. Sed ad hoc, quod habatur cognitio propter quid, oportet, quod anima per istam speciem formet sibi idolum, quod sit terminus intellectus perfectae intra, in quo idolo repraesentatur obiectum extra principale, et illud sic formatum est verbum representativum rei 25 perfecte.

Contraistam opinionem arcuitur sic: Augustinus....

NB Gulielmus expressly attributes the definition of verbum presumably that of p 259* line 10 f. to Gandavus, See p 270* line 21ff

J. Paulus notes that Gandavus introduced the notion of the propter quid into the notion of verbum.

Act and Activity.

A Platonist can think of final and efficient causality, of activity and passivity. But were he to grasp and accept the notion of formal causality, of act, then he would cease to be a Platonist and become an Aristotelian. There results a radical ambiguity. The area that is divided by the Platonist into the two parts of activity and passivity, is divided by the Aristotelian into three parts, namely, activity, passivity, and act. For both Platonist and Aristotelian, activity and passivity are contraries. ~~But-while-the-Platonist-has-to-operate-only-with-this-opposition-of-contrary-terms.~~ But in the two contexts the two contraries, are contrary in different manners. For the Aristotelian, finite act, since it has to be produced, is also a pati and, since it cannot produce itself, must be a pati from the other. Again, for the Aristotelian act is the principle of perfection; not as such but only in its manifestation, its consequent, is act to be characterised by activity, fecundity, production. On the other hand, the Platonist, since he has no category of act as formal cause, is driven to identify activity with the more perfect and passivity with the less perfect; corporeal things act on one another; in the main they are passive; but spiritual things are essentially active and, indeed, in the finest mode of activity which is self-movement. In the main corporeal things are passive; if they act at all, it is not on themselves but only on the other; but spiritual things are essentially active and their activity primarily is the firm self-movement that, for the Aristotelian, is a self-contradiction.

At some length we have offered the evidence that Aquinas gradually adopted the Aristotelian analysis and, to a less extent, Aristotelian terminology [T.S.]. Very briefly we may indicate that he ~~was~~ was quite aware of the ambiguity just outlined and, indeed, quite ready to exploit it for his own purposes when occasion demanded. When do self-movement and absolute immobility mean exactly the same thing? When self-movement is a term in a Platonist context and absolute immobility is a term in an Aristotelian context. Aquinas wrote: "nihil enim differt devenire ad aliquod primum quod moveat se, secundum Platonem; et devenire ad primum quod omnino sit immobile, secundum Aristotalem" CGent I 13 §10. But not only could Aquinas pierce the shell of systematic differences to grasp the identity of the systematised realities. He could also take advantage of the Platonist incomprehension to answer Platonist difficulties. The name, life, is derived from what appears externally, namely, self-movement; but properly it denotes the substance "cui convenit secundum suam naturam movere seipsum, vel agere se quocumque modo ad operationem" I 18 2 c. Further, God is the supreme instance of life; for he is not dependent on anything else; his intellect is his nature; it is most perfect and always in act I 18 3 c. Does this mean that God moves himself? Well, understanding is a kind of movement and, inasmuch as God understands himself, he is said to move himself: ibid l. 1. I know, writes "Quod se intelligit, dicitur se mouere." ibid l. 1. one can easily suspect that the last is highly significant and more instructive" In this phrase the "se" would receive more emphasis from an Aristotelian than from a Platonist.

Alex of Hales
Jean de la Rochelle
Bonaventure
Matthew of Aquasparta
Marston Olivi

But as the heat of controversy rose and issues were more sharply defined, it became ever less easy for the theologians of the thirteenth century either to attend to the ultimate unimportance of systematic differences or to entertain the analogous and nuanced concept of life as the substance that could be said to "agere se quocumque modo ad operationem." In the older Franciscan school/opposition to the Aristotelian doctrine of that cognitional acts were a pati, that corporeal objects acted on sense, that sense acted upon intellect. Perhaps Alexander of Hales did not even trouble to contest the view that sensation was passive (Rohmer 106) while his notions of material and possible intellect were not sufficiently developed for him to determine whether or not sense acted on understanding [p 120]. In Jean de la Rochelle the issue makes its appearance: with regard to sensation he denies that bodies act on the soul and affirms some type of parallel activity [p 125]; further he avoids any action of phantasm on intellect by having agent intellect directly actuate the possible intellect which in turn operates with respect to sensitive data to know quiddities, principles, and conclusions [p 140]; thus, knowing is not an act caused by the object but an activity of the subject with respect to the object. Saint Bonaventure admitted the passivity of sense organs but, rather obscurely, affirmed the activity of the senses (p 147); he considered intellectual knowledge as a judicial activity, springing from an Augustinian illumination, at times conditioned by the presence of ~~some~~ the sensible data with respect to which it was exercised (p 148-61).

Matthew of Aquasparta came to grips with the issue. If the object does not contribute to the cognition, how can the cognition be anything but purely immanent. But if the object does contribute, how can one agree with the Augustinian doctrine that the soul is not moved by bodies but moves itself? [p 162 ff] His solution was a compromise; the soul "non tam recipit de rebus, quam accipit vel rapit vel facit seu in se format non de se sed ex illis et de illis." [p 171 n 3; QQ III de Cogn, Quaracchi 1903 p 288.. Roger Marston felt that Matthew had conceded too much to the Aristotelians [Q de Anima, q 8, Quaracchi 1932, p 385] John Pecham's anti-Aristotelian ardor is well-known [Ehrle, Hefele-Leclercq] and so it is not surprising that his disciple, Roger Marston, [Introd, Quar 1932, pp] found that Matthew of Aquasparta had conceded too much to the Aristotelian view [Q de An q 8, Quar 1932 p 385]; Roger endeavoured to work out a position in which not only Augustinian thought but also Augustinian language would be preserved [ibid qq 8 and 9, 376-429; briefly 422-26].

In Peter John Olivi one may find a whole-hearted champion of vital activity. Cognitional acts have the intrinsic property of vitality; they cannot have it from material objects but only from the soul itself [In II Sent q 58 c, Quar 1924, pp 412-14]; Olivi would seem to have had a precursor in Henry of Ghent, Perez []. To round off his theory of the freedom of the will, which excluded any action of the object on the will, he set forth at considerable length the arguments that might be

there was no sharp/

Olivi
Gonzalvus Hispan
Vital Four, Durand

adduced to show that objects acted on any potency of the soul [ob 13 pp 400-403; ob 14 pp 403-408] and then at still greater length [ibid respectively pp 437-61 and 461-515] his own thesis that "potentiae sunt de se et ex se sufficientes ad hoc ut sint aut esse possint principia effectiva suorum actuum absque aliqua cooperatione seu coefficientia facta ab obiectis vel speciebus" [p 463 after and interesting and rather exhaustive list of possible contrary opinions pp 461f].

1) In the same context but in briefer fashion Gonsalvus Hispanus advanced three opinions, /that in no potency was the act due to the efficient causality of the potency, 2) that once the potency was disposed by a species or an affection then it produced its own act, and 3) that every potency or, at least, the will without any previous action from the object effected its own act [QD q 3, Quaracchi 1935, p 31]. [From the foot-notes of the erudite editor one gathers that the first opinion was advanced by Godfrey of Fentaine, the second by John de Murro, the third by Henry of Ghent] Gonsalvus holds the third opinion and develops his argument in three main parts over ~~suum~~ a dozen pages [ibid pp 32-45]. He meets the objection that nothing can reduce itself from potency to act (p 23) with the distinction that "non movet seipsum secundum idem, quia secundum quod est virtualiter tale movet; secundum autem quod est potentia formaliter tale movetur." (p 46). As to the principle, quidquid movetur ab alio movetur, it is not indubitably universal nor manifest to sense; it is denied by Thomas in the Prima Secundae; finally, if the philosophers contend that accidents are not without a subject, are we to deny the scriptural doctrine of the Eucharist (p 47)?

Arch HDLMA 2 1927 151-337

In the Quaestiones of Vital du Four it seems that cognition is ~~not~~ conceived as pure activity. Just as Aristotelian cosmology conceived the sun as operating in the operations of terrestrial agents (homo generat hominem et sol; cf I 118 1 3m), so Vital du Four has intellect operating in the operations of sense. As the soul, so the intellect is present in all the ~~senses~~, ^{present} organs of sense, terminating its inorganic operation in but not through the organs, perfecting the otherwise monstrous judgments of sense which would have the sun two feet in diameter; and, incidentally, knowing concrete and particular existence [see pp 163-73].

Since the actual exercise of efficient causality does not add ~~more-than~~ anything absolute to the agent qua agent, it is not a far step from Vital du Four's position to that advanced by Durandus in the first ¹ version of his Commentary on the Sentences. Durandus appealed to the analogy of the Aristotelian gravia and levia in which local movements do not add any absolute, intrinsic entity but only new relations to different places. As weight and lightness were forms, so also were the senses and intellect; as local movements add no absolute intrinsic entity but only new relations, so cognitional acts add nothing absolute to the accidental forms of sense and intellect but only new relations of the subject to shifting objects. It followed, quite conveniently, that even de potentia absoluta God could not produce an intuition of an object that did not exist (p 17). It followed that all acts of cognition had as their causa per se the generator or conserver of the sense or intellect so that the object was only a "causa sine qua

Koch p 20/

Pri 12/78
attribute similar
view to the
Anglians.

non" (Kock p 20 f). It followed finally that all acts of intellect were of the same species (p 16 line 20ff of 63 line 13 ff and p 72), a view that had been met by Peter John Olivi (In II Sent q 58 ob 2 et ad 2m (Quar 1924, pp 395 and 415-19) and also by Godfrey of Fontaines (Quodl XIII a 3 Phil Belg V 192); the earlier proponent has been identified by P. Glorieux as Amand de Saint- Quentin, OP, (Repertoire des Maitres de Theologie de Paris au XIII^e siecle, Paris 1933, I p 175, §54) a point of interest to readers of J. Koch's suggestion that there had been an Augustinian tendency ~~xxxx~~ in the Dominican convent of Saint Jacques in Paris (J Koch, Jakob von Metz).

prior to Duran/

We have been following the Platonist-Augustinian line of thought. It conceived knowing either as act or as pure activity. In either case the efficient cause of the act or the source of the activity proceeded from soul or from the potencies of soul. It conceived knowing as act or as activity or as mere relation. But the efficient cause of the act, the source of the activity, the ground of the relation, always was soul or a potency of soul. The object was never an efficient cause of knowing; it was always the term no more than a necessary condition, supplying the terminus of the act, activity, or relation. However, there is a profound difference between the earlier and later representatives of the Augustinian school of thought. In the earlier period there existed two opposed systematic contexts, so that a single reality could be described in two contrary manners; in this fashion Aquinas could write that it was all one whether as a Platonist you said that God moved himself or as an Aristotelian you said that God was simply immobile. But in the later period there seems to have existed only a single context and that was Aristotelian. As Dr. Kock has put it - Aristotle By the turn of the century Aristotle had won the victory of the school-master; his opinions might be rejected; his fundamental ideas might not be grasped; yet even such rejection and incomprehension could not express itself in any but Aristotelian formulae categories and analogies. The result was an enormous impoverishment. In a Platonist context activity and passivity mean more than in an Aristotelian context in which perfection essentially is neither activity nor passivity but act. To transpose Platonist affirmations of activity and negations of passivity into an Aristotelian context results in the ~~bixxi~~ brilliant phantasy of Vital du Four or the intelligent vacuity of Durandus.

Koch, J. B. v. Metz
The condemnations of the Aristotelians in Paris and Oxford and, to an extent that cannot be calculated, the

The condemnations of Aristotelian tendencies in Paris and Oxford undoubtedly reduced the followers of Aristotle and

Condemnation
Godfrey of Fontaines

It is not possible, however, to trace the Aristotelian line of thought as we have traced the Augustinian. The immediately sufficient reason is that the works-of-possible writings of possible Aristotelian writers have not been published in a comparable fashion. Behind this reason, there may also be another, namely, that the repeated condemnations of Aristotelian tendencies both at Paris and at Oxford not only provided a welcome reinforcement to Augustinian argument but also proved a deterrent to the existence and perhaps even to the articulateness of Aristotelians. In 1295 Godfrey of Fontaines protested against the continued enforcement of the condemnation of 1277 [Quodl XII 5, Phil Bel V 100-105, ed Hoffmans Louvain 1932]. ^{XI} About 1316 in a similar public question John of Naples advanced the thesis that the doctrine of Aquinas could be taught at Paris in all its conclusions [Jellouschek III 88-101]. But a fully satisfactory solution was reached only on February 14, ^{XII} 1325, when the Bishop of Paris decreed the revocation of the condemnation in so far as it touched the doctrine of Aquinas [Jellouschek ib p 84 note 8; Denifle Chatelain Chartularium II 280 ff §838]. A final difficulty is that during this period Aristotelians and even Thomists were on the defensive; they were engaged in composing Correctoria and Impugnaciones; they had to ~~mask~~ devote their energies, not to the questions that would develop and consolidate the lines of thought opened by Aquinas, but to the refutation of implications of heresy that their opponents proclaimed to find in their doctrine.

In Godfrey of Fontaines one finds a thorough Aristotelian, yet one innocent of the higher synthesis of Aristotelian and Augustinian thought that had been wrought by Aquinas. Yet at least we must be grateful for his relentless affirmation of the essentials. If Activity in the sense of efficient causality is not established by the use of a transitive verb in the active voice; because "materia appetit formam" and "materia recipit formam", you cannot conclude that matter is the efficient cause of form [XIII 3 (V 201)]. A distinction is to be drawn between the "modus significandi" and the reality that is signified (IX 19 [4 278]). Just as the object is not changed by being known, so the subject does not produce by knowing (IX 19 (IV 275)). To draw the distinction between actus perfecti and actus imperfecti is just dodging the issue (VIII 2 (IV 20)). Agent and patient universally differ re et subiecto (VIII 2 (IV 26)). If you wish to follow a famous man, Henry VIII of Ghent, and deny this principle, that is bad enough; but it is sheer nonsense to go on to affirm that there ~~is~~-action can be ^{the} pure activity of action without passion (XIII 3 (5 198)). The long and short of the whole question is whether one is ready to face basic principles: ens, actus, potentia are ultimate concepts; Aristotle's four causes are distinct and ultimate (VI 7 (3 170); VIII 2 (4 18); XIII 3 (5: 193 200)); and there is ~~x~~ not an known method by which one can deny that the object is the efficient cause of the cognitional or volitional act and yet successfully and coherently avoid occasionalism in every other instance of efficient causality (VI 7 (3 158); VIII 2 (4: 20 22); X 12 (4 362)).

or at any rate
available.

glorioue, M. Augustin
Ripstein

expand/

any contradiction

Godfrey
Sutton
Trivet Herveus

Godfrey applied coherently his Aristotelian principles to the analysis of the will (Quodl IV 8 [I 257 f]; VI 7 [III 148-72]; IX 13 [IV 254-57]; XV 2 [XIV 6-11]). His position has been studied in its rich and rather exciting historical context by Dom Lottin and from his learned articles we gather a few indications of the existence of other Aristotelians. John Quidort of Paris, writing some ten years after the death of Aquinas, did not venture to determine whether the will were an active or a passive potency.

William of Hothun, OP, writing in 1280, reveals a dutiful conformism [Rev neosc 38 1935 222 f]. The Correctorium Corruptorii Quare, frequently ascribed to Richard Clapwell, OP, similarly reveals nothing new (ibid 225 f; see Glorieux pp However, John Quidort of Paris writing in 1284-86, ventures to leave it an open question whether the will is an active or a passive potency [Rev neosc 40 1937 563 note 35] and even maintains that the will cannot act against the decision of intellect and that liberty consists in absence of coercion [ibid 563 f]. Similar views are attributed to William of Tortocollo in the Correctorium "Sciendum" [ibid 565: see Muller]. In Nicholas Trivet OP one finds a long refutation of the view of Henry of Ghent that the object of the will is a mere "causa sine qua non": the object is a cause of the act of will; in itself, it is a final cause; as apprehended, it is an efficient cause [567 and note 48]. Thomas of Sutton OP affirmed the impossibility of anything moving itself as its own efficient cause; the efficient cause of the act of the will is the object; ~~not properly but only metaphorically be-cause-not-efficiently,-the-will-is-said-to-move-itself~~ the will moves itself only consecutive through its control of the acts of the intellect (briefly, ibid 570-73; at length, rech theol anc med 9 1937 281-312). We may add that Thomas of Sutton considered the act of sensation to be a pati [Sharp 1], that he considered the act of understanding to be a pati [Schmaus], than he even proposed the astounding view that formare verbum was a pati [Schmaus; explain through identification of verbum and intellegere]. Finally, there is Hevre of Nedellec's biting statement that, while some people have taken it at their good pleasure that the same thing can be both active and passive in the same respect, still no one has ever justified such a view ~~xxxix~~ before the bar of reason (apud Koch p 65 lines 15-19)

Scotus
Nicolaus
Siger of Brabant

in itself/

concurrent
independent/

still
current/

proportionate/
natural/

John Duns Scotus stands at the confluence of the two streams. Peter John Olivi and Gonsalvus Hispanus had insisted on the activity-of-the-soul causal efficiency of potencies to the exclusion of causal efficiency from objects. Godfrey of Fontaines, Thomas of Sutton, Nicolaus Trivet had insisted on the passivity of potencies and the causal activity of objects. Scotus played the honest broker. The act, intelligere, as received in the possible intellect is a pati [OP Ox 1 d 3 q 7 Vives IX 387; Fernandez q 9 a 3 §504 Quaracchi 1912 p 461]. Next, the immanent act is neither a relation, an action, nor a passion; it is a quality and, indeed, in the first species of quality [Vives q 6 p 305; Fernandez, q 8 §473 p 427]. Thirdly, there is a species received in intellect prior to the act of intellection and its function is to provide the presence of an actually universal object [1 d 3 q 6 Vives pp 236-52; Fernandez §§447-54 pp 401-10]. Fourthly, there is the key theory of partial causes: the faculty and the object or the faculty and the species combine as/partial causes to produce the act [Vives 1 d 3 q 7 pp 361-64; Fernandez q 9 a 2 §§493-98 pp 446-50]. Fifthly, the potentia intellectiva that is the partial cause of the act of intellection need not be the agent intellect; it may well be the possible intellect. The principle that the same thing in the same respect cannot be both in act and in potency is open to distinctions; an equivocal cause, such as the intellect which produces all species of intellection, can be virtually in act and formally in potency [ibid; Fernan a 3 §501 pp 453 ff].

compromise

The success of this position is not to be minimized. Nicolaus of Autrecourt in his Exigit attacked the common saying, that acts were produced by the active power of the soul and the object [ed J R O'Donnell, Med Stud 1 1939 p 259 lines 15 - 21]. Cajetan confessed that at one time he had taught and might even have put in writing the "communem cursum iudicantium de intellectu et specie intelligibili sicut de duobus agentibus partialibus." [In I q 12 a 2 §XIV Leon IV 118]. Finally, what is the supposition of the problem of the elevation of the faculty for the performance of supernatural acts prior to the reception of supernatural habits? The supposition is that the faculty is the/efficient cause of the/act and must somehow be made into a proportionate efficient cause of a supernatural act. It would seem that the Platonist-Augustinian resistance to Aristotle and to Aquinas is still with us.

Our study of Aquinas & on this question [TS took full cognizance of the fact that Platonist, Augustinian, Avicennist elements are to be found in the thought and in the language of Aquinas] St. Thomas. Our thesis was that his thought did mix and to a notably less extent his language did move to an acceptance of the Aristotelian position. But Aquinas not merely accepted Aristotelian analysis; he transposed it in a higher synthesis; and a brief comparison with between his position and that of subsequent Aristotelians will serve to bring out this mix essential point. Siger of Brabant denied the existence of any real distinction between species and intelligere [QQ de Anima III q 10 van Steenb p 138]; there are, of course, intellectual habits but they are not the species themselves but on the contrary inclinations of the intellect towards having species which are identical with acts [ib q 11; I 140;

If Siger of Brabant and Godfrey of Fontaines denied the distinction between species and intelligere because they did not grasp the advance over Aristotle effected by Aquinas, it is no less true that others admitted the distinction only to misconceive it. Durandus outlines and attacks successfully an analysis that drew its inspiration from Aristotelian physics. Intellection is an activity of an intellect informed by an intelligible species; just as water ~~must~~ has to be heated before it can heat your hands or feet, so an intellect has to be informed by a species before it can elicit its activity; just as it is the heat in the water that is the ground of the water's heating your hands, so it is the species in the intellect that is the ground of the intellect's being active; the one difference is that the heating is transient but the intellection is immanent [Koch p 8³ f]. Later Cajetan was to inveigh against such physical analogies [In I 14 l ** §§ IV-VII leon 4 167 f] But Herve de Nedellec, who rejected the real distinction [E Hocedez, Aegidii Romanii Theorematum de Esse et Essentia, Louvain 1930, pp 92-94], was not in a position to hold an opinion radically different from the one that Durandus attacked. His possible intellect is an accidental form on the analogy of Aristotelian physics; his intellection is another ~~form~~ accidental form; and his species is a third form, informing the first and producing the second. He meets the objection that "forma non est formae" [Koch p 18] by contending that one absolute form can produce or receive another [p 55 line 24 f]; he conceives the species as the efficient principle of the intellection [p 66 line 24 ff], and ~~as~~ as the form of the intellect moving the intellect to the intellection [p 67 line 24]; on the other hand, the intellection itself is the operation of the possible intellect as recipient [66 line 25f]. His conception of the relations of intellect, species, and intellection can be put most briefly in his own words. "Operatio ergo speciei non est intelligere sed intelligere facere": that is, it is operation in the sense of efficient causality and not in the sense of second act. "Sed intelligere est operatio ipsius intellectus possibilis ut receptivi": that is, it is operation in the sense of second act which, however, for Herve is another form. "species requiritur ut similitudo informans intellectum et movens ipsum ad cognoscendum et non ut medium cognitionis" 67 line 23 ff: that is, the species is a form that informs a form, the intellect, and produces a form, the intellection. the intellect, perhaps conceived as a form, and then produces a form, the intellection.

66 lin 24
66 lin 25

I think it noteworthy that even in my very limited reading I have not noticed any complementing of the Aristotelian efficient cause (*principium motus vel mutationis in alio vel qua aliud*) by the Aristotelian natural principle (*principium motus in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens*). Plainly, if the Aristotelians were to meet the Augustinian insistence on self-movement and vitality.

exhibits a good grasp of Aristotle but //

Controversy and polemic do not breed wisdom. Traditional feeling in favor of Platonist activity and Augustinian self-movement of soul ~~maxed~~ crystallized in the vital acts of Henry of Ghent and Peter John Olivi. Instead of meeting such estimable feeling and pardonable dullness with the urbane exposition of a higher point of view, Godfrey of Fontaines insisted on Aristotelian requirements to the point where no subject and no potency could be the efficient cause of its own perfection or act [Quodl VIII 2 (IV 18-33); XIII 3 (V 190-213)]. The result was that the Aristotelians found themselves in ~~the~~/false position. They were committed to accounting for the characteristics of life exclusively in terms of the Aristotelian solution that "vivens movet se ipsum in quantum una pars in actu movet aliam partem in potentia." In this fashion Herve de Nedellec was ~~surprised~~ driven to the need of a sensus agens to make acts of sense "vital" in the manner that the agent intellect made acts of intellect "vital." (Koch p 69 line 16) Finally, of course, Aristotelianism itself was in need ~~in~~ of the higher metaphysical synthesis of Aquinas both as a complement to Aristotelian metaphysics and as a corrective of Aristotelian physics.

Since the vital act is still with us, a few expository remarks will not be out of place. Aristotle had two fundamental definitions. Nature was defined as "principium motus vel operationis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens." Efficient potency was defined as "principium motus vel mutationis in alio vel qua aliud." If one wishes to follow these definitions, then the principle of the vital act must always be nature. For a vital act with respect to its internal principles always is "in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens"; it cannot be "in alio"; and it ~~cannot~~ be "in se ipso qua aliud" as when the doctor cures himself, curing qua doctor, but cured qua patient. However, the relation of the vital act to its internal principle may be of different kinds: it may be 1) of potency to first act, or 2) of first act to second act, or 3) of potency and first act combined to second act, or 4) of one second act to another equal or less perfect second act. In the first three cases the relation is of the ~~less-perfect-to~~ the perfectible to its perfection; in these three cases nature differs from efficient potency in two respects, for ~~matters~~ the efficient potency must be proportionate to its effect and, as well, by Aristotelian definition its effect is in the other or, if in self, then in self as other. On the other hand, in the fourth case nature differs from efficient potency in only one respect; for then nature is proportionate to its resultant and differs from efficient potency only inasmuch as that resultant is immanent while the product of efficiency per se is transient; moreover, while nature in the first three cases does not dispense with from the need of an efficient cause, in the fourth case it does dispense with such a cause; finally, in this fourth case, which is the processio operati of De Ver 4 2 7m, it is plain that nature is not only as excellent a principle as efficient causality, since no/efficient cause is needed, but also superior to efficient causality, since/~~in~~ resultant is immanent.

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~~the vital~~
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This analysis has its bearing on Thomist trinitarian thought. In the Summa theologiae I 27 1 c., Aquinas accounts for Arianism and Sabellianism because their authors attempted to conceive the divine processions on the analogy of the efficient cause. Moreover, in the same question, a 5 ad lm., he refuses to acknowledge any divine procession according to the attribute of power, for ~~potentia, operationis et principium~~ power is the efficient causality that accounts for creatures; "potentia est principium agendi in aliud." The divine processions are natural I 41 2 c; "secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod manet in ipso" I 27 1 c; "per modum intelligibilis actionis" I 27 2 c; "per modum amoris" I 27 4 c; they are not processions terminating in the diverse but processions which, as they increase in perfection, so also they approximate more closely to identity between principle and term [I 27 1 2m cf CGent IV 11]. ~~Whence~~, add to these observations the fact that, while other writers constantly speak of the divine processions as productions, Aquinas especially in the Summa only rarely and, as it were, in ~~propositio~~ contexts uses the term "production" [e.g. I 37 2 c 2m 3m], and it seems necessary to conclude that the Aristotelian distinction between natural principle and efficient cause is essential to understanding Thomist thought.

Finally, if we may attempt to define the Thomist attitude towards the subsequent Augustinian reaction, let us turn to Aquinas' concept of life. "... nomen vitae sumitur ex quodam exteriori exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est movere seipsum; non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc significandum, sed ad significandam substantiam cui convenit secundum naturam suam movere seipsum, vel agere se quocumque modo ad operationem." I 18 2 c. In other words life is a degree of substantial perfection; its manifestation is through accidents, through the growth of and reproduction of animals, through the local movements of animals and men, through intelligence and will I 18 3 c. The manifestations of life are from natural principles to which in some cases external/efficient causes must be added, for living things are not isolated and independent monads, but in other cases external created efficient causes need not be added, as when apprehension moves appetite and appetite releases the springs of local movement. The trouble with the Augustinians is that they give an Aristotelian meaning to Platonist statements: if as Platonists they say that potencies move themselves, we can agree with them, for Platonists have no grasp of/difference between act and activity, natural principle and efficient cause; but if as Aristotelians they wish each vital potency to be the efficient cause of its own act, then it is reasonably plain that they are merely being obstreperous. It is impossible for the vital act-to-the potency to be the efficient cause of its own act where by efficient cause is meant the principle of an effect that is produced per se in the other and only per accidens in the producer. Either the vital potency is not an efficient cause of its own act or else its own act is only per accidens its own.

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Aquinas

Next, the Augustinians may urge that this solution is verbal inasmuch as it appeals to definitions and they may put their point differently by claiming that the procession of vital act from vital potency is always a processio operati. In that form their claim has the merit of not being nonsense but it cannot be true unless the whole technique of Aristotelian and Thomist analysis is inapplicable to the accidental order: it admits only one meaning of the relation of potency to act, namely, that of second act to second act; it excludes the possibility of a possible intellect that is a tabula rasa standing to all intelligible forms as prime matter stands to the forms of sensible things; it excludes the possibility of processio operationis, of first act to second, of sight to seeing, of taste to tasting, of species to intelligere, of habit to operation; and it confuses these minor processions with the higher procession of inner word from intelligence in act.

ANSWER

Augustinians urge that there is no difference between the two positions of power and operation. They do not see that the Augustinian position is based on the notion of tabula rasa and that the notion of tabula rasa is based on the notion of processio operati. The Augustinian position is based on the notion of processio operati and the notion of processio operati is based on the notion of tabula rasa.

Amor procedens

Aristotle had taught that "appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum." As I have indicated elsewhere [TS St. Thomas in his Pars Prima considered the act of rational appetite to result from the rational apprehension of the good. Later, in the De Anlo q 6 a 1 and in the Prima secundae q 9, he introduced a distinction between the specification of acts of will by the intellect and their exercise as due to the will itself. This later distinction is irrelevant to an interpretation of the Pars Prima and, in any case, it cannot affect trinitarian analogy which prescinds from productive process to utilize rational procession.

I have also quoted some ten texts from the writings of Aquinas all to the effect that the love in the intellectual order, love in a rational appetite, presupposes and proceeds from the inner word of intellect [TS-VIII-1947-407-note-20] and in this fashion the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son [TS VIII 1947 407 note 20]. As this parallel seems to have escaped contemporary theologians & and the commentators that inspire them [See T L Penido, Gloses sur la procession d'amour dans la Trinité, Ephem. theol. Lovan. XIV 1937 33-68], it may be useful to show that the parallel frequently affirmed by Aquinas was also frequently-affirmed-by-theologians-from St-Anselm-to-Scotus affirmed by Sixtus

St Anselm, Monologion, cap 50, ed Schmitt p 65

Durandus, I d 6 q 2 [Schmaus p 129 note 49]/p 128 ff

/129f

[Similarly but no so clearly James of Metz/note 48 James of Lausanne John of Paris, I q 27 a 4 [Schmaus p 200 note 33; evidently influence of Henry of Ghent]

Odo Rigaldi I d 10 [Schmaus p 185 note 6]

Hervaeus Natalis [p 213 post medium; little more than distinction of processions]

Bernardus Claromontensis [p 231 ad calcem; distinction of processions] John of Naples (very clear) Quaest disp XIII, Schmaus p 132* line 1ff

p 138* line 1 ff; Quaest disp XXX p 132 note 51 ad fin

Albertus Magnus, I d 3 H, a 19 Borgnet 25 130: ab ipsa notitia semper vaporat amor; but little in development

Bonaventura, Itinerarium mentis in Deum, cap III Quar 1891, V 305a

"ex memoria et intelligentia spiratur amor tamquam nexus amborum"

Scotus,

Amor procedens.

What holds for the procession of the inner word, also holds, mutatis mutandis, for the procession of rational love. The matter is evident, if only one can succeed in taking off the spectacles created by the Augustinians of the late thirteenth century. For them, the soul was self-moving. If Aristotle forced them to acknowledge real distinctions between the soul and its potencies, then the potencies had to be self-moving; unless the potencies were the efficient causes of their own acts, the potencies would not be vital and the acts would not be vital. What is asserted with regard to the potencies in general, above all ~~is~~ asserted with regard to the will; unless the will is a potency that is the efficient cause of its own act, unless the object of the will presented by the intellect is reduced to the status of a mere condition, a "causa sine qua non," then the will cannot be free. Such was the position of Peter John Olivi [In II Sent., q 58 ob 13a, ob 14a, c, ad 13m, ad 14m; Quaracchi 1924, ~~xvi~~ II, 400-3, 403-8, 412-14, 437-61, 461-515] and Gonsalvus Hispanus [Quaest. disp., q. 3, Quaracchi 1935, esp. pp. 32-47]. At the opposite pole was the resolute and intransigent Aristotelianism of Godfrey of Fontaines who overlooked the Aristotelian notion of nature and applied rigorously the Aristotelian definition of efficient cause to reach the conclusion that universally agent and patient really differ re et subiecto [Quodl. VIII q 2 (PB IV 26); XIII 3 (PB V 191)]. What resulted from such extremism, was a heap of confusions [Lottin has studied etc.] and ultimately the Scotist compromise that object and faculty are concurrent, partial, independent, ~~and~~ efficient causes of immanent acts [In I Sent d 3; Vives q 7 vol IX 361-64; Fernandez q 9 a 2 §§493-98 Quaracchi 1912 pp 446-50]. This Scotist compromise ~~has~~ triumphed: Nicolaus of Autrecourt referred to it as the "commune dictum" [Exigit, ed O'Donnell ~~MR~~ J R, Med Stud I 1939 p 269 lines 15-21]; Cajetan spoke of it as the "communem cursum iudicantium" and expressed his regret that at one time he held it and taught it and might even have put it in writing [In I q 12 a 2 XIV Leon IV 118]; finally, despite Cajetan's repentance, we still have the common run of opinion manifesting itself in the requirement that faculties be elevated to be able to elicit/~~fix~~ supernatural acts in vital fashion.

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The Augustinian Reaction.

X Gillon DTC 15/1946 346-147

If Thomism was a higher synthesis of Aristotelian and Augustinian thought, it also was an historical event with notable repercussions in the latter part of the thirteenth century. William of Tocco, biographer and promoter of the canonization of Aquinas, praised the novelty of his questions, methods, principles, and solutions [Xenia III 529], This expresses to conclude that God had inspired him with a new light. This praise but echoed the letter written by the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris to the General Chapter of the Order of Friars Preacher in which Aquinas was ~~suspicious~~ said to be the morning star, nay the sun, of the age./ But perhaps most convincing of all was the tribute of Godfrey of Fontaines in the dark days when simple souls at the University considered the works of Aquinas to lie under official suspicion: "... ut vere doctor qui hanc doctrinam scripsit, possit dici in singulari illud quod Dominus in plurali apostolis, Matth quinto, 'Vos estis sal terae'; et cetera, sub hac forma: 'Tu es sal terae, quod si mal evanuerit, in quo salvetur'?" Quia per ea quae in hac doctrina continentur quasi omnium doctorum aliorum doctrinæ corriguntur, sapidae redditur et conduntur; et ideo si ista doctrina de medio auferatur, studentes in doctrinis aliorum sapore modicum invenirent." (Phil Belges V 103; Quod XI a 5; ed Hoffmans Louvain 1932)

There is some question whether Aquinas returned from Italy to Paris in 1269 to defend the University against the encroachments of Averroism or to defend Aquinas, who shaped the Averroists respect-for-Aristotle, against Thomist Aristotelianism threatened to be condemned along with Averroism the Averroist variety (Gillon DTC 15 653). In any case, John Pecham, the Franciscan Master-of-The Regent Master of Theology and later Archbishop of Canterbury, while greatly admiring the humility with which Aquinas submitted his doctrines for correction (Xenia III 527 f), did never extend his admiration to the doctrines themselves and later was able to complain bitterly of the pagan idols introduced into the very house of God (Enrle Zeitse 1889) William de la Mare seems to have composed a briefer and a longer Correctorium fratris Thomae (Pelster RTAM 3 1931 397-411) and to have been answered by a series of Correctoria Corruptorii (Glorieux, Muller, Ramberti; see Gillon 656). The polemics of the Correctoria were followed by the larger impugnations and filled out the lists of objections and of opinions in works of a more general character until, as the ground of the debate shifted, discussion of Durandus and of Scotus began to provide the terms of reference in which the Thomistic school evolved (Gillon 656).

in 1274/

Xenia III 59/

dixit

was less inclined to//
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opposed/

This debate was theological.

More than in Aquinas' predecessors, it is in his contemporaries and in his successors that the historical context of his thought appears. Predecessors can exhibit the materials which Aquinas worked into organic unity. But contemporaries and successors were confronted not only with the matter but also with the form of Thomism; they had to live in and think in the situation he was transforming or had transformed; they had to meet step by step the issues which he cut through by the intuitive strokes of genius. By their opposition, their perplexity, their substitutions, their undue simplifications, their anticipations of later difficulties, their contributions to points of view that still are current, they built a bridge between ourselves and Aquinas and provide historical testimony, at once illuminating and convincing, to the summits that he scaled.

practically/
proximately/

Certain general observations, to be confirmed by what will follow, had best be indicated at once. Essentially the issue was theological [Gillon 657] and it extended to all questions that were not matters of faith [ibid]. If one may put it briefly, the question was whether the Thomist higher synthesis of Augustine and of Aristotle was to be accepted. This breaks down into a series of equally global questions. Did Aquinas really understand Aristotle? If he did, was he correct in complementing and correcting Aristotle with elements of Augustinian psychology and Platonist metaphysics? Did Aquinas really grasp Augustine? If he did, was he right in correcting and complementing the letter of Augustine with the mind of Aristotle? No small part of the trouble was that mediæval technique did not permit the scientific discussion of such issues. Really Aquinas did not live at a time in which he could explain what he was doing. He could only announce, with a suitable reference, that sapientia est ordinare and then proceed to order questions and give them each an orderly answer coherent with his answers to all the others. He could affirm his agreement with Aristotle. He could affirm his agreement with Augustine. In like manner his opponents, who wished to deny the possibility of agreeing with both, could not treat that issue in its generality; they had to attack this statement and that in an enormous series; they carried on their attacks from differing points of view and these had each to be something less than the fundamental unity in which Aquinas had embraced both Aristotle and Augustine. Moreover, since wisdom rarely gains by controversy, since what is true but profound, so far from providing telling arguments, tends rather to be remembered only by its opponents, the efficacious legacy of the thirteenth century to the fourteenth was no higher synthesis of Aristotle and Augustine but rather a variety of blends or the superficial elements that the school-rooms of philosophy and theology could not fail to transmit. To this broad ~~fact~~ assertion corresponds the equally broad fact of fourteenth century decadence and bankruptcy.

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D.B.

The Augustinian Reaction.

If Aquinas aimed
was

DAVID Thomism is a higher synthesis of Aristotelian and Augustinian thought, it also was an historical event with notable repercussions in the theological centers of the latter part of thirteenth century. William of Tocco celebrated the novelty of Aquinas' questions, method, principles, and solutions (Xenia 529). John Peckham spoke bitterly of the pagan idols brought into the house of God (Xen. ibid.).

PROBLEMS 100-109

२५४ अन्तिम वर्षात् यह अवधि है।

As the ultimate bankruptcy of fourteenth century thought attests, wisdom does not prosper by debate and controversy. What is true and profound but profound, so far from providing telling arguments, presents ~~principia~~ on its surface so many difficulties that it is apt to be recalled only by its opponents. If, then, we must use such terms as Aristotelianism and Augustinianism, we must also bear in mind that they ~~were~~ are radically equivocal, that they have a different content in the context of successive minds, that profound grasp is compatible with a wavering terminology and technical precision with surprising superficiality.

THE TITANIC WOULD HAVE BEEN DESTROYED

Siger

Godfrey

Herveus

Durandus

[Koch p 65 lines 15-19], but there is also felt the need of a sensus agens to make sensations vital acts as the intellectus agens makes intellectual acts vital [p 69 line 16]. Obviously, though Herveus was a clear-headed Aristotelian [See Koch p 53 f], none the less Augustinian vitalism had him rattled.

A few remarks will complete the picture. Thomism is a good deal more than Aristotelianism. Aquinas held that species is to intelligere as forma is to esse [I 14 4 c]. It follows that if one does not grasp the real distinction between essence and existence, one cannot grasp the real distinction between species and intelligere. Now Siger of Brabant [QQ de Anima III q 10 v. Steenb/p 138] denied any distinction between species and intelligere; there are habits of intellect but the habits are not species but inclinations towards have the species which are identical with the acts [ib q 11; I 140]. Similarly, Godfrey of Fontaines denied the distinction between species and intelligere agreed with Siger [IX q 19 (IV 270-81)]; there are no species distinct from acts, though there are habits. In adopting this position both Siger and Godfrey were thinking coherently with their denial of the real distinction [Siger: v. Steenb II 593-601]; also A Maurer, Med Stud VIII 1946 68-85. Godfrey: QUod VII 5 (III 299-336). But Herveus Natalis who rejected the real distinction [EHoc de z, Aegidii Romani Theorema de Esse et Essentia, Louvain 1932, Introd. pp 92-94] accepted the distinction between ~~esp~~ species and intelligere. To do so, he had to make the species the cause of the intelligere, and he had to conceive the intelligere not as second act but as form [Koch 66 line 24; 67 line 23ff]. This ~~ix~~ view is nothing but a substitution of Aristotelian physics for Thomist metaphysics, and Durandus played-havec-with-it rightly ridiculed it ~~ix~~ with the description that just as water, unless it is heated, will not heat your feet, so intellect, unless given a species, will not have an intellection [Koch p 8 ff]; two centuries later Gajetan still had to inveigh against physical analogy [I 14 1 §§iv-vii Leon IV 167]. ~~ix~~ Durandus himself, in his first version of his Sentences, advanced that intellect and sense are forms like weight and lightness while acts of knowing are extrinsic denominations like local movements [Koch p 20]. He admitted the consequence that all cognitional acts are of one and the same species (p 16 line 20 ff; cf 65 line 13 ff), reaped the benefit that the object was only a condition of the knowing and not a cause (p 20 f) and the epistemological benefit that even de potentia absoluta God could not produce a knowing without there being a confronting object [p 17]. The view that all intellectual acts are of the same species was held earlier by Amand de Saint Quentin, OP, [Glorieux Repertoire des Maitres de Theologie de Paris au XIII^e siecle, Par 1s 1933, I p 175 §54; see Godfrey Quod XIII 3 (V 192); cf Pjolivi In II Sent q 58 ob 2a et ad 2m (Quar 1924 395 & 415-19)] a point that will be of interest to those who have read J Kohl's claim that the convent of S. Jacques at Paris was not free from Augustinian tendencies [Jakob v Metz]. On the other hand, according to Perez [p 12f/178f], Thomas Anglicus held a position similar to that of Durandus outlined above. In conclusion, one may note that there is little difference between Durandus notion of knowing as mere relation and Vital du Four's notion of knowing as pure activity with no corresponding passivity [HDLMA 2 1927 163-73]; cf Godfrey [XIII 3 (5 198)].

de C. (an)

I. 2

I,

O Augustinian/

O

Baltasar Pérez Argos, S.I.

La actividad cognoscitiva en los escolásticos del primer periodo postomista

Extracto de la tesis de doctorado en la Facultad de filosofía del colegio maximo de S. Francisco Javier, Oña (Brugos)

Madrid, 1948 [NB double numbering of pages]

II. El verbo mental. 288/32 287/37.

§1. Escuela agustiniana.

1. Positive sources. Nothing in Aristotle. Tunc to Aug Ans Damasc
2. Attack on Aristotelian passivism.
3. Identification of verbum with act of intellection.
4. Position of Scotus.

§2. Escuela Aristotélica. 291/41.

1. Aristotelian difficulty.

Possible intellect is passive. Godfrey of Fontaine retains this position; makes agent intellect the parent. Pérez mistaken in saying that verbum proceeds according to Godfrey nominally; it proceeds by efficient causality from agent intellect, but is a grammatical action of possible intellect. Godfrey like Augustinians identifies verbum with intelligere.

Henry breaks with Aristotelian passivity.

291/41 Henry, Summ Theol a 58 q 1 p 993 states that in Aristotelian theory one had better speak of a "verbum phantasmatis vel objecti quam verbum mentis"

Henry Quodl II qq 6 & 7 develops Augustinian theory or vacillates. Later he posits influential theory of initial indeterminate knowledge whence by reasoning one reaches adequate knowledge. Perez cites Godfrey Quodl X q 12 p 362

cf Phil Belges IV, 362 *Neque etiam sic

NB conversion super se etc; cf Scotus 1 d 2 a 3.

2. Aristotelian school (apart from Godfrey) distinguishes intellection and verbum.

a Hervaeus, Tractatus de Verbo, XI I a 2, cited 293/43
Quodl. II a 8

theologically/ argues/for necessity of distinction between intelligere and verbum

b Hervaeus, De Verbo q 2 a 2, cited note 124 p 294/44

First some sort of intellection prior to formation of verbum; because one does not try to manifest what one does not know

c Aegidius, Quodl. V, q 9, cited text 295/45

Verbum needed for same reason as species, because object absent. "Definitio ergo rei sive verbum non est nisi quoddam speculum in quo cernitur natura rei"

d Hervaeus, Quodl II q 8, cited note 127, 295/45

Verbum is forma quedam speculis in qua... cognoscatur veritas de rebus exteroribus... rather in intellect than phantasm

e Liber propugnatorius, contra I Sent Scoti, d 27 q 1
cited note 128 p 295/45

The operation of intellect cannot terminate at nothing; but the res intellectua as such does not establish real existence; appeal to Avicenna et Algazel; hence terminates at similitudo rei which represents thing more expressly than species impressa.

f Hervaeus, De Verbo II q 1; Quodl II q 8.

enuntiation/ Distinguishes three intellectual acts and three corresponding verba: verba are definition, assent-or-dissent, reasoning; the intellectual acts are intuition or perfect intellection, assent or dissent, doubt. 295f/45f

g Henry of Ghent, Summ Theol a 54 q 9 p 840; cited 296/46

"Duplex est actus cognoscendi in intellectu: unus simplicis intelligentiae de re intelligibili, ut secundum se est obiecta ante verbi formationem, sed per ipsius rei obiectae actionem formatus; ex quo manat simplex notitia in memoria. Et alter cogitatius post verbi formationem, formatus de re intelligibili, ut est obiecta in ipso verbo... Et sic actus qui est dicere sive generare non est idem quod intelligere sive primum sive secundum; quia dicere est vera actio..., et sic est actio ~~quaedam~~ sive operatio quaedam intellectus informati simplici notitia...; intelligere autem est passio in intelligentia."

Succesive reciprocal causality of intelligere and verbum.

h Hervaeus, De Verbo, II aa 3 et 4, cited text 296/46

There is a first intelligere caused immediately by the species; there is a second, express intelligere caused by the verbum as an instrument.

g' Completing text from Henry in g supra

"Et sic actus qui est dicere sive generare non est idem quod intelligere sive primum sive secundum. Quia dicere est vera actio procedens a memoria sive a notitia simplici existente in ipsa, sive de re obiecta ut est in memoria; et sic est actio sive operatio quaedam intellectus informati simplici notitia, qua in se ipso format notitiam declarativam simillimam illi simplici notitiae." Note 132 p 297/47

i Egidius, Quodl 5 q 9, cited note 130 p 296/46

Notices only one act of intellect intermediate between species and verbum.

j Liber propagatorius, cited note 131 p 296/46

"Ad 4 dico quod aliquis actus intelligendi qui est in potestate nostra praesupponit alium actum intelligendi. Et ita dico quod verbum, quod est in potestate nostra, praesupponit unum actum intelligendi, quamvis praecedat alium actum intelligendi." In I Sent d 27 q 1.

k Hervaeus, De Verbo, I q 4, cited note 133 p 297/47

Will, agent intellect, and species are principia activa verbi; agent intellect because it causes whatever is caused in possible intellect; species because determinate verbum is caused.

m Hervaeus, De Verbo q 2 aa 2 et 3, cited note 134 p 298/48

Intelligere is prior to verb naturally, even in time; there is a new intelligere consequent to the formation of the verbum; verbum is instrument in causing second intelligere.

n Liber propugnatorius, d 27 q 1, note 135 p 298/48

Follows directly on citation above i

"... alium actum intelligendi. Et quando dicitur quod intelligere est prius in potestate nostra, potest dici quod non, accipiendo intelligere prout includit terminum suum immediatum, qui est verbum; et non accipiendo intelligere ut distinguitur contra verbum vel contra dicere, etc. Vel potest dici quod tempore simul sunt intelligere et dicere; et intelligere quantum ad substantiam actus praecedit ordine naturae ipsum dicere, licet ipsum dicere praedecat ordinare naturae ipsum intelligere in quantum terminatur ad objectum extra."

Perez sees in this a distinction between an ontological and naturally prior intelligere and a psychological and consequent intelligere. NB however Perez assertion that Lib propug is obscure.

o Thomas of Sutton, Quaest disp, q 3, note 298 136 p 298/48

Responsio: dicendum quod verbum mentis nostrae non est effective ab intellectu possibili sed tantum passive.

Thomas of Sutton, Quodl 1 q 17 (Beiträge 29) Perez note 136p298f
ad primum dicendum argumentum dicendum quod verbum formatur ab intellectu sed non tanquam a principio activo, sed tanquam a principio passivo; et tu dicas "formare verbum est agere"; si igitur intellectus format verbum, intellectus est activus. Ad quod dicendum est quod "formare verbum" secundum Aristotelem et Commentatorem non est agere, nisi secundum similitudinem et figuram dictionis, sicut sentire; et verum est quod verbum est ab objecto active. p. 28* probably in Beiträge

There is a modica differentia between intelligere and verbum, operatio and operatum, though they are taken as the same thing by the authors. p. 24*

Unus actus absolutus est actus intelligendi et verbum; et non videntur differre per aliquam rem absolutam, sed per diversum modum significandi vel accipiendi unum et idem, sc. ut viam et terminum. p 29*

Differentia modica; still some; intelligere is pati, in genere passionis; verbum is quality; again, verbum is genitum, intelligere is productio geniti.

p. Aureolus, In I Sent d 9 a 2 Rome 1596 p 323 a. B; p 319 a. B d 27 a 2 p 626 a. F; p. 622

Perez says that Aureolus regards forma specularis of Hervaeus as idealist.

q Durandus, In I Sent d 27 q 2 Lugduni 1533 fol 49v; ^{Kap. print redaction} Perez cites p 301/51; ^{sup. this is rejetum ex causa Augustinian element}

"Propter quod dicendum est aliter quod verum in nobis est ipsem actus intelligendi... Quantum ad secundam conditionem quam ponunt, sc. quod verum est productum per actum dicendi, qui est actus intelligendis secundum quod intelligens; dicendum quod verbum vocis est productum per actum voicalem dicentis...; sed verbum mentis non est productum per actum dicendi, nec dicere est producere verbum mentale, imo dicere est habere verbum: quia cum verbum mentiale non sit aliud quam notitia rei apud intellectum, per quam homo cogitans sibi ipsi loquitur, dicere vel loqui non est aliud a se, hoc in se notitia rei quae est verbum ait"

Constantin Michalski, C.M.,
Les sources du scepticisme et du scepticisme dans la philosophie
du XIV^e siècle, pp. 241-268 1922
Bulletin internationale de l'Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres 1925, 1927

242: Loss of confidence in human intellect due to Augustinian
theory of illumination. No documentation.

243: Much richer source: Aristotelian distinction between
demonstration (Post Anal) and probable argument (Topics)

Algazel, *Destructio philosophorum*, (*Tahâsâk Tahâsif al falasifa*)
defended Mohammedan orthodoxy by arguing that philosophers could
not demonstrate creation; unity; perfection; immateriality of God;
divine self-knowledge and knowledge of other things; principle
of causality.

244 Maimonides reports and rejects this view; his report
supposed by some scholastics to be statement of his own view.

245 Cf Aquinas negation of demonstration that world *ex tempore*.

Oxford

245 William of Ware denied demonst of unicity of God

Scotus denied demonstr of omnipotence as Xtiens conceive it

246 Thomas Sutton (? Anglicus, M. cites "Contra Scotum") /d/
suggests demonstration of omnipotence as Xtiens conceive not yet found
Thomas Wilton, extends denial to divine knowledge of other,
to multiplication of human souls agst Averroes

William Ockham admitted possib of infinite series of causes

247 Adam Woodham sometimes goes further

John Rodington spreads doubt through theodicy; defends
proof of divine existence agst Ockham; admits not it is intuitiva
directly produced by God without object

Thomas Claxton denies evident proof, holds *consonum rationi*,
doctrines of creation, unity of God, omnipotence

Paris

248 Guillaume de Rubione, more probable but not evident proofs
of existence; unity of God, of creation; also doubts proofs of
free will, immortality of soul

Jean de Bassols, denies evidence to theodicy

Jean de Mirecourt, denies evidence to theodicy, admits
infinite series of causes aspossible

Nicolas d'Autrecourt

Jean Buridan: free will based rather on faith

249 Marsile d'Inghen, idem

Rosetti, not demonstration but more probable arg in theodicy

Pierre d'Auribœuf attacks proofs soul form of body

Jean de Polliaco attacks proofs of omnipotence creation

Walter of Chatton finds no demonstration of unity of God

Landolphe Caracalibœuf finds no proof for omnipresence

Antiaverroist theses of Stephen Tempier not denied but
degree of certitude reduced.

249f: Padua; situation obscure; noted for averroism.

250: Logical and psychological conceptualism.

esse obiectivum: Richard of Middleton, Hervé de Nedellec,
Durand de St. Pourçain (Les courants philosophiques à Oxford et
à Paris, Crozatier 1921)

Jacques d'Eculo: pp 251-54 "*esse obiectivum*" distinct from
species and act of knowing; ~~caused per accidens~~ by cause of knowing
natural resultant (conveniens ut efficientes)

Logical and psychological conceptualism

254:f. Petrus Auriolus: esse obiectivum, apparen^s, is object of knowing. Denies real distinction of species and intelligere; holds species can be in intellect without intelligere because of absence of phantasm. As Jacques d'Ascoli he holds esse obiectivum to be a sequela of the intelligere.

- 255: William of Alnwick, oponent of logical conceptualism 255-57
257-61 Ockham denies esse obiectivum
261ff Walter of Chatton attributes to Ockham acceptance of esse obiec
263 Guillaume de Rubione follows Walter in attributing same to Ockh
263f Jean de Mirecourt opponent to esse obiectivum
264f Affirmation of esse obiectivum does not determine whether one is r-alist conceptualist nominalist

Notitia abstractiva et intuitiva.

265: Scotus defines intuitiva as bearing on existence
Auriolus appeals to experiments in proof that intuitiva does not establish existence; further God could produce intuitiva without object

266: Ockham takes science strictly as demonstration from per se nota; empirical propositions (eg fire heats) not per se nota; intuitive knowledge could be caused supernaturally without object
267: Ockham maintains that facts of consciousness (as Augustine advanced) beyond possibility of doubt

Nicolas d'Autrecourt and Jean de Mirecourt similarly have recourse to Augustine to escape their own scepticism

267f: Method of Nicolas d'A: proposes opinions which he is careful not to assert and shows what conclusions (generous scepticism) they would lead to.

268: Parallel with disappearance of metaphysic in scepticism, at Paris and still more at Oxford there develops positive science.