

Classes of Relations

1. The terms of the relations are themselves objects of thought, and so the consequent relation is also an object of thought, e. g., genus, species, etc.

2. Elementary conditions of the real relation are not satisfied:

a) The relation of identity.

The same object is considered twice or under two aspects; like the <sup>duality of the</sup> considerations the comparison between them is just an object of thought.

b) The relation of a relation.

The relation, R, of A to B, by itself and not by some further relation, R', is of A, and by itself and not by some further relation, R'', is to B. Otherwise, an infinite regress!

c) Comparison of the real with the no-longer or not-yet real.

We are prior to our great-great-grandchildren, but like the children, the priority is just an object of thought ~~for~~ at the present time.

But a further<sup>r</sup> question arises when our world is considered sub specie aeternitatis and/or as four-dimensional.

3. Aristotelian conditions of the real relation.

Categories 7, 6a 36: "Those things are called relative, which being said to be of something or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing.

Ibid., 6b 3: The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way.

Ibid., 6b 26: All relatives have correlatives...

Ibid., 7a 22: All relatives then, if properly defined, have a correlative.

Ibid., 7b 15: Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is for the most part true... Moreover they cancel one another....

De pot., q. 7, a. 8 ad 1m: correlatives are simul natura if the relations are (father son) even though the subjects are not.

On "simul natura" see Sum. theol. I, q. 13, a. 7 ad 6M.

God is Lord only ex tempore because only in time does he have actually existing subjects.

Scibile and scientia as in potency are not simul, but as in act they are simultaneous.

The definition of relations 6a 36 & 6b 3 imply that relations are of one substance to another.

This has a ~~1~~ bearing on the subsequent discussion whether "head" or "hand" are instances of substance as the subject of relation. Cf 8a 31 where the matter is left to further clarifications of the definition.

4. Classical instances of mutuxal real relations.

De pot., q. 7, a. 9; Sum. theol. I, q. 13, a. 7.

Sum theol loc cit: "Quaedam vero relationes sunt quantum ad utrumque extremum res naturae, quando scilicet est habitudo onter aliqua duo secundum aliquid ~~mutu~~ realiter conveniens utrique. Sicut patet de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur quantitatem, it magnum et parvum, duplum et dimidium, et huiusmodi, nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum. Et simile est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem et passionem, ut motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et similia.

5. Classical instances of mixed relations.

Ibid.: Quandoque vero relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in altero est res rationis tantum. Et hoc contingit quandocumque duo extrema non sunt unius ordinis. Sicut sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et scibile, quae quidem inquantum sunt res quaedam in esse naturali existentes sunt ~~n~~ extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis; et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis, secundum quod ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res ipsae in se consideratae sunt extra ordinem huiusmodi. Unde in eis non est aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum; sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos relationum scientiae et sensus.

15,

Unde Philosophus dicit in V Metaphys (Delta 1021a 29) quod non dicuntur relative eo quod ipsa referuntur ad alia, sed quia "alia referuntur ad ipsa." Et similiter dextrum non dicitur de columna, nisi in quantum ~~XXXXX~~ ponitur animali ad dexteram; unde huiusmodi relatio non est realiter in columna sed in animali.

6. Classical application of foregoing to God.

Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes creaturae ordinentur ~~in~~<sup>ad</sup> ipsum, et non e converso, manifestum est quod creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem tantum, in quantum creaturae referuntur ad ipsum.

Et sic nihil prohibet huiusmodi nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam praedicari de Deo ex tempore, non propter aliquam mutationem ipsius, sed propter creaturae mutationem; sicut columna fit dextera animali, nulla mutatione circa ipsam existente, sed animali translato.

6

Doubts about the adequacy of the classical solution:

De pot., q. 7, a. 11 ad 3m.

God really is Lord even though Lord denotes a notional relation.

Ibid., ad 5m. The relation of divine knowledge to the creature is not primo et per se; primo et per se it is a relation to ~~the~~ the divine essence in which God knows all he knows.

Sum. theol., I 13, 7 ad 3m: Relations based on divine immanent acts such as knowing and loving are not ex tempore but eternal.

Augustine, De diversis qq. 83, q. 65; ML 40, 54.

Aquinas, Sum. theol. I q, 34 a. 3

Augustine, De trin., VI, v; ML 42, 928.

Aquinas, Sum. theol. I q. 37, a. 2

In so far as God really is Lord, really knows, really loves, there is a difference from the column in which there is just nothing that is right or left.

In so far as relations follow from immanent operations, there are ab aeterno and so no change is involved, but only an eternal contingency (it might be otherwise).

In so far as the knowledge and love are specifically trinitarian, they include the supernatural order, and as that is absolutely supernatural it involves the divine persons in a manner that is not simply intra ordinem creaturae.

yt/  
Sum. theol., I, q. 34, a. 3. Videtur quod in nomine verbi non impo~~retur~~ respectus ad creaturam.

Sed contra quotes from:

Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII liber unus, q. 63  
ML 40, 54:

In principio erat Verbum (Io. 1, 1). Quod graece logos dicitur, latine et rationem et verbum significat. Sed hoc loco melius verbum interpretatur, ut significetur non solum ad Patrem respectus, sed ad illa etiam quae per Verbum facta sunt operativa potentia.

Respondeo:

..... Et sicut Dei scientia Dei quidem est cognoscitiva tantum, creaturarum autem cognoscitiva et factiva; ita Verbum Dei eius quod in Deo Patre est, est expressivum tantum, creaturarum vero est expressivum et operativum.

Ad secundum. Actions are immanent or transient. Transient divine actions (create, govern) ground relations ex tempore. Immanent divine ~~relations~~ actions ground relations that are not said ex tempore. Among the latter are the relations of the Word to creatures. Cf I, q. 13, a. 7 ad 3m.

Sum. theol., I, q. 37, a. 2. Videtur quod Pater et Filius non diligunt se Spiritu sancto.

Sed contra. quotes from:

De trin., VI, v; ML 42, 928.

"quo ¶Genitus a Generante diligitur, Genitoremque suum diligit."

Respondeo (ad fin c.)

"Sicut ergo dicitur arbor florens floribus, ita dicitur Pater dicens Verbo vel Filio se et creaturam; et Pater et Filius dicuntur diligentes Spiritu sancto, vel Amore procedente, et se et nos."

B. Lonergan, De Deo Trino, II, 107; Pars systematica, Caput II, Quaestio III: Utrum Verbum procedat ex intelligentia creaturarum.

Real Relations in God

- 1. Distinguish three orders:
  - a) The order of expressed meaning
  - b) The order of human knowing (compound of exp. und. judg.)
  - c) The order of the realities known and meant
  
- 2. In the order of expressed meaning, distinguish:
  - a) The sentence as the relatively complete unit of meaning
  - b) The context of the sentence: the set of other sentences whose meaning clarifies, qualifies, complements, corrects what could be taken as the meaning of the sentence.

Sentences are true in so far as they go. But they never are isolated monads, but stand within a context, knitting together, of further expressed or expressible meanings.

The fact of context must not be taken to cancel the fact that a sentence does make its own distinct, even though not fully determinate, contribution to communication.

Scylla and Charybdis:

The idealists that never arrive at determinate meaning because the totality of relations is never known

The simplifiers that think true predication by extrinsic denomination is just a ~~wretched dogdge~~ wretched dogdge

- 3. In the relation between expressed meaning and reality meant, distinguish:
  - a) the truth of the expressed meaning: truth as the conformity of meaning and meant [Insight 502-507]
  - b) the principle of metaphysical equivalence:/metaphysical analysis establishes constitutive principles of reality; to apply the principle of metaphysical equivalence is to apply the definition of truth in terms of these constitutive principles; in general, which central and/or conjugate potencies, forms, acts are necessary and sufficient for such and such a statement to be true.

4. Relevance of preceding section 3.

There is a marked tendency to confuse 3a and 3b.

It is one thing to say that it is true that God knows and loves ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ the elect

It is another to assign the conditions, whether in God or in creatures, for the truth of such assertions.

The former type of statement is religious or theological; it does not presuppose a precise metaphysical system.

The latter type of statement does presuppose a ~~metaphysical~~ metaphysical system.

Inadvertence to this presupposition easily results in the implicit supposition of rather wretched metaphysics.

Even when people advert to the presupposition and acknowledge an explicit metaphysics, it can happen that their metaphysics is uncritically constructed

In Aquinas affirmation of a notional relation is quite compatible with affirmation of a connected truth

De pot., q. 7, a. 11 ad 3m, 5m.

Opponents of the traditional view are prone to argue that if there are not real relations in God then it really is not true that God ~~is~~ knows and loves contingent beings.

5. Distinguish two types of cognitional theory:

a) concepts are prior to acts of understanding: first intellect abstracts species ~~pk~~ from phantasm and produces concepts; secondly, intellect compares the concepts and discovers relations of possibility or necessity obtaining between them.

b) acts of understanding are prior to explanatory concepts: first intellect gains insight into the data presented by phantasm; secondly, it expresses its insights through both terms and relations

6. Distinguish two types of metaphysical system:

a) When concepts are conceived as prior to understanding, the concept provides the basic clue to the metaphysical system

e. g., the concept of absolute and the concept of relative are irreducible; therefore, there is bound to be a real distinction between the reality of a real relation and the reality of its foundation.

b) When the act of understanding is conceived as prior to explanatory concepts, then the act of understanding provides the basic clue to the metaphysical system

hence, the concept of the absolute and the concept of the relative are two components in the expression of the same act of understanding; were this not so, there would be no plausibility to the discovery in the concepts of the nexus between them

7. On the second type of metaphysical system

As the real is constituted by intelligibility, so too it is constituted by relativity

The relativity is not a reality over and above some absolute: it is the intelligibility constitutive of what also is absolute, <sup>relativity</sup>

Hence a change in real ~~relations~~ is a change in the constitutive reality of an object.

Hence process thought gives us quite a different God, one subject to change, one in correlation with the changes in creatures.

While traditional Aristotelian-Thomist thought denies contingent real relations in God. But the ~~x~~ precise meaning of this position requires an exposition of its historical context.

or a component in the absolute.



8. The reality of relations is the reality of the order of the universe:

esse reale divides into esse naturale (studied by the Naturwissenschaften) and esse intentionale, morale, iuridicum (studied in the Geisteswissenschaften;

strict correlatives are discernible on each of the many levels of nature and spirit

but also there is an emergent probability from lower to higher levels (cosmogogenesis, biogenesis, noogenesis, Christogenesis)

hence on any level relations of efficient causality <sup>in recipient</sup> and ~~finality~~ horizontal finality <sup>in agent</sup>

from lower to higher levels relations of instrumentality and vertical finality

Sum theol I q 47 a 1: "... Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis et per eas repraesentandam. Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repraesentari non potest.... Unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et repraesentat eam totum universum, quam alia quaelibet creatura...

The highest level of vertical finality is the absolutely supernatural communication of God himself

Incarnation, Gift of the Spirit, Charity, Vision of God

9. It is true that God knows every contingent detail of the whole of world history Deus quaerit non propter se sed

It is true that he loves all good, ~~propter~~ suam gloriam, i. e. propter nos (II-II 132 1 1m)

Not as a component within history, within its intelligible network determining his reality, but as cause of history context <sup>con</sup> but modo eminentiori, ipsum intelligere, ipsum amare, freely given himself and thereby making us good and holy

10. Distinguish notional relations, real relations, eminent principle of all relating.

LL. Are trinitarian processions free: Aq on Sp early; Rahner myster

*una forma composita  
intellectus  
eminentiori  
substantia  
functione  
receptiva*

## 5.1 Systematics

### References:

R. Lindardt, Die Sozialprinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Freiburg: Herder, 1932. #10. Die Universumsidee, pp. 67 - 80.

Cf. De pot. q. 7, a. 9 c. Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 7 c.; q. 28, aa. 1 & 2; q. 48, aa. 1 - 3. C. Gent. II, 11-14.

B. Lonergan, "The Natural Desire to See God," Collection, New York and London 1967, pp. 87 -90.

B. Lonergan, Insight, London and New York 1957, c. XVI: Metaphysics as Science, #2. Relations, pp. 490 - 497.

B. Lonergan, De Deo Trino, Rome: Gregorian Press, 1964. vol. 2: Pars systematica, Appendix 3: De relationibus, pp. 291-315. Asserta 15, 16, 17: pp. 217, 219, 226.

### A Few Texts

De pot., q. 7, a. 9

C. Gent., II, 12: Huiusmodi autem relationes quae sunt ad suos effectus, realiter in Deo esse non possunt.

Non enim in eo esse possent sicut accidentia in subiecto: cum in ipso nullum sit accidens, ut in primo libro [c. 23] ostensum est.

Nec etiam possent esse ipsa Dei substantia. Cum enim relativa sint quae secundum suum esse ad aliud quodammodo se habent, ut Philosophus dicit in Praedicamentis, oporteret quod Dei substantia hoc ipsum quod est ad aliud diceretur. Quod autem ipsum quod est ad aliud dicitur, quodammodo ab ipso dependet: cum nec esse nec intelligi sine eo possit. Oporteret igitur quod Dei substantia ab aliquo extrinseco esset dependens. Et sic non esset per se ipsum necesse esse, ut in primo libro (c. 13) ostensum est.

Non sunt ergo huiusmodi relationes secundum rem in Deo.

Sum. theol. I, q. 47, a. 1: "... Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis et per eas repraesentandam. Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repraesentari non potest... Unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et repraesentat eam totum universum, quam alia quaelibet creatura. Et quia ex divina bonitate....