

Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon

The question suggested for this <sup>symposium</sup> ~~XXXXXX~~ read: "How, from the viewpoint of the lecturer, does philosophy view the religious phenomenon in terms of the viability or validity of that phenomenon?"

A first topic is philosophy and, indeed, not any philosophy but philosophy from the viewpoint of the lecturer. To this topic a certain clarification may perhaps be contributed if I contrast the Scholastic or Neoscholastic views on which I was brought up with my present position.

On a Scholastic view, then, philosophy was concerned with ultimate, naturally known truths about the universe. It was concerned with the universe: in other words, its material object was unrestricted. It was concerned with truths: it did not aim at setting up a theory in the perpetual hope of later arriving at a still better theory ~~in the manner~~ as do ~~of~~ the natural and human sciences; it aimed at determining for all time just what was so. It was concerned with naturally known truths: for it acknowledged the existence of supernaturally known truths, but left that domain to theology. Finally, ~~it~~ it was concerned with ultimate, naturally known truths, and thereby it distinguished itself from the ~~the~~ sciences concerned with proximate ~~the~~ truths about the various parts and levels of the universe.

new paragraph]

—] Clearly on Scholastic soil a philosophy of religion could not flourish. Either it confined itself to naturally known ~~religious~~ truths, and then it overlooked the one true religion, which is supernatural. Or else it vainly attempted to include the supernatural within its purview, and then its inevitably inadequate viewpoint led to a misrepresentation and distortion of the one true religion. So it was that <sup>not quite</sup> twenty years ago Henry Duméry's Scholastically trained judges placed his account <sup>of a critical</sup> ~~series of works on the~~ philosophy of religion on the Index librorum prohibitorum.

However, since the second Vatican council the Index has been dropped and the prestige of Scholasticism has practically vanished. <sup>At this point accordingly there</sup> ~~is that at this point there~~ become operative the terms of reference, "philosophy, from the viewpoint of the lecturer." On these terms, if I understand them correctly, I am ~~free~~ to be my little self. ~~with no special~~ ~~needs~~

, then,  
From my viewpoint, a contemporary philosophy is under the constraint of an empirical principle. This principle means that there always is required some empirical element in any judgement of fact or <sup>of</sup> possibility or <sup>of</sup> probability. In the natural sciences the empirical element is the relevant data of sense. In the human sciences the empirical element <sup>relevant</sup> is the data of sense and of consciousness. In a foundational logic, a foundational mathematics, a foundational methodology, the relevant data are the immanent and operative norms of human cognitional process, a process that is both conscious and intentional, and as conscious provides the data of its own proper and improper proceeding.

For a fuller account of the nature and implications of this empirical principle, I must refer ~~me~~ to my little book, Insight. My present concern is a philosophic approach that is open to the inclusion of a philosophy of religion.

To this end I note that a foundational methodology involves three successive sections: first, there is a cognitional theory, answering the question, what are you doing when you are knowing; secondly, there is an epistemology, answering the question, on what grounds is doing that really knowing; thirdly, there is a metaphysics, answering the question, what do you know when you do it.

A series of observations/<sup>is</sup>~~xxx~~ now in order.

First, ~~xxxx~~ foundational methodology on this showing covers all that is basic in philosophy. One may or may not choose to include other issues within philosophy, but one cannot ~~avoid~~ <sup>and thorough</sup> treating them in any sound/fashion without settling -- or presupposing as settled/the issues of cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics.

Secondly, from the viewpoint of foundational methodology metaphysics is not the first science. It is not the Grund- und Gesamtwissenschaft. Though I have the honor of having my name associated with that of Fr Emerich Coreth and of being included with him when transcendental Thomists are mentioned, still on the matter of the priority of metaphysics we have disagreed, we have disagreed publicly, and we still do disagree. I am quite willing to grant that in a philosophy primarily concerned with objects metaphysics must be the first science, for it is the objects of metaphysics that are both most basic and most universal. But in a philosophy that primarily is

concerned not with objects but with operations metaphysics cannot be the first science. What now is both most basic and most universal are the operations, and these are studied in cognitional theory. Secondly, comes the validity of the operations, and such is the concern of epistemology. Only in the third place does there arise the question of objects which is the concern of a metaphysics.

Thirdly, this shift from the priority of a metaphysics ~~of objects to the priority of a theory of cognitional operations~~ of objects to the priority of a theory of cognitional operations has an interesting implication for a philosophy of religion. For the distinction between naturally known objects and supernaturally known objects can now both retain all of its validity and, at the same time, lose the rather absolute priority it enjoyed in Scholastic thought. For its priority in Scholastic thought presupposed the priority of metaphysics, and on our present showing the priority of metaphysics no longer exists. Metaphysics finds its proper place not on the primary, not even on the secondary, but only on a tertiary level.

Fourthly, the shift we have been discussing is a shift from logic to method. Logic regards particular systems in their clarity, their coherence, and their rigor. Method regards movement, movement from non-system into systematic thinking, and from ~~the~~ the systematic thinking of a given place and time to the better systematic thinking of a later time whether at the same or at another place.

Here a comparison with Hegel may not be out of place. Hegel rightly felt that logic was too static to deal with a universe in movement. But the solution to that problem, we feel, does not consist in the invention of a logic of movement. Rather we would leave logic to its traditional tasks, which are essential to working out the coherence of any system and thereby bringing to light its shortcomings. But we would confine the relevance of logic to single stages in the process of <sup>developing</sup> ~~development~~ thought, and we would assign to method the guidance of thought from each less satisfactory stage to each successive more satisfactory stage. In brief, the relevance of logic is at the <sup>instant,</sup> ~~moment~~, when things are still. The guide of philosophy and science over time is method.

We may cut short the argument here to offer the conclusions to this first section of our paper. Such conclusions are three.

First, since philosophy has been identified with foundational methodology, there no longer holds the peremptory Scholastic argument against a sound philosophy of religion.

Secondly, as philosophy is foundational methodology, so philosophy of religion is the foundational methodology of religious studies.

Thirdly, a foundational methodology of religious studies will be able to pronounce on the viability or validity of this or that method of religious studies. But such a foundational methodology would go beyond its competence if it ventured to pronounce on the non-methodological aspects of religious studies.

Therewith we arrive at a first conclusion ~~of~~ on the topic before us. A philosophy of religion has <sup>much</sup> ~~everything~~ to say on

the method of religious studies. The religious studies themselves, however, are not mere deductions from the method but applications of the method; and the attentiveness, intelligence, and reasonableness with which the applications are carried out are the responsibility, not of the methodologist, but of the student of religion. Accordingly, philosophy as foundational methodology can pronounce, not immediately and specifically, but only remotely and generically on the validity or viability of the results of religious studies.

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Let us now attempt to carry the argument a step further.

The priority of metaphysics in the Aristotelian tradition led to a faculty psychology. For other sciences were subordinate to the first science; from it they derived their basic terms and theorems; and so Aristotelian psychology had to be a metaphysical psychology in terms of potencies, forms, and acts.

But once the priority of metaphysics is rejected, there also is rejected its implication of a faculty psychology. When philosophy is conceived as a foundational methodology, and when cognitional theory is its basic step, the empirical principle demands that cognitional theory take its stand on the data of cognitional consciousness. But cognitional consciousness is of operations and ~~and~~ of the normative tendencies linking operations together. Cognitional theory, accordingly, will consist of terms and relations, where the terms name operations, and the relations name normative tendencies. In this fashion faculty psychology gives way to an intentionality analysis.

This shift is of considerable importance. As long as psychology is basically a discussion of faculties or potencies, there arise questions regarding the relative priority or importance of the sensitive, the conative, the intellectual, and the volitional components of human living and acting. Moreover, since clear-cut solutions to these questions do not exist, there result unending complaints about the one-sidedness of the other fellow's stand.

In contrast, intentionality analysis transposes these issues into a new form that automatically settles questions of precedence and importance. For now there are compared, not potencies, but levels of operation. The levels are sharply distinguished by operators that promote the conscious and intentional subject from a lower to a higher level. The operators are manifested by questions. So from a first level to a second the promotion is effected by questions for intelligence; such questions are: what? why? how? what for? how often? They arise with respect to data, and they lead to and thence to insights/~~and~~/the expression of insights in concepts, definitions, hypotheses, theories, systems. From a second to a third level the promotion is effected by questions for reflection; such questions ask: is that so? are you certain? From a third level to a fourth the promotion is effected by questions for deliberation; they ask whether a proposed course of action is truly or only apparently good, whether it is really worth while or not; and such fourth level questions lead to the operations of evaluating, deciding, acting.

Now the relation between successive levels may be named sublation, not in the proper Hegelian sense of Aufhebung, but in a related sense I have found in Karl Rahner's Hearer of the Word. One reaches this related sense by distinguishing between sublated and sublating operations, and by defining the sublating operations as going beyond the sublated, introducing a radically new principle, respecting the integrity of the sublated, and ~~xxx~~ bestowing upon them a higher significance and a wider relevance.

So questions for intelligence go beyond the data of sense and/or the data of consciousness. They ~~xxx~~ head for insights that contrast radically with the mere givenness of data. They not merely respect the integrity of data but make possible ever more comprehensive <sup>and more exact</sup> apprehensions of data. Finally, they promote data from the status of conscious occurrences in a subject to the beginnings of an apprehension of a universe.

Similarly, questions for reflection go beyond the concepts, definitions, hypotheses, theories, systems thought out by intelligence. They direct conscious intentionality beyond mere understanding towards truth and reality. They lead to operations that effect the transition from objects of thought to real objects, and thereby they bestow an essentially new significance and importance on experience and understanding.

In like manner questions for deliberation sublimate the previous three levels. They are concerned with the good. They end the one-sidedness of purely <sup>l</sup>cognitional endeavor to restore the integration of sense and conation, thought and feeling. They <sup>not merely</sup>ask about a distinction between satisfaction and value but also assume the existential viewpoint that



asks me whether I am ready, whether I am determined, to sacrifice satisfactions for the sake of values. Having put the question of moral authenticity, they reward acceptance with a good conscience and <sup>they</sup> sanction rejection with an uneasy conscience. Finally, they push the requirement of authenticity to the sticking point: good decisions must be complemented by good conduct and good actions; and failure in this respect is ~~a~~ just the inner essence of hypocrisy.

Now from the viewpoint of intentionality analysis and sublation the old questions of sensism, intellectualism, sentimentalism, / voluntarism merely vanish. Experience, understanding, judgement, and decision all are essential to human living. But while all are essential, while none can be ~~slighted~~ dropped or even slighted, still the successive levels are related inasmuch as the later presuppose the earlier and complement them and inasmuch as the earlier are ordained to the later and need them to attain their human significance.

Such an introduction of hierarchy naturally calls for a series of notes and corollaries.

First, ~~I~~ while we have spoken of successive levels, of earlier and later, of lower and higher, such terms are merely initial signposts. The real meaning is neither spatial nor chronological. The real meaning is in terms of sublating and sublated operations, and the meaning of sublation is the meaning already defined and illustrated.

Secondly, the hierarchy that intentionality analysis brings to light justifies traditional complaints about the one-sidedness of intellectualism, of an exclusive emphasis on the cognitional elements in man's make-up. While it is true that

observation, understanding, and factual judgement  
 // are immediately under the guidance of the subject's attentiveness,  
 his intelligence, his reasonableness, while it is true that this  
 guidance excludes interferences from feelings and wishes,  
 still this guidance is not the activity of some putative faculty  
 named  
 /~~names~~ speculative intellect or pure reason. It is the guidance  
 x of the norms immanent and operative on the first three levels  
 of conscious and intentional operations<sup>e</sup>, and it is a guidance  
 that attains its proper stature when formulated in a method  
 and implemented by a decision to dedicate <sup>some</sup> part of one's  
 life to scientific, scholarly, or philosophic pursuits.

However, while acknowledging the one-sidedness of an  
 exclusive intellectualism and the incompleteness of an ~~intellectualism~~  
 intellectualism that is not subordinated to a deliberately  
 chosen method, one must not accept the common complaint that  
 intellectualist products are abstractions. They are not.  
 The so-called abstract is <sup>usually</sup> ~~always~~ the incompletely determined  
 apprehension of the concrete, and all human apprehension is  
 incompletely determined. Indeed, intellectualist apprehension  
 is more complete than the apprehensions of undifferentiated  
 consciousness, and it is just the ignorance of undifferentiated  
 consciousness that complains about the abstractness of the ~~intellectual~~  
 intellectual.

Thirdly, the ~~mix~~ hierarchy of sublated and sublating  
 operations reveals the significance of the existential.  
 For the level of deliberation, decision, action has two  
 aspects. In so far as it affects other persons and objects,  
 it is practical. But in so far as it is the locus where  
 the subject decides for or against his own authenticity,  
 it is existential.

Note that the two aspects, the practical and the existential, are not separable. However practical any decision is, it reveals and confirms and intensifies the authenticity or unauthenticity of the practical subject. Inversely, however existential any decision is, it attains substance and moment in the measure that it transforms one's conduct and pursuits.

Note again that the man of common sense, without any aspiration to science or scholarship or philosophy, is spontaneously existential and practical for the simple reason that he has no notion and much less any attainment of the scientific, the scholarly, or the philosophic differentiations of human consciousness. But at the same time note that while undifferentiated consciousness does not need to be told to prefer orthopraxis to orthodoxy, it is prone to underestimate orthodoxy, while a just balance is to be had only by a consciousness that is differentiated that multiply, /has a proper appreciation of orthodoxy, and /learns to rank orthopraxis ~~high~~ higher still.

Fourthly, a foundational methodology can function as a philosophy of religion only by moving beyond the levels of experience, understanding, and judgement and including the higher significance and relevance of deliberation, evaluation, decision, and action. For every religion is involved in value judgements, and value judgements pertain to the fourth level of intentional consciousness. ~~Specifically~~ Specifically, Catholic theologians consider the act of religious belief to proceed from judgements of credibility and cred<sup>u</sup>lity; in plainer English, the object of belief not only can but also should be believed; and to judge that it should be believed is a value judgement.

To be noted here is that this extension of foundational methodology to include the subject as existential and practical, while it runs counter to older philosophies that thought in terms of speculative intellect or pure reason, merely follows out the implications of what already has been noted. For the austere detachment of purely cognitive or intellectual operations is itself the product of a free choice and implemented by the acceptance of a method. And the higher integration of an orthopraxis, that justly appreciates an orthodoxy, is ~~making~~ a complement to which experience, understanding, and factual judgement are ordained and which they need.

In this connection it is only proper to note that the view we are propounding draws support from / Talcott Parsons' account of the development of the sociology of religion away from an initial hostility and towards a recognition of <sup>the high role of religion</sup> ~~its high role~~ within an action system. For the early hostility was against a view of religion as essentially cognitive and the later friendliness views religion as predominantly non-cognitive.

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Talcott Parsons, "The Theoretical Development of the Sociology of Religion," Essays in Sociological Theory, Revised edition in paperback, New York: The Free Press, 1964. See also his "The Dimensions of Cultural Variation," in Parsons et al., Theories of Society, New York: The Free Press, 1965, pp. 964-970. Also the initial and final essays in Robert Bellah, Beyond Belief, New York: Harper and Row, 1970.

A final note to this section will be a simple contrast with the Hegelian program which was to sublimate religion <sup>i</sup> by philosophy. It was a sublation strongly resisted especially by Catholic theologians on the obvious ground that it rejected the subordination of the natural to the supernatural and so the subordination of philosophy to religion and theology. If however we fully agree with our Catholic predecessors in rejecting the Hegelian program, we cannot do so precisely on the grounds that they offer. For the distinction between natural and supernatural resides within a metaphysical context, and for us a metaphysical context is not primary or even secondary but only tertiary. But this does not imply that our opposition to the Hegelian sublation of religion is only tertiary. For our opposition rests on ~~the~~ our own primary context of intentionality analysis, in which one finds such cognitive or putatively cognitive operations as a Hegelian dialectic subordinated to the operations of the existential and practical subject. In a word, Kierkegaard had a point.

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Our intentionality analysis distinguished the four levels of experience, understanding, factual judgement, and existential decision. We must now advert to the fact that this structure may prove open at both ends. The intellectual operator that promotes our operations from the ~~XX~~ level of experience to the level of understanding may well be preceded by a ~~■~~ symbolic operator that <sup>d</sup>coordinates neural potentialities and needs with higher|goals through its control over the ~~■~~ emergence of images and affects.

Again, beyond the moral operator that promotes us from judgements of fact to judgements of value with their retinue of decisions and actions, there is a further realm of interpersonal relations and total commitment in which human beings tend to find the immanent goal of their being and with it their fullest joy and deepest peace.

So from an intentionality analysis distinguishing four levels one moves to an analysis that distinguishes six levels. Moreover, the two added levels are particularly relevant to religious studies. The symbolic operator that shapes the development of sensibility and, in its ultimate achievement, guides the Jungian process of individuation, would seem highly relevant to an investigation of religious symbols. And the soul of religion has been seen to lie in a total commitment that embraces the universe and frequently does so in adoration of a personal God.

I have characterized  
From a specifically Christian viewpoint, the total commitment of religious living as "being in love in an unrestricted manner"; I have associated it with St Paul's statement that "God's love has flooded your inmost heart through the Holy Spirit/given us" (Rom 5, 5); and I have noted that the Christian case of the subject being in love with God is complemented by God's manifestation of his love for us in the death and resurrection of Christ Jesus.

But attention to Christian religion does not exclude attention to other religions. Indeed the transition to the others may be effected in two manners. The first has ~~the~~ specifically Christian premisses. It appeals to the rule: "By their fruits you shall know them" (Mt 7, 16). It notes the scriptural

text that favors the affirmation of God's will to ~~and~~ save all men (1 Tim 2, 4). It notes that those God wills to ~~xxx~~ save will be given the charity described in the thirteenth chapter of the first letter to the Corinthians, even though as yet they have no explicit knowledge of Christ the mediator.

The second manner of proceeding towards a universalist view of religion may begin with Raymond/<sup>Panikkar's</sup>~~Pannikaris~~ conception of a fundamental theology that takes its stand on the lived religion or mystical faith that is prior to any formulation and perhaps beyond formulation. Again, it may take ~~in~~ its rise from empirical studies of religious phenomena that come to discern a convergence of religions. Finally, it may seek to bring these two standpoints together into a single integrated view.

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For the notion of symbolic operator I am indebted to conversations with Robert Doran, S. J. See his "Paul Ricoeur: Toward the Restoration of Meaning," Anglican Theological Review, October 1973. On the individuation process, Gerhard Adler, The Living Symbol, A Case Study of the Process of Individuation, New York: Pantheon, 1961 (Bollingen Series, 63).

On the nature of religion, see Joseph Whelan, The Spirituality of ~~xxxxx~~ Friedrich von Hügel, New York: Newman, 1971, pp. 131 ff.

B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972, and New York: Seabury, 1973, Chapter Four.

Raymond Panikkar, "Metatheology as Fundamental Theology," Concilium, vol. 46, p. 54.

William Cenkner, "The Convergence of Religions," Cross Currents, 22, 429-437, Winter 1973. Robley Whitson, The Coming Convergence of World Religions, New York: Newman, 1971.

In concluding this section I would recall that we have been conceiving the philosophy of religion as foundational methodology, that in a first section we attempted to surmount the incapacity of a Scholastic philosophy to be the philosophy of ~~the true religion~~ what it considered the true religion; in a second section we extended the range of foundational methodology to include value judgements; and in this third section we have introduced two further extensions. First, we mentioned the possibility of a symbolic operator that, through image and affect, headed psychic process to its own and to higher ends; and an exploration of this area we felt highly relevant to an account of religious symbolism. Secondly, we adverted to a topmost level of interpersonal relations and total commitments, a level that can be specifically religious, a level that in one of its actuations is easily verified in New Testament doctrine, that conforms to the view of all Scholastic schools that without charity even the infused virtues are unformed, that provides a basis for explicating the universalism of Christianity and relating it positively to other religions. As a final note to this section one may add that, what in a philosophic context I have named being in love in an unrestricted manner, in a theological context could be paralleled with Father Rahner's supernatural existential.

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Up to now we have been working our way out of a traditional Scholastic context -- in which a sound philosophy of religion is a contradiction in terms -- and into contemporary context in which philosophy, by becoming foundational methodology, regains both its universal significance and its universal function.

As already remarked, <sup>basic</sup> foundational methodology consists of three parts: cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics. Moreover, as argued in Insight, from this viewpoint metaphysics is, not knowledge of all being, but the <sup>integral</sup> heuristic structure within which one operates methodically towards knowledge of all being.

Such an integral heuristic structure has both a ground and a consequent. Its ground is the self-appropriation of the experiencing, intelligent, ~~x~~ reasonable, free, responsible, and loving subject. Its consequent is the application of this ground to the guidance of methodical inquiry in a fashion analogous to the application of mathematics in the inquiry of modern physics.

My <sup>I</sup> ~~present~~ purpose is limited. ~~We~~ <sup>I</sup> cannot offer a full exploration of the heuristic structure of religious studies. ~~We~~ <sup>I</sup> can only indicate two items in such a heuristic structure: one of them ~~we~~ <sup>I</sup> shall be content to mention, for I have treated it sufficiently elsewhere. The other I shall sketch to some extent: I have treated elsewhere as well, but here I shall attempt a different and perhaps more accessible approach.

The first element, then, in a heuristic structure for religious studies arises from the distinction between authentic and unauthentic. The distinction is relevant both to the object of religious studies and to the subject. It is relevant to the object for the followers of a given religion may represent it authentically or unauthentically to provide contradictory evidence on the nature of the religion under investigation. It is relevant to the subject<sup>s</sup> carrying out religious studies for ~~he~~<sup>they</sup> may be humanly or religiously authentic or unauthentic and so offer contradictory interpretations of the same data.

This problem is not new. But it has been evaded either by abstracting from the values exhibited by the religion, or by attending to these values but refraining from any judgement that either approves or disapproves of them.

While these devices satisfy the requirements of empirical<sup>i</sup> science, it is not impossible to doubt that they meet the exigences of a science of religions. Simply to ignore the values exhibited by a religion seems to ignore a principal element in the religion. It seems as unacceptable as a Scholastic philosophy of religion that considers any religion except in so far as it resembles what the Scholastics ~~had~~ held to be the one true religion. On the other hand, to exhibit the values presented by a religion while abstaining from any value judgement of one's own is a hazardous procedure; it is like undertaking a value-free theory of values, and that resembles a theory of knowledge that prescind from the knower. Such procedures are precritical.

However, if empirical science bogs down in the empirical facts that followers of a religion follow differently and that interpreters of religion<sup>i</sup> interpret differently, it remains that a philosophy of religion can resolve the issue. Paul Ricoeur has advocated the combination of a hermeneutic of suspicion with a hermeneutic of recovery, so that unauthentic religion can be repudiated and authentic religion maintained. I myself in Insight and again in Method in Theology have proposed a dialectic in which investigators are urged both to expand what they consider authentic in the followers of a religion they are studying and, as well, to reverse what they consider unauthentic. The result will be a projective test in which interpreters reveal their own notions of authenticity and unauthenticity both to others and to themselves. In the short run both the more authentic will discover what they have in common, and so too will the less authentic. In the long run the authentic should be able to reveal the strength of their position by the penetration of their investigations, by the ~~growing~~ growing number in the scientific community attracted to their assumptions and procedures and, eventually, by the reduction of the opposition to the hard-line dogmatists that defend an inadequate method no matter what its deficiencies.

for the long run ~~on the course that Thomas Kuhn~~  
 In brief, / ~~I am advocating the procedure that Thomas Kuhn~~  
 I am relying on the course that Thomas Kuhn  
 // has found to prevail in physics, namely, that mistaken ideas that once were dominant are not so much refuted as abandoned. They vanish when they ~~prove~~ <sup>a</sup> prove incapable of gaining competent disciples.

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There is a second contribution that, I believe, a philosophy of religion can make to religious studies. For the most part I have referred to it as differentiations of consciousness, but I now find that an equivalent ~~point~~ point can be made and parallel results obtained in a less abstruse approach.

The issue in hand is the need of some account and ordering of the various contexts in which, first, religious living occurs and, secondly, investigations of religious living are undertaken. Such an ordered account is again a dialectic, not indeed in the meaning of dialectic in the previous section which turns on the opposition of authenticity and unauthenticity, but rather a ~~dialectic~~ dialectic in the style of Collingwood as interpreted by Louis Mink.

In such a dialectic there are the terms whose meaning shifts in the course of time and, further, there are the terms that denote the factors bringing about such shifts in meaning.

The terms whose meaning shifts are social contexts and cultural contexts. Social contexts are the already understood and accepted modes of <sup>human</sup> cooperation grouped under such headings as family and mores, community and education, state and law, economics and technology. Cultural contexts are the areas of interest in which social frameworks find explanation, justification, a goal: such areas are art, religion, science, philosophy, history.

further one turns to the past, the shorter become the  
 Now the/~~more and more~~ lists of social  
 headings and cultural areas, ~~become shorter~~, while the realities  
 to which they refer become simpler in structure and more com-  
 prehensive in scope. So, for example, the more ancient the religion,  
 the less sharply will its role be distinguished from other  
 roles, and the more notable will be the position it occupies  
 in the sociocultural matrix.

It remains that earlier forms may be found in later  
 periods, so that mere chronology does not provide even a  
 preliminary ordering. On the other hand, differentiation  
 is not independent of language and, in fact, not a little relevance  
 is found when one distinguishes four stages: the linguistic,  
 literate,  
 the/~~logical~~ the logical, and the methodical.

Each of these stages includes those that precede but adds  
 a new factor of its own. In the linguistic stage people speak and  
 listen. In the <sup>literate</sup>/~~logical~~ they read and write. In the logical  
 they operate on propositions; they promote clarity, coherence,  
 and rigor of statement; they move towards systems that are  
 thought to be permanently valid. In the methodical stage  
 the construction of systems remains, but the permanently  
 valid system has become an abandoned ideal; any system is  
 presumed to be the precursor of another and better system;  
 and the role of method is the discernment of invariants and  
 variables in the ongoing sequences of systems.

Now in later periods the scope of earlier stages may  
 be enhanced: so the radio extends speech and hearing; the  
 cinema extends the drama; television extends both. Again,  
 the invention of printing extends reading and writing.  
 Further, a symbolic logic provides an intermediate step



It leads to alienation. For inasmuch as the more advanced devise the social arrangements and invent their cultural justification, the less advanced find themselves living in social arrangements beyond their comprehension and motivated by <sup>appeals to values</sup> ~~by a cultural/gene~~ they do not appreciate. Inversely, inasmuch as the less advanced assume the initiative, the more advanced are alienated by simplistic social thought and crude cultural creations.

I have been sketching in bold outline -- an outline that admits almost endless differentiations and refinements -- (1) eight headings of social arrangements, (5) five areas of cultural interest, (3) four stages diversifying the scope of social and cultural initiatives, and (4) the increasing <sup>S</sup> <sub>A</sub> tendency of these stages to bring about stratification and alienation.

In its within these varying social and cultural contexts that religion discovers itself, works out its identity, differentiates itself from other areas, and interacts with them. But in its linguistic stage religion will manifest itself as myth and ritual. In its <sup>literate</sup> ~~kkkkkk~~ stage it ~~kkkk~~ becomes religion of the book, of the Torah, the Gospel, the Koran. In the logical stage it may reduplicate itself with the reflection on itself <sup>would end</sup> that ~~ends~~ <sup>by</sup> dissension ~~with~~ dogmatic pronouncements and <sup>would seek</sup> ~~seeks~~ overall reconciliation by systematic theologies. In the methodical stage it confronts its own ~~at~~ history, distinguishes the stages in its own development, evaluates the authenticity or unauthenticity of its initiatives, and preaches its message in the many forms and styles appropriate to the many social and cul<sup>l</sup>trual strata of the communities in which it operates.

Over the years each earlier stage brings to light an exigence for the next. To meet that exigence there forms an élite and, when its work is not merely abstruse and difficult but in some measure unsuccessful, the steadfast representatives of earlier stages express their alienation by voicing their grievances.

So Christianity began and spread through the words and deeds of Christ and his apostles. But by the end of the second century there had emerged an élite that studied the scriptures and read Irenaeus in Gaul, Hippolytus in Rome, Tertullian in North Africa, Clement and Origen in Egypt.

The spoken word objectifies transiently. The written word objectifies permanently. It can regard a larger area and underpin a sustained scrutiny. So Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Clement, and Origen propounded Christianity in its opposition to a Gnosticism that belittled and even ridiculed the creator God of the Old Testament who also was ~~the~~ God the Father of Jesus Christ the Savior of mankind.

Now even the linguistic stage of a religion will be concerned not only with "doing the truth" but also with the particular form of "doing" that is "saying the truth." So scholars have discerned brief formulas of faith embedded in the New Testament, and the first epistle of John is thought to be opposing a form of Gnostic ~~the~~ docetism. But ~~these~~ ~~the~~ apologetics and controversy lead into the logical stage of religion. The anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament had to be explained not as literal but as symbolic statements; and to express literally the Christian apprehension of God the Father, turned Christian resourcefulness to the achievements



of the Greeks. For Origen God the Father was strictly spiritual and strictly eternal; and the same was true of his Son and Word.

Now an entry into the logical stage admits no logical retreat from it. Worse, arguments for one position can be matched by other arguments against it. <sup>There followed the councils. The</sup> ~~Sextine~~/Arians were rejected at Nicea, the Macedonians at Constantinople, the Nestorians at Ephesus, the Monophysites at Chalcedon. The doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation were formulated in all their austerity, and ~~the~~ dangers of alienation were warded off inasmuch as literate minds <sup>were permitted to</sup> regard ~~the~~ the dogmas as laws, <sup>while</sup> ~~the~~ the masses in the linguistic stage ~~had~~ them enshrined in ~~their~~ confessions of faith and ~~their~~ liturgical prayers.

As there is a transition from "doing the truth" to "saying the truth," so there is a further transition from "saying the truth" to reaching some understanding of it. Even though the truth expresses mystery, at least it should not involve contradiction. This concern, of course, brings forth a further and still smaller élite. It had made a momentary appearance in Origen's comparison of the generation of the Son to the origin of willing from knowing. It had attained a brief but still compelling realization in Gregory of Nyssa's Ad Ablabium that explained the difference between the ~~the~~ generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit. It found a ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ respected vehicle in Augustine's lengthy and largely rhetorical and logical De trinitate. But it became the occupation of a large and ongoing intellectual community in medieval Scholasticism.

The inspiration of Scholasticism was Anselm's faith seeking, though hardly attaining, understanding. Its schoolmaster was Abaelard's Sic et non. Its achievement was the collected works of Aquinas. Its tragedy was that a spontaneous method, stemming from the practice of lectio et quaestio, was led astray by the ineptitude of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.

Scholasticism declined. Its decline was greeted by the alienation of the devotio moderna, which would rather feel compunction than define it, by the ridicule of the humanists in a new revival of learning, and by the invention of printing, which gave new life and vigor to religion of the book. On this wave rode the Reformation. Breasting it stood the council of Trent. But if the reformation rejected <sup>R</sup> en bloc the ambiguities of Scholasticism, if it stressed the  $\times$  scriptures, still it remained faithful to the Greek councils and so was committed to a logical stance and, in time, to a Scholasticism of its own.

It remains that  $\times$  Protestant insistence on scripture kept open a door. Through that door in due course there entered into scriptural studies the application of new, nineteenth-century methods to historical investigation and textual interpretation. So there came to light the differences between the mind of the scriptures and the mind of the councils, and there followed doubts that conciliar dogmas could be attributed to divine revelation. The problem surfaced in ~~the~~ nineteenth-century Liberal Protestantism, in early twentieth-century Modernism, and for a third time in the wake of the second Vatican council ~~when a writer in the International Catholic Review explains that Jesus no longer is the God-man but now the true, exemplary, new man.~~

when even Catholic theologians find the definition of Chalcedon questionable and wish to change/<sup>both</sup>our traditional understanding of Christ and our profession of faith in Christ.

The problem, indeed, I should say the crisis, is one of understanding. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ However radical its content, its roots are ancient, for problems of understanding are problems of method. Scholasticism went ~~at~~ astray when its questions arose, not from its sources in scripture and tradition, but from the conflicts between theological systems. The sixteenth century went astray/<sup>when</sup>~~with~~ its incomprehension of doctrinal development ~~and~~ divided Christendom into the archaists, that pronounced developments corruptions, and the anachronists, that read later developments into earlier documents. Catholics <sup>both</sup>went astray/by their long sustained opposition to advanced methods in historical investigation ~~and~~ and textual interpretation and by/<sup>an</sup>uncritical transposition of Scholasticism into the milieu of modern ~~thought~~ thought.

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My discussion falls into two parts. In the first I sought to set up a philosophy of religion by conceiving philosophy as foundational methodology, philosophy of religion as foundational methodology of religious studies. This first part fell into three sections: in the first section there was effected a transition from the priority of metaphysics to the priority of cognitive theory; in the second, we moved from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis; in the third, we added the parts of intentionality analysis specifically relevant to religious studies.

The second part of the paper was concerned with heuristic structures in religious studies: a first concern was with the methodical handling of value problems; the second/<sup>was</sup>with the ordering of the differences due to developments.