tigators are human beings. They too live in a world as they know it. They too are correlative to that world, praising what they praise in it, and blaming what they blame. They too have begun their development from a heritage that, for all its richness, need not and even cannot be free from every distortion and every aberration. Only as investigators free themselves from all distortion and aberration of their own making, only as they go to the root in eradicating any distortion or aberration they may have inherited from others, only then can they be genuinely sympathetic with others and really effective in coming to know them in truth and in justice.

11

This exigence of method may seem too steep and its goal too high. But I can only repeat the argument and leave it to you to evaluate it. The basic premiss is the correlativity of the subject and his world. Hence for the subject to know others is for him to extend and enlarge his own world and assign them their place in it. But if the world that is to be extended and enlarged already is distorted and unbalanced, there is every reason to expect the extension and enlargement to be carried out under the already functioning principles that distort and unbalance. Conversely, if the subject lays the axe to the root of his own distortion and aberration, once more there will be every reason to expect that he will also exclude distortion and aberration in extending and enlarging his own world and thereby including in it others and their world.

Indeed, that one's world should be open to question, so far from being too steep and too high a requirement, really is the most fundamental of all. For man's world is the first

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in man's surmise but last in his knowledge. For man knows by raising and answering questions. He will know his world when he has answered all the questions he can raise about it. But from the beginning until that future consummation, if it does occur, man raises more questions than he can answer. He knows and knows he knows not his world but just some part of it. But to know one knows only in part, is to know that there is an as yet unknown totality or whole. It is that known unknown that is man's world, that is bodied forth in primitive myth, in Babylonian astrology, in the Ptolemaic universe, in our own big-bang or steady-state cosmologies with their subatomic particles, their evolving species, their historically-minded "man's world," modern man. What will be the next we can hardly imagine. But that there could be a next, we infer from the fact that as yet many questions are not answered. When one comes down to it, we are all in the same boat, this earth, and we cannot afford to sniff at our most distant ancestors. To know ourselves, we have to know them too.

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with its basic contention that to understand others we have to understand ourselves and, conversely, that short-comings in one's self-understanding are matched by short-comings in/ understanding of others. Nor should we find this surprising. As perception is more than sensation, so interpreting a text or a symbol is more than just reading it or looking at it. As perception draws upon one's whole previous development, so too interpretation is no broader or deeper than the experience, the penetration, the aspirations of the interpreter himself.

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It remains the high privilege of method to raise the stature of individuals by making them members of a scientific community and so compensating for the weakness of any by the presence, the aid, the challenge of others. So the gifts of each become a leaven of the whole mass and, while this leavening process is working its effects insensibly at any time, still over time it is not difficult to document the same process as it operates over successive generations of investigators.

In illustration it will be most convenient to refer to Talcott Parsons' account of "The Theoretical Development of the Sociology of Religion" (<u>Essays in Sociological Theory</u>, New York: The Free Press, 1964; originally 1949; revised edition, 1954). The initial stage of the development was rationalist, evolutionist, positivist. Religion was regarded as superstition to be explained by biological or psychological factors; or else it was a primitive pseudo-science resulting from a lack of accumulated knowledge, from limitations of technique, from an absence of sustained observation. Articata envidor resultion & Articata

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