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Thank you, Professor Fortin!

Ladies and Gentlemen

Let me begin by thanking Boston University, its Institute for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology, and in particular the committee in charge of this Bicentennial Lecture Series.

I am indeed grateful for being counted among the distinguished speakers they have invited to participate in an overview of philosophy and religion in America.

Finally, let me say how happy I am to be here with you this evening.

SELF-TRANSCENDENCE: INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, RELIGIOUS

HOBART & WILLIAM SMITH COLLEGES

OCTOBER 10, 1974

It was suggested that I speak to you of self-transcendence^{den}: intellectual, moral, and religious. That provides me with five topics: 1) The Self; 2) Self-transcendence; 3) Intellectual Self-transcendence; 4) Moral Self-transcendence; and 5) Religious Self-transcendence.

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The Self *Existenz and Aggiornamento*

the self or of
To speak of ~~Existenz~~ being oneself, is to speak in public about what is private, intimate, more intimate perhaps than one has explicitly conceived. Such existential speaking cannot be tidily tucked away into a category: at once it is psychological, sociological, historical, philosophic, theological, religious, ascetic, perhaps for some even mystical; but it is all of them because the person is all and involved in all.

At the same time, it is not personal in a merely individual sense: it is not exhibitionism on the part of the speaker; it is not exhortation ~~a domestic exhortation in place of a lecture~~ for those that listen. It is what the Germans call a *Besinnung*, a becoming aware, a growth in self-consciousness, a heightening of one's self-appropriation, that is possible because our separate, unrevealed, hidden cores have a common circle of reference, the human community, and an ultimate point of reference, which is God, who is all in all, *τὸ πᾶσι ἐν πᾶσι θεός*.

for believers

~~An address given to the faculty and student body at Regis College, Willowdale, Ontario, on September 14, 1964, and at Alma College, Los Gatos, California, on September 25, 1964, and subsequently published in *Focus: A Theological Journal* (student publication at Regis College) 2 (1965), pp. 5-14. — Edition~~

Now with regard to the self, the first

EXISTENZ AND AGGIORNAMENTO

THE SUBJECT

1. The first distinction is between substance and subject. When one is sound asleep, one is actually a substance and only potentially a subject. To be a subject, one at least must dream. But the dreamer is only the minimal subject: one is more a subject when one is awake, still more when one is actively intelligent, still more when one actively is reasonable, still more in one's deliberations and decisions when one actively is responsible and free.

Of the human substance it is true that human nature is always the same; a man is a man whether he is awake or asleep, young or old, sane or crazy, sober or drunk, a genius or a moron, a saint or a sinner. From the viewpoint of substance, those differences are merely accidental. But they are not accidental to the subject, for the subject is not an abstraction; he is a concrete reality, all of him, a being in the luminousness of being.

Substance prescind from the difference between the opaque being that is merely substance and the luminous being that is conscious. Subject denotes the luminous being.

2. The being of the subject is becoming. One becomes oneself. When I was a child, I was a subject; but I had not yet reached the use of reason; I was not expected to be able to draw reasonably the elementary distinctions between right and wrong, true and false. When I was a boy, I was a subject; but I was a minor; I had not reached the degree of freedom and responsibility that would make me accountable before the law. The self I am today is not numerically different from the self I was as a child or boy; yet it is qualitatively different. Were it not, you would not be listening to me. Were you yourselves not, I would not be talking to you in this way.

3. The subject has more and more to do with his own becoming. When an adult underestimates a child's development and tries to do for the child what the child can do for itself, the child will resent the interference and exclaim: Let me do it. Development is a matter of increasing the number of things that one does for oneself, that one decides for oneself, that one finds out for oneself. Parents and teachers and professors

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and superiors let people do more and more for themselves, decide more and more for themselves, find out more and more for themselves.

4. There is a critical point in the increasing autonomy of the subject. It is reached when the subject finds out for himself that it is up to himself to decide what he is to make of himself. At first sight doing for oneself, deciding for oneself, finding out for oneself are busy with objects. But on reflection, it appears that deeds, decisions, discoveries affect the subject more deeply than they affect the objects with which they are concerned. They accumulate as dispositions and habits of the subject; they determine him; they make him what he is and what he is to be.

The self in the first period makes itself; but in a second period this making oneself is open-eyed, deliberate. Autonomy decides what autonomy is to be.

The opposite to this open-eyed, deliberate self-control is drifting. The drifter has not yet found himself; he has not yet discovered his own deed and so is content to do what everyone else is doing; he has not yet discovered his own will and so he is content to choose what everyone else is choosing; he has not yet discovered a mind of his own and so he is content to think and say what everyone else is thinking and saying; and the others too are apt to be drifters, each of them doing and choosing and thinking and saying what others happen to be doing, choosing, thinking, saying.

I have spoken of an opposite to drifting, of autonomy disposing of itself, of open-eyed, deliberate self-control. But I must not misrepresent. We do not know ourselves very well; we cannot chart the future; we cannot control our environment completely or the influences that work on us; we cannot explore our unconscious and preconscious mechanisms. Our course is in the night; our control is only rough and approximate; we have to believe and trust, to risk and dare.

5. In this life the critical point is never transcended. It is one thing to decide what one is to make of oneself; ~~a Catholic, a religious, a Jesuit, a priest.~~ It is another to execute the decision. Today's resolutions do not predetermine the free choice of tomorrow, of next week, or next year, or ten years from

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now. What has been achieved is always precarious: it can slip, fall, shatter. What is to be achieved can be ever expanding, deepening. To meet one challenge is to effect a development that reveals a further and graver challenge. ^

Self-transcendence

A distinction has been drawn between the autonomous human subject and the mere drifter. Now it is in the autonomous human subject that self-transcendence occurs. Our account of it will consist in a description of six stages, of 1) dreamless sleep; 2) dreaming; 3) waking; 4) inquiring; 5) reflecting; and 6) deliberating. To these six there will be added later a seventh, being in love. But the six suffice to introduce intellectual and moral self-transcendence, and it will be time enough to speak of being-in-love when we come to religious self-transcendence.

In dreamless sleep we are substance without being subject. Still we are alive. We are operating in

~~In dreamless sleep, we are still alive. We are operating in~~ accord with the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. It may be said that we are ourselves but not that we are reaching beyond ourselves and, much less, that we are rising above ourselves. But when we begin to dream, consciousness emerges. However helpless, however lacking in initiative, the dreamer is an intending subject. What is intended, commonly is obscure, fragmentary, symbolic. In so-called dreams of the night the source of the dream is one's somatic state, say, the state of one's digestion. But in dreams of the morning the dreamer is anticipating his waking state; he is recollecting his world; he is beginning to adopt a stance within that world. In the dream of the morning, then, the dreamer has got beyond himself; he is concerned with what is distinct from himself; he is anticipating his self-transcendence. CC 67

An enormously richer self-transcendence emerges when one awakes. There is the endless variety of things to be seen, sounds to be heard, odors to be sniffed, tastes to be palated, shapes and textures to be touched. We feel pleasure and pain, desire and fear, joy and sorrow, and in such feelings there seem to reside the mass and momentum of our lives. We move about in various manners, assume now this and now that posture and position, and by the fleeting movements of our facial muscles, communicate to others the quiet pulse or sudden surge of our feelings.

Still, sensations, feelings, movements are confined to the narrow strip of space-time occupied by immediate experience.

THE RESPONSE OF THE JESUIT

But beyond that there is a vastly larger world. Nor is anyone content with immediate experience. Imagination wants to fill out and round off the picture. Language makes questions possible, and intelligence makes them fascinating. So we ask why and what and what for and how. Our answers construct, serialize, extrapolate, generalize. Memory and tradition and belief (put at our disposal the tales of travelers, the stories of clans or nations, the exploits of heroes, the treasures of literature, the discoveries of science, the reflections of philosophers, and the meditations of holy men. Each of us has his own little world of immediacy, but all such worlds are just minute strips within a far larger world, a world constructed by imagination and intelligence, mediated by words and meaning, and based largely upon belief.

If the larger world is one and the same, still there are as many different constructions of it as there are stages in human development and differences in human cultures. But such diversity only serves to bring to light a still further dimension of self-transcendence. Beyond questions for intelligence—such as what and why and how and what for—there are the questions for reflection that ask, Is that so or is it not so? Is that certain or is it only probable? Unlike questions for intelligence, these can be answered by a simple "Yes" or "No." How we can give such answers, is beside my present purpose; but what such answers mean, is very much to it. For when we say that this or that really and truly is so, we do not mean that this is what appears, or what we imagine, or what we would like, or what we think, or what seems to be so, or what we would be inclined to say. No doubt, we frequently have to be content with such lesser statements. But the point I would make is that the greater statement is not reducible to the lesser. When we seriously affirm that something really and truly is so, we are making the claim that we have got beyond ourselves in some absolute fashion, somehow have got hold of something that is independent of ourselves, somehow have reached beyond, transcended ourselves.

*world constructed by meaning
self-transcendence, cognitive*

A SECOND COLLECTION

I have been endeavoring to clarify the notion of self-transcendence by contrasting, first, dreamless sleep with the beginnings of consciousness in the dream, secondly, the dreaming with the waking subject, thirdly, the world of immediate experience and the enormously vaster real world in which we live our lives, fourthly that larger world as constructed by intelligence with the same larger world as known to have been constructed as it really is.

There remains a still further dimension of self-transcendence. Our illustrations, so far, have mainly regarded knowledge. There remains action. Beyond questions for intelligence—what? why? how? what for?—there are questions for reflection—is that so? But beyond both there are questions for deliberation. Beyond the pleasures we enjoy and the pains we dread, there are the values to which we may respond with the whole of our being. On the topmost level of human consciousness the subject deliberates, evaluates, decides, controls, acts. At once he is practical and existential: practical inasmuch as he is concerned with concrete courses of action; existential inasmuch as control includes self-control, and the possibility of self-control involves responsibility for the effects of his actions on others and, more basically, on himself. The topmost level of human consciousness is conscience. 166-66

However, man's self-control can proceed from quite different grounds. It can tend to be mere selfishness. Then the process of deliberation, evaluation, decision, is limited to determining what is most to one's advantage, what best serves one's interests, what on the whole yields a maximum of pleasure and a minimum of pain. At the opposite pole, it can tend to be concerned solely with values: with the vital values of health and strength; with the social values enshrined in family and custom, society and education, the state and the law, the economy and technology, the church or sect; with the cultural values of religion and art, language and literature, science, philosophy, history, theology;

*self-transcendence, moral
knowledge and action*

THE RESPONSE OF THE JESUIT

with the achieved personal value of one dedicated to realizing values in himself and promoting their realization in others.

In the measure that one's living, one's aims, one's achievements are a response to values, in that measure self-transcendence is effected in the field of action. One has got beyond mere selfishness. One has become a principle of benevolence and beneficence. One has become capable of genuine collaboration and of true love. In the measure that self-transcendence in the field of action characterizes the members of a society, in that measure their world not only is constructed by imagination and intelligence, mediated by words and meaning, based by and large on belief; it also is a world motivated and regulated not by self-seeking but by values, not by what is only apparently good but by what truly is good.

Now if we compare the last four of our modes of self-transcendence, we find that they form an interlocking unity. Experiencing is presupposed and complemented by inquiry and understanding. Experiencing and understanding are presupposed and complemented by collecting and judging. Experiencing, understanding, and judging, are presupposed and complemented by deliberating and deciding. The four modes are interdependent, and each later level sublates those that precede in the sense that it goes beyond them, introduces something entirely new, makes that new element a new basis of operation; but so far from crowding or interfering with its predecessors, it preserves them, perfects them, and extends their relevance and significance. Inquiry sharpens our powers of observation, understanding enormously extends the field of data one can master, reflection and judgment force inquiry to attend to ever further data and force understanding to revise its previous achievements, deliberation turns attention from what is to what can be, to what probably would be and above all, to what really is worthwhile.

To conclude, human authenticity is a matter of following the built-in law of the human spirit. Because we can experience, we should attend. Because we can understand, we should inquire. Because we can reach the truth, we should reflect and check. Because we can realize values in ourselves and promote them in others, we should deliberate. In the measure that we follow these precepts, in the measure we fulfill these conditions of being human persons, we also achieve self-transcendence both in the field of knowledge and in the field of action.

Intellectual Self-transcendence

The problem of intellectual self-transcendence seems connected with language. More precisely, it is connected with the transition from the stage in which one does not speak yet and the later stage in which one does. But let me explain.

~~As soon as, then, meaning is no part of one's being~~ As long as one is an infant, etymologically a non-talker, one is busy learning to develop, differentiate, combine, group in ever broader syntheses one's capacities for operation in the movements of head and mouth, neck and arms, eyes and hands, in mastering the intricacies of standing on one's feet, then of tottering from one spot to another. When first hearing and speech develop, they are directed to present objects, and so meaning initially is confined to a world of immediacy, to a world no bigger than the nursery, and seemingly no better known because it is not merely experienced but also meant. ~~Then, to all appearances, it~~

But as the command and use of language develops, there comes a reversal of roles. For words denote not only what is present but also what is absent, not only what is near but also what is far, not only the past but also the future, not only the factual but also the possible, the ideal, the ought-to-be for which we keep on striving though we never attain. So we come to live, not as the infant in a world of immediate experience, but in a far vaster world that is brought to us through the memories of other men, through the common sense of the community, through the pages of literature, through the labors of scholars, through the investigations of scientists, through the experience of saints, through the mediations of philosophers and theologians.

This larger world, mediated through meaning, does not lie within anyone's immediate experience. It is not even the sum, the integral, of the totality of all worlds of immediate experience. For meaning is an act that does not merely repeat but goes beyond experiencing. What is meant, is not only experienced but also somehow understood and, commonly, also affirmed. It is this addition of understanding and judgment that makes possible the larger world mediated by meaning, that gives it its structure and its unity, that arranges it in an orderly whole of almost endless differences partly known and familiar, partly in a surrounding penumbra of things we know about but have never examined or explored, partly an unmeasured region of what we do not know at all. It is this larger world mediated by meaning that we refer to when we speak of the real world, and in it we live out our lives. It is this larger world, mediated by meaning, that we know to be insecure, because meaning is insecure, since besides truth there is error, besides fact there is fiction, besides honesty there is deceit, besides science there is myth.

I have been contrasting a world of immediacy and a world mediated by meaning. But it is very much to our purpose to make quite clear where differences lie and where identity obtains.

It is one and the same person that once was an infant and now is an adult. Such is a first identity.

Again, in becoming an adult one does not migrate from one world to another quite different world. When one grows up, one is still in the same world one was when an infant. Such is a second identity.

On the other hand, there is difference between the world as apprehended by the infant and the world as apprehended by the adult. For the latter apprehension includes an endless multitude of things which the infant did not know.

Further, the apprehension of the adult differs from the apprehension of the infant. For the infant's world of immediacy need include no more than what is given to sense. But the adult's world includes sense but adds to sense both what is grasped by intelligence and what is affirmed or denied by judgement. It adds the unifications and relations, the constructions and extrapolations, the serializations and generalizations of intelligence. It also adds the distinctions of judgement between science and myth, honesty and deceit, fact and fiction, truth and error.

Finally, as the relevant cognitional operations differ, so too the criteria of objectivity differ. For the world of immediacy there^e suffice the criteria of experience, the visible givenness of what is seen, the audible givenness of what is heard, the sensible givenness of what is felt. But for the world mediated by meaning, while all the criteria of experience are

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required, still they alone do not suffice. There also are needed the criteria for the appropriate use of human intelligence and, no less, the further criteria on the necessary and sufficient evidence for a true judgement.

Now while there is a certain complexity to the ambiguities I have been pointing out, there would seem to be no real difficulty. It remains that what I have said is extremely general and abstract, while the difficulties arise in the concrete, in saying just what happens and why when mathematicians do mathematics, scientists do science, men and women of common sense make their commonsense pronouncements, historians do history, even philosophers do philosophy. Only too easily people can drift from infancy through childhood and a long educational process only to practice adult cognitional procedures with no clear notion of what they are doing. They have a firm grasp of impressions on their senses and feelings. They have a sure appreciation of the intelligence or dullness, the reasonableness or silliness that emerge in the spoken or written. But what goes on between the input from sense and the output in language, that is obscure, vague, unconvincing. To them the human mind is just a black box. The input is clear enough. The output is clear enough. But the inner working is a mystery.

Intellectual self-transcendence is taking possession of one's own mind. It is a matter of attending to each of its many operations, of identifying them, of comparing them, of distinguishing them, naming them, relating them to one another, grasping the dynamic structure of their emergence and development and so coming to clarify the workings of the mind in mathematics, in science, in common sense, in history, in phil-

osophy.

If a comparison would be helpful, it is a labor not unlike Carl Rogers' client-centered therapy. People have feelings that are distorting their lives, feelings they experience, feelings however they have to identify, compare, distinguish, name, relate to their occasions, their causes, their consequences.

What is true of the neurotic and his feelings, also can be true of the normal man or woman and their insights. Insights are not rare and marvellous events. They are a dime ^a dozen. They occur easily and frequently in the intelligent, more rarely and with greater difficulty in the retarded. But for the most part not even the intelligent have any clear notion of what an insight is, under what conditions it occurs, how frequent are merely bright ideas that remain only half baked, what a long succession and cumulation of insights is required for a genuine discovery.

In brief, for intellectual self-transcendence a price must be paid. My little book, Insight, provides a set of exercises for those that wish to find out what goes on in their own black boxes. But it is only a set of exercises. What counts is doing them.

Should one attempt to do them? As long as one is content to be guided by one's common sense, to disregard the pundits of every class whether scientific or cultural or religious, one need not learn what goes on in one's black box. But when one moves beyond the limits of commonsense competence, when one wishes to have an opinion of one's own on larger issues, then one had best know just what one is doing. Otherwise one too easily will be duped and too readily be exploited. Then explicit intellectual self-transcendence becomes a real need.

Moral Self-transcendence

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A recent work with the intriguing title, Towards Deep Subjectivity, begins with two photographs. The first is of two ~~park~~ benches set at right angles in a park in the Czech city of Prague. On one of the benches are seated three Russian soldiers, and they are looking straight ahead. One surmises that they are avoiding the eyes of the two Czech civilians, a young man and a young woman, seated on the bench at right angles to theirs, and looking right at them.

As the book explains the picture has a moral. Rather, to adopt the author's expression, it illustrates ethical space. It sets forth in the objective world the subjective reality of two moral judgements. The moral judgement of the Czechs whose gaze amounts to the question, What right have you to be here? The moral acquiescence of the Russians who do not care to look the Czechs in the eye.

There are many morals to the picture.

The first is, perhaps, that there is nothing recondite about morality. We are all forever praising this and blaming that, praising what we consider right and good, blaming what we consider wrong and evil.

The second is that good and evil bear witness to each other. The open gaze of the Czechs bears witness to the fact that they were wronged. The Russians' avoidance of the Czechs' eyes transmits the blame from their helpless selves to their powerful and exacting masters.

The third is that people commonly are unwilling to accept the blame. They pass it along to those higher up or those lower down or those to the right or those to the left. They retort it and so it is always safer to leave throwing the first stone to the man that is without sin.

The fourth is pretence. One's cause is not blameless, but one points to a greater good, to the long run, to the extenuating circumstances, to the example of one's betters, to the hypocrisy of one's rivals or opponents, to the dangers that menace one. After all, one has to confess -- who does not -- that one is not a saint. Or again one explains that one has to live. In the kingdom of crooks one has to be a crook to survive.

A fifth is ideology. Now it happens that ideology has two basic meanings. In the language, mostly of people that do not attempt to think seriously, it is no more than an otiose synonym for ^{systematic} thought. But properly it denotes ^{systematic} rationalization, that is, a system of thought worked out to defend, justify, legitimate an iniquitous style, of living, of economic arrangements, of political government, of any of the organized forms of human activity. So for Marx capitalist economics was the ideology of the bourgeoisie. For the advocates of free enterprise communism is the ideology of the Soviet commissars. So in its proper meaning the term, ideology, includes a moral judgement of reprobation both of the system of thought that one opposes and of the system of action that the system of thought would legitimate.

A sixth feature is impotence. When one grows up, ^{one} can easily see through the nonsense of children each blaming the other for some mishap. But it is a far more difficult task

to obtain accurate information, to understand lengthy and minute analyses, to follow protracted chains of reasoning, to come to appreciate or see through the claims of clusters of nations armed with thermonuclear bombs.

But impotence on the grand scale is coupled in each of us with impotence on the small, the private scale. For virtuous action has two conditions: sound judgement and good will. Unfortunately we are not born equipped either with sound judgement or ^{with} good will. They have to be acquired. But acquiring them is a long and difficult task. More than any other it calls for sound judgement so that we know what we have to do, and for good will ^{so} that we actually do it. But if sound judgement is a prerequisite for acquiring sound judgement, how are we ever to acquire it. If good will is a prerequisite for acquiring good will, how are we ever to acquire good will.

Is then moral development just a trap? Is it caught in a vicious circle in which, to acquire what one does not have, one must already have it? Call it a trap or a vicious circle if you please. But at least note that another interpretation of the human situation is available. One becomes a moral being by transcending oneself.

There are questions for intelligence that promote our being from a world of sense impressions, images, feelings into a world of intelligence, discovery, endless vistas. There are questions for reflection that promote our being from a world of sense and intelligence to the rationality of a world in which one discerns clearly and efficiently between fact and fiction, astronomy and astrology, chemistry and

alchemy, history and legend, philosophy and myth, science and ideology. There are questions for deliberation, and they are of two kinds. There are the self-regarding questions that merely ask what is in it for me or for this or that group of which I am a part. There are the moral questions that ask what is worth while, what is truly and not merely apparently good.

Both sets of questions are practical. On them hinges what courses of action will be adopted and followed. Both sets of questions are interpersonal, for on both the lives of other persons are affected for good or ill. Both sets of questions are existential, for on both there is being settled what I am to make of myself, what I am to be.

But along with these common features there also are grave differences. If basically one's questions are of the self-regarding type, then one has not attempted moral self-transcendence. One has merely added oneself to the world's already teeming population of moral drifters. One has merely added/ ~~another humble contributo~~ another humble contributo to the economic and political determinism resulting from competing egoisms. But when one's basic questions for deliberation regard not satisfactions but values -- the vital values of health and skill, the social values that secure the vital values of the group, the cultural values that make worth while, social goals and the satisfaction of vital needs -- then moral self-transcendence has begun. One has ceased to need the carrot of desire and the stick of fear; one has become a self-starter, a principle of benevolence and beneficence, a ~~genuine person~~ genuine person whose words and deeds inspire and invite those know him or her to aspire themselves to moral self-transcendence, to become themselves genuine persons. *ch. st.*

Religious Self-transcendence

Man's questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation reveal man's capacity for self-transcendence. But capacity, hankering, intermittent trying are one thing; stable achievement is another. Such stable achievement seems to occur when one falls in love.

Then one's being becomes being-in-love. Such being-in-love has its antecedents, its causes, its conditions, its occasions. But once it has blossomed forth and as long as it lasts, it takes over. It becomes the first principle. From it flow one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and deeds.

Being-in-love is of different kinds. There is the love of intimacy, of husband and wife, of parents and children. There is the love of one's fellow men with its fruit in the achievement of human welfare. There is the love of God with one's whole heart and whole soul, with all one's mind and all one's strength (Mk 12, 30; Deut. 6, 4). It is God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us (Rom 5, 5). It grounds the conviction of St. Paul that "there is nothing in death or life, in the realm of spirits or superhuman powers, in the world as it is or the world as it shall be, in the forces of the universe, in heights or depths—nothing in all creation that can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord (Rom 8, 38 f.)."

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I have been speaking in terms of the Judeo-Christian experience. It has its parallels, as Professor Heiler has explained at some length, in Islam, Zoroastrian Mazdaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism. But in this already crowded lecture I had best stay on native soil, and note that religious love is the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality, of our questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation. It is a fulfilment that brings ^{a deep-set joy} that can remain despite humiliation,

failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfilment bears fruit in a love of one's neighbor that strives mightily to bring about the Kingdom of God on this earth. On the other hand, the absence of that fulfilment opens the way to the trivialization of human life stemming from the ruthless exercise of power, to despair about human welfare springing from the conviction that the universe is absurd.

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ONE of the oldest convictions of spiritual writers and directors is that religious experiences are highly ambiguous. What really reveals the man or woman, is not inner experience but outward deed. As scripture put it, "By their fruits you shall know them" (Mt. 7, 16).

Hence, if anyone wishes to ascertain whether he loves God, he is not to attempt psychological introspection, but he is to consider his own palpable behavior. A person can be profoundly in love with God yet fail to find it in his inner experience. As Professor Maslow put it, most people do have peak experiences, but most of them are not aware of the fact. Psychological introspection is a highly difficult art.

Now being in love with God, if not a peak experience, at least is a peak state, indeed, a peak dynamic state. Further, it will be marked by its unrestricted character. It is with one's whole heart and whole soul, and all one's mind and all one's strength. Hence, while all love is self-surrender, being in love with God is being in love without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations. Just as unrestricted questioning is our capacity for self-transcendence, so being in love in an unrestricted fashion is the proper fulfillment of that capacity.

Such fulfillment is not the product of our knowledge and choice. It is God's free gift. So far from resulting from our knowing and choosing, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on, and it constructs a new horizon in which

the love of God transvalues our values and the eyes of that love transform our knowing.

Though not the product of our knowing and choosing, it is a conscious dynamic state of love, joy, peace that manifests itself in acts of kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness and self-control (Gal. 5, 22).

To say that his dynamic state is conscious, is not to say that it is known. For consciousness is just experience, while full human knowing is a compound of experiencing, understanding, judging.

Because the dynamic state is conscious without being known, it is an experience of mystery. Because it is being in love, the mystery is not merely attractive; it is fascinating; to it one belongs; by it one is possessed. Because it is an unmeasured love, the mystery is otherworldly; it evokes awe; in certain psychic contexts it can evoke terror. Of itself, then, inasmuch as it is conscious without being known, the gift of God's love recalls Rudolf Otto's idea of the holy, his *mysterium fascinans et tremendum*.⁸ Again, it seems to correspond to what Paul Tillich named a being grasped by ultimate concern.⁹ Thirdly, it is like St. Ignatius Loyola's consolation without a cause, as expounded by Karl Rahner, namely, a consolation that has a content but is without an apprehended object.¹⁰ ^

I have been concentrating on religious experience but I must not overlook the religious word.

BY the word is meant any expression of religious meaning or value. Its carrier may be intersubjectivity, or art, or symbol, or language, or the portrayed lives or deeds or achievements of individuals or groups. Normally all modes of expression are employed but, since language

is the vehicle in which meaning is most fully articulated, the spoken and written word are of special importance in the development and the clarification of religion.

By its word religion enters the world mediated by meaning and regulated by value. It endows that world with its deepest meaning and its highest value. It sets itself in a context with other meanings and other values. Within that context it comes to understand itself, to relate itself to the object of ultimate concern, and to draw on the power of that relationship to pursue the objectives of proximate concern all the more fairly and all the more efficaciously.

Before it enters the world mediated by meaning, religion is the prior, soundless word God speaks to us inasmuch as he floods our hearts with his love. That prior word pertains, not to the world mediated by meaning, but to the world of immediacy, to the unmediated experience of the mystery of love and awe. The outwardly spoken word is historically conditioned: its meaning depends on the human context in which it is uttered, and such contexts vary from place to place and from one generation to another. But the prior word in its immediacy, though it differs in intensity, though it resonates differently in different temperaments and in different stages of religious development, has an orientation of its own. It withdraws man from the diversity of history by moving out of the world mediated by meaning and towards a world of immediacy in which image and symbol, thought and word, can lose their relevance and even disappear.

Still one must not conclude that the outward word is something incidental. It has a constitutive role. When a man and a woman love each other yet do not avow their love, they are not yet properly in love. Their very silence means that their love has not yet reached the point of self-surrender and self-donation. It is the love that each freely and fully reveals to the other that brings about the radically new situation of being in love and that begins the unfolding of its life-long implications.²¹

What holds for the love of a man and a woman, also holds in its own way for the love of God and man. Ordinarily, the experience of the mystery of love and awe is not objectified. It remains within subjectivity as a vector, a fateful call to a dreaded holiness. Perhaps after years of sustained prayerfulness and self-denial, immersion in the world mediated by meaning will become less total and experience of the mystery will become clear and distinct enough to awaken attention, wonder, inquiry. Even then in the individual case there are not certain answers. All one can do is let be what is, let happen what in any case keeps recurring. But then, as much as ever one needs the word--the word of tradition that has accumulated religious wisdom, the word of fellowship that unites those that share the gift of God's love, the word of the gospel that announces that God has loved us first and has revealed his love in Christ crucified, dead and risen.

The word then is personal. *Cor ad cor loquitur*: Love speaks to love, and its speech is powerful. The religious leader announces in signs and symbols what is congruent with the gift of love that God works within us. The word too is social: it brings into a single fold the scattered sheep that belong together because at the depth of their hearts they respond to the same mystery of love and awe. The word finally is historical. It is meaning outwardly expressed. It has to find its place in the context of other non-religious meanings. It has to borrow and adapt a language that more easily speaks of this world than of what transcends it; and all such languages and contexts vary with time and place to give words changing meanings and to give statements changing implications.

It follows that religious expression will move through the various stages of meaning and speak in its different realms. But any attempt to outline the successive stages of meaning and its different realms lies beyond the scope of the present paper. Such an attempt would have to account for the prior background of the Old Testament, the diverse layers within it, intertestamental thought and speech, the diverse layers in the New Testament, the apostolic fathers, antenicene Christian writers, the style of postnicene writing, the developments in the west during the medieval period, during the renaissance and reformation periods, in subsequent dogmatic theology, and in contemporary theology. The only point I wish to make here is that religious thinking is a product not only of the religious experience but also of the culture of religious thinkers and writers. What accounts for the differences between religious thinkers is far less differences in their religious experience and far more differences in the culture in which their thinking and writing is embedded.

To go into these differences pertains to religious studies. To study them in the light of commitment to a single faith is the task of the theologian. Into such matters I cannot now go, but if any of you feel called to take them, let me assure you that the fuller your preparation in languages and literatures, in the natural and the human sciences, in philosophy and above all a good life, the greater may be your hope for the successful completion of your appointed task.

SELF-TRANSCENDENCE: INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, RELIGIOUS.

1.)page 3

from p. 1, "To speak of the self..." to p. 3 "...and graver challenge."

2 Collection, pp. 240-243. New York: Seabury. London: Darton Longman Todd

2.)page 7

3 from p. 4, "accord with the laws of physics..." to p. 7 "field of action."

Second Collection, pp. 166-170. Philadelphia: Westminster. London: DLT.

4 3.)page 8 "...there is myth." Collection, pp. 252-253.

6 4.)page 16 "...Christ Jesus our Lord (Rom.8,38 f.)."

The Pilgrim People, p. 56.

7 5.)page 16 "...is absurd." The Pilgrim People, p. 56.

8 6.)page 17 "...an apprehended object." The Pilgrim People, pp. 57-58.

9 7.)page 19

from p. 17, "One of the eldest..." to p. 19 "...writing is embedded."

The Pilgrim People, pp. 62-64.

5 Also cited, page 12:

Roger Poole, Towards Deep Subjectivity, London: Allen Lane,

The Penguin Press, 1972. Harper Torchbooks, TB 1676.

The Pilgrim People: A Vision with Hope. The Villanova University Symposium, edited by Joseph Papin. Vol. IV. Theology Institute Publications, Villanova University, Villanova, PA 19085.