

Canadian Philosophical Association

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Introduction to Insight

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3. As an Experience, and as a Theme
4. Transcendental Method or Generalized Empirical Method
5. As an Element in Cognitional Process
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1. The Book

Often thought
extremely difficult
calling for more time and labor than one can spare

In fact it began as a course
on Thought and Reality
offered at the Thomas More INstitute for Adult Education
Montreal September to Easter 1945-46
out of original 45 students, 41 still coming at Easter time

For reasons that will shortly be apparent
there is an initial hump one has to struggle over
but this is true of most new topics
sixth or seventh class in Montreal, girl whacked desk "I've got it"

I shall not follow Montreal procedures
a professional audience very different from amateurs
much is already familiar to them - repetition tedious
are apt to
they/have their own very complicated and abstruse difficulties

Purpose in the book, and in this lecture, is
not proof demonstration refutation
but invitation

not invitation to agree with me

but to find out each in himself and each for himself

~~I was told at Florida meeting by Heelan now chairman Sunny xbrook
if an old man may repeat a very great compliment
We are not your disciples; ■ you have taught us to think for our-
selves; and that is what we are doing it~~

SUNY

2. The Division: Insight as Activity, 1 - 10
 Insight as Knowledge, 11 - 20

1) Philosophy is about reality: it is a metaphysics; but there are many views of reality, many ~~metaphysics~~ systems of metaphysics, and those that claim there exists no valid metaphysics at all

Hence, philosophy is primarily an epistemology, an account of valid knowledge, of the criteria for deciding whether this or that instance is an instance of valid knowledge or not. Notably, Descartes, Kant. But there are many discussions of Descartes, Kant, and the various revisions of their positions.

Hence one may resort to previous issue: just what are the operations that occur when people think that they are knowing.

It is intentionality analysis: it is concerned with operations that are intentional; it is concerned with them inasmuch as they happen to be relevant to human ⁱcongitional process.

What are you doing when you are knowing? Intentionality analysis
 Why is doing that knowing? Epistemology.

What do you know when you do it? Metaphysics.

2) Like Husserl. Epokhe as precluding from metaphysics and epistemology.

Unlike Husserl. Not Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft: necessity is a marginal notion, and the margin is very thin.

Anschauung is of no epistemological significance; the notion that it is, is the worst trap in the whole of philosophy.

3) Intentional

Human operations are unconscious or conscious: different views on just what consciousness is, just what the unconscious is.

Operations are conscious inasmuch as they are present to the operator and ground the operator's presence to himself. Present: not as spectacle to spectator, but as ~~spectacle to spectator and~~ spectator to himself.

Conscious operations may be intentional or non-intentional: intentional if they refer to other than operator and operation; non-intentional if they do not. EG anxiety when it is fear and no object feared; hunger when no advertence to fact that ill ease is due to lack of food. *Scheider Mar*

~~Intentional operations may be cognitive or non-cognitive.~~

*Dilthey
 Dasein*

Intentional operations may be considered either each in isolation from all others or in conjunction with an appropriate set of other operations.

On the present analysis, intentional operations may be true or false, cognitive or non-cognitive, only when forming an appropriate set.

Hence on this analysis there is a clear distinction between epistemology and intentionality analysis: epistemology is concerned with the criteria of truth of appropriate sets of intentional operations; intentionality analysis is concerned with intentional operations ~~xxxxx~~ either singly or as within incomplete sets of other intentional operations

4) Division again

chapters 1 - 8: what are you doing when understanding
chapters 9 - 13: when does doing that become knowing
chapters 14 - 17: what is known when that is done

Subdivision

insight in maths: chapter 1

insight in natural science: chapters 2 - 5

insight in common sense: chapters ~~XX~~ 6 and 7

insights common to common sense and science: chapter 8

Why begin from maths?

Because mathematics are the clearest, most precise, most fully explicit of the sciences. Precise examples of insight

Why natural science? Insight as gradual accumulation; as ongoing self-correcting process

Why common sense last? Because common sense has the least knowledge of what precisely goes on in the development and exercise of common sense. Analysis based on analogy and extension of what goes on maths and sc in CS - specialization in particular and concrete

3. Insight as 1) an experience and 2) as explicit theme
From Erlebnis to Erkennen; from vécu to thématique

a) Two difficulties

General difficulty of any case of thematization

Eg Carl Rogers client-centered therapy: aim to facilitate process in patient, who has feelings, that disturb him more or less gravely, ~~which~~ to which he has not adverted, singled out, compared, contrasted, distinguished from other feelings, named, become able to recognize recurrence, identify them, say it is just that again and recall what to do about it

Special difficulty for philosophers

They are apt to want to know what precisely is going on in ~~this~~ this process of thematization; their philosophic concern can prove a block in so far as the process does not fit in with previously entertained views of what goes on in human knowing

b) Unthematized occurrences of insight

How long is MN? Is its length a function of the position of P?

How construct an equilateral triangle? I, 1.

Is the exterior angle greater than interior opposite? I, 16

a' Implicit reasoning. Diagonals of a $\frac{1}{2}$ rectangle are equal

b' Appropriate axiom easily found. But not an axiom that covers most instances or all instances of such oversights in E's logic.

c' Counter instance in Riemannian geometry.

Qua unthematized

occurs within a cognitional process involving distinct acts noticed as jump, hole, oddity in the process

Piaget: child confronted with object that does not fall under acquired skill: brief embarrassment; turns to something else

c) Insight as conscious

All insights are conscious

But not therefore an object:consciousness is not of objects but of the subject and his operations; for the spectator to be aware of himself, to spectate consciously, he does not have to run out and become part of the spectacle; nor does he become object ~~in~~ⁱⁿ some inner spectacle; he has to thematize; objectify; make an object of what is given only on the side of the subject.

Maslow: peak experiences common but most people do not advert to them; when insights are great enough, they are objectified in what probably is myth: Archimedes, Newton

d) The objectification, thematization of insights

A main purpose of chapters 1 to 8

Chapters 1 to 8: not an argument or, if an argument, still the argument is not the point.

The point is self-appropriation: finding things out for oneself and in oneself; for oneself; one is invited to be one's own man [we are not your disciples; you have taught us to think for ourselves; and that is what we are doing]; and in oneself, the data are to be found in one's own processes of learning

Chapters 1 to 8 are a graded set of instances, of five-finger exercises, of occasions on which insights may occur, in which attention is to include the ~~an~~ object (else insight will vanish) but to heighten consciousness ~~an~~ so as to advert to the insight either negatively (I guess I do not understand, have not caught on) or positively (insight adds to sensible data a grasp ~~x~~ of intelligible relation ~~an~~ or intelligible unity).

The newer the insight, the greater the difficulty, the more noticeable it is when eventually it occurs

The more familiar, already known, the insight, the less the likelihood that one will advert to it

What is most efficacious is genuine process of learning, so that there is novelty, excitation of attention

yet not too difficult, onerous a process of learning, otherwise people give up.

↓ Take out of chapters 1 to 8 what one can manage to assimilate without too great an effort, expenditure of ~~time~~ time

Girl about half a dozen evening sessions, came in, whacked desk, said "I've got it." Her Eureka.

Too great an

4. Method

What the method is concretely has already been said: a process in which unthematized conscious and intentional acts become thematized.

Otto Muck, The Transcendental Method, New York: Herder and Herder 1968. Die transzendente Methode in der Scholastischen Philosophie der Gegenwart, Innsbruck F. Rauch

I mention Maréchal in Preface to Insight, have been associated with him, Transcendental Thomism

Not Kant's transcendental ^aesthetic and logic: begins from logicians world of propositions; works out a priori forms of sensibility, a priori categories of understanding, a priori ideas of reason, and a priori transcendental subject as conditions of possibility of a priori content of propositions.

Nor Coreth's Metaphysik

- es/
- a) questioning is unquestionable: to question it is selfcontradictory
 - b) condition of possibility of questioning is ~~is~~ its object as possible; an-sich-Sein as knowable [Maréchal]

But Insight p 72 bottom "generalized empirical method"

Empirical method: sensible data, inquiry, observation, description, contrasts and conflicts, problems, discoveries, hypotheses, formulation, experimental or ~~xxxx~~ observational programs, verification, revised hypothesis

/Generalized empirical method: same process ^{both} as object under observation, including data of consciousness among data, and as sequence of operations with respect to this object.

Will GEM yield just hypothesis? Yes

Will it be open to revision in sense of improvements? Yes

Will it be open to radical change? So as to exclude still further revisions? No, must retain possibility of revisions; that possibility has its suppositions; and suppositions coincide with substance of results to be achieved.

Maréchal: basically not an intentionality analysis but an epistemology

not an epistemology that does not presume metaphysics!x but with metaphysical assumptions from the start.

5. Insight as Element within Cognitive Process

Previously, insight as experience to be thematized

Now, insight as element within a dynamic process, as deriving its intelligibility ~~and~~ from its relations to other elements in the process, from its function within process as a whole.

Process conceived in terms of operators and levels

Operators

1) revealed in qq for

A. intelligence (what why how what for how often)
 B. reflection (is that so? are you sure?)
 C. deliberation (is it worth while, truly good)

2) promote intentional operations from lower to higher levels

A from 1 to 2	1 empirical: data to representative images
B from 2 to 3	2 intellectual: insights to world view
.C from 3 to 4	3 rational: weighing the evidence to judgments
	4 deliberative: evaluations and decisions

3) are

a) not questions but revealed in questions, e. g.

A is spirit of inquiry revealed in any and all qq. for intelligence

b) not concepts (man, oxygen) but may be objectified in concepts
 eg intelligible, true real good as concepts

notions: awareness of incompleteness in previous level; movement towards and anticipation of next level (A, B, C)

c) not a posteriori: occasion of previous level but not content of...
 but a priori: anticipate content of next level

d) not abstract: part, aspect of a thing, problem

but comprehensive: notions anticipate all qq of a given type
 (A B C) and content of all answers to those questions

meaning of concrete (sensible, the whole of reality of a thing)

e) not categorial: categories are not predicable of their

differences: ~~if x is a category then it is not predicable of its differences~~

but transcendental: universally predicable when objectified
 universal, because steps ~~in~~ in any instance of human knowing

also transcendental in Kantian sense: conditions of knowing object
 in so far as ~~the~~ knowing is a priori

Levels lower are presupposed by higher

higher sublate lower: do not cramp them but include,
 presuppose extend relevance, give new scope, refine and enlarge
 use

Distinctions appropriate to account of cognitional process develop over time: first, in the exercise of c. p.; then, from reflection on the exercise.

Trobriand islanders had names but not sentences; but the names were equivalent to a set of connected sentences. Cf. Dorothy Lee, "Being and Value in a Primitive Culture," in The Self, Explorations in Personal Growth, edited by C. E. Moustakis, New York: Harper and Row, 1956.

In general people do not distinguish any of the levels: so the Hebrews' word for truth meant fidelity; more precisely, perhaps, the vulgate translation uses "veritas" to translate the word that in general means fidelity.

The Greek discovery of science and philosophy was the pursuit of truth, of the goal of the first three levels, as a specialty.

Hence Greek and medieval systematic thought aimed at true and therefore permanently valid systems.

Similarly, Kant thought of understanding (Verstand) as the faculty of judgement. (Ideas of reason - notions; reasoning - ^gjudgement)

For us, understanding is the faculty of forming hypotheses.

The goal of science, theory, system, is a succession of increasing, probable theories, systems, i. e., ever fuller approximations to the truth, which is an ideal limit.

Inasmuch as truth is a ~~time~~ value indeed, but an unattained value, science can be in some sense value-free.

A still further stage of specialization is reached with depth psychology: dreams, free association, projective tests, etc., are concerned with the subject and the subject's problems as pre-moral, pre-rational, pre-intellectual.

6. Basic Ambiguities

Flourish when levels indistinct, not distinguished; tend to vanish as levels are distinguished and distinctions are assimilated.

Reality as
 world of immediacy: the already-out-there-now-real
 world mediated by meaning: meanings constructed from empirical
 basis, intelligently, rationally, morally
 world of immediacy is the world of infant, non-speaker, the
 nursery without any experience of what is beyond it
 man's being is a being-in-the-world; hence need to construct
 a world, even by guess-work, function of cosmic, geographic myth

Knowing as
 any cognitional operation: seeing, hearing, feeling, touching,
 smelling, ~~xxxx~~ tasting, understanding, saying what it is,
 whether it is
 as a compound set of related and complementary operations;
 summarily, experiencing, understanding, judging

Objectivity
 some single quality found in all cognitional operations that
 really and truly are cognitional; usually the given; the empirical;
 (understanding is thought of as intellect, and intellect as
 a spiritual eye that takes a look at essences)
 a complementary set of distinct and different qualities
 empirical: the givenness of the data of sense and consciousness
 normative: proceeding intelligently and reasonably
 absolute: reaching the virtually unconditioned
 principal: of type: A is; B is; C is...

I am A; I am not B; I am not C;....
 any single proposition from empirical normative absolute
 distinction of subject and objects from relevant set of propositions

7. Intermediate Stages

a) De anima, III, 7 431a 14 f., b 2 f.

Metaphys., Z, 17 1041b 5: ~~διότι~~ 'oti tñv 'ulnv Zntef
dià ti tì estiv

epistēmōn of the necessary: Prior and Post Anal
phorōnōnsis of the contingent: the given

b) the necessary is ~~the~~ true: comprehensive necessary systems
of rationalists and absolute idealists; negations of sceptics

the real~~x~~ is the given: ~~materialist~~ materialist and empiricist
tendencies; reinforcement from scepticism re ~~x~~ demonstrations

c) Scholastic empiricism: besides the sensible there is also
the intelligible; the latter is apprehended by a spiritual
eye that grasps essences, intuits the existing and present as
existing and present (Scotus, Ockham)

critical idealism: Anschauung is only of sensible and so
only of phenomenal; forms of sensibility, categories of under-
standing, ideas of reason yield subjectively necessary con-
struction of phenomenal world

d) Anschauung as ocular vision etc exists, but is not of full
epistemological significance, but only partial component

Necessity is marginal: analytic propositions and analytic
principles; latter need verification; deductivist systems
either trivial or incomplete or incoherent

Verification (falsification) is not empiricist look at
the data; it is subsuming data under fulfilling conditions
for virtually unconditioned that grounds judgement

e) Method in Theology goes beyond corrects Insight~~x~~ on the
good, ethics, etc.