Faith and Beliefs

In a public lecture[1] at the University of Toronto on January the ninth, 1968, Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith began by remarking that much fruitful energy has been devoted to exploring the religious traditions and reconstructing the history of the overt data of mankind's religious living. Both in detail and in wide compass the observable forms have been observed and the observations recorded. But Prof. Smith went on to claim that a further, a more important, and a more difficult question must be raised. To live religiously is not merely to live in the presence of certain symbols but, he urged, it is to be involved with them or through them in a quite special way -- a way that may lead far beyond the symbols, that may demand the totality of a person's response, and may affect his relation not only to the symbols but to everything else; to himself, to his neighbor, and to the stars.

This special involvement, Prof. Smith claimed, pleads to be elucidated. And elucidate it he did by naming this involvement, engagement, commitment, faith, and by distinguishing such faith from the imperatives, rituals, traditions, beliefs that inspire faith or are inspired by faith. So conceived, I think, faith would not be the prerogative of some particular church or religion. It would not be merely ecumenical but universalist. It would be relevant to an understanding of any and every religion. Moreover, its relevance would be of the highest order: for unless one understands what personal involvement in religion is, one can hardly be expected to think or speak very intelligently of religiously committed persons.

No doubt, prior to the second Vatican council, a universalist view

of faith would have been suspect in Roman Catholic circles. But since the council, since the establishment in Rome both of a secretariat for Christian unity and of a secretariat concerned with non-Christian religions, it is of the utmost importance for Catholics to think this matter through. Unhesitatingly they grant that God wills all men to be saved. Unhesitatingly they grant that God gives each man sufficient grace for salvation. But what this grace is and how it is related to the phenomena set forth in the history of religions seem shrouded in obscurity.

Accordingly, what profoundly interests Prof. Smith as a student of comparative religion, also profoundly interests me as a theologian. I propose then to raise four questions. First, what is man's capacity for religious involvement? Secondly, in what precisely does such religious involvement consist? Thirdly, in what sense can such involvement be called faith? Fourthly, what is the relation between such faith and religious beliefs?

Such are the questions, and I had best add at once a word about the answers. Obviously they cannot but be sketchy. I cannot present my grounds for my philosophic opinions. I cannot amass the empirical evidence that would be necessary to confirm my views. Accordingly I must ask you to think of this paper as offering a construct, a model, an ideal type, something that is neither a description of reality nor a hypothesis about reality but just a set of related notions that may prove quite useful to have around when the time does come for forming hypotheses or describing realities.

1. Man's Capacity for Religious Involvement

In an essay entitled Traum und Existenz Ludwig Binswanger distinguished dreams of the night and dreams of the morning.[2] In both kinds of dream there is an element of Existenz, of being someone, someone conscious, someone within some sort of world, someone somehow dealing with that world or, perhaps, being overwhelmed by it. Any such world, of course, is imaginary and one's apprehension of it in the dream is symbolic, obscure, fragmentary. But in dreams of the night we are further from our waking state than in dreams of the morning. Dreams of the night respond more to somatic conditions, to the state, say, of one's digestive apparatus. But in dreams of the morning our waking state is being anticipated. Already its problems are dimly sensed. Already the subject is taking a stance with regard to them.

I am not enough of a psychologist to know how well-founded Dr. Binswanger's distinction is but, at least, it provides an introduction to a notion I consider of basic import, the notion of self-transcendence. For in the dream-state there is not just the unconscious; however imperfectly, there has emerged a conscious self relating to subjective need or to some sort of "objective" problem. In dreamless sleep there is neither conscious subject nor intended object. With the dream there is not yet one's full self nor an adequately intended object. But there is the fragmentary recollection or anticipation of both. There have appeared both a self and a self's conscious relation to some other. From that slight beginning we have to mount through four further stages or levels of human consciousness and intentionality if we are to apprehend the self

and its capacities.

Most easily identified in our waking states are our sensations, feelings, movements. There is the endless variety of sights to be seen, sounds to be heard, odors to be sniffed, tastes to be palated, shapes and textures to be touched. We feel pleasure and pain, desire and fear, joy and sorrow, and in such feelings there seem to reside the mass and momentum of our lives. We move about in various manners, take now this now that posture, and express our emotions by the fleeting movements of our facial muscles.

Still sensations, feelings, movements reveal no more than the narrow strip of space-time that we immediately experience. One may doubt that man has ever been content with such a world of immediacy. Imagination wants to fill out and round off the picture. Language makes questions possible, and intelligence makes them fascinating. So we ask what and how and what for and why. Our answers extrapolate and serialize and construct and generalize. Memory and tradition and belief put at our disposal the tales of travellers, the stories of nations, the exploits of heroes, the meditations of holy men, the treasures of literature, the discoveries of science, the reflections of philosophers. Each of us has his own little world of immediacy, but all such worlds are just minute strips within a far larger world, a world constructed by imagination and intelligence, mediated by meaning, and largely based upon belief.

Now it is that far larger world that is, for each of us, the real world. It is a world unknown to the infant, learnt about at home and at school and at work. It is the world in which we live most of our lives.

But you are, I suspect, somewhat uneasy about this larger world that only slightly is "this sure and firm-set earth on which I tread" that, in the main is constructed by imagination and intelligence, that is mediated by words and meaning, that by and large is based on belief. Such a description, however accurate, is not reassuring. This lack of assurance reveals the presence of a further question and, indeed, a question different in kind from those already considered. The questions already considered were questions for intelligence asking what "x" is and what is it for and how is it made and on what principles does it work. None of these questions can be answered by a simple "Yes" or "No." But whenever any of these questions are answered, the answer itself gives rise to a still further question that can be answered by a simple "Yes" or "No." These further questions are questions, not for intelligence, but for reflection. They ask, Is that so? Is that not so? Is it certainly so? Is it only probably so?

Just how such questions can be answered, is a very nice problem in cognitional theory. But the fact is that we do answer them. The further fact is that when we affirm that something really and truly is so, then we do not mean that that is what appears, or what we imagine, or what we think, or what seems to be so, or what we are inclined to say. No doubt, very frequently we have to be content with such lesser statements. But the point I would make is that the greater statement is not reducible to the lesser. When we affirm that something really and truly is so, we mean that we somehow have got beyond ourselves, somehow have got hold of what is independent of ourselves, somehow have transcended ourselves.

I have been endeavoring to unfold and clarify the notion of self-transcendence by drawing your attention to a succession of distinct levels

of human consciousness. First, I spoke of the subject in his dreams. Secondly, I spoke of the empirical subject awake, sensing, feeling, moving about in his world of immediacy. Thirdly, I spoke of the inquiring subject in a far larger world constructed by imagination and intelligence, mediated by words and meaning, by and large based upon belief. Fourthly, I spoke of the rational subject that reflects, marshals and weighs the evidence, pronounces judgement in the light of the evidence, and by his judgement claims to state something about some part of a world that only to a slight extent is his world of immediacy.

With judgement, then, self-transcendence, in so far as it is cognitional, is complete. But human self-transcendence is not only cognitional; it also may be moral. Beyond questions for intelligence and questions for reflection, there are questions for deliberation. Beyond the pleasures we enjoy and the pains we dread, there are the values to which we may respond with all our being. On the topmost level of human consciousness the subject deliberates, evaluates, decides, controls, acts. He is at once practical and existential: practical inasmuch as he is concerned with concrete courses of action; existential inasmuch as control includes self-control, and the possibility of self-control involves responsibility for what he makes of himself.

However, man's self-control can proceed from quite different grounds. It can tend to be mere selfishness. Then the process of deliberation, evaluation, decision is limited to determining what is most to one's advantage, what best serves one's interests, what on the whole yields a maximum of pleasure and a minimum of pain. At the opposite pole it can tend to be concerned solely with values: with the vital values of health and strength;

with the social values enshrined in family and custom, society and education, church or sect, state and law, economy and technology; with the cultural values or religion and art, language and literature, science, philosophy, and history; with the personal value of one that realizes values in oneself and helps realize them in others.

In the measure that one's living, one's aims, one's achievements are a response to values, in that measure a real self-transcendence is effected. One has got beyond mere selfishness. One has become a principle of benevolence and beneficence, capable of genuine collaboration and of true love. In the measure that real self-transcendence characterizes the members of a society, in that measure their world not only is constructed by imagination and intelligence, mediated by words and meaning, by and large based on belief; it also is a world that is regulated not by self-seeking but by values, by what truly is good.

I have been attempting to describe man's capacity for self-transcendence, and now I must add two reflections. The first regards the spatial metaphor of speaking of levels of consciousness. To remove this metaphor, I wish to introduce the notion of sublation, not exactly in Hegel's sense, but rather in a sense used by Karl Rahner.[3] Let us distinguish, then, between a sublating set of operations and a sublated set. The sublating set introduces operations that are quite new and distinct; it finds among them a new basis and ground; but so far from stunting or interfering with the sublated set, it preserves them integrally, it vastly extends their relevance, and it perfects their performance.

Now the transition from dreaming to waking is not sublation: waking does not include dreaming but simply puts an end to it. On the other hand,

the transitions effected by questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, questions for deliberation, are sublations. The empirical subject does not vanish when he begins to inquire, to ask what and why and how and what for. On the contrary, he begins to notice what before he had overlooked, to perceive more distinctly, to observe more accurately. Similarly, the empirical and inquiring subject does not vanish when questions for reflection are raised, when he asks whether this or that is or is not so. On the contrary, such questions keep us confronting our insights, explanations, views with ever broader and fuller ranges of data. Finally, the question for deliberation that stops us by asking whether this or that is really worth while, introduces the notion of value to complete the cognitional self-transcendence, reached through experiencing, understanding, and judging, with the moral ~~real~~ self-transcendence of benevolence and beneficence. But this addition and completion in no way dispenses with experiencing, understanding, and judging. One cannot do good without knowing the facts, without knowing what really is possible, without knowing the probable consequences of one's course of action. Just as inquiry directs sense towards knowledge of a universe, just as reflection directs sense and understanding towards truth and reality, so deliberation turns sense and understanding and judgement towards the realization of the good, of values.

My second remark regards the continuity and unity of human consciousness. A faculty psychology divides man up: it distinguishes intellect and will, sense perception and imagination, emotion and conation, only to leave us with unresolved problems of priority and rank. Is sense to be preferred to intellect, or intellect to sense? Is intellect to be preferred to will, or will to intellect? Is one to be a sensist, an intellectualist, or a

voluntarist? The questions vanish, once one has ceased to think in terms of faculties or powers. What is given to consciousness, is a set of interrelated intentional operations. Together they conspire to achieve both cognitional and real self-transcendence. Such is the basic unity and continuity. No part of the process can be dispensed with, for each has its essential contribution to make. To achieve the good, one has to know the real. To know the real, one has to reach the truth. To reach the truth one has to understand, to grasp the intelligible. To grasp the intelligible, one has to attend to the data. Each successive level of operations presupposes and complements its predecessors. The topmost level is the level of deliberate control and self-control; there consciousness becomes conscience; there operations are authentic in the measure that they are responses to value.

2. What is Religious Involvement

I have been speaking of man's capacity for self-transcendence. I have now to ask not about mere capacity but about achievment. Now capacity, I suggest, becomes achievement when one falls in love. Then one's being becomes being-in-love. Such being-in-love has its antecedents, its causes, its conditions, its occasions. But once it has occurred and as long as it lasts, it takes over. It is the first principle. From it flow one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and deeds.

Being-in-love is of different kinds. There is the love of intimacy, of husband and wife, of parents and children. There is the love of one's

fellow men with its fruit in the achievement of human welfare. There is the love of God with one's whole heart and whole soul, with all one's mind and all one's strength (Mk 12, 30). It is God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us (Rom 5, 5). It grounds the conviction of St. Paul that "there is nothing in death or life, in the realm of spirits or superhuman powers, in the world as it is or the world as it shall be, in the forces of the universe -- nothing in all creation that can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord (Rom 8, 38 f.).

Being in love with God, as experienced, is being in love in an unrestricted fashion. All love is self-surrender, but being in love with God is being in love without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations. It is with one's whole heart and whole soul, with all one's mind and all one's strength. Just as unrestricted questioning is our capacity for self-transcendence, so being in love in an unrestricted fashion is the proper fulfilment of that capacity.

Because that love is the proper fulfilment of our capacity, that fulfilment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. Again, that fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfilment bears fruit in a love of one's neighbor that strives mightily to bring about the kingdom of God on this earth. On the other hand, the absence of that fulfilment opens the way to the trivialization of human life in the pursuit of fun, to the harshness of human life arising from the ruthless exercise of power, to despair about human welfare springing from the conviction that the universe is absurd.

The fulfilment that is being in love with God is not the product of our knowledge and choice. It is God's gift. So far from resulting from our knowledge and choice, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on, and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing.

Though not the product of our knowing and choosing, it is a conscious, dynamic state of love, joy, peace, that manifests itself in the harvest of the Spirit, in acts of kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control (Gal 5, 22).

To say that that dynamic state is conscious is not to say that it is known. What is conscious is, indeed, experienced. But human knowing is not just experiencing. Human knowing includes experiencing but adds to it scrutiny, insight, conception, naming, reflection, checking, judging. The whole problem of cognitional theory is to effect the transition from conscious operations to known operations. A great part of psychiatry is helping people effect the transition from conscious feelings to known feelings. In like manner the gift of God's love ordinarily is not objectified in knowledge, but remains within subjectivity as a dynamic vector, a mysterious undertow, a fateful call to a dreaded holiness.

Because that dynamic state is conscious without being known, it is an experience of mystery. Because it is being in love, the mystery is not merely attractive but fascinating: to it one belongs; by it one is possessed. Because it is an unrestricted, unmeasured being in love, the mystery is other-worldly; it evokes awe. Because it is a love so different from the selfish self that it transcends, it evokes even terror. Of itself, then,

inasmuch as it is conscious without being known, the experience of the gift of God's love is an experience of the holy, of Rudolf Otto's mysterium fascinans et tremendum.[4] Again, it is what Paul Tillich named a being grasped by ultimate concern.[5] Again, it corresponds to Ignatius Loyola's consolation that has no cause, as interpreted by Karl Rahner.[6]

I have distinguished different levels of consciousness, and now I must add that the gift of God's love is on the topmost level. It is not the consciousness that accompanies acts of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. It is not the consciousness that accompanies acts of inquiry, insight, formulation, speaking. It is not the consciousness accompanying acts of reflecting, marshalling and weighing the evidence, making judgements of fact or possibility. It is the consciousness that also is conscience, that deliberates, evaluates, decides, controls, acts. But it is this consciousness as brought to fulfilment, as having undergone a conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded, as ever more ready to deliberate and evaluate and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. So the gift of God's love occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's waking consciousness. It takes over the peak of the soul, the apex animae.

I think many of you will grant that a basic component of religious involvement among Christians is God's gift of his love. But I wish to indicate a reason for thinking that the same may be said of religious involvement in all the world religions, in Christianity, Judaism, Islam Zoroastrian Mazdaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism. For Friedrich Heiler has described at some length seven common areas in those religions.[7] While I

cannot reproduce here the rich texture of his thought, or its nuances, I can at least give a list of the topics he treats and, from it, draw a conclusion.

The seven common areas are: first, the existence of a transcendent reality; secondly, the immanence of that reality in human hearts; thirdly, the characterization of that reality as supreme beauty, truth, righteousness, goodness; fourthly, the characterization of that reality as love, mercy, compassion; fifthly, our way to that reality is repentance, self-denial, prayer; sixthly, our way is love of one's neighbor, even of one's enemies; seventhly, the way is love of God, so that bliss is conceived as knowledge of God, union with him, or dissolution into him.

Now it is not, I think, difficult to see how these seven common features of the world religions are implicit in the experience of being in love in an unrestricted manner. To be in love is to be in love with someone. To be in love in an unrestricted manner is to be in love with someone transcendent. When someone transcendent is my bebved, the one to whom my being belongs, he is in my heart, real to me from within me. When that love is the fulfilment of my unrestricted thrust to the intelligible, the true, the real, the good, the one that fulfils that thrust must be supreme in intelligence, truth, reality, goodness. Since he comes to me by the gift of his love, he himself must be love. Since my loving him is my transcending of myself, it also is a denial of the self that is transcended. Since loving him means loving attention to him, it is prayer, meditation, contemplation. Since love of him is fruitful, it overflows into love of all those he loves or wishes to love. Finally, from an experience of love focussed on mystery

there wells forth a longing for knowledge, while love itself is a longing for union; so for the lover of the unknown beloved, bliss is knowledge of him and union with him, however they may be achieved.

There is, then, a line of reasoning that suggests that a basic component of religious involvement may be the same in members of the world religions. But may one not extend this view to the more elementary forms of religion? Can one not discern in them the harvest of the Spirit that is love, joy, peace, kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control (Gal 5, 22)? As a theologian holding that God gives all men sufficient grace for salvation, I must expect an affirmative answer; but as a mere theologian, I must leave the factual answer to students of the history of religions.

3. Religious Involvement and Faith

Our account of religious involvement or, at least, of a basic component in religious involvement has had one very significant feature. It has outflanked the adage, Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum, Nothing can be loved that is not already known. The adage is, of course, generally true. For being in love occurs on the fourth level of waking consciousness and, ordinarily, this fourth level presupposes and complements the previous levels of experiencing, understanding, and judging. But what ordinarily is so, admits exceptions, and such an exception would be what Paul described to the Romans as God's flooding our hearts with his love. Then love would not flow from knowledge but, on the contrary, knowledge would flow from love. It is the knowledge that results from God's gift of his love that, I suggest, constitutes the universalist faith proposed by Prof. Smith.

But how can loving generate knowledge? There is the celebrated pensée of Blaise Pascal: Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait pas, The heart has its reasons which reason does not know. Let me indicate what precisely this statement would mean in terms of the analysis of human consciousness already presented.

First, by the heart is meant the subject in love, the subject attaining real self-transcendence on the fourth level of waking consciousness.

Secondly, by reason is meant the subject on the first three levels of waking consciousness, the subject as attaining cognitional self-transcendence through experiencing, understanding, and judging.

Thirdly, by the reasons known to the heart and unknown to reason are meant the subject's responses to values, vital, social, cultural, personal, as distinct from his desires for pleasure and his fears of pain.

Fourthly, while values attract and disvalues repel us spontaneously, still it is when we are in love and in the measure that we are in love that we discern values and disvalues clearly, finely, delicately, fully, and that we respond to them firmly and powerfully. There is, then, a knowledge that is born of love. It is a knowledge of values and disvalues, of good and evil. It is a knowledge that consists in one's response to the values and disvalues and, more specifically, in the development, strength, fulness, refinement of one's responding.

By a universalist faith, then, I would understand the transvaluation of values that results from God's gift of his love. Just as the gift of that love, so too the consequent transvaluation of values is, in some sense, a constant. It does not presuppose any specific set of hist-

orical conditions. It can be bestowed on the members of any culture at any stage in its development. The values that are transvalued may vary, but the process of transvaluation has its constant ground in God's gift of his love.

4. Religious Beliefs

Religious involvement is intensely personal, but it is not so private as to be solitary. It can occur in many. They can discover the common orientation in their lives, encourage and support one another, find ways of expressing their deepest concern and of integrating it within the matrix of their social and cultural forms.

Already I have indicated how experience of the mystery of love and awe can lead, on the cultural level of the world religions, to acknowledgement of a transcendent reality immanent in human hearts, supreme in beauty, intelligence, truth, reality, goodness, characterized by love, mercy, compassion, to be approached through self-denial and prayer, through love of one's neighbor, and through love of God above all.

But the same experience, in an earlier cultural period, will give rise to hierophanies. For early expression results from insight into sensible presentations.[8] So it is easy, then, to express the spatial but not the temporal, the specific but not the generic, the external but not the internal, the human but not the divine. Only in so far as the temporal, the generic, the internal, the divine can somehow be associated with or, as is said, projected upon the spatial, specific, external, human, can an insight be had and expression result. So it is that by associating religious

experience with its outward occasion that the experience becomes expressed and thereby something determinate and distinct for human consciousness.

Such outward occasions, called hierophanies, are many. When each of the many is something distinct and unrelated to the others, there arise the gods of the moment. When they are many but recognized as possessing a family resemblance, then there is a living polytheism represented today by the 800,000 gods of Shintoism.[9] When distinct religious experiences are associated with a single place, there is the god of this or that place. When they are the experiences of a single person and united by the unity of that person, then there is the god of the person, such as was the god of Jacob or the god of Laban.[10] Finally, when the unification is social there result the god or gods of the group.

In brief, similar religious experiences become objectified differently at different stages of human development. But there is a still further source of difference. We have conceived religious experience in terms of self-transcendence, and we must remember that human self-transcendence is ever precarious. Self-transcendence involves a tension between the self as transcending and the self as transcended. It follows that human authenticity never is some pure and serene and secure possession. It is ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity, and every successful withdrawal only brings to light the need for still further withdrawals. Our advance in understanding is also the elimination of oversights and misunderstandings. Our advance in truth is also the correction of mistakes and errors. Our moral development is through repentance for our sins. Genuine religion is discovered and realized by redemption from the many traps of religious

aberration. So we are bid to watch and pray, to make our way in fear and trembling. And it is the greatest saints that proclaim themselves the greatest sinners, though their sins may seem slight indeed to less holy folk that lack their discernment and their love.

ia/ This dialectical character of self-transcendence explains why almost any characteristic of religion can be matched in the history of religions by its opposite. Being in love, we said, is being in love with someone. It has a personal dimension. But this can be overlooked in a school of prayer and asceticism that stresses the orientation of religious experience to transcendent mystery. The transcendent is nothing in this world. Mystery is the unknown. Without formulating a transcendental notion of being as not merely the known but also the asked about, transcendent mystery can come to be named nothing at all.[11]

At a far earlier stage transcendence can be overemphasized and immanence overlooked. Then God becomes remote, irrelevant, almost forgotten. Inversely, immanence can be overemphasized and transcendence overlooked. Then the loss of reference to the transcendent will rob symbol, ritual, recital of their proper meaning to leave them merely idol and magic and myth. Then too the divine may be identified with life as universal process -- a process in which individual and group are part and of which they participate.[12]

I have conceived religious experience as an ultimate fulfilment of man's capacity for self-transcendence, and this view of religion is sustained when God is conceived as the supreme realization of the transcendental notions of intelligence, truth, goodness. Inversely, when

religious experience is not strictly associated with self-transcendence, then too easily the love of God seeks reinforcement in the erotic, the sexual, the orgiastic. On the other hand, religious experience involves not only love but also awe and, in the sinner, even terror. Unless religion is totally directed to what is good, to a genuine love of one's neighbor and to a self-denial that is subordinated to a fuller goodness in oneself, then the cult of a God that is terrifying can slip over into the demonic, into an exultant destructiveness of oneself and of others.[13]

I have been deriving religious beliefs from the experience of the mystery of love and awe and, as well, deriving religious aberrations from misinterpretations and distortions of the same experience. However, religious beliefs usually are a great deal more than the objectification of personal experience. They play a major role in one's Weltanschauung, one's total outlook, one's already mentioned real world constructed by imagination and intelligence, mediated by words and meaning, based by and large on belief, and hopefully regulated by values. As sociologists insist, such a world is constructed not individually but socially.[14] As theorists of historicity would add, it is the work not of a generation but of the ages.[15] Now religious experience makes two contributions to the construction of reality. Because it is an experience of mystery, it gives rise to inquiries and investigations that otherwise would not be undertaken. Because it is a dynamic state of being in love, it opens one's eyes to values and disvalues that otherwise would not be recognized, and it gives the power to do the good that otherwise would not be attempted. There results a transvaluation of values and, consequently, a transformation of the dynamics of one's world. So religious people live in a world trans-

fused by religious experience, informed by the investigations to which the experience gives rise, and motivated by the evaluations which it grounds.

5. Use of the Model

It was my hope to sketch a construct, a model, an ideal type containing a systematic distinction between a faith, born of other-worldly love and possibly common to all genuine religions and, on the other hand, the many diverse and often opposed beliefs to which religious people subscribe.

But in concluding I must point out that my model is just a skeleton. To apply it to any particular religion further parts may need to be added. Moreover, because religions can differ in fundamental ways, one must have different sets of parts to add and even one may have to add them in quite different ways.

Let me illustrate this with an example. My account of religious beliefs does not imply that they are more than objectifications of religious experience. It is a view quite acceptable to the nineteenth-century liberal protestant or to the twentieth-century catholic modernist. But it is unacceptable to most of the traditional forms of Christianity, in which religious beliefs are believed to have their origin in charism, prophecy, inspiration, revelation, the word of God, the life, death, and resurrection of Christ.

Obviously, to be applicable to this traditional type of religious belief, the skeleton model needs to be fleshed out, and fleshing it out calls for creativity. Let us begin, then, from a human analogy. If a man

and a woman were to love each other yet never avow their love, there would be lacking to their love an interpersonal component, a mutual presence of self-donation. Without that interpersonal component, their love would not have the opportunity to grow. There would not be the steady increase in knowledge of each other. There would not be the constant flow of favors given and received that would make love conscious of its reality, its strength, its durability, aware it could always be counted on.

Now if there is this interpersonal element to human love, if that element is a distinct and important factor in its emergence and in its growth, something somehow similar could also be thought of religious love. But, then, we should not solely have the gift of God's love flooding our hearts. We should not solely believe what results from the objectification of that love. Besides completing our personal self-transcendence in the secrecy of our hearts, God would also address his people as a people, announce to them his intentions, send to them his prophets, his Messiah, his apostles. In that case religious beliefs would be objectifications not only of internal experience but also of the externally uttered word of God.

To conclude, I suggest, first, that there is a construct, model, ideal type grounding a systematic distinction between faith and beliefs but, secondly, to be applied to disparate religious positions the model had to admit additions and transformations that radically modify perspectives and meaning.

Notes

1) I do not know whether this paper has been published. I am going by a typescript sent me by Prof. Smith.

2) Le Rêve et l'existence. Introduction et notes de Michel Foucault. Desclée 1954.

3) Karl Rahner, Hörer des Wortes, München (Kösel-Verlag) 1963, p. 40.

4) Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, London (Oxford) 1923.

5) D. M. Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue, New York (Harper and Row) 1965.

6) Karl Rahner, The Dynamic Element in the Church, Quaestiones disputatae 12, Montreal (Palm Publishers) 1964, pp. 131 ff. Rahner takes "consolation without a cause" to mean "consolation with a content but without an object."

7) F. Heiler, "The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Co-operation of Religions," in The History of Religions edited by M. Eliade and J. Kitagawa, Chicago (Chicago University Press) 1959, pp. 142-153.

For present purposes it will be best to regard Prof. Heiler's position not as an exhaustive empirical statement on the world religions but as an ideal type or model, that is, neither a description nor an hypothesis but a heuristic and expository device open to all the additions and modifications that empirical investigation may dictate. On the nature and proper use of ideal types or models in the present sense, see H. I. Marrou, De la connaissance historique, Paris (Ed. du Seuil) 1955, pp. 159 - 165; English translation by R. J. Olsen, The Meaning of History, Baltimore - Dublin (Helicon) 1966, pp. 167 - 173.

8) E. Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. I: Language, New Haven (Yale University Press) 1953, pp. 198 ff.

9) E. Benz, "On Understanding non-Christian Religions," in The History of Religions (as above at note 7), pp. 121 ff.

10) On biblical apprehensions, N. Lohfink, Bibelauslegung im Wandel Frankfurt am Main (J. Knecht) 1967.

11) See E. Benz. op. cit., pp. 120 f., 124 ff. Also F. Heiler, op. cit., pp. 138 f.

12) On "The Distant God" and on "Cosmo-biology and Mystery" see F.M. Bergounieux and J. Goetz, Prehistoric and Primitive Religions, London (Burns and Oates) 1965, pp. 82-91; 117-126.

13) See A. Vergote, Psychologie religieuse, Bruxelles (Dessart) 1966, pp. 55-57.

14) P. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, Garden City (Doubleday) 1966.

15) H. G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen (Mohr) 1960, p. 261: The assumptions of the individual are not so much his judgements as the historicity of his cultural being.