

DE VERBO INCARNATO: SUGGESTIONS FOR ITS REVISION

General.

1. Explain the division of matter between DSST and DVI. Scripture on the divinity of X^t is put in DVI, but Patres and Nicea in DSST.

2. Explain the theology of a "proof." Some of your theses are "proved" by a quotation from a council (v.g., th. 4 quotes Chalcedon); but a proof should reduce the proposition to its ultimate foundations - on what grounds did the council define the point?

3. Explain your use of the Patres a bit. They seem sometimes to defend the truth by invalid arguments. This is true not only of their exegesis but also of some of their principles; v.g., "quod non assumptum, non sanatum," depends on a futurible of which they have no knowledge.

4. Explain and make consistent your use of censurae. From DPCA, pp. 63, 70, I was led to believe that you distinguish now between "theologica certum" and "sententia communis TT." But DVI sometimes (v.g., p. 465) makes consent of TT. sufficient for "theol. certum," sometimes (v.g., p. 480) says "communiter docetur" without further comment. Item, explain the difference between "de fide definita" and "de fide catholica."

5. What about a chapter developing relations of Incarnation ad alia? - the incarnation and history, the incarnation and the piety of the faithful, etc.?

Per theses.

Thesis 1.

P. 4, 3: "unus idemque." Your proof does not bring the identity into focus (the only explicit reference I noticed was on p. 99, tho' the prenote on schemes touches the matter). But since thesis 3 refers back to thesis 1 for the proof of this point, I suggest a paragraph drawing attention to the identity in many of the texts used.

P. 4, -6: "praexistitisse, creationi interfuisse." (Of. also pp. 58; 73, § -A) This seems to me to refer to the simply divine, not to ~~its~~ its participation by the human. Unless you mean that the idea of the God-Man was an archetype in creation.

P. 43, -4: "Cum tamen Adem... ad imaginem... Dei, novus homo in X^to... sc. intentionem Creatoris." The point of the comparison and contrast escapes me.

P. 63, -12: "Si synoptici inter se comparantur." - But this is developed to include comparison of texts within the same Gospel.

P. 82, 5: Would n. 4 of V go better with VI?

P. 87: I had great trouble finding an order in the 9 nn. of the Pauline conception, pp. 87 to 99.

DVI* SUGGESTIONS - 2

P. 116, 10; 132, -13; 339, pars 3a: Does your use of "similitude" and "analogy" need to be regularized?

P. 135: These objections are against the whole 3rd part of thesis 1. Hence not n. 4 (as if they were part of B, IV) but C, as another section after A and B.

P. 135, 2: Jo 14, 28. You interpret the text from Jo 5 and seem to refer it to eternal relations. But the immediate context seems to refer it to the earthly state. Cf. the note Bible de Jérusalem has in h. 1.

Thesis 2.

P. 141, -2: "De fide catholica." Why not "de fide definitiva," if not from earlier, then from medieval councils? Cf. DB 429, 462.

P. 142 & 143: Arius and Apollinaris are said to err in conceiving the union after the analogy of soul and body. Does this put de la Taille in their company?

P. 150: Add an objection - Quod non assumptum, non sanatum; et quia persona humana non assumpta; ergo persona humana non sanata.

Thesis 3.

P. 187, -10: The point of h' is not clear. Is it that Cyril talks of nature of Xt, as if there were but one and that divine?

P. 192, 1: Adversarii. Should Déodat de Basly and modern non-Catholic Nestorians be included?

P. 192, -10: Note given as "de fide catholica." Why not "definita"?

Thesis 4.

P. 197, -8: "etiam post incarnationem." This implies, "et ante et post."

P. 228, -4: Ter ponitur "unumquodque," & quinque additur "eundem."

P. 229, 6: "duae partes." This suggests that the divine and human natures are "parts." Is not that male sonans?

P. 230, -9: "de fide... catholica." Pars la (p. 225, -1) was "de fide definitiva." What difference have you in mind?

P. 235, -6: Does the argument of 2 c) hold against unio in esse too? *in per se?*

P. 238, 3: Surely there is something wrong here. "Xtus est naturaliter mortalis, creatura," are not examples of negative predication.

DVI: SUGGESTIONS - 3

Thesis 5.

P. 266, 3: "elucet." Sorry, non elucet mihi. Could you clarify this number?

Pp. 267-72: What is the progress from I to II, from II to III? Surely it is not merely part I that is "de*l* ipsis realitatibus"? Is the progress this, that Scr. puts the operata in recto, part II the operationes, part III the naturae, principia?

Again, part III seems to have purpose of justifying the definition of Constantinople; but then is it legitimate to quote Conset. in proof of this part?

Item, the council (DB 292) gives miracles and the passion as examples of the two operations. But surely both are human, one simply human, the other participans divina (thesis 1). Did the council link confusedly the simply divine and the participated divine in one category which miracles would than exemplify?

P. 274: "Quarto." Would it be clearer to distinguish four wills, the fourth being "voluntas eligens condicionate," as in "Transfer calicem hunc"?

P. 275: Add to objections, "Si operatio est duplex quia a natura, etiam esse est duplex quia a natura." And explain at greater length S. T., III, 19, 1, 4m: esse et operari sunt personae a natura.

P. 287: It is natural to scholastics to think of Xtus ut Deus, ut homo, as strictly formal. Why not reserve these terms for that meaning and use Xtus-Deus, Xtus-Homo, for the specificative meaning?

Thesis 6.

P. 291: There seems to be a little confusion on the place of thesis 10 in the division of the book. Is it a 5th thesis of section 3 of the first part, or a single thesis constituting section 4 of the first part? *cf. the index*

Pp. 301-302: "unum." I found the threefold unum, transcendentale-naturale-predicamentale, of DCCOP, pp. 19-20, very helpful; suggest you include it here.

Pp. 325-27: "Argumentum." The whole chain seems to hang from your definition of person, and that definition is assumed to be true (p. 330, "communiter agnoscitur," and cf. p. 406, "Respondetur [bis]"). But should not the definition be justified more ex intrinsecis?

P. 325, 2 ff.: For symmetry divide as follows. 1. Assumpta natura non erat persona.... 2. Non erat subsistens.... Etc.

P. 325, -2: Is your 3rd step in form? It argues: X (subsistens) is Y (id quod est); Z (assumpta natura) is not X; ergo Z is not Y.

P. 331, -5: Do you mean, in n. 5, that Garrigou-Lagrange is himself an essentialist, or that he lists the essentialists as holding the constitutum formale to be esse? Not clear to me even after looking up the reference.

Thesis 7.

Pp. 336, -5: The impression given by the first sentence of n. 3 is that the whole argument is contained in these 2 steps. For better form, call the whole of n. 2 simply the metaphysical principles of the argument - hence only one part of it.

P. 342, -3: "neque eo modo." For the exclusion of this last member, we are referred to n. 9, but n. 9 does not expressly show the exclusion.

contingent
P. 346, -5: Your argument in DCCOP was that, as God's eternal and contingent knowing are one in the infinite act of knowing, so the Word's eternal and contingent being are one in the infinite act of being. This seems to me both more more simple and more direct than the present argument based on the one act founding contradictory predicates. Have I missed some subtle reason for the change?

P. 348, -1: You have omitted the objection over which you labored in DCCOP: if the divine esse is the principle of union, then all 3 persons will be incarnate. Is it not imperative to stop this gap in your ~~xxx~~ defenses. It is not enough to say in assertum 9 that the actus tou assumi respicit solum Verbum, for that is a consequent and cannot explain what is prior.

Further, the objection can take this form: if the Son can be Man without the Father and Spirit thereby being Man, why may not the Son act without the Father and Spirit thereby acting (efficiently) - against the principle, opera ad extra indivisa?

Assertum 9.

P. 354, 7: "producit illam naturam." Perhaps, "tam illem naturam quam eius unionem cum Verbo."

P. 358, 2: "solum Verbum... respicitur". Like the "solum Verbum assumit" (supra, re p. 348) this needs some expansion. Why not invoke the doctrine of DCPA, p. 214, on the 4 graces imitating the 4 trinitarian relations? As the Pater, qua Pater, respicit solum Verbum, so the grace that imitates paternitas respicit solum Verbum.

P. 358, 8: "If the act is not accidental, it is substantial." Can this be made more meaningful?

Further, DCCOP argued that the act is substantial because it is received in a substantial potency. Why does it not follow that grace, received in the soul as subject, not in a faculty, is also a substantial act?

Thesis 10.

P. 374, 3: Calling the 4th grace of consciousness "conscientia sui" may be a bit confusing for some, since experience of self is an element in your definition of conscientia in general. *Auto*, p. 372. -3.

P. 378: "Notantur quaedam." I think it would be helpful to give here a pair of terms to use when distinguishing the non-objective "content" (?) of conscientia in act, in its immediacy, from the same "content" when it becomes an object.

You notice I hesitate over "content." Do we not still need a word for the . . . of consciousness? As color is the object of the external experience of seeing, so the seeing itself and the self seeing are the ??? of consciousness.

DVI: SUGGESTIONS - 5

P. 395: What is the progress from pars 1a, where conscientia is proved, to partes 2 and 3, where praesentia sibi is proved?

P. 417: Cor. 11. I think DCCOP gave more space to explaining the role of beatific vision in Xt's human knowledge of self. - Rightly, I would say.

What do you think about a fifth grade of consciousness, to be added to empirical, intellectual, rational, rational self-consciousness? Namely, that accompanying the beatific vision? Is it possible to say anything certain or probable about this?

Thesis 11.

P. 421: Is it worth while making the enunciation and proof correspond, and adding the left-over conclusions as corollaries?

Should we not also distinguish the ontological reality of grace and its gratuity? For the gratuity in Christ is a special question even where the ontological reality is not.

P. 424, 12: The "medium quo" and the ~~immed~~ closely following "immediate intuetur" jar my aesthetic and logical sense somewhat.

P. 436, -10 ff.: I have the impression that you draw Scriptural terms a bit too much towards Scholastic meanings sometimes. Besides this paragraph, cf. p. 476, 2 ff.

P. 445, 2 to 6: The argument seems to me inconclusive. For a man is by reason of his existence, but he is a man by reason of his human nature. Now the father is a cause, not only of the son's being, but also and especially of the son's being a man. And the son's being a son seems to be founded on his having a human nature from the father, one in the likeness of the father's nature. - In other words, the fact that Xt's human nature is only an ens quo does not prevent its being the foundation for ^{another} sonship; the preventing fact is that that nature is not in the likeness of the Father's.

Thesis 12.

P. 446, -7: Not clear whether you include fides in scientia late.

P. 453, -4: Some of the questions referred to here are merely rhetorical, and would not be so relevant to the point at issue.

P. 455, 5: Are you quoting Mt 11, 27 in relation to human knowledge after using it (p. 65) to show Xt's divinity?

P. 461, -6: I do not see at all how these 3 lines prove your major. Surely there is a serious misprint here.

DVI: SUGGESTIONS - 6

P. 474, -5 ff.: This last paragraph of Cor. 5 does not argue in good form. It runs: qui comprehendit essentiam divinam, cognoscit omnia possibilis; atqui Xtus non comprehendit essentiam divinam; ergo non cognoscit omnia possibilis.

P. 476, -2: Greg. M. is cited. But it seems to me that his argument as a whole does not conclude to more than divine knowledge in Christ. For, despite his "scit... homo" he proves his point against the agnostics by quoting such texts as "omnia per ipsum" and arguing that He who created all, created the day of judgment, and what He created, He surely knew.

P. 478, -10: I am rather reluctant to admit that the "non est meum dare vobis" is merely a "loquendi oeconomia." There is too much evidence of a really limited power in Christ with regard to graces, offices, providence in the world. He cannot do miracles at Nazareth, He prays that the chalice may pass and it does not pass, He accepts those whom His Father gives Him for disciples, no one comes to Him unless the Father draws him, etc. Cf. John passim in the 6, 10, 17.

P. 480: Cor. 7. The reference to p. 436 for the proof of dona in Xt is not very satisfying. Further, must we not show ~~maxx~~ not only that there are dona but that they are distinct from the beatific vision?

P. 482: On the relation between scientia beata and scientia acquisita - can you not use the distinction between ideas and judgments to advantage?

a) Particular ideas are not ~~maxx~~ actu distinctae in the scientia beata, as particular things are not actu distinctae in the fulness of Being. Hence there is a role for the intellectus agens of Xt ~~mx~~ analogous to that played by ours - only His superior lumen enables Him to form ideas with surpassing speed, depth, etc. - In this phase there is also room for a human teacher: to move His phantasms to right constellation for emergence of idea.

b) But then He has to judge the truth of His ideas, and here He is in a class apart from us. For, understanding the fulness of Being, He has a principle sufficient for saying is or is not in all particular cases of being and hence of truth. (St. Thomas talks of lumen naturale, lumen fidei, as adequate principles for a determined range, the range determined by their natures; but the range of the lumen gloriae is Being.) - Hence Xt is never in doubt, does not have to put hypotheses to the test, judges almost automatically, is fully infallible, etc. - On this level He would have no human teacher.

I don't know how well this view can be tested from Scripture. Questions like, Who do men say that I am? How many loaves have you? etc., could be explained, perhaps, as questions for understanding, but that interpretation leaves me a little uneasy.

SUGGESTIONS cover only the first 12 theses - up to page 485.