Theology and Man's Future

If I speak of man's future, I do not mean that I have peered into some crystal ball and there foreseen the future fate of man. Rather I have in mind a somewhat simple observation and argument. It has been observed that human knowledge not only is increasing but also that it is doing so at an ever increasing rate. It has been argued that increasing knowledge results in social and cultural change, and that an acceleration of the rate of increase of knowledge results in an acceleration in the rate of social and cultural change. There is, then, an aspect of man's future implicit in contemporary trends. It is that our institutions of learning have ceased to be store-houses whence traditional wisdom and knowledge are dispensed. It is that they have become centers in which new knowledge is added to old at an ever increasing rate. It follows that we can look forward to an accelerating rate of social and cultural change.

My topic is not just man's future but theology and man's future. I am asking how theology enters into this picture. The theology I have in mind is not just a set of timeless abstractions; it is not just theology as rooted in three millenia of religious history; it is theology as situated in contemporary institutions of learning, as keeping abreast with the accleerating expansion of knowledge, as interacting with other learned disciplines and, by that interaction, having its influence on the accelerating process of social and cultural change.

Since interaction is reciprocal, I have two basic topics. First, what influence is theology undergoing from other disciplines. Secondly, in what manner might theology be relevant to questions raised and problems confronted by other disciplines.

But before treating these basic topics, I had best begin with some statement about theology itself. After all, there is biblical theology, patristic theology, medieval theology, counter-reformation theology, and the somewhat amorphous and bewildering contemporary theology. Just what, then, am I speaking of, when I use the word, theology?

Let me suggest that it may be well to conceive theology in terms of its function, and to specify this function let me recall that Georg Simmel, the German sociologist, coined the phrase, die Wendung zur Idee, the turn to the idea, the shift to system, to denote the tendency and even the necessity of every large social, cultural, or religious movement to reflect on itself, to define its goals, to scrutinize the means it employs or might employ, to keep in mind its origins, its commitments, its past achievements, and its failures. No matter how spontaneous the movement initially was, no matter how creative has been its development, it can keep on its true course, it can resist enticements off in one direction and menaces from another, it can evade capture by other movements, only if it gives heed to the Delphic precept, Know thyself.

Now this turn to the idea, this shift to reflection, is performed differently in different cultural settings. While a historical tradition can retain its identity though it passes from one culture to another, still it can live and function in those several cultures only if it thinks of itself, only if it effects its shift to reflection, in harmony with the style, the mode of forming concepts, the mentality, the horizon proper to each culture and subculture.

Now what is true of any large social, cultural, or religious movement, also is true of Christianity. It expressed itself in the New Testament writings. But it kept adding further expressions in the Apostolic Fathers, in the Apologists of the second century, in the Greek and the Latin Fathers from the third century to the sixth. An entirely new mode made its appearance with Byzantine Scholasticism, and this recurred on a universal scale with the medieval canonists and theologians. Humanism, the Renaissance, the Counter-Reformation brought in another style, a new mode of concept formation, a different mentality. From that style, that mode, that mentality Catholics have been breaking away, and they have been endeavoring to effect a new shift to the idea in the style and mode and mentality of modern culture. Efforts in that direction have been going forward for over a century, but the massive break-through took place at the Second Vatican Council.

Without using the word, theology, I have been trying to say what theology is. It is not the same as religion but it is not without religion. Religion is seeking the Kingdom of God; it is love of God and of one's neighbor. Theology is reflection on religion. It is the moment of self-investigation, self-understanding, self-knowledge, self-evaluation, self-criticism in religion. The further a religion is extended in space, the longer it has endured over time, the larger the number of its adherents, the more necessary and the more elaborate will be the task of self-investigation, self-understanding, self-knowledge, self-evaluation, self-criticism. Finally, while this function of theology is a constant, an invariant, still the manner in which this function is fulfilled is, of course, historically conditioned. Needs and concerns, interests and tastes, methods

and techniques, schools and libraries, problems and ideas, are not immutable forms in some Platonic heaven but concrete, shifting variables in historical process. The theologian is always a product of his day. He cannot but use the resources available in his day to meet, as best he can, the needs of his day.

While this might be illustrated from any period, perhaps the most relevant would be the contrast between classicist and modern culture. By classicist culture I understand the culture that sprang from Humanism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and Counter-reformation. It was a culture that conceived itself not empirically but normatively, not as one culture among many, but as the one and only culture that any cultivated person could conceive. It was culture as opposed to barbarism. It was to be attained by acquiring and assimilating the tastes and skills, the ideals, virtues, and ideas, that were pressed upon one in a good home and through a curriculum in the liberal arts. This notion, of course, had a very ancient lineage. It stemmed out of Greek paideia and Roman doctrinae studium atque humanitatis, out of the exuberance of the Renaissance and its pruning in the counter-reformation schools of the Jesuits. But this relation to antiquity only reinforced its fundamental character of immobility. Precisely because it was conceived normatively, as what ought to be, it had to be always and everywhere the same. So it considered its classics immortal works of art; its philosophy was the philosophia perennis; its laws and structures were the fruit of the prudence and wisdom of mankind. As its classics, its philosophy, its laws, so too was its theology. The Scriptures, the Fathers, the Scholastics, the later theologians might employ different

vocabularies, but the substance of what was proclaimed was always and everywhere the same. The notion of a development of doctrine was not entertained.

While classicist culture conceived itself normatively and abstractly, modern culture conceives itself empirically and concretely. It is the culture that recognizes cultural variation, difference, development, breakdown, that investigates each of the many cultures of mankind, that studies their histories, that seeks to understand sympathetically what the classicist would tend to write off as strange or uncultivated or barbaric. Instead of thinking of men in terms of a nature common to all men whether awake or asleep, geniuses or morons, saints or sinners, it attends to men in their concrete living. If it can discern common and invariant structures in human operations, it refuses to take flight from the particular to the universal, and it endeavors to meet the challenge of knowing people in all their diversity and mobility. It is an endlessly resourceful and novel culture with its modern languages and literatures, modern art and media, modern mathematics and ~~natural science, modern philosophy and human studies, modern finance and commerce and industry, modern wars and revolutions, modern~~ natural science, modern finance and commerce and industry, modern education and medicine, modern philosophy and human studies, modern abundance and poverty, modern wars and revolutions. It is within that modern culture that contemporary Christians and Catholics live and think, work and love. It is within the terms of that culture that a contemporary theology has to carry out its reflection on Christianity, on the Church.

So much for my first, ~~topic~~ preliminary topic: the notion of theology. There remain my two basic topics: the action of other disciplines on theology and, finally, the action of theology on them.

Theology and Man's Future

In the sesquicentennial brochure, Knowledge and the Future of Man,[1] and again in Father Ong's essay in the book with the same title,[2] there is set forth a correlation between the accelerating expansion of human knowledge and, on the other hand, the ever accelerating pace of social and cultural change in the modern world. It is this correlation between expanding knowledge and socio-cultural change that confronts the contemporary university with a grave problem. For the university has ceased to be just a store-house whence traditional wisdom and knowledge are dispensed. It provides a center in which ever increasing knowledge is disseminated to bring about ever increasing social and cultural change. It has a grave responsibility for the future of man, and it is the concern of St. Louis University in sponsoring the present gathering to ventilate this issue.

Accordingly, my title, Theology and Man's Future, is to be understood within this context. I shall speak to you of man's future, not directly, but only indirectly. Not directly, for I have not peered into any crystal ball and there foreseen the future utility or futility of theology. Only indirectly, for the direct and discernible determinant of man's future is the ever accelerating expansion of human knowledge. Theology enters into the picture only in the measure that it keeps abreast of this expansion and in interaction with it. My topic, then, is theology, not theology as a set of timeless abstractions, not theology as rooted in three millenia of religious history, but theology as situated in a contemporary university, as influenced by other disciplines, as possibly relevant to questions other disciplines raise and to problems they confront and, consequently, as making its contribution to the thought that will direct the future of man.

First, then, let me say something of the influence other disciplines have had on theology and, particularly, on Catholic theology where the effect has been belated, more recent and so, at least apparently, more massive. Five areas here merit attention: history, philosophy, religious studies, method, and communications.

One of the profoundest changes in Catholic theology has been brought about by modern methods of historical study. It is true, of course, that Christianity has always been an historical religion. The Fathers appealed to the scriptures, the medieval theologians to both, to the scriptures and to the Fathers, later theologians to all their predecessors. But they did not have at their disposal the resources and the collaboration of modern scholarship with its critical editions of texts, its indices and handbooks, its specialized institutes and congresses, its ever mounting accumulation of monographs and articles. The ideal that focused their interest and guided their attention was not the historical ideal of critically evaluating all available evidence with the aim of bringing back to life the societies and cultures of the past;[3] it was the theological ideal of knowing God and knowing all things in their relation to God. So they assumed not only an unbroken tradition of faith but also unchanging modes of apprehension and conception.[4] A great revolution was needed -- and it is not yet completed -- to make the development of doctrine an acceptable notion, to have it apprehended not merely in some abstract and notional fashion but concretely and really through exact study of relevant texts, to admit historical methods not only in the patristic and medieval and later fields but also in the scriptures, and finally -- to come to the as yet unfinished task -- to effect the synthesis of historical and theological aims so that we have

neither history without theology nor theology without history but both.

A second major influence has been philosophic. Catholic theology has been wedded to Aristotle. The beginnings of that wedding were auspicious enough. For medieval theology was doing two things when partly it accepted and partly it reinterpreted the Aristotelian corpus. On the one hand, it was providing itself with a conceptual system that would make it possible for it to work out coherent answers to its endless quaestiones. At the same time, it was christianizing the Greek and Arabic culture that was pouring into Western Europe and threatening to engulf its faith. But what once was achievement, at a later date proved to be an obstacle to vitality and development. Aristotelian thought is unacquainted not merely with the content but also with the nature of modern science. It is not equipped to distinguish and to relate to one another the natural sciences, the human sciences, philosophy, and theology. It is unable to provide the foundations for their proper functioning and collaboration. Its conceptual system in part is to be revised and in part to be replaced by notions drawn from modern philosophy and science. So it is that contemporary theologians are drawing upon personalist, phenomenological, existential, historical, and transcendental types of philosophic thought to find the conceptual tools needed for their own thinking and writing. The results often are eclectic rather than systematic and deeply based, and here I feel there is a real danger in an age when modernist subjectivism and relativism are becoming increasingly common.

Contemporary Catholic theology, then, not only is open to philosophic influence but profoundly is in need of philosophy. Here I must distinguish between primary and secondary aspects of that need. The theologian will want

to be acquainted with Stoicism in reading Tertullian, with middle Platonism in reading Origen, with Neoplatonism in reading Augustine, with Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes in reading Aquinas, with Aquinas in reading subsequent theologians. But this need is secondary. It is a matter of acquiring the necessary background for particular tasks of interpretation. Again, it is through a study of the philosophers that the theologian will be introduced to philosophic questions, that he will reach answers relevant to his primary need, that he will learn to think and speak on the level of his age and culture. But again this is secondary. It is concerned with the pedagogy of meeting the primary need. It does not define the primary need itself. The primary need is for the theologian to know what he is doing when he is doing theology. To reach such knowledge three prior questions must be answered. There is the question of cognitional theory: What am I doing when I am knowing? There is the question of epistemology: Why is doing that knowing? There is the question of metaphysics: What do I know when I do it? To these three questions the theologian needs full and precise and well-grounded answers. If he has those answers, his essential needs are met. If he does not reach those answers, then he will not know what he is doing, not merely when he reads the philosophers but also when he does theology, when he is interpreting a text, when he is ascertaining a historical fact, when he is reconstructing a situation or mentality, when he moves beyond reason to faith, when he determines what is and what is not a matter of faith, when he seeks an understanding of the mysteries of faith, when he concerns himself with the problem of communicating the faith to all men of all classes and of all cultures. Briefly, theologians have minds and use them, and they had best know what they are doing when they use them. Again, to put the matter historically,

to follow Aquinas today is, not to repeat Aquinas today,but to do for the twentieth century what Aquinas did for the thirteenth. As Aquinas baptized key elements in Greek and Arabic culture, so the contemporary Catholic philosopher and/or theologian has to effect a baptism of key elements in modern culture.

A third major influence is the field of religious studies: the phenomenology of religion, the psychology of religion, the sociology of religion, the history of religions, and the philosophy of religion. I call this a major influence, not because the influence has been conspicuous, but because of very significant and powerful contemporary trends. The first stems from Vatican II, and it consists in the Church's concern with ecumenism, with non-Christian religions, and with the atheist negation of religion. This fact requires the theologian to reflect on his religion, not in isolation from all others, but in conjunction with others. It requires him to attend, not only to the differences separating his religion from others, but also to the similarities that connect them with one another. To meet such requirements theology will be led into the field of religious studies and, indeed, while retaining its identity, to conceive itself as a particular type of religious studies. There is a second factor leading to the same conclusion. I have already spoken of the relations of theology with history and with philosophy. But if it is to take its place in contemporary culture, it has also to be related to all the human sciences; and it is in the field of religious studies, in the phenomenology and psychology and sociology of religion, that it will find models exhibiting what can be done and accounts of what has been tried and found unsatisfactory. Finally, there is the theological doctrine that

God grants all men sufficient grace for their salvation. This doctrine is relevant to religious studies; it makes them studies of the manifold ways God's grace comes to man and operates as the seed that falls on rocks or amidst thorns or by the wayside or on good ground to bring forth fruit thirty or sixty or a hundred fold.

Fourthly, there is the area of methodology. The Aristotelian notion of science is one thing, the modern notion is quite another. Contemporary Catholic theology has already in actual practice taken on the features of a modern science. But in a neurosis-like conflict with this practice there lurk in the minds of many theologians assumptions and implications that stem from Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. No doubt, theologians always have recognized that their subject was not a science in the Aristotelian sense, that in that sense it could be named science only by analogy. But the modern fact is that no science whatever satisfies Aristotle's requirements. To keep on thinking of theology as analogously a science is just to perpetuate a long list of misleading notions and principles.

For Aristotle science is of the necessary: we think we understand when we know the cause, know that it is the cause, and know that the effect cannot be other than it is.[5] In the modern sciences necessity is a marginal notion. Their substantive concern is, not with necessity, but with verifiable possibility. The intelligibility they seek is, not the intelligibility that cannot be other than it is, but the intelligibility that very well could be other than it is and so is intrinsically hypothetical and in need of verification.

Again, for Aristotle, there was a sharp distinction between theory and practice.[6] Theory regarded the necessary; but the necessary is unchangeable; and the unchangeable cannot be changed. It lies utterly outside the whole field of practical activity. All one can do about it is contemplate it. But in the modern sciences theory and practice regard exactly the same objects; they represent successive stages in our dealings with these objects. Good theory is the possibility of efficacious practice, and practice is the application of theory.

Again, for Aristotle, science is true and certain.[7] But modern science is not true and certain. It is an ongoing process in which the range and the probability of human knowing keep increasing, but truth and certainty are just limiting concepts. This fact, of course, marks a major problem in the method of contemporary theology, for theology is the offspring not only of science but also of faith, and faith claims truth and certainty.

Finally, an Aristotelian science was a compact affair; it could be tucked into a habit in the mind of a scientist. But no modern science in its entirety is known by any individual. Modern sciences are parcelled out among the many minds of the scientific community. As they are produced by a far-flung collaboration, so they reside distributively in the minds of researchers, professors, students. And what is true of modern physics, chemistry, biology, also is true of contemporary theology. There are today no omnicompetent theologians.

Finally, there is the area of communications. The church has always felt called to herald the gospel to all men of all cultures and all classes. But the full implications of this mission were hidden by the classicist notion of culture. For that notion was not empirical but

normative. It did not study the different cultures of mankind but simply set up its own as the ideal and generously offered to instruct others in its own ways. Its classics were immortal works of art, its philosophy was perennial philosophy, its assumptions were eternal truths, its laws were the depositary of the wisdom and the prudence of mankind. But modern culture is the culture that knows many cultures, that studies and compares them, that knows they are all man-made and subject to development and to decay. Just as theology has to enter into the context of modern philosophy and science, so religion has to retain its identity yet penetrate into the cultures of mankind, into the manifold fabric of everyday meaning and feeling that directs and propels the lives of men. It has to know the uses of symbol and story, the resources of the arts and of literature, the potentialities of the old and the new media of communication, the various motivations on which in any given area it can rely, the themes that in a given culture and class provide a carrying wave for the message.

So much for my first topic. I have indicated five major areas in which theology has been profoundly influenced or is about to be profoundly influenced by other disciplines: history, philosophy, religious studies, method, and communications. This list, of course, is not exclusive. I have selected them simply on the basis of their enormous contribution to theology or theology's pressing need of them. I now turn to my second topic, What has theology to offer? What relevance does it possess for the concerns of other disciplines? What aid can it bring towards a solution of their problems?

These are large and difficult questions and, perhaps, I cannot do better than go back to the basic theorem in Newman's Idea of a University.

It contains two parts, one positive, the other negative. Positively, Newman advanced that human knowing was a whole with its parts organically related, and this quite accords with the contemporary phenomenological notion of horizon, that one's perceptions are functions of one's outlook, that one's meaning is a fuction of a context and that context of still broader contexts.[8] On the negative side, Newman asked what would happen if a significant part of knowledge were omitted, overlooked, ignored, not just by some individual but by the cultural community, and he contended that there would be three consequences. First, people in general would be ignorant of that area. Secondly, the rounded whole of human knowing would be mutilated. Thirdly, the remaining parts would endeavor to round off the whole once more despite the omission of a part and, as a result, they would suffer distortion from their effort to perform a function for which they were not designed. Such was Newman's theorem.[9] In fact, theology has for some time been dropped from most university curricula. So one well may ask whether Newman's inferences have been confirmed in fact, whether there is widespread ignorance of specifically theological areas, and whether this has resulted in a mutilation and distortion of human knowledge generally. A fair and adequate answer to these questions would have many presuppositions and would involve a very delicately nuanced survey. I cannot here expound the former nor have I been able to undertake the latter. So I must be content with having brought the matter to your attention.

But it is within this context that I should like to indicate a possible relevance of theology to a basic problem of the human sciences. For the human sciences may be and often are pursued simply on the analogy

of the natural sciences. When this is done rigorously, when it is contended that a scientific explanation of human behavior is reached if the same behavior can be had in a robot,[10] then everything specifically human disappears from the science. The human sciences become exact by ceasing to treat of man as he is. On the other hand, when human scientists reject such reductionism, and many do,[11] not only does the exactitude of the natural sciences vanish but also the human sciences risk becoming captives of some philosophy. For what the reductionist omits are the meaning and value that inform human living and acting. But meaning and value are notions that can be clarified only by painstakingly making one's way through the jungle of the philosophies.

Now the suggestion I wish to make is that theology, and in particular a theology that has carefully and accurately worked out its method, could provide the human sciences with hints or even models for tackling the type of problem I have mentioned. For theology has long worked in conjunction with philosophy. At the present time, Catholic theology is disengaging itself from Aristotle and deriving new categories from personalist, phenomenological, existential, historicist, and transcendental types of philosophic thought. It will possess a certain expertise in using the philosophies without committing itself to more of them than it intends. It is much at home with questions concerning meaning from its study of developing doctrines and its problems of demythologization. Finally, not even the natural sciences can prescind from the question of value, for the very pursuit of science is the pursuit of a value, and the contention that science should be value-free, wertfrei, if taken

literally,[12] implies that science should be worthless. But theology has long been aware of conflicting judgements of value, even with radical conflicts, and a successful method of theology will have a technique for dealing competently, respectfully, and honestly with this issue.

Besides the sciences, there are the humanities and, as I have no need to insist, much modern humanism is prone to ignore God, to ridicule religion, when it is not militantly atheistic. Whether certain youth movements indicate a significant break in this trend, I cannot say. But I venture to affirm that an authentic humanism is profoundly religious.

Man's development is a matter of getting beyond himself, of transcending himself, of ceasing to be an animal in a habitat and of becoming a genuine person in a community. The first stage of this development lies in the sensibility that enables him to perceive his surroundings and to respond to what he perceives. But man not only perceives but also wonders, inquires, seeks to understand. He unifies and relates, constructs and extrapolates, serializes and generalizes. He moves out of his immediate surroundings into a universe put together by symbols and stories of mythic consciousness, or by the speculations of philosophers, or by the investigations of scientists. But besides such cognitional self-transcendence, there is also a real self-transcendence. Men ask not only about facts but also about values. They are not content with satisfactions. They distinguish between what truly is good and what only apparently is good. They are stopped by the question, Is what I have achieved really worth while? Is what I hope for really worth while? Because men can raise such questions, and answer them, and live by the answers, they can be principles of benevolence and beneficence, of genuine cooperation, of true love.

Now there is a profound difference between particular acts of loving and the dynamic state to which we refer when we speak of falling in love and of being in love. That dynamic state, while it has its causes, conditions, occasions, none the less once it occurs and as long as it lasts, is a first principle in one's living. It is the origin and source that prompts and colors all one's thoughts and feelings, all one's hopes and fears, all one's joys and sorrows. Moreover, such being-in-love is of three kinds. There is being-in-love with the domestic community, with one's mate and one's children. There is being-in-love with the civil community, eagerly making one's contribution to its needs and promoting its betterment. There is being-in-love with God. Of this love St. Paul spoke when he wrote to the Romans: "The love of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Spirit of God who has been given to us" (Rom 5, 5). To it he referred when he asked: "Then what can separate us from the love of Christ? Can affliction or hardship? Can persecution, hunger, nakedness, peril, or the sword?" And his answer was: "For I am convinced that there is nothing in death or life, in the realm of spirits or superhuman powers, in the world as it is or the world as it shall be, in the forces of the universe, in heights or depths -- nothing in all creation that can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom 8, 35.38.39).

All authentic being-in-love is a total self-surrender. But the love of God is not restricted to particular areas of human living. It is the foundation of love of one's neighbor. It is the grace that keeps one ever faithful and devoted to one's mate. But it is also something in itself, something personal, intimate, and profoundly attuned to the deepest yearnings of the human heart. It constitutes a basic fulfilment of man's being. Because it is such a fulfilment, it is the source of a great peace,

the peace that the world cannot give. Because it is such a fulfilment, it is a wellspring of joy that can endure despite the sorrow of failure, humiliation, privation, pain, desertion. Because it is such a fulfilment, it removes the temptation to all that is shallow, hollow, empty, degrading without handing man over to the fanaticism that arises when man's capacity for God is misdirected to finite goals.

I have quoted St. Paul, but I would not have you think that being in love with God is to be found only among Christians. God gives all men sufficient grace for salvation. Nor is his grace without fruit. A celebrated student of religions, Friedrich Heiler, has listed seven features common to all the high religions.[13] His account runs over ten pages, and I cannot repeat it here, partly because it is too long, but also because I feel that he would recognize at least a rough equivalence between his seven features and what I have said of being in love with God.

There exists, then, in man a capacity for holiness, a capacity for love that, in its immediacy, regards not the ever passing shape of this world but the mysterious reality, immanent and transcendent, that we name God. Deeply hidden, intensely personal, this love is not so private as to be solitary. The Spirit is given to many, and the many form a community. The community endures over generations, spreads over different nations, adapts to cultural changes. It acquires a history of its origins, its development, its successes and failures, its happy strokes and its mistakes. Its failures and its mistakes becloud its witness, but they argue not for the abolition of religion but for its reform.

Long ago St. Augustine exclaimed that God had made us for himself

and that our hearts are restless till they rest in him. What that restlessness is, we see all about us in the mountainous discontents and hatreds and horrors and terrors of the twentieth century. But what it is to rest in God is not easily known or readily understood. Though God's grace is given to all, still the experience of resting in God ordinarily needs a religious tradition for it to be encouraged, fostered, interpreted, guided, developed. Though grace bestows both good will and good performance, still one shrinks and draws back from the performance of denying oneself daily and taking up one's cross and following Christ. For the fulfilment that is the love of God is not the fulfilment of any appetite or desire or wish or dream impulse but the fulfilment of getting beyond one's appetites and desires and wishes and impulses, the fulfilment of self-transcendence, the fulfilment of human authenticity, the fulfilment that overflows into a love of one's neighbor as oneself.

I have been speaking to you of religion at its best. But an organized religion, a church, is not a conventicle of saints. It is like a net cast into the sea that catches all sorts of fish. If the same ultimate goal and ideal is proposed to all, there also must be proposed the successive stages in a development towards reaching the goal. So it is that, as generation follows generation, there is always a gap between the ideal and the real, between religion as it strives to be and religion as it is in fact. But apart from cases of self-deception or insincerity, this gap or contrast does not imply that religion is phony, that religious people say one thing and do another. The very being of man is not static but dynamic; it never is a state of achieved perfection; it always is at best a striving. The striving of the religious man is to give himself to

God in something nearer the way in which God has given himself to us. Such a goal is always distant, but it is not inhuman, for it corresponds to the dynamic structure of man's being, to the restlessness that is ours till we rest in God.

I have been arguing that, because religion pertains to an authentic humanism, theology has a contribution to make to the humanities. But one can go further and argue with Karl Rahner that the dogmatic theology of the past has to become a theological anthropology.[14] By this is meant that all theological questions and answers have to be matched by the transcendental questions and answers that reveal in the human subject the conditions of the possibility of the theological answers. Explicitly Father Rahner excludes a modernist interpretation of his view, namely, that theological doctrines are to be taken as statements about merely human reality. His position is that man is for God, that religion is intrinsic to an authentic humanism, that in theology theocentrism and anthropocentrism coincide. On this basis he desires all theological statements to be matched by statements of their meaning and relevance ~~to~~ in human terms. His purpose is not to water down theological truth but to bring it to life, not to impose an alien method but to exclude the risk of mythology and to introduce into theological thinking the challenge of rigorous controls.

I must not give the impression, however, that such a theological anthropology already exists. Father Rahner has not, to my knowledge, done more than sketch how one might go about constructing it. But the mere fact that the proposal has been made reveals how closely a future theology may be related to the human sciences and to the humanities.

Let me conclude with a brief summary. I pointed to five areas in which theology has been learning or has to learn from other disciplines: history, philosophy, religious studies, methodology, and communications. Then I recalled Newman's theorem that the omission of a significant discipline from the university curriculum left a blindspot, the mutilation of an organic whole, and a distortion of the disciplines that remained and endeavored to meet real human needs. While I was not in a position to discern whether this theorem is borne out by the facts, I did suggest that a theology with a properly developed method would be of some use to human scientists that, on the one hand, wished to avoid all reductionism without, on the other hand, becoming captives of some philosophic fad. Further, I added that religion was part of an authentic humanism, and so that theological reflection on religion was pertinent to the human sciences and the humanities. Finally, I referred to a paper of Father Karl Rahner's, with which I am in substantial agreement, to indicate just how closely related to human studies a future theology may prove to be.

NOTES

1) The brochure was issued by St. Louis University, St Louis, Missouri, on the occasion of its one hundred and fiftieth anniversary.

2) Walter J. Ong, editor, Knowledge and the Future of Man, An International Symposium, New York (Holt, Rinehart and Winston) 1968.

3) Most recently on this theme: P. Hünermann, Der Durchbruch geschichtlichen Denkens im 19. Jahrhundert, Freiburg i. Br. (Herder) 1967.

4) Owen Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman, The Idea of Doctrinal Development, Cambridge (The University Press) 1957.

5) Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 1, 71b 10-12.

6) Ibid., I, 33, 88b 30 ff. Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 5 1140a 24 ff.

7) Posterior Analytics, I, 2, 71b 25 and 72a 37 ff.

8) See Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, A Historical Introduction, 2 vols., The Hague (Martinus Nijhoff) 1960, pp. 159 ff. Also the index of subjects, s. vv. "Horizon" and "Lebenswelt," pp. 718, 720.

9) For this theorem I am indebted to Fergal McGrath, The Consecration of Learning, Lectures on Newman's "Idea of a University," Dublin (Gill and Son) 1962.

10) For a sketch of such views see the first part of Floyd Matson's The Broken Image, New York (Doubleday, Anchor) 1964.

11) For the "third force" in psychology, see Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, Princeton, N J (Van Nostrand) 1962, pp. 206 ff. In sociology there is the attention to meaning in the collective work, Toward a General Theory of Action, edited by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, New York (Harper Torchbook) 1962, pp. 4 ff. Cf. Parsons' study of Max Weber in Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied, Glencoe, Illinois (The Free Press) 1949, pp. 72-93.

12) Talcott Parsons understands Weber to have meant by Wertfreiheit that the values of the intellectual disciplines must be differentiated from other types of values constitutive of the culture. Daedalus 94[1] (1965), 59.

13) Friedrich Heiler, "The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Cooperation of Religions," in The History of Religions, Essays in Methodology, edited by M. Eliade and J. Kitagawa, Chicago (University of Chicago Press) 1959, pp. 142-153.

14) Karl Rahner, "Theologie und Anthropologie," in Schriften zur Theologie, VIII, 43-65. Einsiedeln (Benziger) 1967.