

But the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking of divine truth.

Reply Obj. 2. The true and being are convertible terms. Hence, just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in *Physics* I,³¹ so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but because that particular truth does not remain which existed previously.

Reply Obj. 3. A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, namely, in so far as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them, but it is said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, *Socrates sits*, is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.

Reply Obj. 4. The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, *Socrates sits*, has not the same status when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results varies, and is variously signified by these propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable.

³¹ Aristotle: *Phys.*, I, 8 (191b 17).

Question XVII

CONCERNING FALSITY

(In Four Articles)

WE NEXT consider falsity. About this, four points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether falsity exists in things? (2) Whether it exists in the sense? (3) Whether it exists in the intellect? (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.

First Article

WHETHER FALSITY EXISTS IN THINGS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says, *If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary.*¹

Obj. 2. Further, false is derived from *fallere* [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says, they show nothing but their own species.² Therefore the false is not found in things.

Obj. 3. Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as was stated above.³ But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.

On the contrary, Augustine says: *Every body is a true body and a false unity:* for it imitates unity without being unity.⁴ But everything imitates the divine unity, yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.

I answer that, Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity where primarily we find truth, that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated absolutely by what belongs to it essentially, but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally, a thing may be called false absolutely when compared with

¹ *Solil.*, II, 8 (PL 32, 892). ² *De Vera Relig.*, XXXVI (PL 34, 152). ³ Q. 16, a. 1. ⁴ *De Vera Relig.*, XXXIV (PL 34, 150).

the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is related essentially; but it may be called false relatively as ordered to another intellect, to which it is related accidentally.

Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Therefore, artificial things are said to be false absolutely and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper operation of his art. In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, *Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?* (Ps. iv. 3); as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called *the truth of life* as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, *He that doth truth, cometh to the light* (Jo. iii. 21).

But in relation to our intellect, natural things, which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false, not absolutely, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way, according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false which is signified or represented by false speech or thought. In this manner, anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher says.⁵ So, too, Augustine says: *The tragedian is a false Hector.*⁶ So, too, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which belongs to it. In another way, a thing can be called false, by way of cause—and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And because it is innate in us to judge of things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and essentially deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents which resemble things other than themselves are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is false honey, and tin, false

⁵ *Metaph.*, IV, 29 (1024b 19). ⁶ *Soliloq.*, II, 10 (PL 32, 893).

silver. Regarding this, Augustine says: We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true;⁷ and the Philosopher says: *Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not.*⁸ In this sense a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in that way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as is stated in *Metaph.* v.⁹

Reply Obj. 1. A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is, and false in respect to what it is not. Hence, *The true tragedian is a false Hector*, as stated in *Soliloq.* ii.¹⁰ As, therefore, in things that are there is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a certain character of falseness.

Reply Obj. 2. Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are not.

Reply Obj. 3. Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false absolutely, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.

To the argument which is urged on the contrary: A defective likeness or representation does not involve the character of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false because it resembles another thing, but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in some cases, but in general.

Second Article

WHETHER THERE IS FALSITY IN THE SENSES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says: *If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them.*¹¹ Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses. Therefore falsity is not in them.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, II, 6 (PL 32, 889). ⁸ *Metaph.*, IV, 29 (1024b 21). ⁹ *Ibid.* (1025a 2). ¹⁰ *Soliloq.*, II, 10 (PL 32, 893). ¹¹ *De Vera Relig.* XXXIII (PL 34, 149).

eternal from the state of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously.⁸

Reply Obj. 4. Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.

Second Article

WHETHER PREDESTINATION PLACES ANYTHING IN THE PREDESTINED?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined.

Obj. 2. Further, Origen says on the text, *He who was predestined*, etc. (*Rom. i. 4*): *Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is.*⁹ And Augustine says: *What is predestination but the destination of one who is?*¹⁰ Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something in the predestined.

Obj. 3. Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine says.¹¹ Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.

Obj. 4. Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present, and of glory in the future.¹² Therefore predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in God is eternal.

On the contrary, Augustine says that *predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits*.¹³ But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined.

I answer that, Predestination is not anything in the predestined, but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for, but is an exemplar in the mind of the provider, as was proved above.¹⁴ But the execution of providence, which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is

⁸ Q. 21, a. 3, ad 2; a. 4. ⁹ *In Rom.*, I (PG 14, 849). ¹⁰ *De Divers. Quaest. ad Simplic.*, I, 2 (PL 40, 114). ¹¹ *Cf. De Dono Persev.*, XIV (PL 45, 1014). ¹² *Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent.*, I, xl, 2 (I, 151). ¹³ *De Dono Persev.*, XIV (PL 45, 1014). ¹⁴ Q. 22, a. 1.

clear that predestination is a kind of exemplar of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is *calling* and *magnification*; according to the Apostle (*Rom. viii. 30*): *Whom He predestinated, them He also called; and whom He called, them He also magnified* [Vulg., *justified*].

Reply Obj. 1. Actions passing out to external matter of themselves produce passion—for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as was said above.¹⁵ Predestination is an action of this latter class. Therefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, posits an effect in them.

Reply Obj. 2. Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can be said only of someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly resolve in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar *determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life* (*2 Mac. vi. 20*). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist, however its destination may be understood.

Reply Obj. 3. Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion, and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent, to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, in so far as an agent is said to prepare itself by intellect to act, according as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared the work of salvation by predestination, in conceiving the idea of the direction of some towards salvation.

Reply Obj. 4. Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal.

Third Article

WHETHER GOD REPROBATES ANY MAN?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to the words (*Wis. xi. 25*): *Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made*. Therefore God reprobates no man.

¹⁵ Q. 14, a. 2; q. 18, a. 3, ad 1.

Obj. 2. Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobate as predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this is false. For it is said (*Osee xiii. 9*): *Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me.* God does not, then, reprobate any man.

Obj. 3. Further, to no one ought anything to be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said (*Eccles. vii. 14*): *Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised.* Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.

On the contrary, It is said (*Malach. i. 2, 3*): *I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.*

I answer that, God does reprobate some persons. For it was said above that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above.¹⁶ Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called *reprobation*. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those divinely ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above.¹⁷ Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory, so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation because of that sin.

Reply Obj. 1. God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish for some this particular good—namely, eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobate them:

Reply Obj. 2. Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined—namely, glory—and of what is received in this life—namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present—namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free choice of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way the word of the prophet is true—namely, *Destruction is thy own, O Israel.*

Reply Obj. 3. Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute im-

¹⁶ Q. 22, a. 2, ad 2. ¹⁷ Q. 22, a. 1, ad 3.

possibility, but only conditional impossibility; just as it was said above that the predestined must necessarily be saved, yet by a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice.¹⁸ Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless, that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free desire. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.

Fourth Article

WHETHER THE PREDESTINED ARE ELECTED BY GOD?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the predestined are not elected by God. For Dionysius says that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness.¹⁹ But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God communicates His grace and glory without election; and this belongs to predestination.

Obj. 2. Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.

Obj. 3. Further, election implies some discrimination. Now *God wills all men to be saved* (1 Tim. ii. 4). Therefore predestination, which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.

On the contrary, It is said (*Ephes. i. 4*): *He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world.*

I answer that, Predestination logically presupposes election; and election presupposes love. The reason for this is that predestination, as was stated above, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above.²⁰ But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation logically presupposes that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:—love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as was stated above.²¹—election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as was stated above. Election and love, however, are diversely ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by a good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that

¹⁸ Q. 19, a. 3. ¹⁹ *De Div. Nom.* IV, 1 (PG 3, 693). ²⁰ Q. 22, a. 1. ²¹ Q. 20, a. 2 and 3.

their creation they knew the Word, and things in the Word. But the beatitude of the angels comes of seeing the Word. Consequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from the very beginning of their creation.

On the contrary, To be established or confirmed in the good is of the nature of beatitude. But the angels were not confirmed in the good as they were created. The fall of some of them shows this. Therefore the angels were not in beatitude from their creation.

I answer that, By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate perfection of the rational or of the intellectual nature; and hence it is that it is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its ultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of the rational or intellectual nature. The first is one which it can procure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure called beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle says that man's ultimate happiness consists in the most perfect contemplation by which the highest intelligible, God, can be contemplated in this life. Above this happiness there is still another, to which we look forward in the future, whereby *we shall see God as He is* (1 John iii. 2). This is beyond the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above.⁶

So we must say that, as regards the first beatitude, which the angel could procure by his natural power, he was created blessed. For the angel does not acquire such beatitude by any discursive motion, as man does; but, as was observed above, is straightway in possession of it, owing to his natural dignity.⁷ But the angels did not have from the beginning of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond the power of nature. For such beatitude is no part of their nature, but its end; and consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the beginning.

Reply Obj. 1. Beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 2. The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by its operation; and so, according to Augustine, the growing of plants from the earth did not take place at once among the first works, in which only the germinating power of the plants was placed in the earth.⁸ In the same way the angelic creature had the perfection of its nature in the beginning of creation; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by its operation.

Reply Obj. 3. The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word, of which one is natural, the other from glory. By his natural knowledge he knows the Word through His likeness shining in his nature; and by his knowledge of glory he knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the angel knows things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural

⁶ *Eth.*, X, 7 (1177a 12); 8 (1178b 23). ⁷ Q. 12, a. 4. ⁸ Q. 58, a. 3. ⁹ *De Gen. ad Litt.*, V, 4; 5 (PL 34, 324; 328).

knowledge, and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first knowledge of things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset of his creation; while the second was not, but only when the angels became blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly termed their *morning* knowledge.

Second Article

WHETHER AN ANGEL NEEDED GRACE IN ORDER TO TURN TO GOD?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God. For we have no need of grace for what we can accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God, because he loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said.⁹ Therefore the angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.

Obj. 2. Further, We seem to need help only for difficult tasks. Now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God, because there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God.

Obj. 3. Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for grace. Hence it is said (*Zach. i. 3*): *Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to you*. But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace, and thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore the angel did not need grace to turn to God.

On the contrary, It was by turning to God that the angel reached beatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God, it would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle (*Rom. vi. 23*): *The wage of God is life everlasting*.

I answer that, The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn to God as to the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above, the natural movement of the will is the principle of all that we will.¹⁰ But the will's natural inclination is directed towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined towards it, unless helped by some other and supernatural principle. Thus it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat and to generate fire, whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural power of fire, and so fire has no tendency to it, except in so far as it is moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul.

Now it was shown above, when we were treating of God's knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate beatitude of the ra-

⁹ Q. 60, a. 5. ¹⁰ Q. 60, a. 2.

tional creature consists, is beyond the nature of every created intellect.¹¹ Consequently no rational creature can have the movement of the will directed towards such a beatitude, except it be moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help of grace. Therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own will be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace.

Reply Obj. 1. The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to God in so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.

Reply Obj. 2. A thing is *difficult* which is beyond a power; and this happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the natural order of the power. In this case, if it can be attained by some help, it is said to be *difficult*; but if it can in no way be attained, then it is *impossible*. Thus, it is impossible for a man to fly. In another way a thing may be beyond a power, not according to its natural order, but owing to some intervening hindrance. Thus, to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of the motive power of the soul, because the soul, considered in itself, can be moved in any direction; but the soul is hindered from so doing by the weight of the body. Consequently, it is difficult for a man to mount upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude, however, is difficult for man both because it is beyond his nature, and because he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and the infection of sin. But it is difficult for an angel only because it is supernatural.

Reply Obj. 3. Every movement of the will towards God can be termed a conversion to God. And so there is a threefold conversion to God. The first is by the perfect love of God, and belongs to a creature already enjoying the possession of God. For such conversion consummate grace is required. The second conversion to God is that which merits beatitude; and for this there is required habitual grace, which is the principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man disposes himself so that he may have grace. For this no habitual grace is required, but the operation of God, Who draws the soul towards Himself, according to *Lament. v. 21: Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted*. Hence it is clear that there is no need to go on to infinity.

Third Article

WHETHER THE ANGELS WERE CREATED IN GRACE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angels were not created in grace. For Augustine says that the angelic nature was first made without form, and was called *heaven*, but afterwards received its form, and was then

¹¹ Q. 12, a. 4.

called *light*.¹² But such formation comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.

Obj. 2. Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If, therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever have turned away from God.

Obj. 3. Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems that they were not created even in grace; but that they were first created in nature only, then received grace, and finally they were beatified.

On the contrary, Augustine says, *Who wrought the good will of the angels? Who, but He Who created them with His will, that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same time producing their nature and bestowing grace on them?*¹³

I answer that, There are conflicting opinions on this point. Some¹⁴ hold that the angels were created only in a natural state, while others¹⁵ maintain that they were created in grace. However, it seems more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men, that they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things which were produced by the work of the divine government as creatures to come forth in the course of time under God's activity, were created in the first fashioning of things according to seedlike forms, as Augustine says.¹⁶ Such were trees, animals, and the rest. Now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natural effect; and hence grace is called the *seed of God* (1 John iii. 9). Just as, therefore, in Augustine's opinion, it is contended that the seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted in the first creation of corporeal creatures, so, straightway from the beginning, the angels were created in grace.

Reply Obj. 1. Such informity in the angels can be understood either by comparison with their formation in glory, and thus the absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time; or else it can be understood of formation according to grace, and thus it did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature. This priority of nature Augustine also holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things.¹⁷

Reply Obj. 2. Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the movement of grace

¹² *De Genesi ad Litt.*, II, 8; I, 3; 9; III, 20 (PL 34, 269; 247; 248; 292). ¹³ *De Civit. Dei*, XII, 9 (PL 41, 357). ¹⁴ William of Auxerre, *Summa Aurea*, II, tr. 1, ch. 1 (fol. 35rb); Alex. of Hales, *Summa Theol.*, II, I, no. 100 (II, 126); St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, d. iv, a. 1, q. 2 (II, 134). ¹⁵ St. Albert, *In II Sent.*, d. iii, a. 12 (XXVII, 85). ¹⁶ *De Genesi ad Litt.*, VIII, 3; V, 4; 23 (PL 34, 374; 324; 338). ¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, I, 15; V, 5 (PL 34, 257; 326).

ix days must have existed instantly from the beginning of creation. But, according to his opinion,¹ in those six days, "the morning" he angelic knowledge, according to which he knew the Word and things in the Word. Therefore straightway from their creation they knew the Word, and things in the Word. But the happiness of the angels comes of seeing the Word. Consequently the angels were happy at from the very beginning of their creation.

the contrary, To be established or confirmed in good is of the nature of Happiness. The angels were not confirmed in good as they were created; the fall of some of them shows this. Therefore the angels were not from their creation.

answer that, By the name of Happiness (which is understood the ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and it is that it is naturally desired, since nothing naturally desires its ultimate perfection) now there is a twofold ultimate perfection, rational or of intellectual nature. The first is in which it can procure of its own natural power, as is in a measure called beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle says² that man's ultimate happiness consists in the most perfect contemplation, by which in this life he can contemplate the highest intelligible object; and that is above this happiness there is still another, whereby we look forward to in the future, whereby all see God as He is (1 John, 3. 2). This is the nature of every created intellect, shown above (Q. XII, A. 4).

then, it remains to be said, that, as regards the first happiness, which the angel could procure by his natural power, he was created already happy. Because the angel does not acquire happiness by any discursive motion, as does, but, as was observed above (Q. A. 4), is straightway in possession of it, to his natural dignity. But the angels did not come from the beginning of their creation to ultimate Happiness which is beyond the nature, because such Happiness is not of their nature, but its end; and consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the beginning.

ly Obj. 1. Happiness is there taken for natural perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence.

ly Obj. 2. The corporeal creature instantly from the beginning of its creation could not have perfection to which it is brought by its operation.

¹ PL 31, 312.
² A. 7, 8 (1177¹²; 1178²³).

ation. Consequently, according to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* v. 4, 5),³ the growing of plants from the earth did not take place at once among the first works, in which only the germinating power of the plants was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the angelic creature in the beginning of its creation had the perfection of its nature, but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by its operation.

Reply Obj. 3. The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word: the one which is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a natural knowledge whereby he knows the Word through a likeness of it shining in his nature, and he has a knowledge of glory whereby he knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the angel knows things in the Word, imperfectly by his natural knowledge, and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first knowledge of things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset of his creation, while the second was not, but only when the angels became blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly termed their morning knowledge.

ARTICLE 2. Whether an Angel Needs Grace in Order To Turn to God?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God.

Objection 1. For, we have no need of grace for what we can accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God, because he loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said (Q. IX, A. 5). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.

Obj. 2. Further, it seems that we need help only for difficult tasks. Now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God, because there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God.

Obj. 3. Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for grace; hence it is said (Zach. 1. 3): *Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to you.* But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace, for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore the angel did not need grace to turn to God.

On the contrary, It was by turning to God that the angel reached to Happiness. If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God, it would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess everlasting life. But this is con-

¹ PL 34, 324, 338.

trary to the saying of the Apostle (Rom. 6. 23): *The grace of God is life everlasting.*

I answer that, The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn to God, as the object of Happiness. For, as was observed above (Q. IX, A. 2), the natural movement of the will is the principle of all things that we will. But the will's natural inclination is directed towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural principle. Thus it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat, and to generate fire; but to generate flesh is beyond the natural power of fire, and consequently, fire has no tendency to this, except in so far as it is moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul.

Now it was shown above (Q. XII, A. 4), when we were treating of God's knowledge, that to see God in His essence, in which the ultimate Happiness of the rational creature consists, is beyond the nature of every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the movement of the will directed towards such Happiness unless it is moved through a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help of grace. Therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own will be turned to such Happiness, except by the help of grace.

Reply Obj. 1. The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to God, so far as God bestows Happiness by the vision of His essence.

Reply Obj. 2. A thing is difficult which is beyond a power; and this happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the natural capacity of the power. And then, if it can be attained by some help, it is said to be difficult, but if it can in no way be attained, then it is impossible; thus it is impossible for a man to fly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power, not according to the natural order of such power, but owing to some added hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of the moving power of the soul, because the soul, considered in itself, can be moved in any direction, but is hindered from so doing by the weight of the body; consequently it is difficult for a man to mount upwards. To be turned to his ultimate Happiness is difficult for man both because it is beyond his nature, and because he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and the infection of sin. But it is difficult for an angel only because it is supernatural.

Reply Obj. 3. Every movement of the will towards God can be termed a conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God. The first is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature enjoying the possession of God, and for such conversion, perfecting grace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits Happiness; and for this there is required habitual grace, which is the principle of merit. The third turning to God is that whereby a man disposes himself so that he may have grace; for this no habitual grace is required, but the operation of God, Who draws the soul towards Himself, according to Lament. 5. 21: *Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.* Hence it is clear that there is no need to go on to infinity.

ARTICLE 3. Whether the Angels Were Created in Grace?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that the angels were not created in grace.

Objection 1. For Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* ii. 8)¹ that the angelic nature was first made without form, and was called heaven; but afterwards it received its form, and was then called light. But such formation comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.

Obj. 2. Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If, therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever have turned away from God.

Obj. 3. Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the angels were not made blessed in their creation. Therefore it seems that they were not created in grace, but that they were first created in nature only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were made blessed.

On the contrary, Augustine says,² "Who wrought the good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His will, that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him, at the same time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them?"

I answer that, Although there are conflicting opinions on this point, some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state,³

¹ PL 31, 360; also, 1. 3. 9 (317, 215); 111, 201 (292).

² *City of God*, XII, 9 (PL 41, 557).

³ William of Auvergne, *Summa Aurea*, II, 1. 1 (fol. 346b); Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theol.*, I-II, n. 100 (QR II, 126); Bonaventure, *In Sent.*, II, d. IV, a. 1. 9. 11 (QR II, 111). See also Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacram.*, 1. pt. V, chap. 19 (PL 176, 231); Lombard, *Sent.*, II, d. III, chap. 4 (QR I, 320); d. IV, chap. 1 (QR I, 324).

to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; and thus an earthly king, by reason of not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately.

On the contrary, Augustine says: *As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power, so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life, and this spirit by God Himself.*²⁶

I answer that, In government there are two things to be considered: the nature of government, which is providence itself; and the execution of government. As to the nature of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others.

The reason for this is that, since God is the very essence of goodness, everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, function or knowledge (and such is the nature of government) consists in knowing the individuals within whose domain the action takes place. Thus, the best physician is not the one who gives his attention only to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we must say that God possesses, in its very essence, the government of all things, even of the very least.

But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better in the degree that the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government; as in the case of a teacher, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but also makes some of them to be the teachers of others.

Reply Obj. 1. Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even as concerns the nature of government; and this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the nature of government, into three parts.

Reply Obj. 2. If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Therefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one.

Reply Obj. 3. That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his imperfection, but also of his dignity; because from the array of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence.

²⁶ *De Trin.*, III, 4 (PL 42, 873).

Seventh Article

WHETHER ANYTHING CAN HAPPEN OUTSIDE THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the divine government. For Boethius says that *God disposes all by good.*²⁷ Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the divine government, it would follow that no evil exists.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order of the divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and by chance.

Obj. 3. Further, the order of divine providence is certain and unchangeable, because it is in accord with an eternal design. Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent: which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the divine government.

On the contrary, It is written (*Esth.* xiii. 9): *O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will.*

I answer that, It is possible for an effect to happen outside the order of some particular cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason for this is that no effect happens outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other and impeding cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause. Thus, indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore, as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order of divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause.

Reply Obj. 1. There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is always founded on good, as was shown above.²⁸ Therefore something is said to be evil because it escapes from the order of some particular good. If it escaped wholly from the order of the divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.

Reply Obj. 2. Things are said to be by chance as regards some particular

²⁷ *De Consol.*, III, prose 12 (PL 63, 779). ²⁸ Q. 48, 2, 3.

cause from whose order they escape. But as to the order of divine providence, *nothing in the world happens by chance*, as Augustine declares.²⁰

Reply Obj. 3. Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the divine government.

Eighth Article

WHETHER ANYTHING CAN RESIST THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the divine government. For it is written (*Isa. iii. 8*): *Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord.*

Obj. 2. Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God.

Obj. 3. Further, everything is subject to the order of the divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things rebel against the order of the divine government.

On the contrary, Boethius says:²⁰ *There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly*, as is said (*Wis. viii. 1*): of divine wisdom.

I answer that, We may consider the order of divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the divine government.

Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the divine government. This can be proved in two ways: First, from the fact that the order of the divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only; *for no one acts intending evil*, as Dionysius says.²¹ Secondly, from the fact that, as we have said above, every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; just as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the archer. Hence, every agent, whether natural or voluntary, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said *to order all things sweetly* (*Wis. viii. 1*).

²⁰ *Lib. 83 Quaest., q. 24* (PL 40, 17).

²¹ *De Consol., III, prose 12* (PL 63, 779).

²² *De Div. Nom., IV, 31* (PG 3, 732).

Reply Obj. 1. Some are said to think, speak or act against God, not because they entirely resist the order of the divine government (for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good), but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.

Reply Obj. 2 is clear from the above.

Reply Obj. 3. From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause, but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.

especially in the second way by an interior inclination of the will.

Reply Obj. 1. A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.

Reply Obj. 2. To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.

Reply Obj. 3. If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (*ad 2*), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD WORKS IN EVERY AGENT?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all.

Obj. 2. Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all.

Obj. 3. Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates.

Therefore, if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xxvi. 12): *Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in (Vulgate—for) us.*

I answer that, Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God alone is the immediate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things, to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the

thing wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp.

Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first: for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to operate, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colours, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colours are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according to Job x. 11: *Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews.*

Reply Obj. 1. God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.

Reply Obj. 2. One action does not proceed from two

agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary and a secondary agent.

Reply Obj. 3. God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action, as above explained.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN DO ANYTHING OUTSIDE THE ESTABLISHED ORDER OF NATURE?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (*Contra Faust.* xxvi. 3) says: *God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature.* But that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order.

Obj. 2. Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature.

Obj. 3. Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore if God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is changeable; which cannot be said.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xxvi. *ibid.*): *God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature.*

I answer that, From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household;

reduced to a pre-ordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: *The digger of a grave found a treasure*. And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows of a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Q. CV., A. 4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.

So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were *fore-spoken*, we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v. 1): *If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue*. For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to Divine providence, whereby *nothing happens at random in the world*, as Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 24).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER FATE IS IN CREATED THINGS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v. 1) that the

Divine will or power is called fate. But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.

Obj. 2. Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.

Obj. 3. Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.

On the contrary, Boethius says (*De Consol.* iv.): *Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things*.

I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above (Q. XXII., A. 3; Q. CIII., A. 6), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (*De Consol.* iv.): *Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged*. Of each of these things we have spoken above (A. 1; Q. CIV., A. 2; Q. CX., A. 1; Q. CXIII., Q. CXIV.). It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects.

Reply Obj. 1. The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* v. 8) calls the *series of causes*, has not the nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as

being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very disposition or *series*, i.e., order, of second causes.

Reply Obj. 2. Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.

Reply Obj. 3. Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: *Thy fate draws thee.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER FATE IS UNCHANGEABLE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iv.): *As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence.*

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Topic.* ii. 7): *If we be moved, what is in us is moved.* But fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, as Boëthius says (*loc. cit.*). Therefore fate is changeable.

Obj. 3. Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.

On the contrary, Boëthius says (*ibid.*) that fate is an unchangeable disposition.

I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by

Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have held that the series itself or disposition of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above (Q. CXV., A. 6).

Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, *De Homine*). This too has been disproved above for the reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.

We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: *If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen.* Wherefore Boëthius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds,—*which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence, must also itself be unchangeable.*

From this the answers to the objections are clear.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO FATE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iv.): *The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed.* Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v. 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that

motion of the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.

Obj. 2. Further, the intellect in presenting the object to the will stands in relation to it as the imagination in representing the object to the sensitive appetite. But the intellect, in presenting the desirable thing, does not move the sensitive appetite; indeed, sometimes our imagination affects us more than what is set before us in a picture, and sometimes not at all.¹ Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.

Obj. 3. Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. But the will is moved by the intellect, for we use our intellect to move the will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says² that the desirable thing is "a mover not moved," but the will is "a mover moved."

Answer that, A thing requires to be moved in so far as it is in potency to something; for that which is in potency must be moved to act by something actual, and to do so to move. Now a power of the soul is seen in potency to different things in two ways: with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus light sometimes sees actually, and sometimes does not see; and sometimes it sees white, sometimes black. It needs a mover therefore in two respects: namely, as to the exercise of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the object, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting, while the other is on the part of the subject, by reason of which the act is determined.

The motion of the subject itself is due to the agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above (Q. 1, A. 2), the principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end, the command moves the art which is concerned with the means, "just as the art of sail-making commands the art of shipbuilding."³ Now in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power is included under the object of the will as some particular good, and the will moves the act or power to which the universal

end belongs moves to their acts the acts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good—that is, the order of the whole army—by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.

On the other hand, the object moves by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, by which in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal being and truth, which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.

Reply Obj. 1. The passage quoted proves not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness does not move the sensitive appetite, so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect.⁴

Reply Obj. 3. The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act, since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will, since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect.

ARTICLE 2. Whether the Will Is Moved by the Sensitive Appetite?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appetite.

Objection 1. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to be passive," as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xii, 16).⁵ But the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the intellectual appetite, just as sense is less excellent than intellect. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.

Obj. 2. Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the movement of the will, which

⁴ *Soul*, III, 9 (432^b26); III, 10 (433^b17).
⁵ *PL* 34, 497.

¹ *ut*, III, 3 (427^b23).
² *Ibid.*, III, 6 (433^b10).
³ *Physics*, II, 2 (194^b25).

movement is universal, as following the universal apprehension of the intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, as is proved in the *Physics*,¹ the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.

On the contrary, It is written (James 1, 14): "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured." But man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence unless his will were moved by the sensitive appetite, in which concupiscence resides. Therefore the sensitive appetite moves the will.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), that which is apprehended under the aspect of good and fitting moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appears to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. But fitness is spoken of by way of relation; and so it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Therefore as the Philosopher says,² "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him."

Now it is evident that man is changed to a certain disposition according to a passion of the sensitive appetite. Therefore according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting which does not seem so when he is not so affected; thus that seems good to a man when angered which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way the sensitive appetite moves the will on the part of the object.

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing hinders that which is better absolutely and in itself from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly the will is absolutely more excellent than the sensitive appetite, but in respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.

Reply Obj. 2. Men's acts and choices are in reference to singulars. Therefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.

¹ *Aristotle*, *Physics*, VIII, 5 (257^b23).
² *Ethics*, III, 5 (1114^a32).

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says,¹ the reason, in which resides the will, moves by its command the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, by a despotic rule, as a slave is moved by his master, but by a royal and political rule, as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will, and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.

ARTICLE 3. Whether the Will Moves Itself?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that the will does not move itself.

Objection 1. For every mover, as such, is in act, but what is moved is in potency, since "movement is the act of that which is in potency, as such."² Now the same thing is not in potency and in act in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.

Obj. 2. Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present. But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.

Obj. 3. Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above (A. 1). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers, which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.

On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to be will. But this would not be so had it not the power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), it pertains to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object. Now, as stated above (Q. VIII, A. 2), the end is in things desirable, what the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potency to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through willing the end, moves itself to will the means.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved, and so neither is it in act and in potency in respect of the same. But in so far as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potency to act with

¹ *Politics*, I, 5 (1254^a5).
² *Aristotle*, *Physics*, III, 1 (201^a10).

regard to the means, so that it actually wills them.

Reply Obj. 2. The power of the will is always actually present to itself, but the act of the will, by which it wills an end, is not always in the will. And this is the way it moves itself. Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.

Reply Obj. 3. The will is moved by the intellect otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object, whereas it is moved by itself as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.

ARTICLE 4. *Whether the Will Is Moved by an Exterior Principle?*

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior.

Objection 1. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it pertains to the notion of the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it pertains to the notion of the natural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not from anything exterior.

Obj. 2. Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above (Q. VI, A. 4). But "the violent act is one the principle of which is outside the agent."¹ Therefore the will cannot be moved by anything exterior.

Obj. 3. Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover does not need to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.

On the contrary. The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A. 1). But the object of the will can be something exterior offered to the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.

I answer that. As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is moved to the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior principle.

For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potency, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above (A. 3.), in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel. For when a man wills to be healed, he

¹ Aristotle, *Ethics*, III, 1 (1110^a1).

begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician, and he wills this. But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must of necessity have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Therefore we must of necessity suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the impulse of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the *Endemian Ethics*.²

Reply Obj. 1. It pertains to the notion of the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, but it is not necessary that this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by another. And so though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the natural movement is from without, that, namely, which moves nature.

Reply Obj. 2. For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of him that suffers violence." This does not happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle, for it is the will that wills, though moved by another. But this movement would be violent if it were counter to the movement of the will, which in the present case is impossible, since then the will would will and not will the same thing.

Reply Obj. 3. The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Therefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover.

ARTICLE 5. *Whether the Will Is Moved by a Heavenly Body?*

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It seems that the human will is moved by a heavenly body.

Objection 1. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved in the *Physics*.³ But human movements are various and multiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is uniform according to its nature.

² VII, 14 (1248^a14).

³ Aristotle, VIII, 9 (265^a27); cf. IV, 14 (223^b18).

Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine (*De Trin.* III, 4)¹ "the lower bodies are moved by the higher." But the movements of the human body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.

Obj. 3. Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the will. But this would not be so if the heavenly bodies could not move man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* II, 7)² that the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts. But they would be, if the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly bodies.

I answer that. It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its exterior object, that is to say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will through being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers, are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.

But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the human will in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as to the exercise of its act.³ But this is impossible. For "the will," as stated in the book on the *Soul*,⁴ "is in the reason." Now the reason is a power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ. And so it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the reverse; because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever. Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or the will. For this reason Aristotle⁵ ascribed to those who held that intellect does not differ from sense the theory that "such is the will of men as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on"⁶ (referring to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally by the heavenly

¹ PL 42, 873.

² PG 94, 803.

³ Cf. Denifle, *Chartularium*, n. 432 (t. 487).

⁴ Aristotle, III, 9 (412^b5).

⁵ *Soul*, III, 3 (417^a25).

⁶ *Odyssey*, XVIII, 136.

bodies—that is, through those bodies (whose acts they are) being moved.

But since it has been stated (A. 2) that the intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will, in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite.

Reply Obj. 1. The multiform movements of the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and will. This can be said not of any body, but of some superior immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens as to its cause.

Reply Obj. 2. The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body in so far as the disposition suitable to a particular movement is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence the will begins to will or not to will something; for instance, when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from without, not on the part of an inward impulse.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (cf. Part I, Q. LXXXIV, AA. 6, 7) the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Therefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural make-up. But the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (*Centiloquium* v),⁷ "the wise man governs the stars," which is as though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is free and in no way subject to the movement of the heavens, to effects of this nature of the heavenly bodies.

Or, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* II, 17):⁸ "We must confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind

⁷ Cf. *Quadrupartium*, I, 3; cf. Also Albert, *In Sent.*, II, d. XV, A. 4 (BO XXVII, 270).

⁸ PL 34, 278.

to fulfil it by his own natural powers. For human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural power, even in the state of corrupted nature, by virtue of its natural endowments, it is capable of particular good, as to build dwellings, vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot be good natural to it, so as to fall short of it, just as a sick man can of himself not move, yet he cannot be moved without the movements of one in whom he is, unless by the help of medicine he be

thus in the state of perfect nature man has gratuitous strength superadded to nature for one reason, that is, in order to do will supernatural good; but for two in the state of corrupt nature, namely, to be healed, and beyond this in order to do works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Furthermore, in both states man needs the Divine help, that he may be able to act well.

Obj. 1. Man is master of his acts and willing or not willing, because of the dominion of reason, which can be bent to one or another. And although he is master of deliberating or not deliberating, yet this is not by a previous deliberation; and he cannot go on to infinity, we must come to this, that man's free choice is by an extrinsic principle, which is above human mind, namely, by God, as the Philosopher proves in the chapter on Good Forthence the mind of man still healthy is much master of its act that it does not be moved by God; and much more the power of man weakened by sin, by which he is ordered from good by the corruption of nature.

Obj. 2. To sin is nothing else than to do the good which belongs to any being according to its nature. Now as every created being is from another, and considered as its being from another, and considered as nothing, so does it need to be preceded by another in the good which pertains to nature. For it can of itself fail in good, as of itself it can fall into non-being, unless upheld by God.

Obj. 3. Man cannot even know truth without Divine help, as stated above (A. 1). Yet human nature is more corrupted by sin than to the desire for good, than in regard to knowledge of truth.

emian Ethics, vii, 14 (1248¹⁴).

ARTICLE 3. *Whether By His Own Natural Powers and Without Grace Man Can Love God Above All Things?*

We proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that without grace man cannot love God above all things by his own natural powers.

Objection 1. For to love God above all things is the proper and principal act of charity. Now man cannot of himself possess charity, since the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us, as is said Rom. 5. 5. Therefore man by his natural powers alone cannot love God above all things.

Obj. 2. Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love God above all things is to tend above oneself. Therefore without the help of grace no created nature can love God above itself.

Obj. 3. Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the best love, which is that He be loved above all things. Now without grace man is not capable of giving God the best love, which is His due; otherwise it would be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace and with his natural powers alone, cannot love God above all things.

On the contrary, As some maintain,² man was first made with only natural endowments, and in this state it is manifest that he loved God to some extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or less than himself, otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God above himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can love God more than himself and above all things.

I answer that, As was said above (Part I. Q. LX, A. 5), where the various opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set forth, man in a state of integral nature, could by his natural power do the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not without the help of God moving him. Now to love God above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only rational but irrational, and even to inanimate nature according to the manner of love, which can belong to each creature. And the reason of this is that it is natural to all to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit to be sought and loved since "all things act according as they are naturally fit" as stated in

² Cf. above, Part I, Q. xcvi, A. 1.

the Physics.¹ Now it is manifest that the good of the part is for the good of the whole. Hence each particular thing, by its natural appetite or love, loves its own proper good on account of the common good of the whole universe, which is God. Hence Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv*)² that God "turns everything to love of Himself." Hence in the state of original nature man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God more than himself and above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will, which, unless it is cured by God's grace, follows its private good, on account of the corruption of nature. And hence we must say that in the state of integral nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments in order to love God above all things naturally, although he needed God's help to move him to it; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for this, the help of grace which heals his nature.

Reply Obj. 1. Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things according as He is the beginning and the end of natural good; charity however loves Him as He is the object of Happiness, and according as man has a spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds to natural love of God a certain quickness and joy, in the same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. When it is said that nature cannot rise above itself, we must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any object above itself, for it is clear that our intellect by its natural knowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our natural knowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God above all things is not such an act, for it is natural to every creature, as was said above.

Reply Obj. 3. Love is said to be best not only with respect to the degree of love but also with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode of love. And thus the highest degree of love is that by which charity loves God as the giver of Happiness, as was said above (Reply 1).

¹ Aristotle, II, 8 (1099¹⁰).
² Sect. 10 (PG 3708).

ARTICLE 4. *Whether Man Without Grace and By His Own Natural Powers Can Fulfil the Commandments of the Law?*

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that man without grace, and by his own natural powers, can fulfil the commandments of the Law.

Objection 1. For the Apostle says (Rom. 2. 14) that the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the Law. Now what a man does naturally he can do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfil the commandments of the Law without grace.

Obj. 2. Further, Jerome says (*Expos. Cathol. Fid.*)³ that they are anathema who say God has laid impossibilities upon man. Now what a man cannot fulfil by himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfil all the commandments of the Law by himself.

Obj. 3. Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest is this, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart* (Matt. 22. 37). Now man with his natural endowments can fulfil this command by loving God above all things, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore man can fulfil all the commandments of the Law without grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Hares. lxxxviii*)⁴ that it is part of the Pelagian heresy that "they believe that without grace man can fulfil all the Divine commandments."

I answer that, There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the Law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man does works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in the state of integral nature could fulfil all the commandments of the Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin in that state, since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the Divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfil all the Divine commandments without healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the law can be fulfilled not merely as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, that is, their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the state of integral nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil the commandments of the law without grace. Hence, Augustine (*De Corrupt. et Grat. ii*)⁵ having stated that "without grace men can do

³ Cf. Pelagius, *Epist.*, I, 16 (PL 30, 33).
⁴ PL 42, 47.
⁵ PL 44, 917.

they do by nature those things that are of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore in us the image of God, after which we were naturally made.²⁴

Reply Obj. 2. What we can do with the divine assistance is not altogether impossible to us; for according to the Philosopher: *What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by ourselves.*²⁵ Hence Jerome concedes that *our will is in such a way free that we must confess we still always require God's help.*²⁶

Reply Obj. 3. Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfill the precept of the love of God according as it is fulfilled through charity, as was stated above.

Fifth Article

WHETHER MAN CAN MERIT ETERNAL LIFE WITHOUT GRACE?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that man can merit eternal life without grace. For our Lord says (*Matt. xix. 17*): *If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments*; from which it would seem that to enter into eternal life rests with man's will. But what rests with our will, we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can merit eternal life of himself.

Obj. 2. Further, eternal life is the wage or reward bestowed by God on men, according to *Matt. v. 12*: *Your reward is very great in heaven*. But wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to his works, according to *Ps. lxi. 13*: *Thou wilt render to every man according to his works*. Hence, since man is master of his works, it seems that it is within his power to reach eternal life.

Obj. 3. Further, eternal life is the last end of human life. Now every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end. Much more, therefore, can man attain to eternal life by his natural endowments, without grace.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (*Rom. vi. 23*): *The grace of God is life everlasting*. And, as the Gloss says, this is said *that we may understand that God, of His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life.*²⁷

I answer that, Acts leading to an end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and hence we see in natural things that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active power, but only such as is proportioned to its power. Now eternal life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we have said above.²⁸ Hence man, by his

²⁴ *De Spir. et Litt.*, XXVII (PL 44, 229). ²⁵ *Eth.*, III, 3 (1112b 27). ²⁶ Cf. Pelagius, *Libellus Fidei ad Innocentium* (PL 45, 1718). ²⁷ *Glossa ordin.* (VI, 13F); Peter Lombard, *In Rom.*, super VI, 23 (PL 191, 1412).—Cf. St. Augustine, *Enchir.*, CVII (PL 40, 282). ²⁸ Q. 5, a. 5.

natural powers, cannot produce meritorious works proportioned to eternal life; but for this a higher power is needed, viz., the power of grace. And thus, without grace, man cannot merit eternal life; yet he can perform works leading to a good which is connatural to man, as *to toil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends*, and the like, as Augustine says in his third *Reply to the Pelagians*.²⁹

Reply Obj. 1. Man, by his will, does works meritorious of eternal life; but, as Augustine says in the same book, for this it is necessary that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God.³⁰

Reply Obj. 2. As the Gloss says upon *Rom. vi. 23* (*The grace of God is life everlasting*): *It is certain that everlasting life is meted to good works; but the works to which it is meted belong to God's grace.*³¹ What is more, it has been said that to fulfill the commandments of the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfillment may be meritorious, requires grace.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection has to do with the natural end of man. Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of grace to a higher end, which lower natures can in no way reach; even as a man who can recover his health by the help of medicines is better disposed to health than one who can in no way recover it, as the Philosopher observes.³²

Sixth Article

WHETHER A MAN, BY HIMSELF AND WITHOUT THE EXTERNAL AID OF GRACE, CAN PREPARE HIMSELF FOR GRACE?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that man, by himself and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing impossible is laid upon man, as was stated above. But it is written (*Zach. i. 3*): *Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you*. Now to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it seems that man of himself, and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace.

Obj. 2. Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in him to do, since, if man does what is in him to do, God will not deny him grace; for it is written (*Matt. vii. 11*) that God gives His good Spirit to them that ask Him. But what is in our power, is in us to do. Therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace.

Obj. 3. Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace, with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the first grace; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems that we must not go beyond what was said first, viz., that man, of himself and without grace, can prepare himself for grace.

²⁹ Pseudo-Augustine, *Hypognost.*, III, 4 (PL 45, 1614). ³⁰ *Ibid.* ³¹ Peter Lombard, *In Rom.*, super VI, 23 (PL 191, 1412). ³² *De Caelo*, II, 12 (192b 13).

Obj. 4. Further, it is written (*Prov. xvi. 1*) that it is the part of man to prepare the soul. Now an action is said to be the part of a man when he can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can prepare himself for grace.

On the contrary, It is written (*Jo. vi. 44*): No man can come to Me except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him. But if man could prepare himself, he would not need to be drawn by another. Hence man cannot prepare himself without the help of grace.

I answer that, The preparation of the human will for good is twofold:—the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to enjoy God; and this preparation of the will cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious works, as was stated above. There is a second way in which the human will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself. Now in order that man prepare himself to receive this gift, it is not necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the soul, otherwise we should go on to infinity. But we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God, Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good wish. For it is in these two ways that we need the divine assistance, as was stated above. Now that we need the help of God to move us, is manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every cause must direct its effect to its end; and hence since the order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to the last end by the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate end by the motion of any of the subordinate movers. So, too, the spirit of the soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the leader of the army—and towards following the standard of a regiment by the motion of the standard-bearer. And thus, since God is absolutely the First Mover, it is by His motion that everything seeks Him under the common notion of good, whereby everything seeks to be likened to God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says that *God turns all to Himself*.³² But He directs just men to Himself as to a special end, which they seek and to which they wish to cling, according to *Ps. lxxii. 28*, it is good for Me to adhere to my God. And that they are turned to God can only spring from God's having turned them. Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God; just as whoever has his eyes turned away from the light of the sun prepares himself to receive the sun's light, by turning his eyes towards the sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except by the gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly.

Reply Obj. 1. Man's turning to God is by free choice; and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free choice can be turned to God only when God turns it, according to *Jer. xxxi. 18*: Convert me and I shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God; and *Lament. v 21*: Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.

³² *De Div. Nom.*, IV, 10 (PG 3, 708).

Reply Obj. 2. Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according to *John xv. 5*: Without Me, you can do nothing. Hence when a man is said to do what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according as he is moved by God.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection regards habitual grace, for which some preparation is required, since every form requires a disposition in that which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be moved by God, no further motion is presupposed, since God is the First Mover. Hence we need not go to infinity.

Reply Obj. 4. It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since he does this by his free choice. And yet he does not do this without the help of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above.

Seventh Article

WHETHER MAN CAN RISE FROM SIN WITHOUT THE HELP OF GRACE?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that man can rise from sin without the help of grace. For what is presupposed to grace takes place without grace. But to rise from sin is presupposed to the illumination of grace, since it is written (*Ephes. v. 14*): Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten thee. Therefore man can rise from sin without grace.

Obj. 2. Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as was stated above.³¹ Now man, by force of his nature, can rise from illness to health, without the external help of medicine, since there still remains in him the principle of life, from which natural operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal reason, man may be restored by himself, and return from the state of sin to the state of justice without the help of external grace.

Obj. 3. Further, every natural thing can return by itself to the act befitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its natural coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural movement. Now sin is an act against nature, as is clear from Damascene.³² Hence it seems that man by himself can return from sin to the state of justice.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (*Gal. ii. 21* [cf. *iii. 21*]): For if there had been a law given which could give life, then Christ died in vain, i.e., to no purpose. Hence with equal reason, if man has a nature whereby he can be justified, Christ died in vain, i.e., to no purpose. But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore he cannot be justified by himself, i.e., he cannot return from a state of sin to a state of justice.

³¹ Q. 71, 2. 1, ad 3. ³² *De Fide Orth.*, II, 4; 30 (PG 94, 876; 976); cf. *op. cit.*, IV, 20 (PG 94, 1196).

Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood. And this came of more copious mercy than if He had forgiven sins without satisfaction. Hence St. Paul says (Ephes. ii. 4): *God, Who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ.*

Reply Obj. 4. The sin of the angels was irreparable; not so the sin of the first man (I., Q. LXIV., A. 2).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WAS ANY OTHER POSSIBLE WAY OF HUMAN DELIVERANCE BESIDE THE PASSION OF CHRIST?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there was no other possible way of human deliverance besides Christ's Passion. For our Lord says (John xii. 24): *Amen, amen I say to you, unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground dieth, itself remaineth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit.* Upon this St. Augustine observes that *Christ called Himself the seed.* Consequently, unless He suffered death, He would not otherwise have produced the fruit of our redemption.

Obj. 2. Further, our Lord addresses the Father (Matth. xxvi. 42): *My Father, if this chalice may not pass away but I must drink it, Thy will be done.* But He spoke there of the chalice of the Passion. Therefore Christ's Passion could not pass away; hence Hilary says: *Therefore the chalice cannot pass except He drink of it, because we cannot be restored except through His Passion.*

Obj. 3. Further, God's justice required that Christ should satisfy by the Passion in order that man might be delivered from sin. But Christ cannot let His justice pass; for it is written (2 Tim. ii. 13): *If we believe not, He continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself.* But He would deny Himself were He to deny His justice, since He is justice itself. It seems impossible, then, for man to be delivered otherwise than by Christ's Passion.

Obj. 4. Further, there can be no falsehood underlying

faith. But the Fathers of old believed that Christ would suffer. Consequently, it seems that it had to be that Christ should suffer.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii.): *We assert that the way whereby God deigned to deliver us by the man Jesus Christ, Who is mediator between God and man, is both good and befitting the Divine dignity; but let us also show that other possible means were not lacking on God's part, to Whose power all things are equally subordinate.*

I answer that, A thing may be said to be possible or impossible in two ways: first of all, simply and absolutely; or secondly, from supposition. Therefore, speaking simply and absolutely, it was possible for God to deliver mankind otherwise than by the Passion of Christ, because *no word shall be impossible with God* (Luke i. 37). Yet it was impossible if some supposition be made. For since it is impossible for God's foreknowledge to be deceived and His will or ordinance to be frustrated, then, supposing God's foreknowledge and ordinance regarding Christ's Passion, it was not possible at the same time for Christ not to suffer, or for mankind to be delivered otherwise than by Christ's Passion. And the same holds good of all things foreknown and preordained by God, as was laid down in the First Part (Q. XIV., A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord is speaking there presupposing God's foreknowledge and predetermination, according to which it was resolved that the fruit of man's salvation should not follow unless Christ suffered.

Reply Obj. 2. In the same way we must understand what is here objected in the second instance: *If this chalice may not pass away but I must drink of it*—that is to say, because Thou hast so ordained it—hence He adds: *Thy will be done.*

Reply Obj. 3. Even this justice depends on the Divine will, requiring satisfaction for sin from the human race. But if He had willed to free man from sin without any satisfaction, He would not have acted against justice. For a judge, while preserving justice, cannot pardon fault without penalty, if he must visit fault committed against

another—for instance, against another man, or against the State, or any Prince in higher authority. But God has no one higher than Himself, for He is the sovereign and common good of the whole universe. Consequently, if He forgive sin, which has the formality of fault in that it is committed against Himself, He wrongs no one: just as anyone else, overlooking a personal trespass, without satisfaction, acts mercifully and not unjustly. And so David exclaimed when he sought mercy: *To Thee only have I sinned* (Ps. l. 6), as if to say: *Thou canst pardon me without injustice.*

Reply Obj. 4. Human faith, and even the Divine Scriptures upon which faith is based, are both based on the Divine foreknowledge and ordinance. And the same reason holds good of that necessity which comes of supposition, and of the necessity which arises of the Divine foreknowledge and will.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WAS ANY MORE SUITABLE WAY OF DELIVERING THE HUMAN RACE THAN BY CHRIST'S PASSION?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there was some other more suitable way of delivering the human race besides Christ's Passion. For nature in its operation imitates the Divine work, since it is moved and regulated by God. But nature never employs two agents where one will suffice. Therefore, since God could have liberated mankind solely by His Divine will, it does not seem fitting that Christ's Passion should have been added for the deliverance of the human race.

Obj. 2. Further, natural actions are more suitably performed than deeds of violence, because violence is a *severance or lapse from what is according to nature*, as is said in *De Caelo* ii. But Christ's Passion brought about His death by violence. Therefore it would have been more appropriate had Christ died a natural death rather than suffer for man's deliverance.

Obj. 3. Further, it seems most fitting that whosoever keeps something unjustly and by violence, should be deprived of it by some superior power; hence Isaias says (lii. 3): *You were sold gratis, and you shall be redeemed without money.* But the devil possessed no right over man, whom he had deceived by guile, and whom he held subject in servitude by a sort of violence. Therefore it seems most suitable that Christ should have despoiled the devil solely by His power and without the Passion.

On the contrary, St. Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii.): *There was no other more suitable way of healing our misery than by the Passion of Christ.*

I answer that, Among means to an end that one is the more suitable whereby the various concurring means employed are themselves helpful to such end. But in this that man was delivered by Christ's Passion, many other things besides deliverance from sin concurred for man's salvation. In the first place, man knows thereby how much God loves him, and is thereby stirred to love Him in return, and herein lies the perfection of human salvation; hence the Apostle says (Rom. v. 8): *God commendeth His charity towards us; for when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ died for us.* Secondly, because thereby He set us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues displayed in the Passion, which are requisite for man's salvation. Hence it is written (1 Pet. ii. 21): *Christ also suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow in His steps.* Thirdly, because Christ by His Passion not only delivered man from sin, but also merited justifying grace for him and the glory of bliss, as shall be shown later (Q. XLVIII., A. 1; Q. XLIX., AA. 1, 5). Fourthly, because man is all the more bound to refrain from sin, when he bears in mind that he has been redeemed by Christ's blood, according to 1 Cor. vi. 20: *You are bought with a great price; glorify and bear God in your body.* Fourthly, because it redounded to man's greater dignity, that as man was overcome and deceived by the devil, so also it should be a man that should overthrow the devil; and as man

that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are necessary absolutely.

Ninth Article

WHETHER GOD WILL EVILS?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says: *Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things.*²⁶ Therefore God wills evil things.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says: *Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything, i.e., the universe.*²⁷ And Augustine says: *Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good the more evidently, so that the good be more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil.*²⁸ But God wills all that pertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evils.

Obj. 3. Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evils should exist.

On the contrary, Augustine says: *No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse: and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it.*²⁹ Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God does not will evils.

I answer that, Since the good and the appetible are the same in nature, as was said before,³⁰ and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should

²⁶ *Enchir.*, XCVI (PL 40, 276). ²⁷ *De Div. Nom.*, IV, 19 (PG 3, 717). ²⁸ *Enchir.*, X (PL 40, 236). ²⁹ *Lib. 83 Quaest.*, q. 3 (PL 40, 11). ³⁰ Q. 5, a. 1.

be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent does not intend privation or corruption; he intends the form to which is yet annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which yet implies the corruption of another. For when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, which yet is accompanied by the killing of the animal. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, which is yet accompanied by the deformity of sin.

Now the evil that accompanies one good is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus, in willing justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the order of nature, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.

Reply Obj. 1. Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done.³¹ This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words *that evil should be or be done*. This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is outside the intention of the sinner that any good should follow from his sin; as it was outside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged by that which pertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.

³¹ Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacram.*, I, iv, 13 (PL 176, 239); *Summa Sent.*, I, 13 (PL 176, 66).—Cf. Peter Lombard, *Sent.*, I, xlv, 3 (I, 280)

Reply Obj. 2. Evil does not contribute towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as was said above. Therefore, in saying that *evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe*, Dionysius draws this conclusion as the consequence of false premises.

Reply Obj. 3. The statements that evil comes to be and that it does not come to be are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to be and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed, since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done; but He wills to permit evil to be done, and this is a good.

Tenth Article

WHETHER GOD HAS FREE CHOICE?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God has not free choice. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son: *God alone it is Who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free choice, can be inclined to either side.*³²

Obj. 2. Further, free choice is a faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said. Therefore there is not free choice in God.

On the contrary, Ambrose says: *The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity.*³³

I answer that, We have free choice with respect to what we do not will of necessity, or by natural instinct. That we will to be happy does not pertain to free choice but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free choice. Since then God wills His own goodness necessarily, but other things not necessarily, as was shown above, He has free choice with respect to what He does not will necessarily.

Reply Obj. 1. Jerome seems to deny free choice to God, not absolutely, but not as regards the turning to sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Since the evil of sin consists in turning

³² *Epist. XXI* (PL 22, 393). ³³ *De Fide*, II, 6 (PL 16, 592).

away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as was above shown, it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can choose one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be or not to be. In the same way we ourselves can, without sin, will to sit down and not will to sit down.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers penance as a passion.

Reply Obj. 2. To desire vengeance on another, through passion, belongs to the irascible appetite, but to desire or take vengeance on oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will.

Reply Obj. 3. The memory is a power that apprehends the past. But penance belongs not to the apprehensive but to the appetitive power, which presupposes an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance is not in the memory, but presupposes it.

Reply Obj. 4. The will, as stated above (P. I., Q. LXXXII., A. 4; P. I-II., Q. IX., A. 1), moves all the other powers of the soul; so that it is not unreasonable for penance to be subjected in the will, and to produce an effect in each power of the soul.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE ORIGINATES FROM FEAR?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that penance does not originate from fear. For penance originates in displeasure at sin. But this belongs to charity, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore penance originates from love rather than fear.

Obj. 2. Further, men are induced to do penance, through the expectation of the heavenly kingdom, according to Matth. iii. 2 and iv. 17: *Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.* Now the kingdom of heaven is the object of hope. Therefore penance results from hope rather than from fear.

Obj. 3. Further, fear is an internal act of man. But penance does not seem to arise in us through any work of man, but through the operation of God, according to Jerem. xxxi. 19: *After Thou didst convert me I did penance.* Therefore penance does not result from fear.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xxvi. 17): *As a woman with child, when she draweth near the time of her delivery, is in pain, and crieth out in her pangs, so are we become, by*

penance, to wit; and according to another* version the text continues: *Through fear of Thee, O Lord, we have conceived, and been as it were in labour, and have brought forth the spirit of salvation, i.e. of salutary penance, as is clear from what precedes.* Therefore penance results from fear.

I answer that, We may speak of penance in two ways: first, as to the habit, and then it is infused by God immediately without our operating as principal agents, but not without our co-operating dispositively by certain acts. Secondly, we may speak of penance, with regard to the acts whereby in penance we co-operate with God operating, the first principle† of which acts is the operation of God in turning the heart, according to Lament. v. 21: *Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted;* the second, an act of faith; the third, a movement of servile fear, whereby a man is withdrawn from sin through fear of punishment; the fourth, a movement of hope, whereby a man makes a purpose of amendment, in the hope of obtaining pardon; the fifth, a movement of charity, whereby sin is displeasing to man for its own sake and no longer for the sake of the punishment; the sixth, a movement of filial fear whereby a man, of his own accord, offers to make amends to God through fear of Him.

Accordingly it is evident that the act of penance results from servile fear as from the first movement of the appetite in this direction and from filial fear as from its immediate and proper principle.

Reply Obj. 1. Sin begins to displease a man, especially a sinner, on account of the punishments which servile fear regards, before it displeases him on account of its being an offence against God, or on account of its wickedness, which pertains to charity.

Reply Obj. 2. When the kingdom of heaven is said to be at hand, we are to understand that the king is on his way, not only to reward but also to punish. Wherefore John the Baptist said (Matth. iii. 7): *Ye brood of vipers, who hath showed you to flee from the wrath to come?*

* The Septuagint.

† Cf. I-II., Q. cxiii.

Reply Obj. 3. Even the movement of fear proceeds from God's act in turning the heart; wherefore it is written (Deut. v. 29): *Who shall give them to have such a mind, to fear Me?* And so the fact that penance results from fear does not hinder its resulting from the act of God in turning the heart.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PENANCE IS THE FIRST OF THE VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that penance is the first of the virtues. Because, on Matth. iii. 2, *Do penance, etc.*, a gloss says: *The first virtue is to destroy the old man, and hate sin by means of penance.*

Obj. 2. Further, withdrawal from one extreme seems to precede approach to the other. Now all the other virtues seem to regard approach to a term, because they all direct man to do good; whereas penance seems to direct him to withdraw from evil. Therefore it seems that penance precedes all the other virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, before penance, there is sin in the soul. Now no virtue is compatible with sin in the soul. Therefore no virtue precedes penance, which is itself the first of all, and opens the door to the others by expelling sin.

On the contrary, Penance results from faith, hope, and charity, as already stated (AA. 2, 5). Therefore penance is not the first of the virtues.

I answer that, In speaking of the virtues, we do not consider the order of time with regard to the habits, because, since the virtues are connected with one another, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. LXV., A. 1), they all begin at the same time to be in the soul; but one is said to precede the other in the order of nature, which order depends on the order of their acts, in so far as the act of one virtue presupposes the act of another. Accordingly, then, one must say that, even in the order of time, certain praiseworthy acts can precede the act and the habit of penance, e.g. acts of dead faith and hope, and an act of servile

fear; while the act and habit of charity are, in point of time, simultaneous with the act and habit of penance, and with the habits of the other virtues. For, as was stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. CXIII., AA. 7, 8), in the justification of the ungodly, the movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and the movement of the free-will towards sin, which is the act of penance, are simultaneous. Yet of these two acts, the former naturally precedes the latter, because the act of the virtue of penance is directed against sin, through love of God; where the first-mentioned act is the reason and cause of the second.

Consequently penance is not simply the first of the virtues, either in the order of time, or in the order of nature, because, in the order of nature, the theological virtues precede it simply. Nevertheless, in a certain respect, it is the first of the other virtues in the order of time, as regards its act, because this act is the first in the justification of the ungodly; whereas in the order of nature, the other virtues seem to precede, as that which is natural precedes that which is accidental; because the other virtues seem to be necessary for man's good, by reason of their very nature, whereas penance is only necessary if something, viz. sin, be presupposed, as stated above (Q. LV., A. 2), when we spoke of the relation of the sacrament of penance to the other sacraments aforesaid.

Reply Obj. 1. This gloss is to be taken as meaning that the act of penance is the first in point of time, in comparison with the acts of the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. In successive movements withdrawal from one extreme precedes approach to the other, in point of time; and also in the order of nature, if we consider the subject, i.e. the order of the material cause; but if we consider the order of the efficient and final causes, approach to the end is first, for it is this that the efficient cause intends first of all: and it is this order which we consider chiefly in the acts of the soul, as stated in *Phys. ii.*

Reply Obj. 3. Penance opens the door to the other virtues,