

*I answer that,* As the Apostle says (*Rom. xiii. 1*), *those things that are of God are well ordered.* Now the order of things consists in this, that some things are led to God by others, as Dionysius says.<sup>2</sup> And hence, since grace is ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a certain order, so that some are led to God by others.

According to this, consequently, there is a twofold grace: one, whereby man himself is united to God, and this is called *sanctifying grace*; the other is that whereby one man co-operates with another in leading him to God, and this gift is called *gratuitous grace*, since it is bestowed on a man beyond the capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. But since it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather that he may co-operate in the justification of another, it is not called sanctifying grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (*1 Cor. xii. 7*): *And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility, i.e., of others.*

*Reply Obj. 1.* Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently, but formally, *i.e.*, because thereby a man is justified, and is made worthy to be called pleasing to God, according to *Col. i. 21*. *He hath made us worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light.*

*Reply Obj. 2.* Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given, excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways. First, as arising from merit; and this is referred to the person to whom it belongs to do meritorious works, according to *Rom. iv. 4*: *Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt.* The second debt concerns the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to a man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet in neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an obligation to His creature, but rather that the creature ought to be subject to God, so that the divine ordination may be fulfilled in it, which is that a certain nature should have certain conditions or properties, and that by doing certain works it should attain to something further. Hence natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense, but in the second. But supernatural gifts are due in neither sense. Hence they especially merit the name of grace.

*Reply Obj. 3.* Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of gratuitous grace something which also belongs to the nature of grace, since it makes man pleasing to God. And hence gratuitous grace, which does not do this, keeps the common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and non-sanctifying grace.

<sup>2</sup> *De Cael. Hier.*, IV, 3 (PG 3, 181).

## Second Article

## WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO OPERATING AND CO-OPERATING GRACE?

*We proceed thus to the Second Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into operating and co-operating grace. For grace is an accident, as was stated above.<sup>3</sup> Now no accident can act upon its subject. Therefore no grace can be called operating.

*Obj. 2.* Further, if grace operates anything in us, it assuredly brings about justification. But not only grace works this. For Augustine says on *John xiv. 12* (*the works that I do he also shall do*) *He Who created thee without thyself, will not justify thee without thyself.*<sup>4</sup> Therefore no grace ought to be called unqualifiedly operating.

*Obj. 3.* Further, to co-operate seems to pertain to the inferior agent, and not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more than does free choice, according to *Rom. ix. 16*: *It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.* Therefore no grace ought to be called co-operating.

*Obj. 4.* Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to operate and to co-operate are not opposed, for one and the same thing can both operate and co-operate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating and co-operating.

*On the contrary,* Augustine says: *God, by co-operating with us, perfects what He began by operating in us, since He who perfects by co-operation with such as are willing, begins by operating that they may will.*<sup>5</sup> But the operations of God whereby He moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is fittingly divided into operating and co-operating.

*I answer that,* As was stated above, grace may be taken in two ways.<sup>6</sup> First, as a divine help, whereby God moves us to will and to act; secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us. Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and co-operating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover. Hence, in that effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the operation is attributed to God; and it is with reference to this that we speak of *operating grace*. But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is not attributed only to God, but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of *co-operating grace*.

Now there is a double act in us. First, there is the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is as something moved, and God is the

<sup>3</sup> Q. 110, a. 2, ad 2. <sup>4</sup> *Serm. CLXIX*, 11 (PL 38, 923). <sup>5</sup> *De Grat. et Lib. Arb.*, XVII (PL 44, 901). <sup>6</sup> Q. 109, a. 2, 3, 6 and 9; q. 110, a. 2.

mover; and especially so when the will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But there is another act, namely, the exterior act. Now since this act is commanded by the will, as was shown above,<sup>7</sup> the operation of this act is attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both by strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of co-operating grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augustine subjoins: *He operates that we may will; and when we will, He co-operates that we may accomplish.* And thus, if grace is taken for God's gratuitous motion, whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into operating and co-operating grace.

But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a double effect of grace, even as of every other form, the first of which is *being*, and the second, *operation*. Thus, the work of heat is to make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. In this way, habitual grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the principle of meritorious works, which proceed from free choice, it is called co-operating grace.

*Reply Obj. 1.* Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, even as whiteness makes a surface white.

*Reply Obj. 2.* God does not justify us without ourselves, because while we are being justified we consent to God's justice by a movement of our free choice. Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect; and hence the whole operation pertains to grace.

*Reply Obj. 3.* One thing is said to co-operate with another not merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when it helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, under the presupposition of the end, grace co-operates with us.

*Reply Obj. 4.* Operating and co-operating grace are the same grace, but they are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain from what has been said.

## Third Article

## WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO PREVENIENT AND SUBSEQUENT GRACE?

*We proceed thus to the Third Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the divine love. But God's love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according to *1 John iv. 10:*

<sup>7</sup> Q. 17, a. 9.

*Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first loved us.* Therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient and subsequent.

*Obj. 2.* Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since it is sufficient, according to *2 Cor. xii. 9: My grace is sufficient for thee.* But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.

*Obj. 3.* Further, grace is known by its effects. Now there are an infinite number of effects—one preceding another. Hence if it is with regard to these that grace must be divided into prevenient and subsequent, it would seem that there are infinite species of grace. Now no art takes note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.

*On the contrary,* God's grace is the outcome of His mercy. Now both are found in *Ps. lviii. 11: His mercy shall prevent me,* and again, *Ps. xxii. 6: Thy mercy will follow me.* Therefore grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.

*I answer that,* just as grace is divided into operating and co-operating, according to its diverse effects, so also is it divided into prevenient and subsequent, however we consider grace. Now there are five effects of grace in us. Of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second, to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory. And hence grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us, is called prevenient with respect to the second, and inasmuch as it causes the second, it is called subsequent with respect to the first effect. And as one effect is posterior to this effect, and prior to that, so grace may be called prevenient and subsequent because of the same effect viewed in relation to other and different effects. And this is what Augustine says: *It is prevenient, inasmuch as it heals, and subsequent, inasmuch as, being healed, we are strengthened; it is prevenient, inasmuch as we are called, and subsequent, inasmuch as we are glorified.*<sup>8</sup>

*Reply Obj. 1.* God's love signifies something eternal, and hence can never be called anything but prevenient. But grace signifies a temporal effect, which can precede and follow another; and thus grace may be both prevenient and subsequent.

*Reply Obj. 2.* The division into prevenient and subsequent grace does not divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects, as was already said of operating and co-operating grace. For subsequent grace, inasmuch as it pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct from prevenient grace whereby we are at present justified. For even as the charity of earth is not voided in heaven, so must the same be said of the light of grace, since the notion of neither implies imperfection.

*Reply Obj. 3.* Although the effects of grace may be infinite in number,

<sup>8</sup> *De Nat. et. Grat.*, XXXI (Pl. 44, 264).

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*Reply Obj. 2.* A man ought not to return to those things that are behind, by loving them; but, for that matter, he ought to forget them, lest he be drawn to them. Yet he ought to recall them to mind, in order to detest them; for this is to fly from them.

*Reply Obj. 3.* Previous to justification a man must detest each sin he remembers to have committed, and from this remembrance the soul goes on to have a general movement of detestation with regard to all sins committed, in which are included such sins as have been forgotten. For a man is then in such a frame of mind that he would be sorry even for those he does not remember, if they were present to his memory; and this movement co-operates in his justification.

## SIXTH ARTICLE

Whether the Remission of Sins Ought to Be Reckoned Amongst the Things Required for Justification?

*We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification. For the substance of a thing is not reckoned together with those that are required for a thing; thus a man is not reckoned together with his body and soul. But the justification of the ungodly is itself the remission of sins, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned among the things required for the justification of the ungodly.

*Obj. 2.* Further, infusion of grace and remission of sins are the same; as illumination and expulsion of darkness are the same. But a thing ought not to be reckoned together with itself; for unity is opposed to multitude. Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the infusion of grace.

*Obj. 3.* Further, the remission of sin follows as effect from cause, from the free-will's movement towards God and sin; since it is by faith and contrition that sin is forgiven. But an effect ought not to be reckoned with its cause; since things thus enumerated together, and, as it were, condivided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the things required for the justification of the ungodly.

*On the contrary,* In reckoning what is required for a thing we ought not to pass over the end, which is the chief part of everything. Now the remission of sins is the end of the justification of the ungodly; for it is written (Isa. xxvii. 9): *This is all the fruit, that the sin thereof should be taken away.* Hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification.

*I answer that,* There are four things which are accounted to be necessary for the justification of the ungodly, viz., the infusion of grace, the movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the movement of the free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins. The reason for this is that, as stated above (A. 1), the justification of the ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved by God from a state of sin to a state of justice. Now in the movement whereby one thing is moved by another, three things are required:—first, the motion of the mover; secondly, the movement of the moved; thirdly, the consummation of the movement, or the attainment of the end. On the part of the Divine motion, there is the infusion of grace; on the part of the free-will which is moved, there are two movements,—of departure from the term *whence*, and of approach to the term *whereto*; but the consummation of the movement or the attainment of the end of the movement is implied in the remission of sins; for in this is the justification of the ungodly completed.

*Reply Obj. 1.* The justification of the ungodly is called the remission of sins, even as every movement has its species from its term. Nevertheless, many other things are required in order to reach the term, as stated above (A. 5).

*Reply Obj. 2.* The infusion of grace and the remission of sin may be considered in two ways:—First, with respect to the substance of the act, and thus they are the same; for by the same act God bestows grace and remits sin. Secondly, they may be considered on the part of the objects; and thus they differ by the difference between guilt, which is taken away, and grace, which is infused; just as in natural things generation and corruption differ, although the generation of one thing is the corruption of another.

*Reply Obj. 3.* This enumeration is not the division of a genus into its species, in which the things enumerated must be simultaneous; but it is a division of the things required for the completion of anything; and in this enumeration we may have what precedes and what follows, since some of the principles and parts of a composite thing may precede and some follow.

## SEVENTH ARTICLE

Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Takes Place in an Instant or Successively?

*We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as already

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*On the cont* ungodly is caus the Holy Spirit to men's mind. ii. 2: *And sudd heaven as of which the gloss Ghost knows n tification of the instantaneous.*

*I answer that* ungodly consist