

agent; from Him, however, comes whatever pertains to perfection of action in the sinful act.

[6] Hence, it is said in Ecclesiasticus (15:12): "Say not: He hath caused me to err. For He hath no need of wicked men." And later: "He hath commanded no man to do wickedly, and He hath given no man license to sin" (Ecclus. 15:21). And in James (1:13) it is said: "Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God is not a tempter of evils."

[7] However, some passages are found in Scripture from which it seems that God is the cause of sinning for certain men. Indeed, it is said in Exodus (10:1): "I have hardened Pharaoh's heart, and the heart of his servants"; and in Isaiah (6:10): "Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy . . . lest they see with their eyes . . . and be converted, and I heal them"; and in Isaiah (63:17; Douay modified): "Thou hast made us to err from Thy ways; Thou hast hardened our heart, lest we fear Thee." Again, in Romans (1:28) it is said: "God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient." All these texts are to be understood in this way: God does not grant to some people His help in avoiding sin, while to others He does grant it.

[8] Moreover, this help is not only the infusing of grace, but also external guardianship, whereby the occasions of sinning are taken away from man by divine providence and whereby provocations to sin are suppressed. God also helps man in opposing sin by the natural light of reason and by the other natural goods which He accords man. So, when He takes away these aids from some, according to the merit of their action, as His justice demands, He is said to harden or to blind them, or to do any of the other things mentioned.

Chapter 163.

ON PREDESTINATION, REPROBATION, AND
DIVINE ELECTION

[1] So, since we have shown¹ that some men are directed by divine working to their ultimate end as aided by grace, while others who are deprived of the same help of grace fall short of their ultimate end, and since all things that are done by God are foreseen and ordered from eternity by His wisdom, as we showed above,² the aforementioned differentiation of men must be ordered by God from eternity. According, then, as He has preordained some men from eternity, so that they are directed to their ultimate end, He is said to have predestined them. Hence, the Apostle says, in Ephesians (1:5): "Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children . . . according to the purpose of His will." On the other hand, those to whom He has decided from eternity not to give His grace He is said to have reprobated or to have hated, in accord with what we find in Malachias (1:2-3): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau." By reason of this distinction, according to which He has reprobated some and predestined others, we take note of divine election, which is mentioned in Ephesians (1:4): "He chose us in Him, before the foundation of the world."

[2] Thus, it appears that predestination, election, and reprobation constitute a certain section of divine providence, according as men are ordered to their ultimate end by divine providence. Hence, it is possible to show that predestination and election impose no necessity, by the same reasoning whereby we showed above³ that divine providence does not take away contingency from things.

1. See above, ch. 161.

2. See above, ch. 64.

3. See above, ch. 72.

[3] Moreover, that predestination and election do not find their cause in any human merits can be made clear, not only from the fact that God's grace which is the effect of predestination is not preceded by merits but rather precedes all human merits, as we showed,⁴ but it can also be shown from this, that the divine will and providence is the first cause of things that are done, but that there can be no cause of the divine will and providence,⁵ although, among the effects of providence, and likewise of predestination, one may be the cause of another.

"For who," as the Apostle says (Rom. 11:35-36; Douay modified), "hath first given to Him, and who shall make recompense to Him? For of Him, and in Him, and by Him, are all things. To Him be honor and glory for ever. Amen."

4. See above, ch. 149.

5. SCG, I, ch. 87; III, ch. 97.

SUBJECT INDEX

Parts I and 2

- abstraction, and understanding, *Pt. 2*: 32
accidents, knowledge of sensible, *Pt. 1*: 189; do not pass from subject to subject, *Pt. 1*: 234-235
act of being, no created substance is its own, *Pt. 1*: 77; not identical with the individual being, *Pt. 1*: 176; no thing is its own, except God, *Pt. 1*: 216; each thing has its proper, *Pt. 2*: 101
action, for the sake of some perfection, *Pt. 1*: 39; apart from intention, *Pt. 1*: 40-43; defective, *Pt. 1*: 59-61; every created agent needs a subject for its, *Pt. 2*: 83; relation to agent and to act, *Pt. 2*: 84; voluntary and forced, *Pt. 2*: 226-227
action, principle of, either nature or intellect, *Pt. 1*: 36-38
actions, moral, four principles in, *Pt. 1*: 58-59
acts, formal, gradations of, *Pt. 1*: 86; specified by their objects, *Pt. 1*: 200; human, how good and evil, *Pt. 2*: 162-164
adultery, evil of, *Pt. 1*: 46
agent, intelligent, how it acts for an end, *Pt. 1*: 39; natural, how it acts for an end, *Pt. 1*: 39-40; natural, resists corruption, *Pt. 1*: 40; secondary, acts through power of primary, *Pt. 1*: 60, 219-220; supreme, moves all secondary agents, *Pt. 1*: 72-73; makes an effect like itself, *Pt. 1*: 82; univocal, and cause of a species, *Pt. 1*: 215, 233; and patient, as simultaneous, *Pt. 1*: 223-224; lower, depends on superior, *Pt. 1*: 236; voluntary, and providence, *Pt. 1*: 245-246; particular and universal, intention of, *Pt. 2*: 55; working through will, *Pt. 2*: 76
agent, every, intends an end, *Pt. 1*: 34-38; acts for a good, *Pt. 1*: 38-40; acts in so far as it is in act, *Pt. 1*: 39; acts through God's power, *Pt. 1*: 220-222
agents, subordination among, *Pt. 1*: 216-219; diversity of patients and, *Pt. 2*: 69; succession of, does not wholly explain action of any one of them, *Pt. 2*: 251
angels, described in the shape of man, *Pt. 1*: 192; nine orders of, *Pt. 1*: 264-272; and human intellectual knowledge, *Pt. 2*: 40; enlighten man's understanding, *Pt. 2*: 44
animals, share in liberality and fortitude, *Pt. 1*: 121; do not share in felicity, *Pt. 1*: 122; share in prudence, *Pt. 1*: 123; their means of self-protection, *Pt. 1*: 251; have some knowledge, *Pt. 1*: 272-273
apparitions, magical, *Pt. 2*: 90
appetite, sense, moves the body, *Pt. 1*: 101; natural, for ultimate end, *Pt. 1*: 104, 162, 195; present in all things, *Pt. 1*: 104; natural and intellectual, *Pt. 2*: 34-35
apprehension, process of intellectual, *Pt. 2*: 105-106
art, ends of, *Pt. 1*: 123; work, presupposes nature, *Pt. 1*: 216; form in mind of the artist, *Pt. 1*: 233, 255; lower, receives principles from higher, *Pt. 1*: 255; architectonic, *Pt. 1*: 266; products, in relation to the artist, *Pt. 2*: 81
astronomers, their use of the astrolabe, *Pt. 1*: 192; not astonished by eclipse, *Pt. 2*: 82; their foretelling of future events, *Pt. 2*: 245
beatific vision, *Pt. 1*: 185, 202
beauty, of the whole universe, *Pt. 1*: 240, 243
beings, not an infinite number of, *Pt. 1*: 36; divided by act and potency, *Pt. 1*: 49; relation to truth in judgment, *Pt. 1*: 55; all are good, *Pt. 1*: 62; and absolute use of the term being, *Pt. 1*: 79; intelligible and natural, *Pt. 1*: 196; actual, first in intention, last in generation, *Pt. 1*: 219; grades of, *Pt. 1*: 242-243
belief, in divine truth, advantages of, *Pt. 2*: 237
bodies, lower, are moved things only, *Pt. 1*: 84; their movements caused by intellectual substances,

by fate the ordering which is found in things as a result of divine providence. Thus, Boethius says: "fate is a disposition inherent in mutable things, whereby providence connects each thing with His orders."² In this description of fate, "disposition" is used for ordering; while the phrase "inherent in things" is used to distinguish fate from providence; since the ordering, as present in the divine mind and not yet impressed on things, is providence, but, as already unfolded in things, it is called fate. Moreover, he speaks of "mutable things" to show that the order of providence does not take away contingency and mobility from things, as some men have claimed.

[6] So, according to this meaning, to deny fate is to deny providence. But, since we should not even have names in common with unbelievers, lest occasion for error could be taken from the association of names, the name fate is not to be used by the faithful lest we appear to agree with those who have held a wrong opinion about fate, by subjecting all things to the necessitation of the stars. Consequently, Augustine says, in Book v of the City of God: "If any man calls the will, or power, of God by the name, fate, let him hold his view, but correct his way of speaking."³ And also Gregory, in accord with the same understanding of it, says: "Far be it from the minds of the faithful to say that there is any fate."⁴

Chapter 94.

ON THE CERTAINTY OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE

[1] Now, there is a difficulty that arises out of the foregoing. If all things that are done here below, even contingent events, are subject to divine providence, then, seem-

2. Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, IV, prosc 6 (PL, 63, col. 815).

3. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, V, 1 (PL, 41, col. 141).

4. St. Gregory, *In Evangelium*, homil. 10 (PL, 76, col. 1112).

ingly, either providence cannot be certain or else all things happen by necessity.

[2] In fact, the Philosopher shows in the *Metaphysics*¹ that, if we assert that every effect has a direct cause, and again that, given any direct cause we must necessarily grant its effect, it follows that all future events come about by necessity. For, if each effect has a direct cause, then any future effect will be reducible to a present or past cause. Thus, if we ask whether a certain man is to be killed by robbers, the cause preceding this effect is his encounter with the robbers; and, in turn, another cause precedes this effect, namely, the fact that he went out of his home; still another precedes this, that he wished to look for water; and a cause precedes this, namely, his thirst; and this was caused by the eating of salted foods; and this eating is going on now, or was done in the past. Therefore, if it be so, that, granted the cause, the effect must be granted, then necessarily, if he eats salt foods, he must get thirsty; and if he is thirsty, he must desire to get water; and if he desires to get water, he must go out of his home; and if he leaves his home, the robbers must encounter him; and if they encounter him, he must be killed. So, from the first to the last, it is necessary for this eater of salty foods to be killed by robbers. Therefore, the Philosopher concludes that it is not true that, granted the cause, the effect must be granted; since there are some causes which can fail. Again, it is not true that every effect has a direct cause, for something that comes about accidentally, for instance, that this man who wishes to look for water encounters the robbers, has no cause.

[3] Now, by this reasoning it appears that all effects that may be reduced to some direct cause, present or past, which when granted requires that the effect be granted must of necessity happen. Either, then, we must say that not all effects are subject to divine providence and, thus, that providence does not apply to all—but we showed

1. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V, 3 (1027a 29).

earlier that it does;² or else it is not necessarily so, that, granted providence, its effect must be granted, and thus providence is not certain; or, finally, it is necessary for all things to happen by necessity. For providence is not only in present or past time, but in eternity, since nothing can be in God that is not eternal.

[4] Again, if divine providence is certain, then this conditional proposition must be true: *If God foresees this, then this will happen.* Now, the antecedent of this conditional proposition is necessary, for He is eternal. Therefore, the consequent is necessary, for every consequent in a conditional proposition must be necessary when the antecedent is necessary. So, the consequent is like the conclusion of the antecedent, and whatever follows from a necessary proposition must be necessary. Therefore, it follows that, if divine providence is certain, all things must occur by necessity.

[5] Besides, suppose that something is foreseen by God; for example, that a certain man will become a ruler. Now, it is either possible that he will not rule, or it is not. But, if it is not possible that he will not rule, then it is impossible for him not to rule; therefore, it is necessary for him to rule. However, if it is possible that he will not rule, and if, given the possible something impossible does not follow, then it does follow that divine providence will fail; hence, it is not impossible for divine providence to fail. Therefore, it is either necessary, if all things are foreseen by God, that divine providence be not certain or else that all things happen by necessity.

[6] Moreover, Tully argues as follows, in his book *On Divination*:³ if all things are foreseen by God, the order of causes is certain. But, if this is true, all things are done by fate. And if all things are done by fate, nothing is within our power; there is no volitional choice. Therefore, it follows that free choice is taken away if divine providence be

2. See above, ch. 64.

3. Cicero, *De divinatione*, II, 7 (Teubner ed., 1938, p. 71b).

certain. And in the same way it will follow that all contingent causes are taken away.

[7] Furthermore, divine providence does not exclude intermediate causes, as we showed above.⁴ But, among causes, some are contingent and capable of failing. So, it is possible for an effect of providence to fail. Therefore, God's providence is not certain.

[8] However, for the purpose of answering these arguments, we must repeat some of the observations put down before, so that it may be made clear that nothing escapes divine providence; also, that the order of divine providence cannot possibly be changed; and yet that it is not necessary for all things to happen of necessity simply because they come about as a result of divine providence.

[9] First, then, we must consider the fact that, since God is the cause of all existing things, giving being to all, the order of His providence must embrace all things. Indeed, on the things on which He has lavished being He must also lavish preservation and guide them toward perfection in their ultimate end.⁵

[10] Now, two things must be considered in the case of any provident agent⁶—namely, premeditation of the order, and the establishment of the premeditated order—in the things that are subject to providence. The first of these pertains to the cognitive power, while the second belongs to the operative. Between the two there is this difference: in the act of premeditating the order, the more perfect that providence is, the more can the order of providence be extended to the smallest details. The fact that we are not able to think out, ahead of time, the order of all particular events in regard to matters to be arranged by us stems from the deficiency of our knowledge, which cannot embrace all singular things. However, the more a person is able to think

4. See above, ch. 77.

5. See above, ch. 64ff.

6. See above, ch. 77.

ahead about a plurality of singular things, the more adroit does he become in his foresight; while the man whose foresight is restricted to universals only participates but little in prudence. Now, a similar consideration can be made in regard to all the operative arts. But, in regard to imposing the premeditated order on things, the providence of a governing agent is more noble and perfect the more universal it is and the more it accomplished his premeditated plan by means of a plurality of ministers, because this controlling of ministers occupies an important place in the order that pertains to foresight.

Moreover, divine providence must consist in the highest perfection, since He is absolutely and universally perfect, as we showed in Book One.⁷ So, in the function of providential foresight, by means of the sempiternal meditative act of His wisdom, He orders all things, no matter how detailed they may appear; and whatever things perform any action, they act instrumentally, as moved by Him.⁸ And they obediently serve as His ministers in order to unfold in things the order of providence, which has been thought out, as I might say, from eternity. But, if all things able to act must serve as ministers to Him in their actions, it is impossible for any agent to block the execution of divine providence by acting in opposition to it. Nor is it possible for divine providence to be hindered by the defect of any agent or patient, since every active and passive power is caused in things in accord with divine disposition.⁹ It is also impossible for the execution of divine providence to be impeded by a change in the provident Agent, since God is altogether immutable, as we showed above.¹⁰ The conclusion remains, then, that divine foresight is utterly incapable of being frustrated.

[11] Next, we must consider that every agent intends the good and the better, in so far as he can, as we showed

7. SCG, I, ch. 28.

8. See above, ch. 67.

9. See above, ch. 70.

10. SCG, I, ch. 13.

above.¹¹ But the good and the better are not considered in the same way, in the whole and in the parts.¹² For, in the whole, the good is integrity, which is the result of the order and composition of its parts. Consequently, it is better for there to be an inequality among the parts of the whole, without which the order and perfection of the whole cannot be, than for all its parts to be equal, even if each of them were to exist on the level of the most important part. However, if the parts are considered in themselves, each part of a lower grade would be better if it were on the level of the higher part. This is exemplified in the human body: in fact, the foot would be a more worthy part if it possessed the beauty and power of the eye, but the whole body would be more imperfect if it lacked the functioning of the foot.

Therefore, the intention of a particular agent tends toward a different objective from that of the universal agent. Indeed, the particular agent tends to the good of the part without qualification, and makes it the best that it can, but the universal agent tends to the good of the whole. As a result, a defect which is in accord with the intention of the universal agent may be apart from the intention of the particular agent. Thus, it is clear that the generation of a female is apart from the intention of a particular nature, that is, of the power which is in this semen which, as much as possible, tends to a perfect result of conception; but it is in accord with the intention of the universal nature, that is, of the power of the universal agent for the generation of inferior beings, that a female be generated; for without a female the generation of a number of animals could not be accomplished. Similarly, corruption, decrease, and every defect pertain to the intention of the universal nature, but not of the particular nature, for each thing avoids defect, and tends to perfection, to the extent that it can. So, it is evident that the intention of the particular agent is that its effect become as perfect as is possible in its kind, but the intention of the universal nature is that this individual effect become perfect in a certain type of perfection, say in

11. See above, ch. 3.

12. See above, ch. 71.

male perfection, while another would become so in female perfection.

Now the primary perfection among the parts of the whole universe appears on the basis of the contingent and the necessary.¹³ For the higher beings are necessary and incorruptible and immobile, and the more they fall short of this condition, the lower the level on which they are established. Thus, the lowest things may be corrupted even in regard to their being, whereas they are changed in regard to their dispositions, and they produce their effects not necessarily but contingently. So, any agent that is a part of the universe intends as much as possible to persevere in its actual being and natural disposition, and to make its effect stable. However, God, Who is the governor of the universe, intends some of His effects to be established by way of necessity, and others contingently. On this basis, He adapts different causes to them; for one group of effects there are necessary causes, but for another, contingent causes. So, it falls under the order of divine providence not only that this effect is to be, but also that this effect is to be contingently, while another is to be necessarily. Because of this, some of the things that are subject to providence are necessary, whereas others are contingent and not at all necessary.

[12] So, it is obvious that, though divine providence is the direct cause of an individual future effect, and though it is so in the present, or in the past, indeed from eternity, it does not follow, as the first argument¹⁴ implies, that this individual effect will come about of necessity. For divine providence is the direct cause why this effect occurs contingently. And this cannot be prevented.

[13] From this it is also evident that this conditional proposition is true: *If God foresees that this event will be, it will happen*, just as the second argument¹⁵ suggested. But

13. See above, ch. 72.

14. Above, ¶2.

15. Above, ¶4.

it will occur in the way that God foresaw that it would be. Now, He foresaw that it would occur contingently. So, it follows that, without fail, it will occur contingently and not necessarily.

[14] It is also clear that, if this thing which, we grant, is foreseen by God as to occur in the future belongs in the genus of contingent beings, it will be possible for it, considered in itself, not to be; for thus is it foreseen, as something that is contingent, as able not to be. Yet it is not possible for the order of providence to fail in regard to its coming into being contingently. Thus the third argument¹⁶ is answered. Consequently, it can be maintained that this man may not become a ruler if he be considered in himself, but not if he be considered as an object of divine foresight.

[15] Also, the objection that Tully offers¹⁷ seems frivolous, in view of the foregoing. Indeed, since not only effects are subject to divine providence, but also causes and ways of being, as is obvious from what we have asserted before, it does not follow that, if everything be done by divine providence, nothing is within our power. For the effects are foreseen by God, as they are freely produced by us.

[16] Nor can the possibility of failure on the part of secondary causes, by means of which the effects of providence are produced, take away the certainty of divine providence, as the fifth argument¹⁸ implied. For God Himself operates in all things, and in accord with the decision of His will, as we showed above.¹⁹ Hence, it is appropriate to His providence sometimes to permit defectible causes to fail, and at other times to preserve them from failure.

[17] Finally, those arguments in favor of the necessity of effects foreseen by God, which might be drawn from the

16. Above, ¶5.

17. Above, ¶6.

18. Above, ¶7.

19. SCG, II, ch. 23; III, ch. 67.

body, or from an intellectual persuasion, does not bring necessity to the act of choice, a man does not always choose what his guardian angel intends, or that toward which a celestial body gives inclination. But a man does choose in all cases the object in accord with God's operation within his will. Consequently, the guardianship of the angels is sometimes frustrated, according to this text: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed" (Jer. 51:9); and still more is this true of the inclination of the celestial bodies, but divine providence is always steadfast.

[5] Moreover, there is still another difference to be considered. Since a celestial body does not dispose to a choice, unless it makes an impression on our body by which man is stimulated to choose in the way that passions induce one to choose, every disposition to choice which results from the celestial bodies works by means of some passion, as when a person is led to choose something by means of hatred, or love, or anger, or some similar passion. But a person is disposed to an act of choice by an angel, by means of an intellectual consideration, without passion. In fact, this happens in two ways. Sometimes, a man's understanding is enlightened by an angel to know only that something is a good thing to be done, but it is not instructed as to the reason why it is a good, since this reason is derived from the end. Thus, at times, a man thinks that something is a good thing to be done, "but, if he be asked why, he would answer that he does not know."³ Hence, when he reaches a beneficial end, to which he has given no thought before, it will be fortuitous for him. But sometimes he is instructed by angelic illumination, both that this act is good and as to the reason why it is good, which depends on the end. And if this be so, when he reaches the end which he has thought about before, it will not be fortuitous. We should also note that, just as the active power of a spiritual nature is higher than a corporeal one, so also is it more universal. Consequently, the disposition resulting from a celestial body does not extend to all the objects which human choice covers.

3. *Ibid.*, (1207b 1).

[6] Still another point: the power of the human soul, or also of an angel, is particularized in comparison with divine power which, in fact, is universal in regard to all beings. Thus, then, some good thing may happen to a man which is apart from his own intention, and apart from the inclination given by celestial bodies, and apart from the enlightenment coming from the angels—but not apart from divine providence, which is regulative, just as it is productive, of being as such, and, consequently, which must include all things under it. Thus, some good or evil may happen to man that is fortuitous in relation to himself, and in relation to the celestial bodies, and in relation to the angels, but not in relation to God. Indeed, in relation to Him, nothing can be a matter of chance and unforeseen, either in the sphere of human affairs or in any matter.

[7] But, since fortuitous events are those apart from intention, and since moral goods cannot be apart from intention, because they are based on choice, in their case no one can be called well or ill favored by fortune. However, in regard to them, a person can be called well or ill favored by birth; when, as a result of the natural disposition of his body, he is prone to virtuous, or vicious, acts of choice. But in regard to external goods, which can accrue to a man apart from his intention, a man may be said to be both favored by birth and by fortune, and also governed by God and guarded by the angels.

[8] Moreover, man may obtain from higher causes still another help in regard to the outcome of his actions. For, since a man has both the ability to choose and to carry out what he chooses, he may at times be assisted by higher causes in regard to both or he may also be hindered. In regard to choice, of course, as we said, man is either disposed by the celestial bodies to choose something, or he is enlightened by the guardianship of the angels, or even he is inclined by divine operation. But in regard to the carrying out of the choice man may obtain from a higher cause the strength and efficacy needed to accomplish what he has chosen. Now, this can come not only from God and the

by sense in some way; past things it knows as remembered; future things are not known in themselves because they do not yet exist, but can be known in their causes with certitude if they are totally determined in their causes so that they will take place of necessity; by conjecture if they are not so determined that they cannot be impeded, as in the case of those things that are for the most part; in no way if in their causes they are wholly in potency, i.e., not more determined to one than to another, as in the case of those that are indeterminate to either of two. The reason for this is that a thing is not knowable according as it is in potency, but only according as it is in act, as the Philosopher shows in IX *Metaphysicae*.¹¹⁷

20. God, however, is wholly outside the order of time, stationed as it were at the summit of eternity, which is wholly simultaneous, and to Him the whole course of time is subjected in one simple intuition. For this reason, He sees in one glance everything that is effected in the evolution of time, and each thing as it is in itself, and it is not future to Him in relation to His view as it is in the order of its causes alone (although He also sees the very order of the causes), but each of the things that are in whatever time is seen wholly eternally as the human eye sees Socrates sitting, not in its causes but in itself.

21. Now from the fact that man sees Socrates sitting, the contingency of his sitting which concerns the order of cause to effect, is not destroyed; yet the eye of man most certainly and infallibly sees Socrates sitting while he is sitting, since each thing as it is in itself is already determined. Hence it follows that God knows all things that take place in time most certainly and infallibly, and yet the things that happen in time neither are nor take place of necessity, but contingently.

22. There is likewise a difference to be noted on the part of the divine will, for the divine will must be understood as existing outside of the order of beings, as a cause producing the whole of being and all its differences. Now the possible and the necessary are differences of being, and therefore necessity and contingency in things and the distinction of each according to the nature of their proximate causes originate from the divine will itself, for He disposes necessary causes for the effects that He wills to be necessary, and He ordains causes acting contingently (i.e., able to fail) for the effects that He wills to be contingent. And according to the condition of these causes, effects are called either necessary or contingent, although all depend on the divine

will as on a first cause, which transcends the order of necessity and contingency.

This, however, cannot be said of the human will, nor of any other cause, for every other cause already falls under the order of necessity or contingency; hence, either the cause itself must be able to fail or, if not, its effect is not contingent, but necessary. The divine will, on the other hand, is unfailing; yet not all its effects are necessary, but some are contingent.

23. Some men, in their desire to show that the will in choosing is necessarily moved by the desirable, argued in such a way as to destroy the other root of contingency the Philosopher posits here, based on our deliberation. Since the good is the object of the will, they argue, it cannot (as is evident) be diverted so as not to seek that which seems good to it; as also it is not possible to divert reason so that it does not assent to that which seems true to it. So it seems that choice, which follows upon deliberation, always takes place of necessity; thus all things of which we are the principle through deliberation and choice, will take place of necessity.

24. In regard to this point there is a similar diversity with respect to the good and with respect to the true that must be noted. There are some truths that are known per se, such as the first indemonstrable principles; these the intellect assents to of necessity. There are others, however, which are not known per se, but through other truths. The condition of these is twofold. Some follow necessarily from the principles, i.e., so that they cannot be false when the principles are true. This is the case with all the conclusions of demonstrations, and the intellect assents necessarily to truths of this kind after it has perceived their order to the principles, but not before. There are others that do not follow necessarily from the principles, and these can be false even though the principles be true. This is the case with things about which there can be opinion. To these the intellect does not assent necessarily, although it may be inclined by some motive more to one side than another.

Similarly, there is a good that is desirable for its own sake, such as happiness, which has the nature of an ultimate end. The will necessarily adheres to a good of this kind, for all men seek to be happy by a certain kind of natural necessity. There are other good things that are desirable for the sake of the end. These are related to the end as conclusions are to principles. The Philosopher makes this point clear in II *Physicorum*.¹¹⁸ If, then, there were some good things without the

¹¹⁷ *Metaph.* II, 9, 1051a 22 ff.; St. Thomas, Lesson X.

¹¹⁸ *Phys.* II, 7, 198a 35 ff.; St. Thomas, Lesson XV.