

Besides. The order of effects is according to the order of causes. Now the first of all effects is being: for all others are determinations of being. Therefore being is the proper effect of the first agent, and all other agents produce it by the power of the first agent. And secondary agents which, as it were, particularize and determine the action of the first agent, produce the other perfections, as their proper effects, which are particular kinds of being.

Furthermore. That which is such by its essence, is the proper cause of that which is such by participation: thus fire is the cause of all things that are afire. Now God alone is being by His essence, while all others are beings by participation: for in God alone existence is His essence.¹ Therefore the existence of every existing thing is His proper effect, so that whatever brings a thing into existence, does so in so far as it acts by God's power. Wherefore it is said (Wis. i. 14): *God created, that all things might be*: and in several passages of Holy Writ it is stated that God makes all things.—Again in *De Causis* it is said that not even does an intelligence give being except *in so far as it is something divine*, i.e. in so far as it acts by God's power.

CHAPTER LXVII

THAT IN ALL THINGS THAT OPERATE GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THEIR OPERATING

HENCE it is clear that in all things that operate God is the cause of their operating. For everyone that operates is in some way a cause of being, either of essential or of accidental being. But nothing is a cause of being except in so far as it acts by God's power. Therefore everyone that operates acts by God's power.

Again. Every operation consequent to a certain power, is ascribed to the giver of that power as effect to cause: thus the natural movement of heavy and light bodies is consequent to their form, whereby they are heavy or light,

¹ Bk. I., ch. xxii.; Bk. II., ch. xv.

wherefore the cause of their movement is said to be that which produced them, and gave them their form. Now all power of any agent whatsoever is from God, as from the first principle of all perfection. Therefore since all operation is consequent to some power, it follows that God is the cause of every operation.

Moreover. It is clear that every action that cannot continue after the influence of a certain agent has ceased, is from that agent: thus the visibility of colours cannot continue after the action of the sun has ceased to enlighten the air; wherefore without doubt it is the cause of the visibility of colours. The same applies to violent motion, which ceases when the violence of the impelling force has ceased. Now, since God not only gave existence to things when they first began to exist, but also causes existence in them as long as they exist, by preserving them in existence, as we have proved,¹ so not only did He give them active forces when He first made them, but is always causing those forces in them. Consequently if the divine influence were to cease, all operation would come to an end. Therefore every operation of a thing is reducible to Him as its cause.

Besides. Whatever applies an active power to action, is said to be the cause of that action: for the craftsman, when he applies the forces of nature to an action, is said to be the cause of that action; as the cook is the cause of cooking which is done by fire. Now every application of power to action is chiefly and primarily from God. For active forces are applied to their proper operations by some movement of the body or of the soul. Now the first principle of either movement is God. For He is the first mover, wholly immovable, as we have proved above.² Likewise every movement of the will whereby certain powers are applied to action, is reducible to God as the first object of appetite, and the first willer. Therefore every operation should be ascribed to God as its first and principal agent.

Further. In all ordered active causes, the causes that follow must always act by the power of the first: thus in

¹ Ch. lxxv.

² Bk. I., ch. xiii.

natural things the lower bodies act by the power of the heavenly bodies; and in voluntary things all the inferior craftsmen act in accordance with the direction of the master craftsman. Now, in the order of active causes, God is the first cause, as we proved in the First Book.¹ Consequently all the lower active causes act by His power. Now the cause of an action is the thing by whose power it is done, more even than that which does it: even as the principal agent in comparison with the instrument. Therefore God is more the cause of every action than even secondary active causes.

Further. Every operator is directed through its operation to its ultimate end: since either the operation itself is its last end, or the thing operated, namely the effect of the operation. Now it belongs to God Himself to direct things to their end, as we have proved.² Therefore we must conclude that every agent acts by the power of God: and consequently it is He who causes the actions of all things.

Hence it is said (Isa. xxvi. 12): *Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us*.³ and (Jo. xv. 5): *Without Me you can do nothing*: and (Philip. ii. 13): *It is God who worketh in us*⁴ *both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will*. For this reason Holy Writ often ascribes natural effects to the divine operation: because He it is who works in every agent, natural or voluntary, as it is written in Job x. 10, 11: *Hast Thou not milked me as milk, and curdled me like cheese? Thou hast clothed me with skin: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews*: and again in Psalm xvii. 14: *The Lord thundered from heaven, and the highest gave His voice: hail and coals of fire*.

CHAPTER LXVIII

THAT GOD IS EVERYWHERE

FROM this it is evident that God must be everywhere and in all things.

For the mover and the thing moved must be simultaneous,

¹ Loc. cit. ² Ch. lxiv. ³ Douay,—for us. ⁴ Vulg.,—you.

as the Philosopher proves (7 Phys. ii.). Now God moves all things in their actions, as we have proved.¹ Therefore He is in all things.

Again. Whatever is in a place, or in anything whatsoever, is, after a manner, in contact therewith: for a body is located somewhere by contact of dimensive quantity: while an incorporeal thing is said to be somewhere by contact of its power, since it lacks dimensive quantity. Accordingly an incorporeal thing stands in relation to being somewhere by its power, as a body to being somewhere by dimensive quantity. And if there were a body having infinite dimensive quantity, it would of necessity be everywhere. Consequently if there be an incorporeal thing with infinite power it must needs be everywhere. Now we proved in the First Book² that God has infinite power. Therefore He is everywhere.

Besides. As an individual cause is to an individual effect, so is a universal cause to a universal effect. Now the individual cause must needs be present to its proper effect: thus fire by its substance gives out heat, and the soul by its essence gives life to the body. Since, then, God is the universal cause of all being, as we proved in the Second Book,³ it follows that wherever being is to be found, there also is God present.

Furthermore. If an agent be present to but one of its effects, its action cannot extend to other things except through that one, because agent and patient must be simultaneous: thus the motive power moves the various members of the body not otherwise than through the heart. Consequently if God be present to but one of His effects, such as the first movable, which is moved by Him immediately: it would follow that His action cannot extend to other things except through that first effect. But this is unreasonable. For if the action of an agent cannot extend to other things except through some first effect, the latter must correspond proportionately to the agent as regards the agent's whole power, else the agent could not use its

¹ Ch. lxvii.

² Ch. xliii.

³ Ch. xv.

Truth • QUESTION TWENTY-FOUR: ARTICLE 13

but grace in regard to good. As a result he is able to sin because of his freedom and weakness, and he is able not to sin mortally because of his freedom and helping grace."³

REPLY:

It is one thing to say that someone can abstain from sin and another to say that he can persevere until the end of his life in abstaining from sin. When it is said that someone can abstain from sin, emphasis is placed only upon the negation, as meaning that someone is able not to sin. And, when there is question of mortal sin, anyone in the state of grace is able to do this, because there is no habitual inclination to sin in one who has grace. Rather there is in him a habitual inclination to avoid sin. As soon as anything is presented to him under the aspect of mortal sin, therefore, because of his habitual inclination he refuses it consent, unless he makes an effort to the contrary, following his concupiscence. But there is no necessity of following it, even though he cannot avoid having some movement of concupiscence arise entirely preceding the act of free choice. Because, then, he cannot help having such movements, he is not able to avoid all venial sins. But because in him no movement of free choice precedes full deliberation, drawing him to sin as by the inclination of a habit, he is therefore able to avoid all mortal sins.

But when it is said that he can persevere in abstaining from sin up to the end of his life, the emphasis is placed upon something affirmative, meaning that a person places himself in a state such that sin cannot be in him; for in no other way could a man make himself persevere by the act of his free choice than by making himself impeccable. This, however, does not fall within the power of free choice, because the motive and executive power does not extend to this. Consequently, a man cannot be the cause of his own perseverance, but is under the necessity of begging for perseverance from God.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The Apostle prayed that they do no evil in view of the fact that they could not succeed in persevering in abstinence from evil except with divine help.

2. The same is to be said in answer to this.

3. Perseverance is spoken of in two senses: (1) Sometimes it is a special virtue; and so it is a habit whose act is to have the determination to persevere unshakably. In this sense everyone who has grace has perseverance, even though he is in fact not going to persevere un-

Truth • QUESTION TWENTY-FOUR: ARTICLE 14

til the end. (2) Perseverance is taken as a particular circumstance of virtue designating the permanence of virtue up to the end of life. In this sense perseverance is not in the power of one who has grace.

4. When we speak of nature we do not exclude the things by which nature is kept in existence. In the same way, when we speak of grace we do not exclude the operation of God conserving grace in existence. Without God's operation a person is not able to continue either in natural existence or in the existence deriving from grace.

ARTICLE XIV

In the Fourteenth Article We Ask: IS FREE CHOICE
CAPABLE OF GOOD WITHOUT GRACE?

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. A commandment is not given about something impossible. Jerome says in this respect: "Cursed is he who says that God has commanded man to do anything impossible."¹ But man is commanded to do good. Man is therefore able to do good by his free choice.

2. No one should be reprimanded if he does not do what he is not able to do. But a man is justly reprimanded if he omits doing good. Hence man is able by his free choice to do good.

3. Man is able by his free choice to avoid sin to some extent, at least as regards a single act. But it is good to avoid sin. Man can therefore do something good by his free choice.

4. Everything is more capable of what is natural to it than of what is against its nature. But free choice is naturally ordained to good, and sin is against its nature. It is therefore more capable of good than of evil. But it is capable of evil by itself. Much more, then, is it capable of good.

5. A creature retains a likeness to the Creator by reason of the vestige, and much more by reason of the image. But the Creator can do good by Himself. Then so too can a creature, especially free choice, which pertains to the image.

Parallel readings: *II Sent.*, 28, a. 1; and as in art. 13, especially S.T., I-II, 109, 9.

Truth • QUESTION TWENTY-FOUR: ARTICLE 14

6. According to the Philosopher² it is by the same causes that virtue is destroyed and engendered. But by free choice virtue can be destroyed, because mortal sin, which a man can commit of his free choice, destroys virtue. By his free choice, then, man is capable of engendering the good which is virtue.

7. In the first Epistle of St. John (5:3) it is said: "His commandments are not heavy." But what is not heavy man can do by his free choice. Man can therefore of his free choice fulfill the commandments, and that is good above all.

8. According to Anselm free choice "is the power of preserving the rectitude of the will for its own sake."³ But the rectitude of the will is preserved only by doing good. A person can therefore do good by his free choice.

9. Grace is stronger than sin. But grace does not so bind free choice that man cannot commit sin. Then neither does sin so bind free choice that a man in the state of sin cannot do good without grace.

To the Contrary:

1'. In the Epistle to the Romans (7:18) we read: "For to will, is present with me; but to accomplish that which is good, I find not." Man therefore cannot do good by his free choice.

2'. Man can do good only by an external or an internal act. But free choice does not suffice for either; for, as is said in the Epistle to the Romans (9:16): "It is not of him that willeth"; i.e., to will, which refers to the internal act, [is not in his power]; "nor of him that runneth"; i.e., to run, which refers to the external act; "but of God that sheweth mercy." Free choice without grace can therefore in no way do good.

3'. Commenting on the words of the Epistle to the Romans (7:15): "The evil which I hate, that I do," the *Gloss* says: "Man wills good naturally, to be sure; but this will always is without effect unless God's grace has strengthened his act of willing."⁴ Without grace, then, man cannot accomplish any good.

4'. The thought of good precedes the doing of good, as the Philosopher makes clear.⁵ But man cannot think anything good by himself; for it is said in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (3:5): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." Hence man cannot do good by himself.

REPLY:

Nothing acts outside the limits of its own species. But everything

Truth • QUESTION TWENTY-FOUR: ARTICLE 14

can act according to the requirements of its species, since nothing is deprived of its proper activity.

Now there are two kinds of good, one which is proportioned to human nature, and another which is beyond the ability of human nature. If we are speaking of acts, these two kinds of good do not differ in the substance of the act but in the manner of acting. Take, for instance, the act of giving alms. It is a good proportioned to human powers in so far as a man is moved to it by a certain natural love or kindness; but it is beyond the ability of human nature in so far as a man is led to it by charity, which unites man's heart to God.

It is apparent that without grace free choice is incapable of the kind of good which is above human nature; and—because it is by this kind of good that man merits eternal life—it is apparent that man cannot merit without grace. The kind of good which is proportioned to human nature, however, man can accomplish by his free choice. Augustine accordingly says⁶ that man can cultivate fields, build houses, and do a number of other things by his free choice without actual grace.

Although man can perform good actions of this kind without ingratiatory grace, he cannot perform them without God, since nothing can enter upon its natural operation except by the divine power, because a secondary cause acts only by the power of the first cause, as is said in *The Causes*.⁷ This is true of both natural and voluntary agents. Yet it is verified in a different way in either case.

In natural beings God is the cause of their natural operation inasmuch as He gives and conserves the intrinsic principle of their natural operation, and from that principle a determined operation flows of necessity. In the element earth, for example, He conserves its heaviness, which is the principle of its motion downward. But man's will is not determined to any particular operation but remains indifferent in regard to many. It is thus in some sense in potency unless it is moved by an activating principle, which is either something presented to it from the outside, such as an apprehended good, or something which works within it interiorly, as God Himself. Augustine explains this,⁸ showing that God works in the hearts of men in many ways. All external motions, moreover, are also governed by divine providence, according as God judges that someone is to be aroused to good by such and such particular actions. Should we wish, accordingly, to call the grace of God, not a habitual gift, but the very mercy of God by which He interiorly moves the mind and arranges external conditions for man's salvation, in this sense also man cannot do any good

Truth • QUESTION TWENTY-FOUR: ARTICLE 14

without God's grace. But commonly speaking, we use the name of grace for a habitual gift which justifies. It is accordingly clear that each set of reasons comes to a conclusion in some sense false. Consequently answers must be given to both.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. What God commands is not impossible for man to observe; for the substance of the act can be observed by his free choice; and the prescribed manner—by which the act is raised above the ability of nature, that is, in so far as it is done from charity—can be observed by a gift of grace, though not by man's free choice alone.

2. A man who does not fulfill the commandments is rightly reprimanded, because it is by reason of his negligence that he does not have the grace by which he can observe the commandments even as to the manner (since he could, even without grace, observe them as to their substance).

3. By performing an act that is good generically man avoids sin, though he does not merit a reward. Consequently, even though man can avoid a particular sin by his free choice, it still does not follow that he is capable of any meritorious good by his free choice alone.

4. By his free choice man is capable of a good which is natural to him; but a meritorious good is above his nature, as has been said.*

5. Although in a creature there is a likeness to the Creator, it is not perfect. Such a likeness is exclusively proper to the Son. It is therefore not necessary that whatever is found in God be found in a creature.

6. The Philosopher is speaking of political virtue, which is acquired by acts; not of infused virtue, which is the only principle of a meritorious act.

7. As Augustine says,⁸ the commandments of God are understood to be easy for love but hard for fear. It accordingly does not follow that they can be fulfilled perfectly by anyone but a person having charity. Though a person without charity could fulfill a particular one as to its substance and with difficulty, he could not fulfill all, just as he could not avoid all sins.

8. Though free choice can keep the rectitude which it has, it cannot keep it when it does not have it.

9. Free choice does not need to be bound for it to be incapable of meritorious good, since this is beyond its nature, just as a man is incapable of flying even if he is not bound.

Truth • QUESTION TWENTY-FOUR: ARTICLE 15

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

The answers to these are clear, because they are either arguing on the basis of meritorious good, or they show that man can do no good without the operation of God.

ARTICLE XV

In the Fifteenth Article We Ask: CAN MAN WITHOUT GRACE PREPARE HIMSELF TO HAVE GRACE?

Difficulties:

It seems that he can, for

1. It is useless to exhort a man to something which he is unable to do. But man is exhorted to prepare himself for grace (Zacharias 1:3): "Turn yet to me . . . and I will turn to you." Man without grace can therefore prepare himself for grace.

2. This is seen from the words of the Apocalypse (3:20): "If any man shall . . . open to me the door, I will come in to him." It appears, then, that it is man's business to open his heart to God—which means to prepare himself for grace.

3. According to Anselm¹ the reason why a person does not have grace is not that God does not give it, but that man does not accept it. But this would not be true if man were not able without grace to prepare himself to have grace. Man can therefore by his free choice prepare for grace.

4. It is written in Isaiah (1:19): "If you be willing, and will hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land." It accordingly depends upon man's will to approach God and be filled with grace.

To the Contrary:

1'. It is written (John 6:44): "No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him."

2'. It is said in the Psalm (42:3): "Send forth thy light and thy truth: they have conducted me. . . ."

3'. In praying we ask of God to convert us to Himself, as is shown

Parallel readings: *II Sent.*, 5, 2, 1; 28, a. 4; *IV Sent.*, 17, 1, 2 sol. 2; *C.G.*, III, 149; *In Hebr.*, c. 12, lect. 3 (P 13: 778a); *Quodl.* I, (4), 7; *S.T.*, I, 62, 2; I-II, 109, 6; *In Joan.*, c. 1, lect. 6 (P 10: 301b-303a).