

*Reply Obj. 2.* Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given, excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways;—first, as arising from merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do meritorious works, according to Rom. iv. 4: *Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt.* The second debt regards the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to a man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet in neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an obligation to His creature, but rather that the creature ought to be subject to God, that the Divine ordination may be fulfilled in it, which is that a certain nature should have certain conditions or properties, and that by doing certain works it should attain to something further. And hence natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense but in the second. But supernatural gifts are due in neither sense. Hence they especially merit the name of grace.

*Reply Obj. 3.* Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of gratuitous grace something pertaining to the nature of grace, since it makes man pleasing to God. And hence gratuitous grace which does not do this keeps the common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and non-sanctifying grace.

## SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO OPERATING AND CO-OPERATING GRACE?

*We proceed thus to the Second Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It seems that grace is not fittingly divided into operating and co-operating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated above (Q. CX., A. 2). Now no accident can act upon its subject. Therefore no grace can be called operating.

*Obj. 2.* Further, if grace operates anything in us it assuredly brings about justification. But not only grace works this. For Augustine says, on John xiv. 12, *the*

*works that I do he also shall do, says (Serm. clxix.): He Who created thee without thyself, will not justify thee without thyself.* Therefore no grace ought to be called simply operating.

*Obj. 3.* Further, to co-operate seems to pertain to the inferior agent, and not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more than free-will, according to Rom. ix. 16: *It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.* Therefore no grace ought to be called co-operating.

*Obj. 4.* Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to operate and to co-operate are not opposed; for one and the same thing can both operate and co-operate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating and co-operating.

*On the contrary,* Augustine says (*De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. xvii.*): *God by co-operating with us, perfects what He began by operating in us, since He who perfects by co-operation with such as are willing, begins by operating that they may will.* But the operations of God whereby He moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is fittingly divided into operating and co-operating.

*I answer that,* As stated above (Q. CX., A. 2) grace may be taken in two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby God moves us to will and to act; secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us.

Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and co-operating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that we speak of *operating grace*. But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God, but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of *co-operating grace*. Now there is a double act in us. First, there is the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a thing

moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the will, as was shown above (Q. XVII., A. 9) the operation of this act is attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both by strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of co-operating grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augustine subjoins: *He operates that we may will; and when we will, He co-operates that we may perfect.* And thus if grace is taken for God's gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into operating and co-operating grace.

But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a double effect of grace, even as of every other form; the first of which is *being*, and the second, *operation*; thus the work of heat is to make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. And thus habitual grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the principle of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will, it is called co-operating grace.

*Reply Obj. 1.* Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as whiteness makes a surface white.

*Reply Obj. 2.* God does not justify us without ourselves, because whilst we are being justified we consent to God's justification (*justitiæ*) by a movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation pertains to grace.

*Reply Obj. 3.* One thing is said to co-operate with another not merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when it helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, the end being already intended, grace co-operates with us.

*Reply Obj. 4.* Operating and co-operating grace are the same grace; but are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain from what has been said.

## THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO PREVENIENT AND SUBSEQUENT GRACE?

*We proceed thus to the Third Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It seems that grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the Divine love. But God's love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according to 1 John iv. 10: *Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first loved us.* Therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient and subsequent.

*Obj. 2.* Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since it is sufficient, according to 2 Cor. xii. 9: *My grace is sufficient for thee.* But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.

*Obj. 3.* Further, grace is known by its effects. Now there are an infinite number of effects,—one preceding another. Hence if with regard to these, grace must be divided into prevenient and subsequent, it would seem that there are infinite species of grace. Now no art takes note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.

*On the contrary,* God's grace is the outcome of His mercy. Now both are said in Ps. lviii. 11: *His mercy shall prevent me,* and again, Ps. xxii. 6: *Thy mercy will follow me.* Therefore grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.

*I answer that,* As grace is divided into operating and co-operating, with regard to its diverse effects, so also is it divided into prevenient and subsequent, howsoever we consider grace. Now there are five effects of grace in us: of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second, to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed;

others are in the divine plan intended for the use of intellectual substances. Hence it is said (Deut. iv. 19): *Lest thou see the sun and the moon and the other stars,<sup>1</sup> and being deceived by error, thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations that are under heaven: and (Ps. viii. 8): Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen: moreover, the beasts also of the field: and (Wis. xii. 18): Thou, being master of power, judgest with tranquillity, and with great favour disposdest of us.*

Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is sinful for a man to kill dumb animals: for by divine providence they are intended for man's use in the natural order. Hence it is no wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any other way whatever. For this reason the Lord said to Noe (Gen. ix. 3): *As the green herbs I have delivered all flesh to you.*<sup>2</sup>

And if any passages of Holy Writ seem to forbid us to be cruel to dumb animals, for instance to kill a bird with its young:<sup>3</sup> this is either to remove man's thoughts from being cruel to other men, and lest through being cruel to animals one become cruel to human beings: or because injury to an animal leads to the temporal hurt of man, either of the doer of the deed, or of another: or on account of some signification: thus the Apostle expounds<sup>4</sup> the prohibition against *muzzling the ox that treadeth the corn.*<sup>5</sup>

## CHAPTER CXIII

THAT THE RATIONAL CREATURE IS DIRECTED TO ITS ACTION BY GOD NOT ONLY IN ITS RELATION TO THE SPECIES, BUT ALSO IN ITS RELATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL

HENCE it is clear that the rational creature alone is directed to its actions by God, with due regard not only to the species, but also to the individual. For, seemingly, everything is on account of its operation: since operation is the ultimate

<sup>1</sup> Vulg.,—the stars of heaven.   <sup>2</sup> Vulg.,—delivered them all to you.  
<sup>3</sup> Deut. xxii. 6.   <sup>4</sup> 1 Cor. ix. 9.   <sup>5</sup> Deut. xxv. 4.

perfection of a thing. Wherefore each thing is directed to its action by God, according as it stands under divine providence. Now, the rational creature stands under divine providence as being governed and cared for, on its own account, and not, as other corruptible creatures, on account of the species only: because the individual that is governed only for the sake of the species, is not governed for its own sake; whereas the rational creature is governed for its own sake, as we have made clear.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, rational creatures alone are directed by God to their actions for the sake, not only of the species, but also of the individual.

Besides. Things that are directed in their actions only so far as these refer to the species, have not the power to act or not to act: since whatever results from the species, is common and natural to all the individuals contained in the species; and we have no choice about natural things. Hence if man were directed in his actions in reference only to the demands of the species, he would not have the power to act, or not to act, and he would have to follow the natural inclination common to the whole species, as is the case with all irrational creatures. It is therefore clear that rational creatures are directed in their actions, with regard not only to the species, but also to the individual.

Moreover. As we proved above,<sup>2</sup> divine providence extends to every single thing, even the least. Therefore whatever things have actions outside the inclination of nature, must needs in such actions receive from divine providence a direction besides that which regards the species. Now, many actions are apparent in the rational creature, for which the inclination of the species is not sufficient: and a sign of this is that they are not the same in all, but differ in different subjects. Therefore the rational creature must needs be directed to its actions by God, with reference not only to the species, but also to the individual.

Again. God provides for every nature according to its capacity: for He made each creature such that He knew it to be adapted to obtain its end through being governed

<sup>1</sup> Ch. cxii.

<sup>2</sup> Ch. lxxv. seqq.

by Him. Now, the rational creature alone is capable of being directed to its actions, in respect not only of the species but also of the individual: because it has intellect and reason, so as to be able to perceive the different ways in which a certain thing is good or evil in relation to various persons, times, and places. Therefore the rational creature alone is directed by God to its actions, in respect not only of the species but also of the individual.

Besides. The rational creature is subject to divine providence in such a way, that not only is it governed thereby, but is able to know something of the nature of providence: so that it is capable of providence and government in respect of others. This is not the case with other creatures, for they only participate in providence by being subject to it. Now, through being capable of providence, a man can direct and govern his own actions also. Therefore the rational creature participates in divine providence not only in being governed, but also in governing: for it governs itself in its own actions, and other things too. Now, every lower providence is subject to divine providence as supreme. Therefore the government of a rational creature's acts, as personal acts, belongs to divine providence.

Again. The personal acts of a rational creature are properly those that proceed from the rational soul. Now, the rational soul is capable of perpetuity, not only in respect of the species, like other creatures, but also in respect of the individual. Therefore the actions of a rational creature are directed by divine providence, not only in the point of their belonging to the species, but also inasmuch as they are personal.

Hence it is that, though all things are subject to divine providence, yet Holy Writ ascribes the care of men to it in a special manner; according to Ps. viii. 5: *What is man that thou art mindful of him?* and 1 Cor. ix. 9: *Doth God take care of oxen?* These things are said because God watches over man's actions not only as belonging to the species, but also as personal acts.

## CHAPTER CXIV

## THAT LAWS ARE GIVEN BY GOD TO MAN

IT is evident from this that it was necessary for man to receive laws from God. For, as we have shown,<sup>1</sup> just as the acts of irrational creatures are directed by God, inasmuch as they belong to the species, so are man's actions directed by God, inasmuch as they belong to the individual. Now, in so far as they are actions belonging to the species, actions of irrational creatures are directed by God by a certain natural inclination, which is consequent to the specific nature. Therefore in addition to this something must be given to man whereby he is directed in his personal actions. And this is what we call law.

Again. The rational creature, as stated above,<sup>2</sup> is subject to divine providence, in such a way as to participate in a certain likeness of divine providence, inasmuch as it is able to govern itself in its own actions, and other things also. Now, that by which the actions of people are governed is a law. Therefore it was reasonable that a law should be given to man by God.

Besides. Since a law is nothing else than a reason and rule of action, it is reasonable that to those alone a law be given, who know the reason of their action. Now, this applies only to the rational creature. Therefore it was fitting that a law should be given to the rational creature alone.

Further. A law should be given to those in whom is the power to act or not to act. But this belongs to the rational creature alone. Therefore only the rational creature is adapted to receive a law.

Moreover. Since a law is nothing else than a reason of action: and the reason for everyone's action is his end: everyone who is capable of receiving a law must receive the law from the one who guides him to his end: even as the inferior craftsman is guided by the master-craftsman, and

<sup>1</sup> Ch. cxiii.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

## SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN, BY HIMSELF AND WITHOUT THE EXTERNAL AID OF GRACE, CAN PREPARE HIMSELF FOR GRACE?

*We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It seems that man, by himself and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing impossible is laid upon man, as stated above (A. 4, ad 1). But it is written (Zach. i. 3): *Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you.* Now to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it seems that man of himself, and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace.

*Obj. 2.* Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in him to do, since if man does what is in him to do God will not deny him grace, for it is written (Matth. vii. 11) that God gives His good Spirit to them that ask Him. But what is in our power, is in us to do. Therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace.

*Obj. 3.* Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace, with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the first grace; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems that we must not go beyond what was said first, viz., that man, of himself and without grace, can prepare himself for grace.

*Obj. 4.* Further, it is written (Prov. xvi. 1) that *it is the part of man to prepare the soul.* Now an action is said to be the part of a man, when he can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can prepare himself for grace.

*On the contrary,* It is written (John vi. 44): *No man can come to Me except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him.* But if man could prepare himself, he would not need to be drawn by another. Hence man cannot prepare himself without the help of grace.

*I answer that,* The preparation of the human will for good is twofold:—the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to enjoy God; and this preparation of the will

cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious works, as stated above (A. 5). There is a second way in which the human will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself. Now in order that man prepare himself to receive this gift, it is not necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the soul, otherwise we should go on to infinity. But we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God, Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good wish. For in these two ways do we need the Divine assistance, as stated above (AA. 2, 3). Now that we need the help of God to move us, is manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every cause must direct its effect to its end, and hence since the order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to the last end by the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate end by the motion of any of the subordinate movers; as the spirit of the soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the leader of the army—and towards following the standard of a regiment by the motion of the standard-bearer. And thus since God is the first Mover simply, it is by His motion that everything seeks Him under the common notion of good, whereby everything seeks to be likened to God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that *God turns all to Himself.* But He directs righteous men to Himself as to a special end, which they seek, and to which they wish to cling, according to Ps. lxxii. 28, *it is good for Me to adhere to my God.* And that they are turned to God can only spring from God's having turned them. Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God: just as, whoever has his eyes turned away from the light of the sun, prepares himself to receive the sun's light, by turning his eyes towards the sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except by the gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly.

*Reply Obj. 1.* Man's turning to God is by free-will; and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free-will can only be turned to God, when God turns it, according to

Jer. xxxi. 18: *Convert me and I shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God*; and Lament. v. 21: *Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.*

*Reply Obj. 2.* Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according to John xv. 5: *Without Me, you can do nothing.* Hence when a man is said to do what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according as he is moved by God.

*Reply Obj. 3.* This objection regards habitual grace, for which some preparation is required, since every form requires a disposition in that which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be moved by God, no further motion is presupposed, since God is the First Mover. Hence we need not go to infinity.

*Reply Obj. 4.* It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since he does this by his free-will. And yet he does not do this without the help of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN CAN RISE FROM SIN WITHOUT THE HELP OF GRACE?

*We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It seems that man can rise from sin without the help of grace. For what is presupposed to grace, takes place without grace. But to rise from sin is presupposed to the enlightenment of grace; since it is written (Eph. v. 14): *Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten thee.* Therefore man can rise from sin without grace.

*Obj. 2.* Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as stated above (Q. LXXI., A. 1 ad 3). Now, man, by force of his nature, can rise from illness to health, without the external help of medicine, since there still remains in him the principle of life, from which the natural operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal reason, man may be restored by himself, and return from the state of sin to the state of justice without the help of external grace.

*Obj. 3.* Further, every natural thing can return by itself

to the act befitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its natural coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural movement. Now a sin is an act against nature, as is clear from Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* ii). Hence it seems that man by himself can return from sin to the state of justice.

*On the contrary,* The Apostle says (Gal. ii. 21; cf. iii. 21): *For if there had been a law given which could give life—then Christ died in vain, i.e., to no purpose.* Hence with equal reason, if man has a nature, whereby he can be justified, *Christ died in vain, i.e., to no purpose.* But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore by himself he cannot be justified, i.e., he cannot return from a state of sin to a state of justice.

*I answer that,* Man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the help of grace. For since sin is transient as to the act and abiding in its guilt, as stated above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 6), to rise from sin is not the same as to cease the act of sin; but to rise from sin means that man has restored to him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a triple loss by sinning, as was clearly shown above (Q. LXXXV., A. 1; Q. LXXXVI., A. 1; Q. LXXXVII., A. 1), viz., stain, corruption of natural good, and debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he forfeits the lustre of grace through the deformity of sin. Natural good is corrupted, inasmuch as man's nature is disordered by man's will not being subject to God's; and this order being overthrown, the consequence is that the whole nature of sinful man remains disordered. Lastly, there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by sinning man deserves everlasting damnation.

Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by God. For since the lustre of grace springs from the shedding of Divine light, this lustre cannot be brought back, except God sheds His light anew: hence a habitual gift is necessary, and this is the light of grace. Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored, i.e., man's will can only be subject to God when God draws man's will to Himself, as stated above (A. 6). So, too, the guilt of eternal punishment can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offence

in order; as may be seen in the example of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.

*Obj. 2.* Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved (A. 3). Therefore also the effect of this government is but one.

*Obj. 3.* Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government.

*On the contrary,* Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. xii.*): *God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness.* But government belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government.

*I answer that,* The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good: and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without number.

*Reply Obj. 1.* The order of the universe includes both

the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another.

From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT?

*We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written (Eccles. ix. 11): *I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favour to the skilful, but time and chance in all.* But things subject to the Divine government are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.

*Obj. 2.* Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. ix. 9): *God hath no care for oxen.* But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

*Obj. 3.* Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

*On the contrary,* Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei v. 11*): *Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their nature.* Therefore all things are subject to His government.

*I answer that,* For the same reason is God the ruler of

things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as proved above (Q. XLIV., AA. 1, 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those things which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown (A. 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. XLIV., A. 4; Q. LXV., A. 2), so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government.

Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, *God hath abandoned the earth* (Ezech. ix. 9).

*Reply Obj. 1.* These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but *time and chance*, that is to say, that defects may be found in these things according to some order of time.

*Reply Obj. 2.* Government implies a certain change

effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down *Phys. iii. 3.* And every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that *God hath no care for oxen*, he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are governed.

*Reply Obj. 3.* The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.

## SIXTH ARTICLE.

## WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE IMMEDIATELY GOVERNED BY GOD?

*We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.*) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to



*Reply Obj. 3.* The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically different; because the one deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not differ in species; and thus they have one specific effect.

*Reply Obj. 4.* A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.

## SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ACTION HAS THE SPECIES OF GOOD OR EVIL FROM ITS END?

*We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their species from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of an action.

*Obj. 2.* Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the species, as stated above (A. 5). But it is accidental to an action to be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give alms from vainglory. Therefore actions are not diversified as to species, according to the good and evil which are from the end.

*Obj. 3.* Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are taken from the end, do not diversify the species of action.

*On the contrary,* It has been shown above (Q. I., A. 3) that human actions derive their species from the end.

Therefore good and evil in respect of the end diversify the species of actions.

*I answer that,* Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as stated above (Q. I., A. 1). Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz., the interior action of the will, and the external action: and each of these actions has its object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will: while the object of the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes its species from the object on which it bears: so the interior act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper object.

Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action: because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure of morality, save in so far as they are voluntary. Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic. v. 2*) that *he who steals that he may commit adultery, is, strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief.*

*Reply Obj. 1.* The end also has the character of an object, as stated above.

*Reply Obj. 2.* Although it is accidental to the external action to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior act of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as form to matter.

*Reply Obj. 3.* When many actions, differing in species, are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part of the external actions; but unity of species on the part of the internal action.

opposites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but also of evil.

*Obj. 2.* Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite purposes, according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* ix. 2). But the will is a rational power, since it is *in the reason*, as is stated in *De Anima* iii. 9. Therefore the will can be directed to opposites; and consequently its volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil.

*Obj. 3.* Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes we wish *not to walk*, or *not to speak*; and again at times we wish for future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not of good only.

*On the contrary*, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that *evil is outside the scope of the will*, and that *all things desire good*.

*I answer that*, The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i. 1) that *the good is that which all desire*.

But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Phys.* ii. 3) that *the end is a good, or an apparent good*.

*Reply Obj. 1.* The same power regards opposites, but it is

not referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred both to good and to evil: but to good, by desiring it: to evil, by shunning it. Wherefore the actual desire of good is called *volition*,\* meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is in this sense that we are now speaking of the will. On the other hand, the shunning of evil is better described as *no-lition*: wherefore, just as volition is of good, so no-lition is of evil.

*Reply Obj. 2.* A rational power is not to be directed to all opposite purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper object: for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the object of the will is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to such opposite purposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and suchlike: for the will can be directed to either under the aspect of good.

*Reply Obj. 3.* That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations are said to be *beings of reason*. In this way, too, future things, in so far as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as suchlike are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good; and it is thus that the will is directed to them. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* v. 1) that *to lack evil is considered as a good*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER VOLITION IS OF THE END ONLY, OR ALSO OF THE MEANS?

*We proceed thus to the Second Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of the end only. For the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 2) that *volition is of the end, while choice is of the means*.

*Obj. 2.* Further, *For objects differing in genus there are corresponding different powers of the soul* (*Ethic.* vi. 1). Now,

\* In Latin,—*voluntas*. To avoid confusion with *voluntas* (the will) St. Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the translation may appear superfluous.

the end and the means are in different genera of good: because the end, which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus *quality*, or *action*, or *passion*; whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to an end, is in the genus *relation* (*Ethic.* i. 6). Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.

*Obj.* 3. Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they are perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art of the) helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of the end, it is not of the means.

*On the contrary*, In natural things, it is by the same power that a thing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus. But the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of the means.

*I answer that*, The word *voluntas* sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act.\* Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way coloured. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of the power of will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.

If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus *to understand* designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end. Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the

\* See note on p. 115.

other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end. Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things that are known in themselves, *i.e.*, first principles: but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things. For in morals the end is what principles are in speculative science (*cf. Ethic.* vii. 8).

*Reply Obj.* 1. The Philosopher is speaking of the will in reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power of the will.

*Reply Obj.* 2. There are different powers for objects that differ in genus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and colour are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and sight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but are as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to another. Now suchlike objects are always referred to the same power; for instance, the power of sight perceives both colour and light by which colour is seen.

*Reply Obj.* 3. Not everything that diversifies habits, diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end proper to it and means that belong properly to that art.

in this way, the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.

*Reply Obj. 1.* Nothing hinders that which is better simply and in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.

*Reply Obj. 2.* Men's acts and choices are in reference to singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.

*Reply Obj. 3.* As the Philosopher says (*Polit. i. 2*), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, by a despotic sovereignty, as a slave is moved by his master, but by a royal and politic sovereignty, as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.

### THIRD ARTICLE.

#### WHETHER THE WILL MOVES ITSELF?

*We proceed thus to the Third Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in potentiality; since *movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such.*\* Now the same is not in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.

*Obj. 2.* Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present. But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.

\* Aristotle, *Phys. iii. 1.*

*Obj. 3.* Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above (A. 1). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.

*On the contrary.* The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.

*I answer that,* As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object. Now, as stated above (Q. VIII., A. 2), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.

*Reply Obj. 1.* It is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.

*Reply Obj. 2.* The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself. Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.

*Reply Obj. 3.* The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.

## FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY AN EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE?

*We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not from anything exterior.

*Obj. 2.* Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above (Q. VI., A. 4). But the violent act is one *the principle of which is outside the agent.*\* Therefore the will cannot be moved by anything exterior.

*Obj. 3.* Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.

*On the contrary,* The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A. 1). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.

*I answer that,* As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior principle.

For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above (A. 3), in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this reflexion

\* Aristotle, *Ethic.* iii. 1.

he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the *Eudemian Ethics* (vii. 14).

*Reply Obj. 1.* It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves nature.

*Reply Obj. 2.* For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add *without the concurrence of him that suffers violence.* This does not happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to the movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible; since then the will would will and not will the same thing.

*Reply Obj. 3.* The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover.

## FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY A HEAVENLY BODY?

*We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform move-

whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are subject to the command of reason; whereas those movements of members, that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason.

*Reply Obj. 1.* The members do not move themselves, but are moved through the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer contact with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul.

*Reply Obj. 2.* In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature. Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to the will: for like a proper accident, it results from life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator, as the Philosopher states (*Phys. viii. 4*). Wherefore this movement is called *vital*. For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (*Nemesius, —loc. cit.*) says that, just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins.

*Reply Obj. 3.* As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei xiv. 17, 20*) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason: in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to posterity.

But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself,

through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the natural cause of this particular member's insubmission to reason. This is stated by Aristotle (*De Causis Mot. Animal.*) who says that *the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary*, and that the reason of this is as follows. These members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension; in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions these movements are a consequence. But they are not moved at the command of the reason or intellect, because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold, which change is not subject to the command of reason. This is the case with these two organs in particular, because each is as it were a separate animal being, in so far as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue, which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural, as stated above (*Reply Obj. 2*).

the world in such a way, that everything in the world obeys His command. Therefore all that is in man, even the powers of the vegetal soul, obey the command of reason.

*Obj. 3.* Further, praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as are subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the nutritive and generative power, there is room for praise and blame, virtue and vice: as in the case of gluttony and lust, and their contrary virtues. Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to the command of reason.

*On the contrary,* Gregory of Nyssa\* says that *the nutritive and generative power is one over which the reason has no control.*

*I answer that,* Some acts proceed from the natural appetite, others from the animal, or from the intellectual appetite: for every agent desires an end in some way. Now the natural appetite does not follow from some apprehension, as do the animal and the intellectual appetite. But the reason commands by way of an apprehensive power. Wherefore those acts that proceed from the intellective or the animal appetite, can be commanded by the reason: but not those acts that proceed from the natural appetite. And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius,—*loc. cit.*) says that *generation and nutrition belong to what are called natural powers.* Consequently the acts of the vegetal soul are not subject to the command of reason.

*Reply Obj. 1.* The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is, and the more is it subject to the command of reason. Hence the very fact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that they rank lowest.

*Reply Obj. 2.* The comparison holds in a certain respect: because, to wit, as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body. But it does not hold in every respect: for the soul did not create the body out of nothing, as God created the world; for which reason the world is wholly subject to His command.

*Reply Obj. 3.* Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not affect the acts themselves of the nutritive and generative

\* Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.* xxii.

power, *i.e.*, digestion, and formation of the human body; but they affect the acts of the sensitive part, that are ordained to the acts of generation and nutrition; for example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking food or in the act of generation, and the right or wrong use thereof.

#### NINTH ARTICLE.

##### WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE EXTERNAL MEMBERS ARE COMMANDED?

*We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the body are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above (A. 8). Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.

*Obj. 2.* Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement. But the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason: for Gregory of Nyssa\* says that *the pulse is not controlled by reason.* Therefore the movement of the bodily members is not subject to the command of reason.

*Obj. 3.* Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 16) that *the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm with desire, the body remains cold.* Therefore the movements of the members are not obedient to reason.

*On the contrary,* Augustine says (*Conf.* viii. 9): *The mind commands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely can one discern obedience from command.*

*I answer that,* The members of the body are organs of the soul's powers. Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect of obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of reason,

\* Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.* xxii.

## FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACT OF THE WILL IS COMMANDED?

*We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded. For Augustine says (*Conf. viii. 9*): *The mind commands the mind to will, and yet it does not.* But to will is the act of the will. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.

*Obj. 2.* Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command; for the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to understand. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.

*Obj. 3.* Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated above (A. 1); for if that act of the will be also commanded, this command will be preceded by another act of the reason, and so on to infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not possible. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.

*On the contrary,* Whatever is in our power, is subject to our command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power; since all our acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are voluntary. Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.

*I answer that,* As stated above (A. 1), command is nothing else than the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something to act. Now it is evident that the reason can direct the act of the will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something so it can direct by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an act of the will can be commanded.

*Reply Obj. 1.* As Augustine says (*ibid.*) when the mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the

fact that it commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command perfectly.

*Reply Obj. 2.* Just as each of the members of the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers; and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will, commands the act of the will for himself.

*Reply Obj. 3.* Since command is an act of the reason, that act is commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will is not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 4). Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.

## SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACT OF THE REASON IS COMMANDED?

*We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But it is the reason that commands, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the act of the reason is not commanded.

*Obj. 2.* Further, that which is essential is different from that which is by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by reason, is rational by participation, as stated in *Ethic. i. 13*. Therefore the act of that power, which is essentially rational, is not commanded.

*Obj. 3.* Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not always in our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.

*On the contrary,* That which we do of our free-will, can be done by our command. But the acts of the reason are



not come after. Indeed, the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the effects to which it has relation.

*Reply Obj. 3.* Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the same object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the choice of another. And since the acts of the will react on one another, in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice and use; so that we may say that the will consents to choose, and consents to consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing. And such acts as are ordained to that which precedes, precede also.

#### QUESTION XVII.

##### OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL.

*(In Nine Articles.)*

We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason? (2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals? (3) Of the order between command and use. (4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct? (5) Whether the act of the will is commanded? (6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded? (7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded? (8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded? (9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?

##### FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER COMMAND IS AN ACT OF THE REASON OR OF THE WILL?

*We proceed thus to the First Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that command is not an act of the reason but of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna says that there are four ways of moving, *by perfecting, by disposing, by commanding, and by counselling.* But it belongs to the will to move all the other powers of the soul, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 1). Therefore command is an act of the will.

*Obj. 2.* Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most free. But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore to command belongs to the will.

*Obj. 3.* Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act of the reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges that a thing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is not an act of the reason, but of the will.

*On the contrary,* Gregory of Nyssa\* and the Philosopher (*Ethic. i. 13*) say that *the appetite obeys reason*. Therefore command is an act of the reason.

*I answer that,* Command is an act of the reason, presupposing, however, an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note that, since the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to bear on one another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing, and the will wills to reason, the result is that the act of the reason precedes the act of the will, and conversely. And since the power of the preceding act continues in the act that follows, it happens sometimes that there is an act of the will in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the reason, as we have stated in reference to use and choice; and conversely, that there is an act of the reason in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the will.

Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way of intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate or declare something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when one person says to another: *This is what you should do*. Sometimes, however, the reason intimates something to a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is said to someone: *Do this*. Now the first mover, among the powers of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 1). Since, therefore, the second mover does not move, save in virtue of the first mover, it follows that the very fact that the reason moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will. Con-

\* Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.* xvi.

sequently it follows that command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by its command, moves (the power) to the execution of the act.

*Reply Obj. 1.* To command is to move, not anyhow, but by intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.

*Reply Obj. 2.* The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely because the reason can have various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will as being *a free judgment arising from reason*, implying that reason is the root of liberty.

*Reply Obj. 3.* This argument proves that command is an act of reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion, as stated above.

#### SECOND ARTICLE.

##### WHETHER COMMAND BELONGS TO IRRATIONAL ANIMALS?

*We proceed thus to the Second Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that command belongs to irrational animals. Because, according to Avicenna, *the power that commands movement is the appetite; and the power that executes movement is in the muscles and nerves*. But both powers are in irrational animals. Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.

*Obj. 2.* Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who receives commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to his master, as the Philosopher says (*Polit. i. 2*). Therefore the body is commanded by the soul, even in irrational animals, since they are composed of soul and body.

*Obj. 3.* Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an action. But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod. ii. 22*). Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.

*On the contrary,* Command is an act of reason, as stated above (A. 1). But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither, therefore, is there command.