

Bernard Lonergan Comments

I must begin by thanking Giovanni Sala for presenting his masterful
^ account of Kant largely in my terms and, no less, William Ryan for his ~~pre~~ penetrating ~~axxxxxx~~ comparison of Husserl's and my own cognitional theory. Xavier Monasterio extends this comparison by relating my work to that of Husserl particularly and of phenomenologists generally, but I must enter a protest in favor of my philosophy teachers. They did not tell me all that I later discovered, but I doubt that I ~~was~~ would have discovered ~~and~~ very much had they not been such honest men.

Vincent Potter has drawn a parallel between my position ~~on~~ on causality and that of Charles Pierce. He is correct in his surmise that I did not get my idea from Pierce. I got it from Aristotle's refutation of determinism, and my account of that may be read in an article published thirty years ago and, more recently, in book form under the title Grace and Freedom.¹

1) Edited by J. Patout Burns with a Foreword by F. E. Crowe. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, and New York: Herder and Herder, 1971. PP. 77, 108, 113.

Miss Anscombe's thought runs in the same direction. For her causality is one thing and necessity another, so that it is not true to say that, posited the cause, the effect follows necessarily. In fact, the days of the necessary laws of physics and even of the iron laws of economics have been over ~~for~~ for some forty years. Any universal law is abstract. It holds only under the proviso that other things are equal.

Whether other ~~things~~^{things} are equal, is a matter of statistics, while the law itself has the intelligibility not of necessity but of verifiable possibility.

In chapter eight of Insight I extended emergent probability ~~to~~ to propose a theory of explanatory genera and species. Philip McShane, to whom we all are grateful for editing these volumes, has gone to work verifying that theory, and has found that biophysics and biochemistry, while ^{they} account for much that goes on in a cell, do so only by bits and pieces that constitute no more than a coincidental manifold.

Thomas Owens would raise the question whether my philosophy allows for intersubjective ~~encounter~~ encounter. I did not treat the matter in Insight. I do in my forthcoming Method in Theology where the first section of the third chapter draws on Max Scheler on intersubjectivity and the second section illustrates inter-subjective meaning by outlining ^{the} a phenomenology of a smile. Nor does my position offer any resistance to such an addition, for the position admits everything that can be experienced, understood, affirmed. Indeed, both ~~of~~ the papers ~~by~~ by Eric O'Connor and the one by C. M. Going ~~witness~~ reveal not a little sympathy for Insight yet manage to be very much at home with the intersubjective dimensions of communication.

Timothy Fallon has extended my notions of horizon and conversion into a theory of collaboration. Carl Bauer has found my philosophy of science relevant to a re-education of the re-educators ~~concerned~~ concerned with leadership-group dynamics and organizational behavior.

Bernard McGinn has put together what is good and what is insufficient in my earlier remarks on history; and I feel I can hope that chapters seven to ten of Method in Theology will remedy some of the deficiencies.

Rocco Cacópardo finds the first eighteen chapters of Insight highly acceptable but finds the last two unpalatable. The root of our difference, I think, lies in the meaning we assign to the complete intelligibility of being. For me it is the exclusion of all obscurantism; at no point is it legitimate to brush aside arbitrarily any intelligent and reasonable question. To him it appears to be the arrogance of supposing that there are no questions that we cannot answer.

Both Donald Johnson and Michael Novak complain that I am not with it. The former would have me align myself more with Marx and Freud and Norman Brown. The latter would want me to think with Marx and Sartre. Neither seems to be aware that I am a child of the depression of the thirties and that I have an as yet unpublished paper on economic analysis as the premiss for moral precepts. I agree with Marx inasmuch as I find intrinsic to the developing economy a surplus; I disagree inasmuch as I find have no doubt that it is a blunder to conceive this surplus as surplus value; it is to be understood and conceived, not in terms of marginal analysis, but in terms of macroeconomics. Again, I agree with Marx inasmuch as he finds the fact of indignation, surplus a source for moral ~~precepts~~ but I disagree with him on his interpretation of the fact of ~~the~~ surplus and on the moral conclusions he draws. Further, I agree with Marx inasmuch as he wants philosophers not only to know but also to make history, but I feel he made a very incomplete rejection of the mistaken efforts of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel to restore the hegemony of speculative reason that had been attacked by Kant. After all, Marx is only a left-wing Hegelian. He does not really belong to the company of a Kierkegaard who took

his stand on faith, of a Newman who took his stand on conscience, of a Dilthey concerned with a Lebensphilosophie, of a Blondel who wanted a philosophy of action, of the personalists and many ~~existentialists~~ existentialists of the present century, and of Paul Ricoeur's still unfinished philosophie de la volonté. With such men I am more easily in sympathy than with Jean-Paul Sartre or Norman Brown.