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Origen, dppx 54-62; dp de princ; k koetschau; ii In Ioan;  
pr preuschen; cc contra Celsum

Altaner 223-235; G. Bardy DTC XI (22) 1516-28; J Danielou  
Message chretien 344-53; H Musurillo TS 24 1963 250-63

Note moot points not settled by dp; Rufinus is thought to have  
improved on original

In apologists of second century there is operative the dilemma:  
if the Son is divine and transcendent, he is not distinct from Father  
if he is distinct from Father, he is not transcendent nor properly God  
Origen does not solve this problem, but he does escape naive realism  
only to fall into the ~~hands~~ arms of Platonism

He insisted on the strict immateriality of God dp I 1 k 16-27  
ii IV 21ff pr 244ff

He taught that the Son was distinct from the Father kath upostasin  
"We worship the Father of truth and the Son that is truth. They  
are two things (pragnata) according to the hypostasis (subject);  
but they are one by consent and concord and identity of will; and  
so who sees the Son - who is the effulgence of God's Splendor  
and the stamp of God's very being - also sees the Father in  
the Son who is the image of God" cc viii 12 k 229, 31ff

He taught that the Son was the substantially subsistent wisdom of  
God the Father. dp I 2 2; k 28, 18

absolutely incorporeal and in the strict sense eternal Ibid k 29

Son not by adoption but by nature

"His generation is eternal and sempiternal, like the generation  
of splendor from light. He does not become Son extrinsically  
through adoption by the spirit, but he is son by nature. dp I 2 4 k 33

He is not the visible but the invisible image of God

".. in some such fashion (as an act of will from the mind) is the  
Father to be thought to have generated a Son, namely as his image,  
and as the Father is invisible by nature so he generated an  
invisible image." dp I 2 6 k 33, 1 ff

As the Father made all things through the Son, so he is  
omnipotent through the Son (omnipotent = pantokrator, pantaduxamos)  
1 Cor 1, 24 Kriston theou dunamin and theou sophian (not quoted)  
X Jn 17 10 All that is mine is thine, and thine is mine (quoted)  
Hence one only omnipotence of Father and Son dp I 2 10 k 43 10-27  
mine and thine identical in extent since one omnipotence exercised  
over all

Anticipation to one ousia, one substance of Nicea

But an incomplete anticipation as will be seen

Or expounded the generation of the Son both negatively and positively  
Negatively, by rejected any analogy resting on human or animal gener \*  
by scouting as mere fables any suggestion that the  
father put forth sprouted a Son; immaterial substance  
cannot be divided+

\*dp I 2 5 k 32, 11 f + dp I 2 6 K 35 10 ff cf dp

IV 4 1(28) k 349; ii XX 18 pr 351 4 ff where

"ex substantia Patris" impugned as a material notion of God

Positively, inasmuch as he explained that the image was to be  
understood not as painted on wood or sculpted in stone but "as when  
we interpret historically that 'When adam had lived one hundred  
and thirty years, he became the father of a son in his own likeness,  
after his image, and named him X Seth' (Geb 5, 3). Such  
an image contains the unity of nature and substance of Father and  
Son. For if 'all that the Father does, the Son does also  
similarly' inasmuch as the Son does similarly all that the  
Father does, the image of the Father is formed in the Son,  
who of course is born of the Father as his will proceeding  
from his mind (velut quaedam voluntas eius ex mente procedens).  
For I opine that the will of the Father should suffice for that  
to subsist that the Father wills. When then the Father wills  
he uses nothing more beyond that which arises ~~by~~ from the counsel  
of his will." dp I 2 6 k 34, 21 ff

Jn 5, 19

The Son is image of the Father, not only because he does just  
what the Father does in similar fashion.. but also because  
he is ever with God and remains God and hardly would remain God  
unless he ever remained in contemplation of the profundity of  
the Father. ii II 2 pr 55 4ff MG 14 110B

Perhaps for this reason he is the ~~xxx~~ image of God the invisible,  
because the image that he is is the image of the Father's will;  
and the divinity that is in him is the image of true divinity;  
and while he is the image of the Father's goodness, still he  
says, Why do you call me good? ii XIII 36 pr 261 24 ff MG 14 461C

Mk 10 18

Difference from predecessors ( and post -Nicene thinkers )

By insisting on the eternity and immateriality of the Son, he excluded all the views that regarded the immanent Logos to be eternal but acknowledged sonship only when the Father put forth his Logos to create the world.

Again, he excluded all the views that defended the unity of God by claiming that the Son was not distant from the Father, that he was continuous with the Father, and the like.

Not only did he exclude material analogies but he also introduced spiritual analogies. He adverted to the procedure of rational consciousness in which will proceeds from mind, and conceived that it was in this fashion that the Son proceeded from the Father.

However Origen did not reach post-Nicene doctrine, which held that F S & Sp had one divinity, one substance, one intellect, one will, one omnipotence. Origen held that the Father was known by himself far more perfectly than by the Son

dp IV 4 8 (35) k 360 4 ff MG 11 410

Cf ii I 27 pr 34 19-31 MG 14 74 where he holds that the Son knows absolutely all truth but suggests that the knowledge of the Father is something higher, proper to the Father, and transcending the very idea of truth.

So Father and Son are two hypostases, the Father is the exemplar, the Son is the image, and the <sup>mutual</sup> relationship is maintained by knowing and willing. The image is the supreme instance of Platonic participation: it is in the order of knowing and free willing. "Such an image constitutes the unity of nature and substance of Father and Son" dp I 2 6 k 34 23 f

Further illustrations of Platonist participation (methokhe)

For Origen ho theos is one thing and theos is another: pr 54 12 ff cf Jn i,1 ho logos en pros ton theon kei theos en o logos the Father is ho theos, autotheos; the Son is theos, divine by participation, and the source of divinization in mankind

Origen considered that he had found a middle way between Sabellianism (no distinction of F S Sp) and adoptionism

(Xt became Son of God at baptism: Thou art my beloved son,

in whom I am well pleased Lk 3 22) ii II 2 pr 54 23 ff MG 14 110AB

Origen

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Not only is the Father divinity itself while the Son participates  
of divinity, but this relationship is generalized, so that some  
attributes are proper to the Father and by participation in the  
Son, while others are proper to the Son while the Father has  
something that transcends them

So the Son is the true light, but the Father surpasses <sup>the</sup> true light  
just as much as the Father of truth surpasses truth and the  
Father of Wisdom surpasses Wisdom ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

ii II 23 (18) pfr 80 12-15 MG 14 156 A

Christ is Life, but the one that is greater than Xt (jn 14 28)  
is greater than ~~light~~ Life ii XIII 3 pr 229 9f MG 14 404C

Xt is good, but the Father is goodness itself and good without  
anything similar dp I 2 13 k 47 3 ff MG 11 143 C

cf further references in k 46, 13 in his apparatus criticus

On the other hand the Word is the substance of truth itself  
(he aletheia he ousiodes) and the substance of justice itself  
(he ~~alētheia~~ he ousiodes) which while they do originate

<sup>a</sup>  
dikaiosune

through anyone still do originate from the Father

ii VI, 6 (3) pr 114 22; 115 1 MG 14 209 D

In general Origen understood Jn 14 28 universally so that  
just as the Son and the Spirit surpassed everything else by  
their abundant excellence, so similarly the Father surpassed  
the Son and the Spirit ii XIII 25 pr 249 14 ff MG 14 411 B  
dp IV 4 8 (35) k 360 4 ff MG 11 410

Here we must note the radical difference between origenist and  
larger thought. The fourth Lateran council (DB 432 DS )  
will assert that whatever similitude may be noted between God  
and his creatures, a far greater dissimilitude must also be noted.  
But while the creator transcends the creature, he is not thought  
to lie beyond the realm of being essence truth ~~intelligible~~  
intelligence. What lies beyond the realm of being is nothing.

At times Origen may be speculating rather than asserting as  
when he says that the God of all is simple, invisible,  
incorporeal and either mind or beyond mind and being (ousia)  
\* cc VII 38 k 188 11 ff MG 11 1473 B

Again similarly when he asks whether the Only begotten is  
the being of beings (ousia ousion) and the idea of ideas and  
the principle while the Father is to be placed beyond all these

CC ~~VI~~ VI 64  
k 135 9 ff  
cf ii 19 6

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
CC VI 64 k 135 9 ff MG 11 1396 D cf ii XIX 6 & I 27  
pr 305 16 f; 34 19-31

But absolutely he affirms that the Son is truth itself, wisdom itself, Logos itself; and he proves that the Son is eternal because it seems absurd to say that there was a time when neither truth nor wisdom nor logos existed.

dp IV 4 1 (28) k 350 8-10 cf lin 1-3

Hal Koch, Provoia und Paideusis, Berlin 1932, p. 19.

"One cannot insist too much that Origen was no metaphysician in the proper sense of that term."

H. Crouzel, Origene et la philosophie, Paris 1962, pp. 179-216

Later the sharp distinction will be between Creator and creature. One will name the creature divine only in some weak sense, divine by participation, by something both created and finite. What the Thomists later will name the universal principle of being (universale essendi principium), for Origen was the Father from whom all things are, and the Son through whom all things are (1 Cor 8, 6). For him divinity and divinization were such that the Father (whom no one has ever seen Jn 1 18 par) is hidden in the darkness of an apophatic theology, while the Son (who is Son not by adoption but by nature) by contemplation and will draws divinity to himself. Again the Son is understood to be "the effulgence of the Father's splendor", not because he consubstantial with the Father, but because he makes the Father understood and known by revealing him to those whom he pleases. dp I 2 8 k 38 5-12

Did Origen hold the Son to be a creature? Genitum non factum. If one believes Rufinus' translation, he did not

"We do not say, as do the heretics, that some part of the Father's substance was turned into the Son, or that the Son was procreated out of nothing substantial, so that there would be a time when he was not, but excluding any suggestion of what is corporeal, we hold that the Word and Wisdom was generated out of the invisible and incorporeal God without any bodily change, just as willing proceeds from mind. Indeed since he is named the son of his love (filius caritatis suae Col 1 13), there is no oddity in thinking him the son of his will." dp IV 4 1 (28) k 349 / 3-10

Again: The Son does not arise extrinsically through adoption by the Spirit but he is Son by nature." dp I 2 4 k 38 33 2 f



Origen

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Later doctrine on creation and consubstantiality

25 443 C

Athanasius, De decretis synodi nicenae 11 AW II 9 33 ff MG ~~XXXXXX~~  
non sine profunditate inter generationem et factionem distinxit God  
argument that God is ho on, while creatures receive their being from

De synodis 46 AW II 272 14 ff MG 26 776 B

Determines exact difference between increatus and ingenitus

De decretis nix. syn. 13 AW II 12 1 f MG 25 440 A

Hence able to argue that if ~~the~~ Christ is a creature, he is not Son,  
and if he is Son, he is not a creature

However these distinctions were worked out ~~in~~ during the controversy  
with the Arians, and they show how intimately related are the  
concepts of consubstantiality and creatureliness

De synodis 48 AW II 272 22 ff MG 26 777C where it is argued that  
if the Son is a creature, he is not consubstantial with the  
Father, and if he is consubstnatial with the Father he is not  
a creature.

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On the above showing Origen's subordinationism implies that for  
him the Son must be a creature

Such a conclusion was drawn by the Arians; it was drawn by the  
those that centuries later condemned Origen; but it was not  
drawn by Origen himself, and it is not evident that he could  
have drawn it

There is to his thought an element of philosophy, namely, the  
conception of God as spiritual and strictly eternal, but  
basically his categories were scriptural. He is a transition point.