The same thing appears in Tertullian. In Tertullian the Son undoubtedly is God. Why? Because God, though he is a spirit, certainly is a body; otherwise he would not be real. A spirit to be real has to have a body, has to be a substance. And out of the divine substance there proceeds a spirit informed by the divine Word; and that is the Son. It is what has been called Tertullian's organic monotheism. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are, as it were, organic parts of one divinity. And behind that is the type of naive realism to which Tertullian perhaps did not consciously subscribe, though de facto it was the way in which he thought. Because of that mentality, Tertullian can hold that the Son is not eternal but came forth in time. Whether he is eternal or not is of no importance in settling his divinity; he is divine if he is made of the divine Matter, the divine

Stuff. The Son can be subordinate: the Father can give the orders and the Son execute them; and that will not be against the divinity of the Son, because it is not whether the Son is subordinate or superior that settles whether he is divine, but what he is made of. Is he made of the divine Stuff or not? Now Tertullian does not put it quite so bluntly as that, but that is what his position comes to. In other words, when Tertullian makes his subordinationist utterances, for us they imply denial of the divinity. But they do not imply denial of divinity in Tertullian's mind.

In Clement of Alexandria the same mentality appears, notably in a series of passages from the Excerpta ex Theodoto; in that work, in parts that scholars attribute to Clement himself and not to

quotations, Clement is quite clearly involved in a naive realism. He speaks of the angels of the little ones, who continuously gaze upon the face of the Father; and "Blessed are the pure of heart, because they see God." But how could there be a face of the Father to see if he has no shape? The Apostle, then, knew about celestial bodies that are beautiful and intelligent, when he said, "Other is the glory of the heavenly beings and other is that of the terrestrial, other that of the angels and other that of the archangels." Compare them with the corporeal bodies we see on earth, and of course they are invisible, far too subtle for us to see; but they are bodies none the less. Similarly with the demons; if they had no body, they would not be able to suffer from the fire of hell. And Clement has a series of arguments -- some philosophical, some from

i.e. Scripture -- to prove that God and the angels have bodies in a sense. This is a confusion of the notion of body with the notion of reality. He argues, as also Ireneus seems to have argued before him, from the parable of Lazarus. The rich man asks Abraham to have Lazarus dip his finger in a glass of water and place it on his tongue. Well, both Lazarus and the rich man are dead, have departed from the crass bodies of this world. But obviously Lazarus could not have a finger to dip in the water and the rich man could not have a tongue on which to place the water if they had no bodies at all. There is, then, a great deal of what we would call "naive realism." What do you mean by the "real?" It is what you can put your hand on. If you extend that idea of the real, and at the same time acknowledge the reality of God, then you have to conceive God in a manner that we should reject.

Now what pulled these thinkers and what pulled the Christian tradition out of that naive realism was the exegetical problem set by the gnostics (less by the Jewish Christians, because they received less attention). Ireneus makes no systematic effort to get to the roots of gnostic exegesis. He proceeds much as the boxer described by Demosthenes: the barbarian boxer puts his hand up not where the blow is coming, but where he has been hit. In a similar manner Ireneus is meeting each objection as it arises. But Clement of Alexandria in the eighth book of his Stromateis tries setting up a systematic type of exegesis. His rules are: first of all, if you use a name, define it, and define it in terms better known than the name itself. Define it in a way that everyone will accept. And after you have agreed on its definition, ask whether anything corresponding to the name exists. And when

you have settled that it exists, inquire about its nature. Then he goes on to give the precepts of Greek hermeneutics, which he followed.

Now the necessity of that systematic procedure set up by Clement of Alexandria is seen when one thinks of gnostic exegesis. If the only interpretation of l.c. Scripture were symbolic, then you could never settle what the symbols are symbols of. And if you are going to say that the symbols are not just symbols of more symbols, then you have to have some idea of reality. And if Clement was to contribute to defeating the l.c. / l.c gnostic exegesis of Scripture (which reduced Scripture to nonsense, really), he had to appeal to some reality, and he had to appeal to some method that settled just what the real was. You have in the exegetic problem the implicit philosophic problem, "What do you mean by

reality?" And that problem of reality, implicit in the exegetic problem, the Alexandrians met by turning to Platonism. The idea that the early Christians held a spiritualist philosophy in the contemporary sense of the term is not only weakened by the examples I have indicated, but you can find the transitional point at which earlier views were corrected if you take Origen's De Principiis, Book I, where he treats of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. And his treatment of God the Father, which runs to some length, is devoted entirely to proving that God the Father is a purely spiritual being, and making it absolutely clear what he meant by "spiritual." Moreover, Origen conceived the generation of the Son from the Father by contemplation and love, an eternal contemplation and love. But Origen was involved in his Platonism (it was a middle Platonism, rather like that of Albinus), and while he conceived the Father

as the absolute good and God <u>simpliciter</u>, he conceived the Son as good and God by participation. The Son is Wisdom itself and Truth itself and Revelation itself and Resurrection itself, where the "itself" refers to the Platonist abstract idea; but the Father is something greater than these. On the other hand, the Son is not God, Divinity itself, but a participation of Divinity, not Goodness itself, but a participation of Goodness. That was Origen's Platonist solution to the problem raised by Sabellianism on the one hand and Adoptionism on the other. In Origen, naive realism has been transcended, but it has been transcended in the direction of Platonism. While Tertullian held the divinity of the Son, and truly held it, on false philosophic assumptions, Origen has a conception of the Son as a really subordinate being, not "true God" in the sense of Nicea. We have moved to the second

step in which philosophic issues were involved in Christian thinking.

A century later the Arians had brought the question back to the Hebraic and Christian categories: l.c. "Is the Son Creator or is He creature?" And they argued that the Son is not unbegotten. He is begotten, he is generated, he has an origin, he depends on someone else; therefore he cannot be the First Principle, he cannot be the Creator, he cannot be God in the proper sense of the term. On the other hand, in Athanasius, who represented and defended the Council of Nicea, the distinction, which had been clarified earlier and then obscured by the Arians, between agennêtos and agenêtos is restored to clarity. The first is from gennaô, "generate," the second from gignomai, "become," What is agenêton is increatum,

not created; what is agennêton has not been generated. In Athanasius one finds fundamental reflections on the notion of creation, on the notion of God as He-who-is. The Greeks, Aristotle and Plato, had spoken of to on, what-is; but with the Septuagint version of the Old Testament, Athanasius speaks of ho ôn, He-who-is. From the fact that the Son is indeed not ungenerated (agennêtos) it does not follow that he has been created, that he is not agenêtos. You have fundamental reflections on the being of God in Athanasius' refutation of Arius, in his distinction between agennêtos and agenêtos, in his reflection on ho ôn, and most of all in his notion of the consubstantiality of the Son. What does consubstantiality mean? Well, it has several meanings; but the meaning in Alexander of Alexandria, who condemned Arius, in Athanasius, and in the Christian tradition, is put very briefly in the

formula, "The same statements are made of the Son as of the Father, apart from the name 'Father'." As it is put in the Preface of the Blessed Trinity in the Mass, "Quod enim de tua gloria, revelante te, credimus, hoc de Filio tuo, hoc de Spiritu Sancto, sine differentia discretionis sentimus." "What we believe about your glory, the kābôd Yahweh, through your revelation, all that is known about the divine glory, the same of the Son, the same of the Holy Ghost, without any distinction, is what we hold." And note the difference between that formula, which was finally crystallized in the Latin Preface to the Mass, and Tertullian's position -- the difference between that naive realist conception of the divinity of the Son and the conception implicit in Nicea and explicit in Athanasius and subsequent writers. For Tertullian (and not only Tertullian, of course; that same type

of thinking runs through the writers of the Western Church, and many in the East too) the Son is divine if he is made of the same matter as God the Father, of the same stuff. Whether he comes out early or late, whether he is subordinate or not , makes no difference; he is still divine because he is made of the right stuff. And that is a possible meaning also of "consubstantial." But on the other hand, when you take the real as WHAT IS KNOWN BY A TRUE AFFIRMATION, then the Son is God if you affirm the same things about the Son as about the Father. The difference there is the difference between two realisms. Is a thing real because of what it is made of, its matter, its stuff -- is that what constitutes it as reality? And is it by a contact with that reality that you know the real? Or is the real <u>what you know when you truly affirm</u>? There is an antithesis here between two

meanings of the word "realism," a fundamental antithesis, and there is an historical transition from one to the other as one follows the evolution of Christian theology in the early centuries.

Now that same realism, the realism of judgment, of truth (where "truth" means not the truth of saying but the truth of affirming) is at the root not only of all dogmatic definitions ("Si quis dixerit..., anathema sit"), but also at the root of the whole scholastic method in its fundamental conception. Abelard in his Sic et Non with regard to 158 topics, quoted the Fathers and the Scriptures both for and against these 158 propositions: "Yes, that is so; no, it is not." Exactly the same procedure had been used by the canon lawyer Gratian in his Concordia Discordantium Canonum. Gilbert de la Porrée defines the question

l.c.

as follows: there is a question if, and only if, sound authorities and good reasons can be given for and against both sides of a contradiction. And the question is the fundamental tool of medieval thought. It has become somewhat formalized and dead, at least it seems dead, for example, in the Summa of St. Thomas, where automatically there is the videtur quod non with three reasons on one side, the sed contra with usually one, sometimes two, reasons for the other side, the response, and then the solutions. But if you want to see St. Thomas using the quaestio as a tool that is fully alive, take De Veritate, q. 24, a. 12, where he contradicting the position he had held in the Sentences. You will find that in the videtur quod non there are 24 authorities, and they are all authorities, and they are all against what he held in the Sentences; then there are eleven more on the other side. His

solution runs through about nine columns in the Vivès edition. But implicit in that method of the question the issue always is saying what is true. It is the same type of thinking as you have in the dogmas: "Si quis dixerit..., anathema sit." It is the same type of thinking as you have in the meaning of "homoousion," when "homoousion" is taken not as identity of matter, but identity of predication.

Now, what is the origin of that Christian realism, the realism of the true affirmation? Clearly, it is the scriptural word of God. It is the word of God as a command in the Law; it is the word of God as a correction in the Prophets. It is the precept of our Lord to the Apostles in the Sermon on the Mount: "Let your speech be 'Yea, yea; nay, nay'." "Sit sermo vester 'Est, est; non, non'." It is the word of God

as conceived by St. Paul in Gal 1: "If an angel from heaven should preach to you a gospel different from the one I have preached to you, let him be anathema." The word of God! To say it is not true would be a blasphemy; to say it does not regard reality would be an impious trifling. And those implications of the word of God as received by the Christian communion are the real foundations and origins, I would suggest, of Christian realism.

I thank you for your very kind attention.