

Religious Commitment

1. The Question

In a public lecture at the University of Toronto in January 1968, the Director of the Harvard Institute for World Religions, Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith, began by remarking that much fruitful energy had been devoted to exploring man's many religious traditions and to reconstructing the history of the overt data on man's religious living. Both in detail and in wide compass the observable forms have been observed and the observations have been recorded. But Professor Smith went on to claim that a further, a more important, and a more difficult question must be raised. To live religiously ⁱas not merely to live in the presence of certain symbols but, he urged, it is to be involved with them or through them in a quite special way -- a way that may lead far beyond the symbols, that may demand the totality of a person's response, that may affect his relation not only to the symbols but to everything else, to himself, to his neighbor, to the stars.

~~This special involvement, Professor Smith claimed, pleads to be elucidated. As he wished to write about Islam in a manner that would enable a pious Muslim to realize that his own religious living was being described now is the time pleads to be elucidated. Moreover, what he desired was a general account of such involvement, commitment, engagement. No doubt, such involvement both inspires and is inspired by religious imperatives, religious rituals, religious traditions, religious beliefs. It remains that it is distinct from them for the very simple reason~~

This special involvement, commitment, engagement, Professor Smith claimed, pleads to be elucidated. If it both inspires and is inspired by religious traditions, religious beliefs, religious imperatives, religious rituals, still it is distinct from them. Members of the same religion are not all equally committed to their religion. The same man may be at one time indifferent to religion, at another profoundly concerned, at a third vehemently hostile. The question is, then, what makes religion come alive? What has happened when it withers and dies?

The matter has been of interest to psychologists. The late Abraham Maslow turned his attention from the neurotic to the healthy personality, from the healthy to what he called peak experiences, and from peak experiences in general to religious peaking.¹ He arrived at the conclusion that most people do have peak experiences. While he did not have an explanation for all cases in which no peaking occurred, he thought that in many instances peaking was suppressed or repressed because it did not square with an out-and-out practical, or materialistic, or rationalistic outlook. Again, though most people do have peak experiences, most do not know that they have them. ~~These~~ Such experiences do not bear a label. When they occur, they are not accompanied by a small voice that assures you you are having a ~~peak~~ peak experience. Just as the psychiatrist has to help his clients identify and name and acknowledge feelings that are indeed conscious but not yet identified, distinguished, named, acknowledged, so too the psychological ~~investigator~~ investigator has to develop the technique and style of communication that will serve to help others uncover and

identify and distinguish and name and acknowledge their conscious but not yet identified, distinguished, named, acknowledged peak experiences. In brief, experiencing is one thing and full human knowing is another. Knowing begins from experiencing but goes on to inquire, understand, conceive, formulate, reflect, weigh the evidence, affirm or deny.

Maslow distinguished strong and weak peakers. He attributed high peak experience to the founders of religions. On the other hand, he conceived the function of religious organization to be the transmission to others of some participation in the original inspiration, while ^{he pointed} ~~pointing~~ to the danger that control of the organization might fall into the hands of non-peakers who would divert it away from its primary purpose.

Professor
It is easy to see that Maslow is offering an answer in terms of psychology to the question raised by Smith. For peak experiences, whether strong or weak, are distinct from traditions, beliefs, imperatives, rituals. Again, variation in peak experiences would account for variation in religious commitment, involvement, engagement. ^{It could be said that some form of peak} ~~It is a peak~~ experience ~~that~~ makes religion come alive.

Now I believe that the question raised by Professor Smith and the answer offered by Professor Maslow point to an issue that concerns the contemporary Catholic theologian. The Second Vatican Council led to the foundation of three secretariats in Rome: one for ecumenism, one for non-Christian religions, and one for atheism. These secretariats can function ~~properly~~ properly, only if the members of their staffs really understand what really animates other Christian religions, non-Christian religions, and those that reject

all religion. Further, it seems to me that an understanding of religious experience in the general case would lead to a fuller understanding of one's personal religious experience. If Professor Maslow is correct in holding that one can have peak experiences without knowing that one has them -- and I have no doubt that he is correct -- then increased light on the general case can prove to be a factor in an increased understanding of oneself.

2. The Procedure

I have been indicating what I hope to achieve in the present paper, and now I must draw attention to the ~~XXK~~ limitations on my hopes. First~~x~~ of all, I do not hope to give a complete account of religious experience. That is as varied as are human cultures, human temperaments, human lives. Again, I do not hope to portray the more common, the more obvious, the more~~x~~ easily objectified elements in religious experience. My aim is to select what I consider the radical element in religious experience, the one that may be least familiar to many, but does possess the redeeming feature of being ~~proportionate~~ proportionate to great achievement. Finally, what I have to offer is not a description of concrete reality, not a hypothesis about it, but what is called a model or an ideal type. It is an intelligibly linked set of terms and relations that may prove to be useful when the time comes for describing realities or forming hypotheses about them.

My model has two parts. In traditional theological language, ~~the first part~~ ~~XX~~ is the doctrine of God's grace as ~~it functions~~ within a Christian context, and the second part is the grace that is sufficient for salvation and, as theologians commonly hold, God grants to all men no matter what their race, their age, their cultural development, their religious affiliation.

However, if I have employed traditional theological language as the simple vehicle for communicating the general area of my thinking, simultaneously I must warn you that my thinking itself will not occur in medieval categories. I am not going to speak of grace in terms of an absolutely supernatural entitative habit received in the essence of the soul from which proceed operative habits received in the potencies of the soul. Contemporary theology differs from medieval theology, not I should say because of a change in theological content, but because of a threefold change in the cultural context.

The first change in the cultural context ~~is~~ was from the Aristotelian to the modern notion of science. According to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics science is a matter of knowing the cause, knowing that it is the cause, and knowing that the effect cannot be other than it is. In brief, the intelligibility sought by science was necessary. In contrast, the intelligibility sought by modern science, so far from being necessary, is intrinsically hypothetical. It is just a possibility that can be advanced to the status of fact and truth only in so far as it is verified.

The second change ~~is~~ in the cultural context was from the classicist to the modern notion of scholarship. The ideal of the classicist scholar was the orator, and his notion of culture was normative. On that normative notion culture was the achievement of an elite. It was one and the same for all times and places. It delighted in immortal works of art, it preached the eternal verities, it subscribed to the perennial philosophy, it found in its social structures and its laws the deposit of the prudence and the wisdom of mankind.

But the modern notion of culture is empirical. A culture is a set of meanings and values that inform a way of life, and there are as many cultures as there are sets of meanings and values informing human living. Hence, the ~~modern scholar~~ modern scholar is no orator. He is a linguist, an exegete, a historian. His task is to enter into the mentality of other peoples, other places, other times, to discover their diverse manners of thought and feeling and communication, to discern even in the ways of ~~the~~ primitive ^{man} human intelligence, human reasonableness, human responsibility.

The third change was from traditional to modern philosophy. Traditional philosophy conceived itself as science. It was concerned with objects. Its first science was ^a metaphysics that speculated on the necessary aspects of being as being. Other sciences were further determinations of the most general science. They dealt with being as moving, being as ~~xxx~~ alive, being as human, being as supreme being. Now modern science withdrew from this scheme of things. First, it ~~rejected~~ ^{basic} ~~metaphysics~~ metaphysics as the source of its ~~concepts~~ concepts. It set up shop for itself and developed its own empirically based concepts in mechanics, thermodynamics, electromagnetics, in the chemist's periodic table, and in the biologist's theory of evolution. Secondly, it presented the philosopher with an apprehension of reality quite distinct from any commonsense apprehension. As Eddington put it, he had two tables. One was brown, hard, heavy, solid. The other was mostly empty space with here and there a wavicle that could not be represented by the human imagination.

Thirdly, modern science presented philosophy with a new paradigm of science. Science is no longer a matter of drawing necessary conclusions from self-evident and necessary premisses. It is an ongoing process in which each new advance brings one closer to the remote ideal named truth. And as modern science, so too modern mathematics is not conceived in terms of necessity. Its conclusions follow necessarily from its premisses, but the premisses themselves are not necessary truths. They are just postulates, and even the coherence of the postulates with one another is not ultimately demonstrable.

↓ This transformation of the notion of science has led to a transformation of the notion of philosophy. In a first phase, from Descartes to Kant, philosophy became critical: from concern with objects it turned to the cognitional activities of subjects. In a second phase, after the interlude of German idealism which attempted to restore speculative system, philosophy became more and more concerned with the good subject, the authentic subject. Schopenhauer wrote on Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Kierkegaard took his stand on faith, Newman rested his case on conscience, Nietzsche was concerned with the will to power, Dilthey aimed at a Lebensphilosophie, Blonder wanted a philosophy of action, Ricoeur today is writing a philosophy of will, and it is in this line of thought that stand the personalists and many existentialists. The consequence in theology is, I should say, what Karl Rahner has named ^h die anthropologische Wende, the turn to the study of man as basic.

3. Man as Self-transcendence

On the traditional definition man is a rational animal, and on that definition human nature is ever the same. It is conceived abstractly, so that a man is man whether he is awake or asleep, young or old, sane or crazy, sober or drunk, a genius or a moron, a saint or a sinner. But ^{in much} contemporary thought man is conceived as a range of potentialities, and men are distinguished by the authenticity with which such potentialities are realized. In so far as a man ~~transcends~~ transcends himself, he is authentic. In so far as a man fails to transcend himself, he is unauthentic.

But what is meant by self-transcendence? The answer to that question cannot be brief. For there are many stages in the process of man's self-transcendence and it is only by adverting to each of them in turn that one can convey what is meant by the phrase, self-transcendence.

In an essay entitled Traum und Existenz Ludwig Binswanger² distinguished dreams of the night and ~~the~~ dreams of the morning. In both kinds of ~~the~~ dream there is an element of Existenz, of being someone, someone conscious, someone with some sort of world, someone somehow dealing with that world or, perhaps, being overwhelmed by it. Any such world, of course, is ~~symbolic~~ imaginary and one's apprehension² of it in the dream is symbolic, obscure, fragmentary. But in dreams of the night we are further from our waking state than in dreams of the morning. Dreams of the night respond more to ~~some~~ somatic conditions, to the state, say, ~~of~~ of one's digestive apparatus. But in dreams of the morning one's waking state is being anticipated. Already its problems are dimly sensed. Already the subject is taking a stance with regard to them.

We need not pause to ask just how well-founded is Dr. Binswanger's distinction between dreams of the night and dreams of the morning. We are concerned with it only in so far as it provides some sort of introduction to the notion of self-transcendence. For in the dream state there is not just the unconscious. However imperfectly, there has emerged a conscious self relating to subjective need or to some sort of objective problem. In dreamless sleep there is neither conscious subject nor intended object. With the dream there is not yet one's full self nor any adequately ~~app~~ apprehended object. But there is the fragmentary recollection or anticipation of both. There have appeared both a self and a self's conscious relation to some other. From that slight beginning we have to mount through four further stages or levels of human consciousness and intentionality if we are to apprehend the self and its capacities.

Most easily identified in our waking states are our sensations, feelings, movements. There is the endless variety of sights to be seen, sounds to be heard, odors to be sniffed, tastes to be palated, shapes and textures to be touched. We feel pleasure and pain, desire and ^fear, joy and sorrow, and in such feelings there seem to reside the mass and momentum of our lives. We move about in various manners, take now this and now that posture, and express our ~~em~~ emotions by the fleeting movements of our facial muscles.

Still sensations, feelings, movements reveal no more than the narrow strip of space-time that we immediately experience. One may doubt that any man ever was content with that narrow world of immediacy. Imagination wants to fill ~~the~~ out and round off the picture. Language makes questions possible

and intelligence makes them fascinating. So we ask what and why and how and what for. Our answers extrapolate and construct ~~x~~ and serialize and generalize. Memory and tradition and ~~xx~~ belief put at our disposal the tales of travellers, the stories of nations, the exploits of heroes, the meditations of holy men, the treasures of literature, the discoveries of science, the reflections of philosophers. Each of us has his own little world of immediacy, but all such worlds are just minute strips within a far larger world, a world constructed by imagination and intelligence, mediated by words and meaning, and largely based upon belief.

Now ~~xx~~ it is this far larger world that is, for ~~xxxxx~~ each of us, the real world. It is a world unknown to the infant, learnt about at home and at school and at work. It is the world in which we live ~~the~~ most of our lives. But you are, I suspect, somewhat uneasy about this larger world that only slightly is "this sure and firm-set earth on which I tread", that in the main is constructed by imagination and intelligence, that is mediated by words and meaning, that by and large is based on belief. Such a description, however accurate, is not reassuring. Now this lack of assurance reveals the presence of a further question and, indeed, of a question different in ~~a~~ kind from those already considered. The questions already considered were questions for intelligence asking what x is, and what it is for, and how it is made, and on what principles does it work. None of these questions can be answered by a simple "yes" or "no." But whenever ~~xxx~~ any of these questions ~~x~~ is answered, the answer itself gives rise to a further question that can be answered by a simple "yes" or "no." These further ~~x~~ questions are questions, not for intelligence, but for reflection. They ask, not what or why or how, but, Is that so? Is it

certainly so? Is it ~~not~~ only probably so?

Now just how such questions can be answered, is a very nice problem in cognitive theory. But the fact is that we do answer them. The further fact is that when we affirm that something really and truly is so, then we do not mean that that is what appears, or what we imagine, or what we think, or what seems to be so, or what we would be inclined to say. No doubt, very frequently we have to be content with such lesser statements. But the point I wish to make is that the greater statement is not reducible to the lesser. When we affirm that something really and truly is so, we mean that we have somehow got beyond ourselves, somehow transcended ourselves, somehow got hold of something that is independent of ourselves.

I have been endeavoring to unfold and clarify the notion of self-transcendence by drawing your attention to a succession of distinct levels of human consciousness. First, I spoke of the subject in his dreams. Secondly, I spoke of the empirical subject awake, sensing, feeling, moving about in his world of immediacy. Thirdly, I spoke of the inquiring subject in a far larger world constructed by imagination and intelligence, mediated by words and meaning, based by and large on belief. Fourthly, I spoke of the rational subject that reflects, marshals and weighs the evidence, pronounces judgement in the light of the evidence, and by his judgement claims to ~~state~~ state something about some part of a world that only to a slight extent coincides with his world of immediacy.

With judgement, then, self-transcendence, in so far as it is cognitive, is complete. But human self-transcendence is not only cognitive but also moral. Besides questions for

intelligence and questions for reflection, there are questions for deliberation. Beyond the pleasures we enjoy and the pains we dread, there are the values to which we may respond with all our being. On the topmost level of human consciousness, the subject, deliberates, evaluates, decides, controls, acts. On that level he is at once practical and existential: practical inasmuch as he is concerned with concrete courses of action; existential ~~inasmuch~~ inasmuch as control includes ~~inasmuch~~ self-control, and the possibility of self-control entails responsibility both for what he does to others and for what he makes of himself.

However, man's self-control can proceed from quite different grounds. It can tend to be mere selfishness. Then the process of deliberation, evaluation, decision is limited to determining what is most to one's advantage, what best serves one's interest, what on the whole yields a maximum of pleasure and a minimum of pain. At the opposite pole, deliberation can tend to be concerned solely with values: with the vital values of health and strength; with the social values enshrined in family and society and education, the state and the law, the economy and technology; with the cultural values of religion and art, language and literature, science, philosophy, history; with the personal values, finally, that realize values in one's ~~own~~ own being and promote their realization in others.

In the measure that one's living, one's aims, one's achievements are a response to values, in that measure moral self-transcendence is achieved. One has got beyond mere selfishness. One has become a principle of benevolence and beneficence, capable of genuine collaboration and of true love. In the measure that moral self-transcendence

characterizes the members of a society, in that measure their world not only is constructed by imagination and intelligence, mediated by words and meaning, based by and large on belief; it also is a world regulated ^{by} not by selfishness but by values, by what truly is good, truly is worth while.

[illegible]

Now the transition from dreaming to waking is not sublation: waking does not include dreaming but simply puts an end to it. On the other hand, the transitions effected by questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, questions for deliberation are sublations. The empirical subject does not vanish when he begins to inquire, to ask what and why and how and what for. On the contrary, he begins to notice what before he had overlooked, to perceive more

distinctly, to observe more accurately. Similarly, the empirical and inquiring subject does not vanish when questions for reflection are ~~it~~ raised, when it is asked whether this ⁷ of that is or is not so. On the contrary, such questions keep us confronting ~~with~~ our insights, explanations, views with ever broader and fuller ranges of data. Finally, the question for deliberation that asks whether this or that is really worth while, introduces the notion of value to complete the cognitional self-transcendence, reached by experiencing, understanding, and judging, with the moral self-transcendence of benevolence and beneficence. But this addition in ~~new~~ no way dispenses with experiencing, understanding, and judging. One cannot do good without knowing the facts of the situation, without knowing what really is possible, without knowing the probable consequences of one's course of action. Just as inquiry directs sense towards knowledge of a universe, just as reflection directs sense and understanding towards ~~it~~ truth and reality, so deliberation turns sense, understanding, and judgement towards the realization of the good, of values.

My second remark regards the continuity and unity of human consciousness. A faculty psychology divides man up: it distinguishes intellect and will, perception and imagination, ~~sense~~ emotion and conation, ~~it~~ only to leave one with unresolved problems of priority and rank. Is sense to be preferred to intellect, or intellect to sense? Is intellect to be preferred to will, or will to intellect? Is one to be a sensist, an intellectualist, a voluntarist, or a sentimentalist? But once one has ceased to think in terms of faculties or powers, such questions vanish. What is given to consciousness, is a set of interrelated intentional operations. Together they conspire to achieve

both moral and cognitional self-transcendence. No part of the process can be dispensed with, for each has its essential contribution to make. To achieve the good, one has to know the real. To know the real, one has to reach the truth. To reach the ~~truth, one has to understand the data. To understand the data, one has to attend to them as they are given. Each subulating level of operations presupposes and complements its predecessors. The topmost level is the level of deliberate control and self-control. There consciousness becomes conscience. There operations are authentic in the measure that control heads for values.~~ truth, one has to understand the data. To understand the data, one has to attend to them as they are given. Each subulating level of operations presupposes and complements its predecessors. The topmost level is the level of deliberate control and self-control. There consciousness becomes conscience. There operations are authentic in the measure that control heads for values.

My third observation has to do with the dialectical character of human self-transcendence. Self-transcendence in man is never more than a precarious achievement. It involves a tension between the self as transcending and the self as transcended. Hence it is never some pure and serene and secure possession. Authenticity is ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity, and every successful withdrawal only brings to light the need for still further withdrawals. Our advance in understanding is also the elimination of our oversights and misunderstandings. Our advance in truth is ~~also~~ also the correction of our mistakes and errors. Our moral development is through repentance for our sins. Genuine religion is discovered and realized through redemption from the many traps of religious aberration. So we are bid to watch and pray, to make our way in fear and trembling. And it is the greatest saints that proclaim themselves the greatest sinners, though their sins may seem slight ~~indeed~~ indeed to less holy folk that

lack their discernment and their love.

From this dialectical character of human self-transcendence there follows a very important conclusion. The same religious traditions, beliefs, imperatives, rituals do not result in uniform behavior. They define ideals. They do not define performance. Performance is an index of the authenticity of one's living, and authenticity is always precarious. General statements may be made about a religion but not about the followers of a religion. Again, the general statements made about a religion are not refuted by the performance of its followers. Indeed, almost any characteristic of any religion can be matched in the history of religions by instances of its opposite.

4. The Orientation of Self-transcendence

I have been describing a fact. Man transcends himself. He moves from dreamless sleep to dreaming, from dreaming to waking, from waking to inquiry, to reflection, to deliberation. Now we must shift from the ^{simple} fact to its meaning. What is the significance of this self-transcendence? Whither is it headed?

A preliminary answer to these questions may be reached by questioning our questioning. It is by his questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation that man moves to cognitional and to moral self-transcendence. If we wish to understand that movement, the obvious procedure will be to question our questioning. And the answer to this reflex questioning will be the discovery of the question of God. We can~~not~~ inquire into the possibility of fruitful inquiry. We can reflect on the nature of reflection. We can deliberate

whether our deliberating is worth while. In each case we will find that we are raising the question of God.

The possibility of inquiry on the side of the subject lies in his intelligence, in his drive to know what, why, how, and in his ability to reach intellectually satisfying answers. But why should the answers that satisfy the intelligence of *the* subject yield anything more ~~than~~ than a subjective satisfaction? Why should they be supposed to possess any relevance to knowledge of the universe? Of course, we assume that they do. We can point to the fact that our assumption is confirmed by its fruits. So implicitly we grant that the universe is intelligible and, once that is granted, there arises the question whether the universe could be intelligible without having an intelligent ground. But that is the question of God.

Again, to reflect on reflection is to ask just what happens when we marshal and weigh the evidence for pronouncing that this ~~is~~ probably is so ~~and~~ and that probably is not so. But ^{to} ~~us~~ what do these metaphors of marshaling and weighing refer? Elsewhere I have worked out an answer to this question and ⁴ here I can do no more than summarily repeat my conclusion. Judgement proceeds rationally from the grasp of a virtually unconditioned. By an unconditioned is meant any x that has no conditions. By a virtually unconditioned is meant any x that has no unfulfilled conditions. In other words, a virtually unconditioned is a conditioned whose conditions are all fulfilled. To marshal the evidence is to ascertain whether all the conditions are fulfilled. To weigh the evidence is to ascertain whether the fulfilment of the conditions involves the existence or the occurrence of the conditioned.

Now this account of the nature of human judgement has a profound implication. If we are to speak of a virtually ^munconditioned, we must speak in the first instance of an [^]unconditioned. The virtually unconditioned has no unfulfilled conditions. But the strictly unconditioned has no conditions whatever. In traditional terms the former is a contingent being, what de facto happens to exist. But the ^{latter} ~~former~~ is a necessary being, what cannot but exist. In more contemporary terms ^{the} former pertains to this world, to the world of possible experience, while the latter transcends this world in the sense that its reality is of a totally different order. But whether we prefer traditional or contemporary language, we come to the question of God. Does a necessary being exist? Does there exist a reality that transcends the reality of this world?

To deliberate about x is to ask whether x is worth while. To deliberate about deliberating ~~is~~ is to ask whether any deliberating ~~is~~ is worth while. Has "worth while" any ultimate meaning? Is moral enterprise consonant with this world? We are apt to praise the developing subject ever more capable of attention, insight, reasonableness, responsibility. We are apt to praise progress and to denounce ~~em~~ every manifestation of decline. But are we not precipitate in our ~~praise~~ praise and blame? Is the universe on our side? Or are we just gamblers and, if gamblers, perhaps also fools struggling individually to develop and struggling collectively to snatch progress from the ~~the~~ ever mounting welter of decline? The questions arise and clearly, it would seem, our answers may profoundly affect ^{the} attitudes and ^{the} resoluteness that we bring to our daily lives. Does there or does there not exist

a transcendent, intelligent ground of the universe? Is that ground or are we the primary instance of moral consciousness? Are cosmogenesis, biological evolution, historical process basically cognate to us as moral beings, or are they indifferent and so alien to us? It is the existential question, Is the universe absurd? But it also is the question of God.

I have been proposing no more than a question. I have not been offering any image or feeling, any concept or judgement. They pertain to answers. I have just been questioning our questioning. Such questioning rises out of our ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ conscious intentionality, out of the a priori structured drive that promotes us from experiencing to the effort to understand, from understanding to the effort to judge truly, from judging to the effort to choose rightly. In the measure that we ~~xxxxx~~ advert to our own questioning and proceed to question it, there arises the question of God.

It is a question that will be manifested differently in the different stages of man's historical development and in the many varieties of his culture. But such differences of manifestation and expression are secondary. They may introduce alien elements that overlay, obscure, distort the pure question, the question that questions questioning itself. None the less, the obscurity and the distortion presuppose what they obscure and distort. It follows that, ~~how~~ however much there differ the questions that explicitly are raised, however much there differ the religious or irreligious answers that are given, still at ~~their~~ their root is the same transcendental tendency of the human spirit, that questions, that questions without restrictions, ^{that} the questions the ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ significance of its own questioning, and so comes to the

question of God.

~~THE~~ The question of God, then, lies within man's horizon. His transcendental subjectivity is mutilated or abolished when he fails to stretch forth to the intelligible, the unconditioned, the good of value. The reach not of his attainment but of his questioning is unrestricted. There exists, then, within his horizon a region for the divine, a shrine for ultimate holiness. It cannot be ignored. The atheist may pronounce it empty. The agnostic may urge that he finds his investigation inconclusive. The contemporary humanist may prevent the question from being considered. But such negations and refusals presuppose the spark in our clod, our ability to raise questions and to question questioning itself.

5. Self-transcendence as Realized

The transcendental notions, i. e. the dynamic spirit that raises questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation, constitute the possibility of man's self-transcendence. The significance of that possibility is that it includes the question of God. But the realization of that possibility in a stable fashion occurs when one falls in love. Then one's being becomes being-in-love. Such being-in-love has its antecedents, its causes, its conditions, its occasions. But once it has blossomed forth and as long as it lasts, it takes over. It becomes the first principle. From it flow one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions
~~Decisions~~ and deeds.

Being-in-love is of different kinds. There is the love of intimacy, of husband and wife, of parents and children. There is the love one's fellow men with its fruit in the achievement of human welfare. There is the love God with one's whole ^{heart} and whole soul, with all one's mind and all one's strength (Mk 12, 30; Deut 6, 4). It is God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us (Rom 5, 5). It grounds the conviction of St. Paul that "there is nothing in death or life, in the realm of spirits or superhuman powers, in ^{the} world as it is or the world as it shall be, in the forces of the universe, in heights or depths -- nothing in all creation that can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord (Rom 8, 38 f.).

As the question of God underpins our ^squestioning, so being-in-love with God is the ^{basic} ~~the~~ fulfilment of ~~our~~ our conscious intentionality. That fulfilment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, ^{de}privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfilment bears fruit in a love of one's neighbor that strives mightily to bring about the kingdom of God on this earth. On the other hand, the absence of that fulfilment opens the way to the trivialization of human life in the pursuit of ^{fun} fun, to the harshness of ~~the~~ human life stemming from the ruthless exercise of power, to despair about human welfare springing from the conviction that the universe is absurd.

6. Conclusion to ~~THE~~ First Section

We have been concerned with religious commitment. By such commitment we have meant the factor whose presence makes religious traditions, beliefs, imperatives, rituals come alive^v, and whose ~~absence~~ absence lets them wither and die. We have found a principal element of such commitment in a command given both in the Old Testament and the New -- the command to love God without limitation or qualification or restriction. We have noted that St. Paul attributes such love to the gift of the Holy Spirit, and we could conclude from chapter thirteen of the first letter to the Corinthians that in comparison with charity he considered all other gifts unfruitful.

We have quoted Scripture but we also have provided a setting or context to elucidate the relation of scriptural doctrine to human living. We have found that to be authentically human is to ~~ex~~ transcend oneself, that self-transcendence raises the question of God, ~~and~~ that the realization of self-transcendence occurs when we are in love, and that the all-embracing and deepest love is being in love with God.

There are further questions to be met. The love of God is a peak, but we shall have to ask whether it is a peak experience. It is something distinctive of Jewish and Christian religion, but we shall have to ask about its bearing in religions generally. Finally, we shall have to consider it in its Christian context of the word of God, faith, belief. Such will be the topics in the second section of this paper.

Second Section

7.
§. Religious Experience

One of the oldest convictions of spiritual writers and directors is that religious experiences are highly ambiguous. What really reveals the man or ~~man~~ woman, is not inner experience but outward deed. As scripture put it, "By their fruits you shall know them" (Mt 7, 16).

Hence, if anyone wishes to ascertain whether he loves God, he is not to attempt psychological introspection, but he is to consider his own palpable behavior. A person can be profoundly in love with God yet fail to find it in his inner experience. As ~~H~~ Professor Maslow put it, most people do have peak experiences, but most of them are not aware of the fact. Psychological introspection is a highly difficult art.

Now being in love with God, if not a peak experience, at least is a peak state, indeed, a peak dynamic state. Further, it will be marked by its unrestricted character. It is with one's whole heart and whole soul, and all one's mind and all one's strength. Hence, ^{while} ~~while~~ all love is ~~self~~ self-surrender, being in love with God is being in love without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations. Just as unrestricted questioning is our capacity for self-transcendence, so being in love in an unrestricted fashion is the proper fulfilment of that capacity.

Such fulfilment is not the product of our knowledge and choice. It is God's free gift. So far from resulting from our knowing and choosing, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on, and it ~~then~~ constructs a new horizon in which the love of God transvalues our values and the eyes ^{of} ~~of~~ that love transform our knowing.

Though not the product of our knowing and choosing, it is a conscious dynamic state of love, joy, peace that manifests itself in acts of kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness and self-control (Gal 5, 22).

To say that this dynamic state is conscious, is not to say that it is known. For consciousness is just experience, while full human knowing is a compound of experiencing, understanding, judging.

Because the dynamic¹ state is conscious without being known, it is an experience of mystery. Because it is being in love, the mystery is not merely attractive; it is fascinating; to it one belongs; by it one is possessed. Because it is an unmeasured love, the mystery is otherworldly; it evokes awe; in ^Ecertain psychic contexts it can evoke terror. Of itself, then, inasmuch as it is conscious without being ¹known, the gift of God's love recalls Rudolf Otto's ⁵idea of the ~~the~~ holy, his mysterium fascinans et tremendum. Again, it seems to correspond to what Paul Tillich named a being grasped by ultimate concern.⁶ Thirdly, it is like St. Ignatius Loyola's consolation without a cause, as expounded by Karl Rahner, namely, a consolation that ~~has~~ ^{is} has a content but ~~is~~ without an apprehended object.⁷

I have ~~have~~ said that being in love with God is conscious without being known, but I must add that the consciousness involved is on the fourth level of waking consciousness. It is not the empirical consciousness that accompanies acts of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching. It is not the intelligent consciousness that accompanies acts of inquiry, insight, formulation, speaking. It is not the rational consciousness that accompanies acts of reflecting, marshaling and weighing the evidence, making judgements of fact or of possibility. It is on the fourth level of consciousness that freely and responsibly deliberates, evaluates, decides, acts. But it is such consciousness as brought to fulfilment, as having undergone a conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded, as ready to deliberate and ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ evaluate and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. The gift of God's love, then, occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's intentional consciousness. It takes ~~xx~~ over the peak of the soul¹, the apex animae.

7. The Anthropological Turn

Now what I ~~xxx~~ have been saying about being in love with God, is a sample of what Karl Rahner has named die anthropologische Wende⁸, the anthropological turn, in theology. It will be worth while, I believe, to inspect this sample and to relate it to Augustinian and to Thomist thought on grace.⁹

First, then, the present sample resembles both Augustinian and Thomist thought inasmuch as it is derived

from scripture yet expresses scriptural truth in a context different from that of scripture. Augustine's writings on grace are largely within the context of the Pelagian heresy. Those of Aquinas, on the other hand, are part of the highly technical medieval endeavor to achieve a systematic reconciliation of all the objects of faith. My sample of the anthropological turn or twist resembles Aquinas and differs from Augustine inasmuch as it is highly systematic, but it resembles Augustine and differs from Aquinas inasmuch as its basic terms and relations are not metaphysical but derived from intentionality awareness and an analysis, from an account of what one is doing when one is knowing and deciding.

Now because Aquinas's thought was primarily metaphysical, his psychology was necessarily a faculty psychology. Because his psychology was a faculty psychology, he conceived God's grace in terms of the essence of the soul and its faculties. For him sanctifying grace was an entitative habit received in the essence of the soul and from it there proceeded operative habits received in the faculties. However, the disagreements of metaphysicians and their endless debates resulted in the dethronement of metaphysics.
~~its dethronement.~~ If philosophers are to have any hope of agreeing, they must begin by asking what they are doing when they are knowing (cognitional theory), then ask why doing that is knowing (epistemology), and finally ~~advance~~ ^{conclude} ~~to the conclusion of~~ what they know ~~when~~ when they do it (metaphysics). Now when one begins from cognitional theory, one begins from the data of consciousness. Neither the essence or the soul nor its faculties are data of consciousness. What is given in consciousness is the subject,

states and
 his various operations, and the relations consciously linking operations with one another. Within this context, then, one must think of God's gift of his grace in terms of the subject, his states, his operations, and the interconnection of states and operations. Sanctifying grace becomes the dynamic state of being in love with God. It is the fulfilment at the highest level of man's capacity for self-transcendence. As fulfilment, it is the ~~xxx~~ ground of joy and peace. As being in love, it is the ~~xxx~~ source of acts of loving, of that harvest of the spirit which is patience, gentleness, kindness, goodness, fidelity, and self-control (Gal 5, 22).

Further, because its context is cognitional theory, ~~the~~ the sample I have offered distinguishes between consciousness, which merely experiences, and full human knowing, ~~which~~ which directs attention to the experience, identifies it, distinguishes it from other experiences, gives it a name, recognizes it when it recurs, and can talk about it in a meaningful fashion.

Further, ~~the~~ the sample finds that the old tags, ignoti nulla cupido, and nihil amatum nisi praecognitum, are too sweeping. They are true enough of ordinary human desire and love. But they do ^{not} oblige God to ~~xxxx~~ flood our hearts with his love only if first he has bestowed knowledge of ~~himself~~ ^{himself} on our minds. On the contrary, I should say, God operates not first on the mind but first on the heart. As Augustine learnt from the prophet Ezechiel, God plucks out our hearts of stone and replaces them with hearts of flesh, and his doing so is not at the ~~xxxx~~ behest of the heart of stone but clean contrary to its desires and inclinations. As Rahner interpreted Ignatius of Loyola, there occur consolations without causes inasmuch as there occur consolations with a content

but without an apprehended object. Moreover, Rahner's interpretation of Ignatius has only to be extended to the point where cognitional activity is excluded, for one to arrive at the account of mystical experience given by the anonymous author of the Cloud of Unknowing.¹⁰

A final point remains. Is God's gift of his love given only to Christians, or is it ~~is~~ given to ~~all~~ all men. I think it is given to all. For theologians commonly hold that God gives all men sufficient grace for salvation, and according to the thirteenth chapter of the first letter to ~~the~~ the Corinthians ~~anything~~ anything less than charity profits us nothing.

9. §. Manifestations of Religious Experience

I am not concerned with the whole of what may be termed religious experience but rather with that kernel or root that grounds true holiness, namely, God's gift of his love, the occurrence of the mystery of love and awe, an occurrence that we have argued comes to all men.

Its spontaneous manifestation is the harvest of the Spirit listed by St Paul as love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control (Gal 5, 22). But it also gives rise to man's quest for the otherworldly loveliness with which he is in love, and the fruits of that quest vary greatly as one moves from earlier to later stages of human meaning.

In the earliest stage, expression results from insight into sensible presentations or representations. Now a gesture can point to what is spatial¹ or external or specific or human. But gestures are not very effective at pointing to the temporal, the internal, the generic, or the divine. Hence it is only in so far as the temporal, the internal, the generic, or the ~~divine~~ divine can be associated with -- ~~an~~ or in the language of the naive realist be "projected upon" -- the spatial, the external, the specific, the human, that it is possible for an ~~an~~ insight to be had and expression result. So it is that by associating religious experience with its outward occasion that the experience can be expressed and thereby becomes something determinate and distinct for human consciousness.

zed / Such outward occasions are called hierophanies, and they are many. When each of the many is something distinct ~~an~~ and unrelated to the others, the hierophanies reveal what are called the gods of the moment. When they are many but are recognized as possessing a family resemblance, then there is the living polytheism represented today by the 800,000 gods of Shintoism.¹² When distinct religious experiences are associated with a single place, there arises the god of the place. When they are the experiences of a single person and are united by the unity of that person, then there is the god of the person, such as was the god Jacob or the god of Laban.¹³ Finally, when the unification is social, there result the god or gods of the group.

If I am asked, however, whether such phenomena have any real connection with the mystery of love and awe, a brief answer is difficult. First, there is an antecedent probability of some connection in so far as God gives all men ~~some~~ grace sufficient for salvation, and a lesser grace than charity does not seem to be sufficient. Secondly, since human self-transcendence is dialectical, since it is not some secure possession ^{but} ~~but~~ ever precarious, we can expect that man's quest for God is subject to many aberrations. Thirdly, contemporary anthropologists and students of the history of religions have an increasing ability to enter into the minds and hearts of the people they study and so more readily discern elements of holiness in their attitudes and lives. Finally, there is at least one scholar that ^{some} claims to have discerned seven elements common to ^{some} representatives at least of such world religions as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Zoroastrian Mazdaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism. He is Friedrich Heiler, and he has described these common elements at some length.

I can only list them and then draw a conclusion. The seven common elements are: that there is a transcendent reality; that he is immanent in human hearts; that he is supreme beauty, truth, righteousness, goodness; that he is love, mercy, compassion; that the way to him is repentance, self-denial, ^{that way} prayer; that ~~is~~ ^{that} is the love of one's neighbor, even the love of one's enemies; that ^{that} ~~the~~ way is the love of God, so that bliss is conceived as knowledge of God, union with him, or dissolution into him. ¹⁴

On such broad matters it is, of course, difficult to find many scholars in agreement. But at least on this showing the relevance of the mystery of ~~the~~ love and awe is clear. To be in love is to be in love with someone. To be in love without qualifications or conditions or reservations or limits is to be in love with someone transcendent. When someone transcendent is my beloved, he also is immanent; he is in my heart, real to me from within me. When love is the fulfilment of my unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence through intelligence and reasonableness and responsibility, then the one that fulfils that thrust must be supreme in intelligence, truth, goodness. Since he chooses to come to me through a gift of love for him, he must also be love. Since loving him is also a transcendence of myself, it also is a denial of the self to be transcended. Since loving him is loving attention to him, it is prayer, meditation, contemplation. Since love of him is fruitful, it overflows into love of all those that he loves or might love. ~~Ex~~ Finally, from an experience of love focussed on mystery there wells forth a longing for knowledge, while love itself is a longing for union, and so for the lover of the unknown beloved the concept of bliss is knowledge of him and union with him ~~by~~ in whatever manner they may be achieved.

This radiant picture, however, has to be qualified in the light of the fact that human self-transcendence is precarious. I have said that being in love is being in love with someone. It has a personal dimension. But this personal dimension can be overlooked in a school of asceticism and mysticism that stresses the orientation of ~~religious~~ religious experience to transcendent mystery. Mystery is

the unknown. What is transcendent is no finite thing. Finally anything affirmed is thereby objectified, and any objectification is a withdrawal from the ultimate solitude of the mystical state. The alleged atheism of the Buddhist may be, perhaps, the expression of a non-objectified experience.¹⁵

Again, at a far earlier stage of human development, transcendence may be over-emphasized and immanence overlooked.¹⁶ Then God becomes remote, irrelevant, almost forgotten. Inversely, ~~immanence~~ immanence can be over-emphasized and transcendence overlooked. This loss of reference to the transcendent robs symbol, ritual, and recital of their proper meaning to transform them into idol and magic and myth.¹⁷ At the same time, the over-emphasis on immanence leads to the identification of the ~~divine~~ divine with life as universal process in which the individual and ~~the~~ the group ~~participate~~ participate and of which they are a part.¹⁸

When God is conceived as supreme intelligence, truth, reality, goodness, then the love of God will be understood as the fulfilment of man's capacity for self-transcendence. But when the love of God is not associated with self-transcendence, it easily tends to be reinforced by the erotic,¹⁹ the sexual, the orgiastic. In contrast, the love of God itself is associated with awe. God's ways are not our ways, and the difference can generate terror. Then unless religion is totally directed to goodness, to genuine love of one's neighbor, and to a self-denial that is fully subordinated to a fuller goodness in ~~the~~ oneself, then the cult of a terrifying God can slip over

into the demonic, into an exultant destructiveness of oneself and of others. ^{#20}

I have been illustrating what I mean by saying that the development of religion is dialectical. It is a matter of opposites, and the opposites are generated by authentic self-transcendence on the one hand and the fall into unauthenticity on the other. It is not confined to the instances we have given but, down the ages, ranges through the endless variety of developments, relapses, recoveries both in ~~the~~ social, cultural, religious affairs ~~and~~ in the personal lives of individuals.

10

The Word

By the word is meant any expression of religious meaning or value. Its carrier may be intersubjectivity, or art, or symbol, or language, or the portrayed lives or deeds or achievements of individuals or groups. Normally all modes of expression are employed but, since language is the vehicle in which meaning is most fully articulated, the spoken and written word are of special importance in the development and the clarification of religion.

By its word religion enters the world mediated by meaning and regulated by value. It endows that world with its ~~own~~ deepest meaning and its highest value. It sets itself in a context with other meanings and other values. Within that context it comes to understand itself, to relate itself to the object of ultimate concern, and to draw on the power of that relationship to pursue the objectives of proximate concern all the more fairly and all the more

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What holds for the love a man and a woman, also holds in its own way for the love of God and man. Ordinarily, the experience of the mystery of love ~~xxx~~ and awe is not objectified. It remains within subjectivity as a vector, a fateful call to a dreaded holiness. Perhaps after years of sustained prayerfulness and self-denial, immersion in the world mediated ^b by meaning will become less total and ~~xxx~~ experience of the mystery will become clear and distinct enough ~~in~~ to awaken attention, wonder, inquiry. Even then in the individual case there are not certain answers. All one can do is let be what is, let happen what in any case keeps recurring. But then, as much as ever one needs the word -- the word of tradition that has accumulated religious wisdom, the word of fellowship that unites those *that* share the gift of God's love, the word of the gospel that announces that God has loved us first and has revealed his love in Christ ~~xxx~~ crucified, dead and risen.

The word then is personal. Cor ad cor loquitur: love speaks to love, and its speech is powerful. The religious leader announces in signs and symbols what is congruent with the gift of love that God works within us. The word too is social: it brings into a single ~~xxx~~ fold the scattered sheep that belong together because at the depth of their hearts they respond to the same mystery of love and awe. The word finally is historical. It is ~~xxx~~ meaning outwardly expressed. It has to find its place in the context of other non-religious meanings. It has to borrow and adapt a language that more easily speaks of ~~xxx~~ this world than of what transcends it; and all such languages and contexts vary with time and

place to give words changing meanings and to give statements changing implications.

It follows that religious expression will move through the various stages of meaning and speak in its different realms. But any attempt to outline the successive stages of meaning and its different realms lies beyond the scope of the present paper. Such an attempt would have to account for the ~~ex~~ prior background of the Old Testament, ~~the~~ the diverse layers within it, intertestamental thought and speech, the diverse layers in the New Testament, the apostolic fathers, antenicene Christian writers, the ~~the~~ style of postnicene writing, the developments in the west during the medieval period, during the renaissance and reformation periods, in subsequent dogmatic theology, and in contemporary theology. The only point I wish to make here is that religious thinking is a product not only of ^{the} religious experience but also of the culture of religious thinkers and writers. What accounts for the differences between religious thinkers is far less differences in their religious experience and far more differences in the culture in which their thinking and writing is embedded.

11. ~~10.~~ Faith

In Roman Catholic circles it is customary to draw no distinction between faith and belief, between fides and credere. A distinction is drawn between fides ~~the~~ quae creditur, the truths that are believed, and fides quae creditur, the infused habit by which they are believed.

On the other hand, outside the Roman Catholic circle a distinction commonly is drawn between faith and belief,

and contemporary ecumenism seems to me to demand that we recognize some validity in it. Nor is this difficult for us to do. For we already recognize that prior to belief there are the iudicia ~~maxima et minima~~ credibilitatis et credentitatis and, when we speak in an ecumenical spirit, it is these prior judgements that we can mean when we speak of the faith that grounds the fact that we believe.

In this sense, then, I should say that faith is the knowledge born of religious love.

First of all, I must show that there is a knowledge born of love. Of it Pascal [↓] spoke when he remarked that the heart has reasons which reason does[↓] not know. Here by reason I would understand the compound of activities on the first three levels of human conscious intentionality, namely, the activities involved in experiencing, in understanding, and in[↓] judging. By the heart's reasons I would understand, with Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand, feelings that are intentional responses[↓] to values, where values are contrasted with satisfactions, and where in the response two aspects are distinguished; there is the absolute aspect that recognizes the value, and the relative aspect that sets distinct values in a hierarchy. Finally, by the heart I understand the subject on the fourth, existential ~~ix~~ level of conscious intentionality and in the dynamic state of being in love. On this showing the meaning of Pascal's remark would be that, besides the factual knowledge reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying, there is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgements of

value of a person in love.

Faith, accordingly, is such further knowledge when the love is God's love flooding our hearts. To the apprehension of vital, social, cultural, personal values, there is added the apprehension of transcendent value. This apprehension consists in the experienced fulfilment of our unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence, in our actuated orientation towards the mystery of love and awe. Since that thrust is the thrust of intelligence to the intelligible, of reasonableness to truth and reality, of freedom and responsibility to the truly good, the experienced fulfilment of ~~the~~ that thrust in its unrestrictedness may be objectified as a clouded revelation of absolute intelligence and intelligibility, of absolute truth and reality, of absolute goodness and holiness. With that objectification there recurs the question of God in a new form. For now it is primarily a question of decision. Will I love him in return, or will I refuse? Will I live out the gift of his love, or will I hold back, turn away, withdraw? Only secondarily do there arise the ~~the~~ questions of God's existence and nature, and they take the form either of the lover ~~and~~ seeking to know him or of the unbeliever seeking to escape him. Such is the basic option of the existential subject once he has been called by God.

As other apprehensions of value, so too faith has a relative as well as an absolute aspect. It places all other values in the light and shadow of transcendent value. In the shadow, for transcendent value is supreme and incomparable. In the light, for transcendent value links

itself to all other values to transform, magnify, glorify them. Without faith the originating value is man and the terminal value is the good man brings about. But in the light of faith ~~xxxxx~~ originating value is divine light and love, while terminal value is the whole universe. So the human good becomes absorbed in an all-encompassing good. Where before an account of the human good related men to one another and to nature, now human concern reaches beyond man's world to God and God's world. Men meet not only to be together and to settle human affairs but also to worship. Human development is not only in skills and virtues but also in ~~hwx~~ holiness. The power of God's love brings forth a new energy and efficacy in all goodness, and the limit of human expectation ceases to be the grave.

To conceive God as originating value and the world as terminal value implies that God too is self-transcending and that the world is the fruit of his self-transcendence, the expression and the manifestation of his benevolence and beneficence^e, his glory. As the excellence of the son is the glory of the father, so too the excellence of mankind is the glory of God. Hence, as Aquinas noted, to say that God created the world for his glory, is to say that he created it not for his own sake but for ours²². He made us in his image, in other ways ~~+~~ but also inasmuch as our authenticity consists in being like him, in self-transcending, in being origins of values, in true love.

Without faith, without the eyes of love, the world is too evil for God to be good, for a good God to exist. But faith recognizes that God grants men their freedom, that he wills them to be persons and not just his automata, that he

calls them to the higher authenticity that overcomes evil with good. So faith is linked with human progress and it has to meet the challenge of human decline. For faith and progress have a common root in man's self-transcendence, while the lack of faith and human decline have a ~~same~~ common root in man's failure to transcend himself, in his unauthenticity. To promote either faith or progress is indirectly to promote the other of the two. Faith puts human efforts in a friendly universe; it reveals an ultimate significance to human achievement; it strengthens new undertakings with confidence. Conversely, progress realizes the potentialities of man and of nature; it reveals that man exists to bring about an ever fuller achievement in this world; and that achievement because it is man's good also is God's glory. Most of all, faith has the power of undoing decline. Decline disrupts a culture with conflicting ideologies. It inflicts on individuals and groups the social, economic, and psychological pressures that for human frailty amount to determinisms. It multiplies and heaps up the abuses and the absurdities that breed resentment, hatred, anger, violence. It is not propaganda and it is not argument but religious faith that will ~~lib~~ liberate human reasonableness from its ideological prisons. It is not the promises of men but religious hope that can enable men to resist the vast pressures of social decay. If passions are to quieten down, if wrongs are to be not exacerbated, not ignored, not merely palliated, but acknowledged and removed, then human possessiveness and human pride and human lust have to be replaced by religious charity, ~~men~~ by the charity of the suffering servant, by self-sacrificing love. Men are sinners.

If human progress is not to be ever distorted and destroyed by the inattention, oversights, irrationality, irresponsibility that generate decline, men have to be reminded of their sinfulness. They have to acknowledge their real guilt and to amend their ways. They have to learn with humility that religious development is dialectical, that the task of repentance and of conversion is life-long.

11. Religious Belief

Among the values that faith discerns is the value of believing the word of religion, of accepting the judgements of fact and the judgements of value that the religion proposes. Such belief and acceptance have the same structure as other belief I have elsewhere described and, in contemporary jargon, is referred to ~~as~~ as the sociology of knowledge. But now the structure rests on a different basis and that basis is faith.

For however personal and intimate is religious experience, love, faith, still it is not solitary. The same gift can be given to many, and the many can recognize in one another a common orientation in their living and feeling, in their criteria and their goals. From a common communion with God there springs a religious community.

Community invites expression, and the expression may vary. It may be imperative, commanding the love of God above all things the the love of one's neighbor as of oneself. It may be narrative, the story of the community's origins and ~~de~~ development. It may be ascetic and mystical, teaching the way to total other-worldly love and warning against the

pitfalls on the journey. It may be theoretical, propounding the wisdom, the goodness, the power, the mercy of God, and manifesting his intentions and his purposes. It ~~may~~ ^{may} be a compound of all four or of any two or ~~the~~ three of these. The compound may fuse the components into a single balanced synthesis, or it may take some one as basic and use it to interpret and manifest the others. It may remain unchanged for ages, and it may periodically develop and adapt to different social and cultural conditions.

Communities endure. As new members replace old, expression becomes traditional. The religion becomes historical in the general sense that it exists over time and that it provides basic components in the ongoing process of personal development, social organization, cultural meaning and value.

But there is a further and far deeper sense in ^{which} ~~which~~ a religion may be named historical. The dynamic state of being in love has the character of a response. It is an answer to a divine initiative. The divine ~~initiative~~ initiative is not just creation. It is not just God's gift of his love. There has ~~never~~ occurred the personal entrance of God himself into human history, a communication from God to his people, the advent of God's word into the world of religious expression. Such was the religion ~~of~~ of Israel. Such has been Christianity.

~~TM~~ Then not only the inner word that is God's gift of his love but also the outer word of religious tradition comes from God. The inner gift of God's love is matched by the outer command to love ~~xxx~~ unrestrictedly, to love with all one's heart and all one's mind and all one's soul and all one's strength. The narrative of religious origins is the ~~xxxxxxx~~

narrative of God's encounter with his people. Religious effort towards authenticity through prayer and penance, and religious love of all men shown in good deeds, become an apostolate for "... you will recognize them by their fruits" (Mt 7, 20). Finally, the word of religious expression is not just the objectification of the gift of God's love (as the modernist might claim); in a privileged area it also is the word ~~same~~ communicated to us by God himself.

Here, however, we come to the point where religious beliefs differ, where different and opposed positions are taken with regard to revelation and inspiration, scripture and tradition, development and authority, schisms^s and heresies. Obviously we cannot begin to go into such matters. But perhaps we may note that b^y acknowledging some validity to the distinction between faith and beliefs we have secured ~~some~~ some basis for an encounter between all religions with a ground in religious experience. For in the measure such experience is genuine, it is orientated to the mystery of love and awe; it has the power of unrestricted love to reveal and uphold all that is truly good; it remains the bond that unites the religious community, that directs their ~~own~~ common judgements, that purifies their beliefs. Beliefs do differ, but behind the difference there is a deeper unity. For beliefs result from judgements of value, and the judgements of value relevant for religious belief come from faith, from the eye of religious love, an eye that can discern God's self-disclosures.

Notes

- 1) Abraham Maslow, Religions, Values, and Peak Experiences, New York (Viking Press) 1970.
- 2) Ludwig Binswanger, Le Rêve et l'existence. Introduction et notes de Michel Foucault. Desclée 1954.
- 3) Karl Rahner, Hörer des Wortes, München (Kösel) 1963, p. 40.
- 4) B. Lonergan, ~~THEORY~~ Insight, London (Longmans) and New York (Philosophical Library) 1957, chapters nine, ten, and eleven.
- 5) Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, London (Oxford) 1923.
- 6) D. M. Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue, New York (Harper & Row) 1965.
- 7) Karl Rahner, The Dynamic Element in the Church, Quaestiones disputatae 12, Montreal (Palm Publishers) 1964, pp. 131 ff.
- 8) Peter Eicher, Die X anthropologische Wende, Karl Rahner's philosophischer Weg vom Wesen des Menschen zur personalen Existenz, Freiburg/Schweiz (Universitätsverlag) 1970.
- 9) See my Grace and Freedom in Aquinas, London (Darton, Longman & Todd) and New York (Herder and Herder) 1971.
This puts in book form and adds corrections and indices to articles published in Theological Studies 2 (1941), 289-324; 3(1942), 69-88; 375-402; 533-578. The new edition is the work of J. Patout Burns.
- 10) See above, note 7.
- 11) ~~WJ~~ William Johnston, The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing, New York, Paris, Rome, ~~THEMEX~~ Tournai (Desclée) 1967.

~~1967~~

- 12) See Ernst Benz, "On understanding non-Christian religions," The History of Religions, edited by M. Eliade and J. Kitagawa, Chicago (Chicago University Press) 1959, pp. 120 ff.
- 13) On local and personal apprehensions of God in the bible, N. Lohfink, Bibelauslegung im Wandel, Frankfurt am Main (Knecht) 1967.
- 14) F. Heiler, "The ¹ History of Religions as a Preparation for the Cooperation of Religions," The History of Religions (as above note 12), pp. 142-153.
- 15) On Buddhism see E. Benz, op. cit., p. 120, and F. Heiler, op. cit., p. 139.
- 16) See F. M. Bergounioux and J. Goetz, Prehistoric and Primitive Religions, Faith and Fact Books 146, London (Burns and Oates) 1965, pp. 82-91.
- 17) A. Vergote, Psychologie religieuse, Bruxelles (Dessart) 1966, p. 55.
- 18) Bergounioux and Goetz, op. cit., pp. 117-126.
- 19) Vergote, op. cit., p. 56.
- 20) Ibid., p. 57.
- 21) Indeed, the mere presence of another person takes one out of a simply ~~one~~ epistemological context, and the words spoken by the other add a new dimension to meaning. See A. Vergote, "La liberté religieuse comme pouvoir de symbolisation," in L'Herméneutique de la liberté religieuse, edited by E. Castelli, Paris (Aubier) 1968, pp. 383 ff. Also Gibson W. Kinter, Elements for a Social Ethic, New York (Macmillan) 1968, pp. 99 ff. on the social origins of meaning.
- 22) "... Deus suam gloriam non quaerit propter se sed ~~propter~~ propter nos." Aquinas, Sum. theol. II-II, q. 132, a. 1 ad 1m.
- 23) For equivalent but different accounts of this being in

love, see Alan Richardson, Religion in Contemporary Debate,
London (SCM) 1966, pp. 113 ff.; ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
Olivier Rabut, L'expérience religieuse fondamentale, Tournai
(Castermann) 1969, p. 168.