

The Assumption and Theology .

My terms of reference set forth three topics: 1) the death of our Lady; 2) theological discussions concerning the Assumption; 3) the Assumption as a defined doctrine. If these topics are transposed into questions and taken in reverse order, their unity will be immediately apparent. The last topic is the question, Could our Lady's Assumption be defined as a matter of faith? The second topic, namely, the discussions of theologians, gives the question, Why could the Assumption be defined as a matter of faith? Finally, the first topic raises the question, Might our Lady's death be included in a definition of the Assumption?

Could the Assumption be defined?

The answer undoubtedly is affirmative. From the seventh century to the present day the affirmation of the Assumption has increased in clarity and in unanimity in the Church of God. In the Dark Ages there existed doubts about the fact of the Assumption and consequent obscurity regarding the object of the Feast.¹ In the Medieval Period obscurity was removed mainly through the influence of St. Albert the Great,² while the scholarship of the Renaissance removed the grounds of doubt that had lingered in the Liturgy from the Dark Ages.³ ~~Since the Renaissance~~ As prior to the Renaissance the Assumption was not denied, so since then it has not been doubted.⁴ Finally, from 1869 to 1941

vast numbers of petitions for the definition of the Assumption have been addressed to the Holy See. To select the most significant of these petitions, namely, those from residential episcopal sees, an incomplete survey reveals that from 820 sees 1332 Patriarchs, Archbishops, and Bishops have sent 1859 petitions asking that our Lady's Assumption be defined as a matter of faith.⁵ While ~~these~~^{this} leaves 299 residential episcopal sees unrepresented, that is, some 27% of the total, it provides very serious grounds for expecting the agreement of all the rest.

Such a practically universal agreement and consent both down the centuries and throughout the Church provides the theologian with sufficient ground for affirming that the Assumption can be defined. Were the Assumption not truth but error, then one would have to admit what no Catholic can admit, namely, that God has not promised preservation from error to the Church.⁶ Moreover, though ~~the recent petitions are appreciated differently by theologians,~~^{the recent petitions are appreciated differently by theologians,}⁷ it should seem that they imply not only that the Assumption is true and certain but also that it is definable as a matter of faith. For the teaching office of the Church is exercised by the Bishops throughout the world; and they preponderantly affirm the Assumption to be ~~axmatterxaxixk~~ definable as a matter of faith. Such is the conclusion drawn by notable theologians in authoritative positions;⁸ and while one might add qualifications and reservations with regard to this or that consideration they advance, I do not see how their ultimate conclusion could effectively be reversed.

Why can the Assumption be defined?

I thought it best to begin with the argument from authority, first, because in matters of faith we normally know what ~~it~~ is true before we know why it is true and, secondly, because an initial account of theological discussions and disagreements ~~w~~ might easily be misleading, for it might lend an impression of confusion and doubt that would be quite ungrounded. The Assumption of our Lady is one thing; the reasons, apart from the ultimate argument from authority, are quite another. The former ^{is} ~~are~~ proximately a matter of faith; the latter are not; and it is with the latter that now I have to deal.

Why, then, can the Assumption be defined as a matter of faith? Evidently, the one sufficient reason for this is that it pertains to the deposit of faith, that it is a truth revealed by God. But in what manner is it revealed? Is it contained explicitly in Holy Scripture? Or is it an explicit, oral, apostolic tradition? The answer to both these questions would seem to be negative. Very few have been those who claimed that the Assumption was explicitly revealed in Scripture.⁹ A more frequent contention has been for the existence of an explicit, oral, apostolic tradition.¹⁰ It remains that the predominant view among theologians ^{at present} is that the Assumption was revealed not explicitly but implicitly.¹¹ Three very broad facts militate against the existence of any explicit revelation either in Scripture or in Tradition. The first is the silence of the early centuries. The second is the diversity of views that appeared,

notably in the apocrypha, when attention first turned to our Lady's death.¹² The third is the long persisting doubts ~~that~~ existing in the western Church,¹³ of which the most notable found expression in the Martyrology of Usuard that was read from the ninth century to the sixteenth and advanced that on the question of the Assumption the sobriety of the Church preferred pious ignorance to frivolous and apocryphal doctrine.¹⁴ These three broad facts of an initial period of silence, a second period of naive speculations, and a third period ~~of~~ in which doubts were countenanced are, on the one hand, just what would be expected were revelation only implicit and, on the other hand, extremely difficult to reconcile with the existence of explicit revelation.¹⁵

If the Assumption, then, is revealed not explicitly but implicitly, a further question arises, namely, What is the precise nature of the implication? This question is the centre of theological discussion. Accordingly, I shall set forth very summarily, first, an illustration of scriptural implication, secondly, an outline of the argument from Holy Scripture for the Assumption, thirdly, an evaluation of the certainty of this argument and, fourthly, an account of its sufficiency for dogmatic definition.

First, then, what is meant by a scriptural implication? In the twenty-fourth chapter of St. Luke there occurs the account of the two disciples who had lost faith in our Lord, did not credit reports of his Resurrection, and so on the first Easter Sunday set out for a town named Emmaus some sixty furlongs from Jerusalem. As you know, a stranger fell in with them on the way, asked the cause of their defection, upbraided

them for being "foolish and slow of heart to believe in all the things which the prophets have spoken" (Luke XXIV, 25), and then proceeded to explain to them the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament. As he spoke, the faith of the faltering disciples was enkindled anew, their hearts burned within them, and the eyes of their understanding were opened; they began to see in divine revelation what had been there all along, even though previously they had not seen it. We have, then, in this story an instance of scriptural implication. The mystery of the Redemption through the suffering and death of our Lord is contained in the Old Testament. But still that mystery does not lie on the surface. To grasp it one must, as we say, put two and two together; one must begin, as did our Lord with the disciples, ^{from} with Moses and then proceed through all the prophets; but Moses and the prophets treated of very many things, and so from them one must select just the right passages; finally, one has to piece together these many passages into a single, intelligible pattern. By this selection and piecing together there is effected a development of understanding, an opening of the eyes of faith, upon what had been long revealed but what had not, from lack of understanding, been apprehended.

Just as our Lord taught the disciples to discover in the Old Testament the doctrine of the Redemption, so down the ages has the Church in the development of dogma brought forth from the deposit of faith both old things and new. My next step, then, will be to indicate the scriptural sources for the doctrine of the Assumption and the manner in which one may proceed from those sources to the Assumption itself.

Scriptural sources for the doctrine of the Assumption lie in the account of man's Fall through Adam and his Redemption through Christ. There are two solidarities: a first in Adam through sin to death; a second in Christ through death to resurrection. Adam sinned, and through his sin death entered into the world. This death was threefold: there was the spiritual death of the loss of sanctifying grace in the soul; there was the metaphorical death, the curse of Adam, so vivid to us today in the host of the moral and physical evils of the world; finally, there was the material death of the grave where dust returns to dust. Now Christ, the Son of God, knew not sin; still he died, but only to rise again; and as he died for the remission of sin, so he rose again to give us grace (Rom. IV, 25). For it is the Risen Christ that is the vitalizing spirit of the Mystical Body,¹⁶ and to that Body of Christ we belong ever more fully as progressively we die & to rise again. First, there is baptism in the death of Christ by which our souls rise again to life to grace and sanctity (Rom. VI, 2 ff). Secondly, there is the metaphorical death of mortification, in which the reign of sin over us and in us is crushed and we live with our members as instruments of justice unto God (Rom. VI, 11 ff). In the third place, death is swallowed up in victory (I Cor. XV, 54) when "in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, ... the trumpet shall sound and the dead shall rise again incorruptible... For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality" (ibid., 52 f). "As in Adam all die, so also

in Christ all shall be made alive" (ibid., 22).

Such then is the general scheme of things. It is through Christ the transfiguration of death, from a death of soul and body in consequence ^{of} ~~to~~ sin, to a dying with Christ as a prelude to resurrection of soul and body. Nor is the resurrection of the body merely a charming incidental, an added attraction. Rather it is the triumphant goal to which all else proceeds and in which all is contained. "By the envy of the devil death came into the world" (Wisdom II, 24) and contrariwise it was "through death he (Christ) might destroy him who had the empire of death, that is to say, the devil." (Hebr. II, 14) Again, "Jesus Christ... hath destroyed death" (II Tim., I, 10) yet because "the enemy death shall be destroyed last" (I Cor., XV, 26), "the expectation of the creature waiteth for the revelation of the sons of God... For we know that every creature groaneth and travaileth in pain, even till now. And not only it, but ourselves also, who have the firstfruits of the Spirit: even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption of the sons of God, the redemption of our body." (Rom., VIII, 19-23) There have been those who found fault with St. Paul for exclaiming: "If... I fought with the beasts at Ephesus, what doth it profit me, if the dead rise not again? Let us eat and be merry, for tomorrow we shall die." (I Cor., XV, 32) But the emphasis of Holy Scripture on things spiritual is not their exclusive emphasis; nor does our good Lord expect us, his creatures of flesh and blood, redeemed by the flesh and blood of Christ, fed on his flesh and blood in the Eucharist, to look forward to a beatitude out of the body or to count Christ's victory over Satan and sin complete without an eternal triumph of sense and

sensibility, of flesh and of feeling, over the miseries of this life and the catastrophe of the grave.

Such is the general perspective presented explicitly to our faith by Holy Scripture. But where in this picture stands Mary, the Virgin blessed amongst women, the Mother of God? As Christ rose from the dead and ascended into heaven, was she too assumed, soul and body, into heaven? Or does she still await, with sinners, the trumpet of an angel to be summoned from death to life? If there have been Christians who felt they had not the grounds to affirm the first alternative with certitude, there have been none to venture to affirm the second. Too clearly, Mary's position is a position of privilege: full of grace, she never for an instant was under the dominion of Satan or stained by sin; ever a virgin, still she was a mother, the mother of God; and she became a mother without the pangs of motherhood, for those pains were the curse of Eve (Gen. III, 16) and she was blessed amongst women (Luke I, 42) to be called blessed by all generations (*ibid.*, 48). Who but she could be the woman spoken of in Genesis: "I will put enmities between thee and the woman, and thy seed and her seed: she shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for her heel." (Gen., III, 15) But can all this be granted, and yet the Assumption be denied? Can one say that the fruits of the Redemption were anticipated to preserve the soul of Mary from original sin but not anticipated to bring her body to heaven? Can one say that she was freed from the empire of Satan, inasmuch as that empire was sin, but not inasmuch as that empire was death? Can one say that she adores in heaven the body to

which she gave birth yet is without the body that gave it birth? Can one invent some metaphysical law or some principle of divine justice that overrules the best of Sons' love for the best of Mothers, that permits the Sacred Heart to be a living heart but forces the Immaculate Heart to be a dead heart, that calls a halt to privilege after the Immaculate Conception, divine maternity, and perpetual virginity, to consign our Lady's body to the grave? ^{it} The more one thinks about ^{it} the more numerous the aspects one considers, the fuller becomes the evidence and the greater its cogency.

Can one deny that the Assumption would be a grace or that Mary is full of grace?

Such then is the implication of the Assumption in the teaching of Scripture. But is that implication absolutely certain? Are not affirmative answers born more of sentiment or enthusiasm or loyalty than of cold logic? Probability is one thing, but certitude is quite another. Undoubtedly there is a good case for the Assumption. One may even admit that there is, at the present time, an overwhelming case for the Assumption; if one understands Scripture in the manner outlined above, one cannot consider any other alternative; but understanding is a tricky thing, the parent of endless theories and hypotheses that have their day and then are relegated to the dust-bin of outmoded thought.

There are three steps in the answer to this difficulty. The first is to point out that the development of Christian doctrine is not subject to the revolutions that are part and parcel of the development of science; the reason for this is ultimately that the development ^{of} understanding in science regards sensible data while the development of understanding in Christian doctrine regards, not sensible presentations

which intellect has to raise to the order of truths, but a divine revelation which already is in the order of truth. The second step is to observe that in the present instance at least not only the truths to be understood but also the general lines of the understanding itself are revealed; we do not have to construct the whole picture; the whole is something given; all that we have to do is to determine from the shape of the whole the place to be assigned to a part. Finally, the third and conclusive step to observe is that the implication of the Assumption is not the fruit of individual human understanding; the understanding that is relevant is the understanding of man illumined by faith and moved by the grace of the Holy Spirit; it is not the understanding of this or that man, nor of this or that age, but of the Church; and ultimately certitude rests not upon judgment proceeding ^{merely} from human understanding but upon the judgment of the Church to whom God has promised infallibility in matters of faith and morals.

There remains a final question. Did God reveal the Assumption of our Lady? Can it be a matter of faith? We have admitted that the Assumption was revealed not explicitly but only implicitly. Still not every implication of Scripture, not every conclusion theologians can spin out from Scripture, thereby is a matter of faith. On the contrary, the Vatican Council is quite strict, teaching that "the doctrine of faith, revealed by God, has not been presented to human talent to be perfected as though it were some philosophic discovery; that it is has been entrusted to the Church, the Spouse of Christ, as a divine deposit, faithfully to be

guarded and infallibly to be declared."¹⁸ There does exist a development of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom both in individuals and in the whole Church; but it must be true to type and without change of dogma, of meaning, or of doctrine.¹⁹

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As is apparent, there are definite limits to the development of dogma, but for a more precise account of them we have to go to the theologians. Here we are met with a variety of opinions. In a recent article Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., affirmed that the majority of theologians require what is termed "formally implicit" revelation for a doctrine to be of faith; ~~he then went on to argue~~ that since the Bishops could not in conscience follow a minority opinion, their petitions for definition of the Assumption imply that they consider the Assumption to be formally implied in revelation.²⁰ In an even more recent article Fr. Charles Balić, O.P.M., advanced that to require formally implicit revelation was to sabotage the movement for a definition of the Assumption,²¹ that the commission that prepared the definition of the Immaculate Conception was hampered by no such criterion as formally implicit revelation,²² that Melchior Cano, who presumably was, had maintained that the Church could never define the Immaculate Conception as a matter of faith.²³ If representatives of the Dominican and Franciscan Theological Institutes in Rome disagree, one can quote Jesuits from either side of the fence. In 1930 Fr. Francis Mueller wrote a book to prove that the Assumption was revealed implicitly and formally.²⁴ In reviewing it Fr. Adhémar d'Alès advanced that, as far as he could see, formal implicit revelation was not necessary and,

in any case, what Fr. Mueller called "formal implication" was no more than a virtual implication.²⁵ As this disagreement manifests, the problem involves not only whether formal implication is necessary for definition but also what precisely formal implication is.

I think not a little light is thrown on this subject if one leaves the field of contemporary theology and goes back to the initiators of the discussion. The original question was whether one could believe by divine faith a conclusion resulting syllogistically from two premises, one of which was revealed by God, while the other was known with certainty by merely human science. For example, we know from the gospel that our Lord changed water into wine at Cana; we know from chemistry that ordinary water is largely H_2O ; is it, then, or could it be a matter of faith that our Lord changed into wine what mainly was H_2O . That is a perfectly clear question; it was given different answers. Molina held it never could be.²⁶ Vasquez advanced that already it was a matter of faith.²⁷ Suarez straddled: unless it is defined, it is not; but if it were defined, then it would be.²⁸ De Lugo followed Suarez.²⁹ John of St. Thomas held the Church would not define a mere theological conclusion such as the above.³⁰ The Salmanticenses agreed with him.³¹ Now the point to be observed is that this discussion throws no doubt on the definability of the Assumption. For the Assumption is not a theological conclusion in the sense defined above; it depends exclusively upon divine revelation; it draws no premises from philosophy or physics or chemistry or biology or any other merely human department of knowledge.

On the contrary, the argument outlined above for the Assumption meets exactly the requirements of the rigorous school as represented by John of St. Thomas.³²

But if this is so, why is there the contemporary disagreement? I should say that it is occasioned by a shift of view-point. In the seventeenth century the basic issue was an accurately defined theological conclusion which was called a virtual implication. In contemporary writers the foreground is occupied with an account of formal implication and for reasons, which are not our present concern, hard-headed and clear accounts of formal implication are not broad enough to fit the facts,³³ while loose and obscure accounts of formal implication ~~are better described as~~ ^{fit the facts by dodging the issue.} ~~muddle-headedness than as theology.~~³⁴ If one wishes to go to the root of this theological problem, one has to get beyond conceptualism and give a central role in thought to the act of understanding. But I see no reason why the definition of the Assumption should be delayed until this problem in speculative theology is solved.³⁵

Our Lady's Death.

If our Lady died, then she died at some determinate place and time; she died from some assignable cause; and one would expect that there were witnesses of the event. But contemporary documentary evidence is totally lacking. Nor do the Fathers add much to our information. Her death was mentioned incidentally as an assumed matter of fact, certainly by Saints Ephraem and Augustine, probably by St. Ambrose,

perhaps also by St. Gregory of Nyssa.³⁶ There are dubious suggestions that she was thought never to have died in St. Epiphanius and in a sermon by Timothy of Jerusalem.³⁷ On the other hand, the apocrypha, which began to be compiled towards the end of the fifth century,³⁸ take the death of our Lady as the central fact of their narrations. Further, at the end of the sixth century veneration was paid to our Lady's tomb at Jerusalem though when that veneration began we hardly know.³⁹ In subsequent centuries Fr. Martin Jugie has unearthed two writers whose words might possibly be taken to express a doubt or denial of our Lady's death.⁴⁰ On the other hand, Fr. Jugie has run to ground an alleged list of theologians supposed to have denied her death; it turns out that the list never existed.⁴¹ All in all, until one reaches the speculations of Canon Arnaldi in the nineteenth century, an unmistakable denial of our Lady's death does not seem to have been found.

These speculations cannot be allowed any weight. They are to the effect that Adam, because he was created in grace, had the privilege of immortality; similarly, since our Lady was conceived immaculately, she had either the privilege itself or, in Fr. Jugie's modification, the right to the privilege of immortality. The summary answer is that privileges are freely bestowed.⁴² The fuller answer is contained in three statements: one may grant that Fr. Jugie establishes an abstract possibility that our Lady did not die; in the second place, such abstract possibilities are not very relevant to matters of fact; in the third place, the Church has not doubted that our Lady did die and that agreement is final

for the theologian.⁴³ I need not add that the scientific historian would not think of asking whether a human being who lived nineteen centuries ago has died.

But there is a further question, Is the death of our Lady capable of definition along with the Assumption? On this issue the recent petitions already mentioned offer nothing decisive. Out of 3017 petitions of what may be termed the teachers of the Church, 2344 do not mention the issue, 5 seem to doubt our Lady's death, 24 seem to affirm her death but do not do so clearly, 434 (including 264 residential bishops) affirmed that our Lady died, do not wish her death defined but rather placed in a preambulatory argument or exposition; finally, 212 (including 154 residential bishops) wish her death included in the definition itself of the Assumption.⁴⁴

Theological opinion reveals a parallel division. Fr. Balić argues that the death of our Lady could be defined as a dogmatic fact in virtue of its connection with the doctrine of the Assumption as that doctrine has been understood by the Church.⁴⁵ Other theologians, while not disputing such a position as Fr. Balić's and while casting no doubt whatever on the fact of our Lady's death, insist on the point that the Assumption does not ~~xxx~~ necessarily presuppose the death of our Lady (she can be in heaven body and soul, even though her soul never was separated from her body); they further point out that the arguments for the Assumption and for the death of our Lady are distinct, that they differ in character, in their ~~xxx~~ guarantees of certitude, in the manner in which they could be objects of faith; in consequence

they favor a simple affirmation of our Lady's death and devote their efforts to showing that the Assumption itself, taken in a rigorous sense, could be defined as an object of faith.⁴⁶ This second view suffers from a certain complexity; on the other hand, it is content with a minimum with which, at present, all could agree.

In conclusion I recapitulate what has been said. The Assumption of our Lady to heaven could be defined as a dogma of divine and catholic faith. Though not explicitly revealed in Holy Scripture nor, as far as we know, ^{with certitude} in any explicit, oral, apostolic tradition, still it is revealed implicitly. That implication is grasped as human understanding illumined by faith and aided by ~~grasp~~ grace penetrates the economy of man's Fall and Redemption and settles our Lady's place in it. That implication is certain because of the long-standing and widespread agreement existing in the Church. That implication is certainly not a theological conclusion in the classical sense, for it is grasped without appealing to any merely human science as a premise; whether one chooses to name it a formal or a virtual implication will depend on one's definition of those terms; but the manner one chooses to define those terms will not alter the one important fact, that the implication of the Assumption is of the type that has sufficed for previous dogmatic definitions. Finally, doubts about the fact of our Lady's death are unjustified; whether, however, our Lady's death should be asserted as a preamble or included in a definition, are points on which theological thought has, as yet, not crystallized.

Notes.

- 1) See Martin Jugie, A. A., La mort et l'Assomption de la Sainte Vierge, Rome 1944, pp. 274-84. This monumental work is an invaluable source of historical information. However, the author's scholarship is frequently put to the service of theological opinions of little or no probability. The latter tendency in the work unfortunately has led to not a little obscuration of its great merit and utility.
- 2) ibid., p. 395.
- 3) ibid., pp. 424-30.
- 4) For the inevitable qualifications of so sweeping a statement, see Jugie, op. cit., pp. 437-60.
- 5) G. Hentrich - R. de Moos, Petitiones de Assumptione corpora B. V. Mariae in caelum definienda ad S. Sedem delatae, 2 vols., Rome 1945, II, 836. I am citing F. S. Mueller, Gregorianum 27(1946), 112.
- 6) Thus, prior to the publication of the petitions, Lennerz, De Beata Virgine, Rome 1939, p. 100.
- 7) Fr. Jugie advances nine considerations against giving much weight to the petitions, op. cit., pp. 595-600.
- 8) "Les pétitions moralement unanimes de l'épiscopat catholique du monde entier, il résulte donc que la définibilité de cette prérogative mariale est chose certaine et que la note théologique, qu'on devra désormais (en attendant la dogmatisation) donner à la thèse de l'Assomption, sera à tout le moins 'proximum fidei.'" E. Druwe, Rech. Sc. Rel., 33(1946), 477. Similarly, F. S. Mueller, Gregorianum 27(1946), 135; R. Garrigou-Lagrange,

Angelicum 22(1945), 72; C. Balić, Antoniarum 21(1946), 63.

9) Jugie, op. cit., p. 474 f.

10) ibid., p. 475 ff.

11) ibid., 480. "Veritas Assumptionis dicenda est formaliter revelata, non quidem, ut videtur, explicita, sed implicita et confuse...." Thesis defended at the Pontifical Gregorian University in the presence of nine Cardinals and uncounted other dignitaries, December 12, 1946. Gregorianum 27(1946), 640. Similar positions are adopted by Druwe, Mueller, Garrigou-Lagrange, Balić in the articles cited in note 8.

12) Observe that the early silence includes such statements as St. Augustine's "Unus resurrexit iam non moriturus, Christus." PL 36, 1673. I cite from Jugie, op. cit., p. 67. On the apocrypha see Jugie, op. cit., 103-171; also Alfred Rush, Am. Ecol. Rev., 116(1947), 3-31. On St. Epiphanius and on Timothy of Jerusalem, see both Jugie, op. cit., 70-81, and also Otto Faller, De priorum saeculorum silentio circa Assumptionem B. Mariae Virginis, Rome 1946, Anal. Greg. XXXVI, pp. 27-43.

13) Jugie, op. cit., pp. 276-85, 371-78, 389-92, 437-52.

14) ibid., 208, 428.

15) From the view-point of apologetics, this point is very important. No theologian would deny that the assistance of the Holy Spirit enabled the apostles to understand the full implications of divine revelation. But it is quite another matter to affirm an explicit, oral, apostolic tradition when there is not sufficient evidence to justify such an affirmation. J. Coppens expresses a legitimate concern

when he concluded a rather unsatisfactory article with the remark: "... évitons, en toute hypothèse, de parler ou d'écrire comme si nous voulions obtenir de l'Église, ou comme si l'Église elle-même envisageait, de sanctionner, sur le plan de l'histoire, une doctrine comme remontant à l'âge apostolique, alors que toute base historique solide, à parler humainement, semble lui faire défaut." Eph. theol. lovan., 23(1947), 35. The argument that the later consent of the Church presupposes the previous existence of an explicit, oral, apostolic tradition is valid only on the erroneous supposition that there is no such thing as implicit revelation or the development of dogma. E. Druwe denies that any nugget of tradition is to be extracted from the apocrypha, Rech. Sc. Rel., 33(1946), 473. A. Rush suggests that the apocrypha may exhibit the first attempts to formulate Christian thought on the death of Mary; he denies that they presuppose necessarily some apostolic or patristic tradition, Am. Ecol. Rev., 116(1947), 29 f. Still see O. Faller, op. cit., 44-62.

16) I Cor., XV, 45. On this and connected matter, see Prat, La théologie de S. Paul, ed. 17, Paris 1933, pp. II, 250-54, 66-77, 203-14.

17) The question is raised by J. Coppens, Eph. theol. lovan., 23(1947), 20. H. Lennerz cuts various theological arguments down to probability, De Beata Virgine, Rome 1939, 101-111. M. Jugie denies efficacy to arguments other than the one he invented, op. cit., 626, 638, 641, 647. The elementary point to be born in mind -- it does seem to be overlooked -- is that our understanding of the mystery of the Redemption cannot be perfect and cannot yield the type of necessary

implication familiar from metaphysics or mathematics; this is no less than the doctrine of the Vatican Council, Sess., III, cap. 4, DB 1796. A further point to be noticed is that it is not ~~the~~^{an} implication as such but the affirmation of an implication that is true or false, certain or ~~not~~ probable; this distinction underlies the distinction drawn by John of St. Thomas (see note 32) between the inference made by human intellect and the affirmation made by with the assistance of the Holy Spirit.

- 18) Vatican Council, Sess. III, cap. 4, DB 1800.
- 19) ibid.: "Crescat igitur... et multum vehementerque proficiat, tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius Ecclesiae, aetatum ac saeculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia: sed in suo dumtaxat genere, ~~et~~ in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu, eademque sententia."
- 20) Angelicum ~~22(1946)~~; 22(1945), 70 cf. 68. On the same point see also F. S. Mueller, Gregorianum 27(1946), 130 ff.
- 21) Antonianum 21(1946), 16.
- 22) ibid., 20 ff.
- 23) ibid., 53.
- 24) F. S. Mueller, Origo divino-apostolicae doctrinae evagationis Beatissimae Virginis ad gloriam caelestem quoad Corpus, Geniponte 1930.
- 25) Rech. Sc. Rel., 21(1931), 240 f.
- 26) In Im., q. 1, a. 2, disp. 1 et 2. I cite Lennerz, De Virtutibus Theologicis, Rome 1938, p. 51. The old writers did not, of course, discuss the example given in the text but the equivalent homo est risibilis.

- 27) In Im., disp. 5, c. 3. Lennerz, ibid.
- 28) De Fide, Disp. III, sect. xi, nn. 1, 6, 7, 11; Paris 1868, XII, 95 ff.
- 29) De Fide, Disp. I, sect. xiii, §1, nn. 261, 269 f.; Paris 1891, I, 123 ff.
- 30) In Im., disp. 2, c. 4. Ed. Solesm., I, 357 ff.
- 31) De Fide, disp. I, dub. iv, §4, 6, 7, nn. 124, 139 ff., 143 ff., Paris 1879, tom. XI.
- 32) loc. cit., §10, p. 360: "Respondetur negando quod propositiones definitae ab Ecclesiae non sint immediate revelatae a Deo: licet revelatio illa non sit implicita et occulta, et ideo per discursum attingatur, et eodem discursu Ecclesia disponat et praeparet ipsam inquisitionem veritatis; tamen cum venitur ad diffinitionem, discursus ipse et disputatio humano modo facta non est ratio definiendi et credendi, sed quia visum est Spiritui sancto: non quidem de novo revelanti illam veritatem, sed occultam revelationem factam illuminanti, et manifestanti legitimum sensum occultum; iuxta quod dicitur (Luc. XXIV, 45), quod Dominus aperuit sensum discipulis, ut intelligerent Scripturas, et ad hoc promisit Spiritum Sanctum Ecclesiae ut doceret illam omnem veritatem. Et sic per auctoritatem Ecclesiae veritas immediate revelata transit ab occulta ad manifestam, non a revelata mediate ad revelatam immediate."
- 33) Such a hard-headed account is represented by the list of formal implications as definition in the defined, essential physical parts in the whole, particular proposition in the universal, conclusion in its premises. Lennerz, De Virtutibus Theologicis, Rome 1938, p. 67. In his De Beata Virgine, Rome

1939, the same author recalls his criteria (p. 101), shows the difficulties of certainty regarding the Assumption as revealed (101-9), and finally proposes as possible solutions that the Assumption was revealed implicitly in the corporeal integrity explicitly revealed as perpetual virginity, or again as part of the victory ~~of~~ over Satan explicitly revealed with regard to sin, implicitly with regard to death (p. 110 f.). It would seem, then, that the Assumption is an essential physical part of a kind of corporeal integrity that includes the Assumption ^{again,} _λ of a victory over Satan.

34) It has been maintained that the Assumption is a conclusion following from two explicitly revealed premises and therefore itself revealed formally and implicitly. See R. Garrigou-Lagrango, Angelicum 22(1945), 71 f. With regard to the putative syllogism so offered one can only say that the conclusion does not follow ^{syllogistically} from the premises; and if the premises are ~~modified~~ so modified that the conclusion does follow rigorously, then the premises will be found not to be formally and explicitly revealed.

35) Fr. Balić, Antoniarum 21(1946), 18, expresses the same view. Fr. Mueller, Gregorianum 27(1946), 132, comes round to it.

36) See Jugie, op. cit., 59-70.

37) Ibid., 70 ff., 77 ff. Also Faller, op. cit. 27 ff., 33 ff.

38) Jugie, op. cit., p. 103.

39) Ibid., 681 ff. Also Faller, op. cit., pp. 44-60.

40) In the sixteenth century, Tasaredus; in the fourteenth, Francis of Mayron; Jugie, op. cit., pp. 275, 402.

- 41) This list attributed to Macedo is mentioned by Lépicier, De Beata Virgine Maria, Paris no date but after Aug. 1901, p. 251; by Bellamy, DTC, I, 2128. See Jugie, op. cit., p. 515.
- 42) P. Charles, Nouv. Rev. Theol., 69(1947), 335. More fully, Balic, Antonianum, 21(1946), 45-53.
- 43) Lemmerz, De Beata Virgine, Rome 1939, p. 59.
- 44) Hentrich -- de Moos, op. cit., II, 715 ff. I am citing from Mueller, Gregorianum 27(1946), 122.
- 45) Antonianum, 21(1946), 53 ff.
- 46) This position advanced by Mueller, Origo d'una divino-apostolica..., Innsbruck 1930, seems to have been adopted in the theses defended at the Pontifical Gregorian University on the occasion mentioned above, note 11.