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We can never know or measure the full extent of Newman's social theories for as the Movement got underway it became necessary for him to hammer out the theological basis for their program: Apostolic Succession, a revived liturgy, the role of the sacraments, etc., against the rigorous Protestantism of the day with its erastianism, Justification by Faith, and severe belief in Private Judgment. Nevertheless, the liberal social theory of the Oxford Movement did bear fruit, if only in the second half of the century. Many if not all of the great worker-priests in England professed themselves to be adherents of the Movement. And even among the episcopacy, there was a gradual change away from the aristocratic ideals to the system of the gospel.⁵²

Paul Ricoeur: Toward the Restoration of Meaning

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"I leave off all demands and listen."

THE philosopher Karl Jaspers recalls that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both prophesied the emergence of an age of infinite reflection, an age in which everything is interpretation and "anything can mean something else."¹ Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were able so to prophesy because they knew themselves as exceptions in their own day, as precursors of this age, as *figurae* or archetypes concretely anticipating what was to become the widespread experience of their race.

The theologian John Dunne has similarly dubbed our time the "age of appropriation," an age in which any journey toward God must be traveled *through* and ultimately *beyond* the self.²

A Contemporary View of the Irish Church's Duty," *Canadian Journal of Theology*, VIII (1962), 50-54.

⁵² R. A. Soloway, *Prelates and People* (London: 1962), pp. 422ff.

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¹ Karl Jaspers, *Reason and Existenz*, trans. by William Earle (New York: Noonday Press, Inc., 1968), p. 31.

² John Dunne, *A Search for God in Time and Memory* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967).

Philosophy for centuries has been gradually abandoning the study of the natural world around us to the physical and biological sciences only to find itself ever more immersed in the task of interpreting human interiority.³ The human sciences, at the same time, have developed conflicting approaches and conclusions, some reductive, some holistic. It appears safe to say that, given a prolonged future for our race, we still stand at the very beginning of the process of accumulating knowledge and deepening our understanding of the inner resources, possibilities, and limits of man.

The almost universal influences of various critical techniques and our growing active familiarity with them has radically affected the state of religious belief in Western society. Our growing capacity for distinguishing the various patterns of our experience and cognitional awareness has had various results. For some it has sharpened the dimension appropriate to religious faith and enabled them to relate religious experience to profane life precisely by being able to distinguish the two more clearly. For others, however, it has removed this dimension altogether and revealed religion as well as conventional moralities and non-pluralistic approaches to knowledge to be culturally-determined, adolescent human traits now quickly to be disposed of in favor of more mature pursuits. Religious apologists, instead of explicating the presuppositions of faith in the terms of a commonly accepted philosophy, find themselves rigorously laying bare the very possibility and pertinence of faith for an educated and sophisticated mind. And they realize that such a propaedeutic cannot be defensive; that is, it cannot violently condemn all of the understanding reached in reductive interpretations (e.g., Freudianism) which have too often demonstrated their explanatory value in certain areas. Nor can it avoid the charge of obscurantism if it fails to face the questions posed by these seemingly destructive systems of thought.

One believing man who has attempted to immerse himself in the contemporary intellectual scene and draw from it is the French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur. In this essay I will try to present the problematic which Ricoeur defines and to expose his treatment of our problems of interpretation and religious belief.

I. The Notion of Philosophy and the Problem of Symbolism

Ricoeur approaches the contemporary intellectual and religious scene not as a theologian, nor as a psychologist, but as a philosopher. His treatment of religious symbolism figures as a part of a vast philosophical undertaking concerned with the task of delineating the

³ See Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), p. 95.

essential structures of human existence and, more concretely, its limits and possibilities. Very roughly, we might say that the abstract, structural analysis is the work of the earlier sections in his projected three-volume study of the philosophy of the will. These earlier sections are *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*⁴ and *Fallible Man*.⁵ The beginnings of a more concrete study can, again roughly, be found in *The Symbolism of Evil*⁶ and *Freud and Philosophy*.⁷ In order to understand the significance of this concrete "turn," we must investigate how Ricoeur understands the philosophical task.

Ricoeur assumes that the work of René Descartes, for whom the positing of the existence of the thinking subject is a first truth which cannot and need not be verified or deduced, marks the beginning of a new tradition in philosophy. Ricoeur finds himself standing within this tradition, for which philosophy is primarily a matter of self-knowledge, of the self-appropriation of the subject.⁸ But how is the self given up to philosophical reflection? Ricoeur maintains that the thinking subject is known only through the mediation of its expressions—ideas, actions, works, institutions, monuments. Philosophical reflection is to recover the act of existing, the *I am*, through reflection on the works of man. The *I* as such, as known, is not concretely given as an immediate datum of experience. Rather, knowledge of the self occurs only through a displacement of the home of the meaning away from immediate consciousness, only through the understanding of the self's objectifications in knowledge, action, and culture.

The meaning of these objectifications or works, however, is not immediately evident nor is it univocal. Man's self-expressions are capable of being variously interpreted. A privileged instance of this susceptibility to different interpretations is found in man's *language*. At

⁴ Paul Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, trans. by Erazim Kohak (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

⁵ Paul Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, trans. by Charles Kelbey (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965).

⁶ Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. by Emerson Buchanan (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1969). Henceforth *SE*. *Fallible Man* and *The Symbolism of Evil* form Vol. II or Ricoeur's philosophy of the will. Vol. III on the poetics of the will is as yet unfinished.

⁷ Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. by Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). Henceforth *FP*.

⁸ "I assume here that the positing of the self is the first truth for the philosopher placed within the broad tradition of modern philosophy that begins with Descartes and is developed in Kant, Fichte, and the reflective stream of European philosophy. For this tradition, which we shall consider as a whole before setting its main representatives in opposition to one another, the positing of the self is a truth which posits itself; it can be neither verified nor deduced; it is at once the positing of a being and of an act; the positing of an existence and of an operation of thought: *I am*, *I think*; to exist, for me, is to think; I exist inasmuch as I think." *FP*, p. 43.

least at the stage which his own thought had reached when he wrote his work on Freud, Ricoeur distinguished between those linguistic expressions of man which admit of only one interpretation and thus are univocal, and those which contain a double meaning and thus, in this sense, are equivocal or, better, plurivocal.⁹ The latter field he designates as the realm of symbolism.

If philosophy is the work of recovering in its concrete fullness the *I* at the heart of the *Cogito*, and if this retrieval can be accomplished only through the mediation of man's self-expressions, philosophy must have recourse to symbols; that is, it must take as a distinct *field of reflection* the whole area of such expressions embracing multiple levels of meaning, and radically the area of symbolic language. Philosophy must thus become a matter of interpretation or hermeneutic. "I have decided to define, i.e., limit, the notions of symbol and interpretation through one another. Thus a symbol is a double-meaning linguistic expression that requires an interpretation, and interpretation is a work of understanding that aims at deciphering symbols."¹⁰

II. The Conflict of Interpretations

The plurivocal nature of symbols consists in a relation of meaning to meaning. "Symbols occur when language produces signs of composite degree in which the meaning, not satisfied with designating some one thing, designates another meaning attainable only in and through the first intentionality."¹¹ Such double-meaning expressions are found in the hierophanies which are the object of study for the phenomenology of religion, in dreams, and in poetic images. Yet the power of symbolism, which *may* be rooted somewhere beyond or behind human language (e.g., in the cosmos itself or in the psychic constitution of man), appears *as such* in man's speech. The task of interpretation or hermeneutic is to reveal the richness or overdetermination of symbols and to demonstrate that symbols play a true role in man's discourse. The manifest meaning of a symbol points beyond itself to a second, latent meaning by a movement which thought can follow but never dominate. For example, the symbols figuring in any of the great religions enable the phenomenologist of religion to be drawn toward a given religion's conception of the sacred and its relation to man. Much of the work of a scholar such as Mircea Eliade¹² is a matter of moving with the symbols and being drawn by them to a universe structured in a

⁹ Ricoeur's later development has moved in the direction of acknowledging all language as symbolic. See Don Ihde, *Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971).

¹⁰ *FP*, p. 9.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

particular way and to a God or gods relating in a certain manner to man's world as he experiences it. It is the predominance of certain symbolic types, for example, which enables Eliade to distinguish religions of the "eternal return" from religions of historically oriented "faith."¹² Thus, the primary meaning moves us to a latent, symbolized meaning and intentionally assimilates us or draws us on to that second meaning. This process of assimilation is identified by Ricoeur as "intentional analogy."

As thinking becomes more concrete, it also becomes more dependent on symbols and thus more hermeneutical. Thus we may speak of a hermeneutic turn in Ricoeur's thought as he moves beyond the abstract analyses of the structures of human existence to an attempt to read man's experience through a study of his expressions.¹³ Such hermeneutic phenomenology differs from the neutral analyses of his earlier works and of most other phenomenology in that it intrinsically points beyond itself by means of a "wager" which shatters the descriptive neutrality of most phenomenological work. "I wager that I shall have a better understanding of man and the bond between the being of man and the being of all beings if I follow the *indication* of symbolic thought."¹⁴ This wager is acknowledged again in *Freud and Philosophy*, with specific reference to the phenomenology of religion. The latter is secretly animated by an intention, a series of philosophical decisions which lie hidden even within its apparent neutrality, a rational faith which employs a phenomenological hermeneutics as an instrument of achieving the restoration of meaning which he refers to as a "second immediacy." Thus, the implicit intention of this hermeneutic phenomenology is "an expectancy of a new Word, of a new tidings of the Word."¹⁵

It is in *The Symbolism of Evil* that Ricoeur begins his attempt to read the constitution of symbolic language by deciphering expression, language, and text. This work also places the horizon for the dialectical conflict he will later attempt to mediate in *Freud and Philosophy*, the nature of which we have yet to examine. This horizon is the problem of the unity of human language. It is this horizon that makes phenomenology a matter of interpretation or hermeneutic, because of the insistence on understanding man's experience by understanding his expressions in symbol and myth. The latter rescue man's feeling from silence and confusion. But such interpretation remains phenomenological; it does not attempt to reach *behind* the symbols for underlying

¹² Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return*, trans. by Willard R. Trask, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1959), Chapter 4.

¹³ This is the approach through which Ihde studies Ricoeur.

¹⁴ *SE*, p. 355.

¹⁵ *FP*, p. 31.

determinants but rather attempts to follow them forward, to follow their indications. "Symbols alone give what they say."¹⁶ "The symbol gives rise to thought."¹⁷ To interpret symbols phenomenologically is to reenact them in sympathetic imagination, not through an immediate belief but through the recovery of the intentionality of the symbol. To reenact a myth through an immediate belief would be to accept the myth as *explanatory* or *etiological*. To reenact it by sympathetically immersing oneself in its implicit intentionality, however, is to accept it as *exploratory*, as interpretative of man, his destiny, and his place in the cosmos.¹⁸ It is to accept mystery. It is to "elevate the symbols to the rank of existential concepts."¹⁹ This is not to say that the cosmic significance which the symbol intends is actually *given* in the symbol. If this were the case, the symbol would cease to be a symbol. Symbols are intentions without fulfillments. (This limitation will be extremely important when we discuss the more concrete reflection on religious symbols which begins from their dialectical unity-in-tension. This will be clarified in the next section.)

The phenomenology of religion may proceed either by analyzing the inherent structures of symbols and myths, or by relating them to one another either in an evolutionary perspective or by showing relations of transposition. An example of the latter is the way in which Ricoeur shows the relations of opposition and identity between the Adamic myth and the other myths of evil, in the last chapter of *The Symbolism of Evil*. In either case three philosophical decisions are made: first, the accent is put on the *object* of investigation; second, a certain *fullness* of symbol is emphasized; third, the *intention* is that one may "finally greet the revealing power of the primal word."²⁰

Regarding the first decision, placing the emphasis on the object of investigation, the phenomenology of religion aims at disengaging the object in myth, ritual, and belief rather than discovering psychological and sociological determinants of religious behaviour. The second decision, i.e., emphasizing the fullness of symbol, is based on a rational faith that symbols point beyond themselves to a second meaning, *giving* what they say. This implies that I who interpret am bound up in the relation of immediate meaning to latent meaning, that I participate in what is announced to me through the symbol. Thus the third decision, i.e., the intention to greet the revealing power of the primal word, manifests a new desire to be addressed and renders the phenomenology of religion a preparation for the revelation of meaning.²¹

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *SE*, p. 347; *FP*, p. 38.

¹⁸ See *SE*, p. 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

²⁰ *FP*, p. 32.

²¹ *Ibid.*

Several recent and very influential schools of thought, however, very forcibly impress upon us that there is a second kind of relationship which may exist between manifest and latent meaning. The manifest meaning may stand in a relationship not of intentional analogy, but of "cunning distortion" to the latent meaning, i.e., a relationship of dissimulation, mystification, and illusion. In the case of Freud, for example, the primary meaning of a symbol is a dissimulation of basic, unsurpassable desire or instinct. The task of psychoanalytic interpretation is not the discovery of a further reality beyond the symbol, a reality toward which the symbol draws us by its own movement, but rather, the reduction of the illusion affected in consciousness by the manifest meaning of such an expression. Religious symbols which would lead a phenomenologist of religion to a particular religion's concept of the sacred would be, for psychoanalysis, but another manifestation of the "universal obsessional neurosis of mankind" known as religion.

These two possibilities thus give rise to conflicting styles of interpretation, the polar extremes of which are denominated by Ricoeur "the hermeneutics of suspicion" and "the hermeneutics of recovery." If philosophy's task, the concrete understanding of the *I* at the heart of the *Cogito* through the mediation of man's self-expressions, is to be possible at all, then the philosopher must not only have recourse to hermeneutics—since many of these expressions are symbolic—but he must also settle the question of whether this hermeneutic conflict can be resolved. Is his only choice to be an option between these two styles, an option seemingly arbitrary and thus perhaps itself determined not by the exigencies of disinterested inquiry or rigorous method, but by the unconscious determinants of his own psychic makeup? Or are there resources available to philosophic reflection itself which will enable a resolution or mediation of the internal variance within the field of interpretation? Is the alternative of conflicting styles definitive or provisional, real or illusory? Can philosophy discover, within the storehouse of resources properly its own, a means of resolving this tension? If not, the odds would seem to lie with the hermeneutics of suspicion, since *either* option in itself would appear arbitrary and thus itself an expression of unsurpassable instinct. The task of interpretation, and thus of the philosopher who recognizes the necessity of interpretation for the fulfillment of his reflective task, would be iconoclastic, purely and simply. The philosopher would thus "purify discourse of its excrescences, liquidate the idols, go from drunkenness to sobriety, realize our state of poverty once and for all."²²

On the other hand, if the conflict can be mediated, the hermeneutics of suspicion would still remain but would be taken up into the task of

²² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

recovery, which would then become, not a parallel task, exclusive of and opposed to that of demystification, but inclusive of the latter. The philosopher would then "use the most 'nihilistic,' destructive, iconoclastic movement so as to let speak what once, what each time, was said, when meaning appeared anew, when meaning was at its fullest."²³ The full act of recovery would thus be effected, not through a mere phenomenology of symbol, as in the phenomenology of religion, but by philosophical reflection in its fullest sense and in reliance upon a process of rigorous dialectic which would include extreme iconoclasm as a moment in the restoration of meaning.

The latter possibility is favored by Ricoeur. By way of an overview of what will be exposed more fully in the remainder of this paper, we can make the following statements:

1. With respect to symbolism and interpretation in general, Ricoeur finds the possibility of including the hermeneutics of suspicion within the hermeneutics of recovery to be grounded *objectively* in the *unity of the symbol*.

2. As a philosophical act, it will be grounded *subjectively* in the essential role of *dialectic* within philosophical reflection. The task of philosophical reflection demands interpretation. But the hermeneutic war itself demands that reflection become also dialectic.

3. The religious and profane spheres of meaning are to be sharply differentiated but the interpretative, dialectical, and reflective tasks imposed by each will be analogous.

4. With respect to the area of symbolism specifically and uniquely designated religious, the possibility of the mediation of the conflict is grounded *objectively* in the *ambiguity* of the unified sacred symbol (e.g., the eschatological symbols of Judaism and Christianity).

5. With respect to the same area, this possibility is grounded *subjectively* in the *dialectical process* called for by such ambiguity, a process analogous to the dialectic demanded in the interpretation of profane symbolism. Thus, the reflective thinker concerned with reopening a possibility of being addressed by the kerygmatic Word will take his cue from the philosopher concerned with the dialectical mediation of the hermeneutic conflict in general. The religious thinker must distinguish the expressions with which he is concerned from those other cultural symbols which occupy the philosopher, but his *process* of interpreting the symbols of faith is analogous. Ultimately he must move *beyond* the phenomenology of religion to a more inclusive, complex, and dialectical mode of reflection. This process will ground both the validity of the phenomenology of religion and the viability of its implicit intention of hearing a new tidings of the Word. At the same

²³ *Ibid.*

time, however, it will incorporate the equally valid intention of demystifying hermeneutics, that of establishing the rootedness of manifest religious symbolism in the darkness of life and nature which surrounds the light of conscious awareness.

The domain particular to the symbolism of faith has not been immune from the attacks of the demystifiers. Nor must the religious thinker regard these attacks either as ultimately destructive intentions to be warded off or avoided at all costs, or as embarrassing revelations disclosing the ever-narrowing scope of his legitimate field of investigation and reflection. Rather, they can be assumed as invitations to him to appropriate the tension which expresses his modernity, to move beyond an anachronistic mode of reflection and expression constantly plagued by the temptation to obscurantism, to open the possibility to himself and his contemporaries for a post-critical encounter with the event of human speech which God has, for faith, become. He can release the possibility for the twice-born man of modernity to hear the language of a call in which "I leave off all demands and listen."²⁴

III. *Dialectic and the Concrete Unity of Symbols*

The hermeneutic task cannot remain at a phenomenological level because of the mighty invasion into contemporary thought of the hermeneutics of suspicion. This conflicting style of interpretation reverses the three decisions made by the phenomenologist of religion. The focus of concern becomes, not the object, but the underlying determinants of human expression and behaviour. The latent meaning behind human expression is not to be discovered by a movement *forward* from the expression but by a movement *back* to the realms of unsurpassable instinctual desire (as in Freud) or economic determination (as in Marx) lying behind and determining the mendacious deliverances of consciousness.²⁵ The intention of the phenomenology of religion to be spoken to anew by the Wholly Other is reversed in such descriptions of religion as "the universal obsessional neurosis of mankind" or "the opium of the people." Such a stance, at face value, is radically opposed to the nondialectical restoration of meaning characteristic of the phenomenology of religion. Any attempt at mediation of this controversy must be dialectical. Ultimately, as most dialectic, it must resolve not only differences in standpoint and correlative content, but also differences in underlying decisions which determine one's standpoint. Such dialectic

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 551.

²⁵ It cannot be denied that this is a gross oversimplification of Marx. However, it is only under this rubric that Ricoeur mentions Marx, at least in this discussion. While he groups Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche together under the heading of the hermeneutics of suspicion, it is only Freud whom he studies in detail.

thus will prepare the philosopher or reflective religious thinker to effect another decision which will give him a more inclusive standpoint. If such dialectic is possible, then the radical doubt of the hermeneutics of suspicion may prove to be beneficial and even indispensable for mature, post-critical religious belief. Whereas reflection, the recovery of the *I* at the heart of the *I think*, had to have recourse to interpretation, the hermeneutic war can be arbitrated only by a return to an expanded, dialectical, reflective critique of interpretations. While such reflection is expanded it is also more concrete, for it penetrates more profoundly into the effort to exist and the desire to be which reflection must appropriate through the expressions of man.

The key to such concrete reflection is found in the *unity of the symbol*. Man's symbols reveal a concrete unity-in-tension in which the two apparently diverging lines of interpretation actually intersect. The tension which characterizes our modernity is the awareness of the unity-in-tension found in man's symbols. For us to be able to think in accord with symbols, to follow their indications, we must subject them to a dialectic, discovering the intersection of diverging interpretations. Then we can return to the attitude of listening, to "the fullness of speech simply heard and understood."²⁶

The tension localized in the mixed texture of concrete symbols is a tension of archeology and teleology. The hermeneutics of suspicion is archeological in intention. Freudian psychoanalysis, for example, provides us with an archeology of the subject. It displaces meaning away from immediate consciousness, not *ahead* toward a fuller meaning analogically bound to the meaning revealed in naive awareness, but *behind*, toward the unconscious. It is this meaning which Freudian discourse captures in interpretation, the meaning of our ultimately unknowable instincts as these are designated in our psychic lives by the ideas and the affects that represent them, e.g., by dreams and neuroses, by ideals and illusions. Freud's analyses reveal the archaic, ever prior, ultimately timeless character of desire and instinct. Man is drawn backward, by a detemporalizing agency, to a destiny in reverse. The muteness of such desire can be spoken only through mechanistic energy metaphors. Philosophical reflection learns from Freudian analysis that knowledge is rooted in desire and effort, and that an epistemology which studies our representations as correlative to the represented objects, no matter how "critical" such an epistemology may be, must be supplemented by an exegesis of the desires and instincts which conscious intentionality deceptively hides from our view. It is because such desire is not only hidden but also interferes with intelligent inquiry that truth is, not a given, but a task.

²⁶ FP, p. 496.

But Freud's very pursuit of the *truth* concerning the mute darkness of desire, the image of his *performance* and of his own acceptance of truth as a task for him as scientist and analyst, itself should be enough to lead the philosopher to ask whether our effort to be does not reveal a further vector, a direction forward toward a goal, a second displacement of meaning away from naive awareness, but in a teleological direction. The inconsistency between Freud's *account* and his *performance* leads one to suspect suspicion. The philosopher places the concept of archeology in dialectical opposition to that of teleology. When he does so, his reflection becomes concrete. He will discover this dialectical opposition in man's symbols, myths, and rituals, and when he does so he will realize that the hermeneutic war can be resolved. The reflective thinker, instructed by the demystifying archeology of Freudian reduction and by the progressive synthesis of the forward movement of man's effort to exist, returns to the spoken word and hears it, not irrationally and precritically, but as one twice-born, with an informed immediacy.²⁷ Symbols coordinate in a concrete unity-tension, in two functions previously assumed to be opposed to one another. They repeat our childhood and the childhood of our race, but they also serve to explore our adult life.²⁸ Authentic symbols are regressive-progressive, archeological-teleological. Their intentional structure unifies the functions of concealing and showing, disguising and revealing. While they conceal the aims of our instincts, they disclose the process of self-consciousness.

Disguise, reveal; conceal, show; these two functions are no longer external to one another; they express the two sides of a single symbolic function.... Advancement of meaning occurs only in the sphere of the projections of desire, of the derivatives of the unconscious, of the revivals of archaism.... The opposed hermeneutics disjoin and decompose what concrete reflection recomposes through a return to speech simply heard and understood.²⁹

IV. The Uniqueness of Sacred Symbolism and the Death of the Religious Object

Ricoeur does not allow that his method of philosophical reflection will give us more than a frontier view of the domain of religious symbolism. In a somewhat Barthian manner, he insists that even the very existence of a problematic of faith exceeds the resources of philosoph-

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ For a detailed presentation of a corroborating theory from a Jungian perspective, see Erich Neumann, *The Origins and History of Consciousness*, Bollingen Series XLII (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

²⁹ FP, p. 497.

ical reflection. Such a problematic occurs in another dimension, that of call, kerygma, word addressed to me.

But the movement of faith toward understanding is a movement of the interpretation of events of speech and thus must encounter a dialectic of reflection. God can be recognized by man only in the interpretation of the event of human speech which He has become. To believe is to listen to the call, but to hear this call we must interpret the message. Thus, in Anselmian fashion, we must believe in order to understand and understand in order to believe.

God thus becomes discernible in and through a dialectic of archeology and teleology. As radical origin, he becomes discernible in the *question* of my archeology, and as ultimate goal in the *question* of my teleology.³⁰ Philosophical reflection itself can never assume creation and eschatology, as acts of the divine, to be any more than the horizon of its explorations of archeology and teleology. They are not fixed possessions of reflective thought, as Hegel tried to maintain. Philosophical reflection can never become absolute knowledge. The reason for this lies in the very fact which gives rise to the problematic of faith, the fact of evil. Evil will never be dissolved in dialectic. As such, it is unsurpassable, inscrutable.

The problematic of faith thus shows God to be discernible in a third way, a way not pointed to specifically by the dialectic of reflection but rather by the impossibility of the progress of reflection to the point of absolute knowledge. God becomes discernible in the *question* of evil, together with and in the symbols of reconciliation and deliverance, which qualify the manner in which eschatology is the horizon of the question of my teleology, and the teleology of the figures of the human spirit in the works of culture.

These symbols of creation, eschatology, and redemption stand today in the same need of a demystifying hermeneutics as do the symbols of culture and ethics, and the dreams, fantasies, and ideals of the individual subject. The phenomenology of religion must enter into a dialectical relationship with the psychoanalysis of religion and other forms of reductive interpretation, and this for the sake of the very authenticity of faith. For the human spirit tends, through a misconception of what it means to know,³¹ to reabsorb transcendence in immanence, to transform horizon into an object which he possesses and uses, and to create idols rather than be content with signs of the sacred. Thus a naive metaphysics, for all its protestations to the contrary, can appear to know more about what God is than what he is not, and religion can treat the sacred as a new sphere of objects, institutions, and powers alongside those of the economic, political, and cultural

³⁰ Compare the discussions in the last two chapters of the book of Dunne's cited in footnote 2.

spheres. Religion becomes the reification and alienation of faith, vulnerable to the blows of a hermeneutics of suspicion, whether the latter be a process of demythologization from within religion or of demystification from without. In either case, the aim is the death of the metaphysical and religious "object."

Such a cultural movement, as exemplified in Freudianism, is necessary if we are to hear and read the signs of the approach of the Wholly Other. We are faced with a never-ending task of distinguishing between faith and religion — faith in the Wholly Other which draws near — and belief in the religious object. The task is very difficult and demanding, mainly because it calls for such a merciless exegesis of our own reference to the sacred. Do we allow religious symbols to point to the horizon of transcendence and to do *only* this, or do we make them an idolatrous reality purely immanent to our culture and thus render them ineffective?

V. Conclusion

The task demanded by Ricoeur is particularly difficult, I believe, for one committed to the possibility of authentic sacramentality, who must at the same time admit that many of the ritual practices within his own community reflect indeed at least a "universal obsessional neurosis of mankind" if not a demonic objectifying of the sacred. To speak at least of the tradition which is my own, sacramental religions are prone to the tendency to reify the sacred and capitulate to man's idolizing tendencies. The combat over the sacred will necessarily be heated, it would seem, in those religious communities where, because of an insistence on sacramentality, the ambiguity of the sacred is pronounced.

The task demanded by Ricoeur is very demanding in another realm too, namely, that of creating a sufficiently nuanced relationship between faith and culture, religious communities and public life, authentic religion and profane institutions. Particularly in this area there is a strong tendency to objectify and use the sacred for the pursuit of goals which are not connected with the problematic of faith. "The idols must die so that symbols may live."³²

The psychoanalysis of religion can be one of the roads toward the death of the religious object. It can aid us in charging the affective dynamism of religious belief to the point where the latter becomes,

³¹ At this point, I am moving beyond Ricoeur, who locates the problem simply in man's objectifying tendencies, to Bernard Lonergan, who maintains that the problem is that we misconceive what objectivity is. See below, Conclusion.

³² *FP*, p. 531.

not simply the consolation of the child in us, but the adult power of loving in the face of hatred and death. It can help us discern that kerygmatic faith excludes a moral God and a penal Christology.³³ It forces us to acknowledge that every symbol of the sacred is also and at the same time a revival of an infantile and archaic symbol, and thus to admit the ambiguity of all religious symbolism and religious experience. It can aid us in moving toward the suspension of the ethical point of view, moving beyond an ethics of righteousness, losing the immediate consolation of our own narcissism. It can purify the hermeneutics of faith to the point where the latter becomes unambiguously the symbolic exploration of ultimate relationships, of the language of a call in which "I leave of all demands and listen."³⁴ It is indeed true that the faith of the believer cannot emerge intact from such a confrontation.³⁵ On the other hand, Ricoeur seems to provide a solid basis for claiming that, despite the supposed origin of religious symbols in instinctual impulses, their present meaning cannot be exhausted by presenting their archeology. "The question here is not whether a given religious symbol is genetically a psychological projection, but rather whether, irrespective of its being such a projection, what it expresses analogically discloses a genuine aspect of reality."³⁶

Finally, in a critical vein, it seems to me that three questions must be posed to Ricoeur concerning his procedure and his conclusions. These questions are posed from the standpoint of one who maintains that Bernard Lonergan's cognitional analysis³⁷ provides us with an invariant structure of human consciousness; that his theory of objectivity is correct (a theory missed by all of phenomenology to date, I believe); and that his later studies on meaning enable us to raise a question as to whether *understanding*, rather than language, ought to be the area where all philosophical (and theological) investigations cut across one another. These questions are by no means meant to minimize the critical significance of Ricoeur's work for philosophy and theology. Rather, they raise the possibility of a further intersubjective approximation to truth by comparing Ricoeur's problematic with that of Lonergan.

First, granted the validity of the transcendental method, i.e., of deducing *a priori* conditions for various domains of human experience,

³³ That theology is capable of such discernment apparently drawing almost exclusively upon its own resources is clear from Lonergan, *De Verbo Incarnato* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964), pp. 486-593.

³⁴ *FP*, p. 551.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Stuart C. Hackett, "Philosophical Objectivity and Existential Involvement in the Methodology of Paul Ricoeur," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, IX (March, 1969), p. 31.

³⁷ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957).

does not this method become truly transcendental only when the *self-evident necessity* and *universality* of certain *a priori* structures of human consciousness are found? I am not referring here to certain logical laws,³⁸ such as the principles of contradiction or sufficient reason, but to the possibility of arriving at a pattern and structure of human awareness which is in principle not subject to revision. This, I would maintain, Lonergan has done with invincible forcefulness in arriving at the "levels" of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision.³⁹

Secondly, must we say that our only knowledge of transcendence is symbolic, that every attempt to know the transcendent realm in another way is inevitably idolatrous? Here Ricoeur displays a perceptualist notion of objectivity, according to which objectivity is achieved as a result of doing something analogous to "taking a look." Objectivity is a correlate of conceptualization for Ricoeur. But if objectivity is rather a function of judgment (e.g., the judgment, "God is"), can we not say that God is an object of non-symbolic knowing that is not idolatrous?

Finally, what is the normative status of linguistic usage for philosophy? Is not meaning at least logically prior to language, and are not its structures independent of the contingencies of actual language? Is not actual language a vehicle of meaning rather than its logical presupposition?⁴⁰ Is not meaning a matter for understanding more radically than for language? Does not the emphasis on understanding provide philosophy with a starting-point that transcends dependence on actual usage?

To repeat, these questions are not aimed against the basic thrust of Ricoeur's effort. His intention is noble, his conception of what it entails accurate, his achievement admirable. We should eagerly await the realization of his promise that there is more to come. At the same, too, I believe we can find in Ricoeur's thought significant pointers to areas in which Lonergan's work on theological method is in need of expansion and development. I am referring particularly to the area of symbolic consciousness. In fact, the second immediacy which Ricoeur's philosophy demonstrates to be both possible and desirable indicates, I believe, the region of a fourth *conversion* necessary for the foundations of theology, beyond the intellectual, moral, and religious conversions specified by Lonergan. This fourth conversion I would name

³⁸ Hackett would like to move this objection in this direction. To do so, I believe, is to miss the point really demanded in response to Ricoeur's insistence that reflective philosophy itself is so culturally relative that no objective certainty can be had regarding its deliverances about the *constitution* of the self.

³⁹ See *Insight*, chaps. 11 and 18.

⁴⁰ This is the most cogent of the objections raised by Hackett; see *op. cit.*, p. 36. Lonergan has dealt masterfully with the question in *Method in Theology*, pp. 254-257.

"psychic." As a result of it, one's theological categories, positions, and system can be highly symbolic in nature; a "poetics of the will," such as that envisaged by Ricoeur, would be a genuine part of systematic theology as such.

Ricoeur seems to imply that philosophy is capable of *effecting* such a second immediacy by drawing upon its own resources. This I question. Philosophy by itself is not therapeutic in nature. Rather, through its work of disengaging transcendental structures, it can indicate the *possibility* of such a "conversion." This is precisely what Ricoeur has done. I take his work as a significant contribution to the delineation of the foundations of theology and thus to theological method as a whole.

Hymns in Early Christian Worship

LEONARD THOMPSON *

IN the history of religions the hymn is universally recognized as an appropriate form for man to use in worship. In the earliest literature from the ancient Near East, hymns of praise are raised to Amon-Re, Ishtar, and Marduk. Within Greek religious traditions one finds the Homeric hymns to Dionysius, Demeter, and other deities, as well as philosophically sophisticated hymns by Neo-Platonists and Stoics. In early European literature Celtic hymns invoke nature to give rain and fertility to the soil or invoke war gods in time of battle. Indian literature contains the hymns of the Rig Veda, and Chinese literature includes the Shih Ching, a record of odes and songs sung in connection with ancestor and emperor worship.¹ Such hymns are invaluable sources for reconstructing not only the worship-life of a particular religion but also its system of beliefs. For in most traditions, the hymn — although it may express the worshipper's emotions and his personal religious experience — functions primarily as one way a religious community

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¹ See the articles under "Hymns" in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. by James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, n. d.), VII, 1-58.

PSYCHIC CONVERSION

BY

ROBERT M. DORAN

[Reprinted from THE THOMIST, XLI, 2, April, 1977.]

PSYCHIC CONVERSION¹

IN A RECENT book symptomatic and expressive of the contemporary drama of existential and religious subjectivity, psychiatrist Claudio Naranjo speaks of creating "a unified science of human development,"² "a unified science and art of human change."³ He attempts to disengage from the diverse techniques, exercises, and procedures of education, psychotherapy, and religion, an experimental meeting ground based on a unity of concern and a commonality of method. The various ways of growth which he examines—ranging from behavior therapy to Sufism—are, he says, contributions to a single process of human transformation involving:

- (1) shift in identity;
- (2) increased contact with reality;
- (3) simultaneous increase in both participation and detachment;
- (4) simultaneous increase in freedom and the ability to surrender;
- (5) unification—intrapersonal, interpersonal, between body and mind, subject and object, man and God;
- (6) increased self-acceptance; and
- (7) increase in consciousness.⁴

He concludes his book with the following summary of his position:

The end-state sought by the various traditions, schools, or systems under discussion is one that is characterized by *the experience of*

¹ I wish to acknowledge with gratitude that the term "psychic conversion" was suggested to me by Rev. Vernon Gregson, S.J. My original term was "affective conversion." That Fr. Gregson's suggestion hits things off better should be obvious from the description given in this paper of the transformation referred to by this term.

² Claudio Naranjo, *The One Quest* (New York: Ballantine, 1972), p. 15.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

openness to the reality of every moment, freedom from mechanical ties to the past, and surrender to the laws of man's being, one of living in the body and yet in control of the body, in the world and yet in control of circumstances by means of the power of both awareness and independence. It is also an experience of self-acceptance, where "self" does not stand for a preconceived notion or image but is the experiential self-reality moment after moment. Above all, it is an *experience of experiencing*. For this is what consciousness means, what openness means, what surrendering leads into, what remains after the veils of conditioned perception are raised, and what the aim of acceptance is.⁵

My argument in this paper is twofold: first, that Bernard Lonergan's analysis of conscious intentionality not only constitutes an essential contribution to the foundational quest of a unified science and art of human change, but also provides the most embracing overall framework offered to date for the development of such a theory-praxis; and second, that the exigence for self-appropriation recognized and heeded by Lonergan, when it extends to the existential subject, to what Lonergan would regard as the fourth level of intentional consciousness, becomes an exigence for psychic self-appropriation, calling for the release of what C. G. Jung calls the transcendent function, the mediation of psyche with intentionality in an intra-subjective collaboration heading toward individuation. The release of the transcendent function is a fourth conversion, beyond the religious, moral, and intellectual conversions specified by Lonergan. I call it psychic conversion. It aids the sublation of intellectually self-appropriating consciousness by moral and religious subjectivity, and thus is an intrinsic dimension of the foundational reality whose objectification constitutes the foundations of theology.

The seven characteristics of human transformation listed by Naranjo may be considered as potential effects of psychic conversion. But its immanent intelligibility is something different. It is the gaining of a capacity on the part of the existential subject to disengage the symbolic and archetypal constitution of

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

moral and religious subjectivity. At a given stage in the self-appropriation of intentional consciousness, the intention of value or of the human good must come to participate in an ongoing conspiracy with the psychosymbolic dimensions of human subjectivity. The attempt to objectify this conspiracy will result in a position complementary and compensatory to that of Lonergan and compensatory to that of Jung. First, the kind of psychotherapy inspired can and must be moved into the epochal movement of the human spirit disengaged in Lonergan's transcendental method. Only such a context preserves the genuine intentionality of Jungian psychotherapy. Secondly, however, the dynamism of transcendental method extends to this further domain of psychic self-appropriation. The finality of the methodical exigence is therapeutic. I shall begin by explicating this latter claim. Then I shall argue that intellectual conversion as articulated by Lonergan is the beginning of a response to this therapeutic exigence. In the third and fourth sections of this paper, I will speak of the psychic dimensions of the self-appropriation of moral and religious subjectivity. I will conclude with an argument for the constitutive function of the psyche in the existential subjectivity whose self-appropriation constitutes a portion of the foundations of theology.

I. THE THERAPEUTIC EXIGENCE

I assume as given an appreciation of the meaning of the term "method" advanced by Lonergan: "method" that has not to do with the Cartesian universal procedure for the attainment of certitude by following fixed rules while neglecting bursts of insight, moral truth, belief, and hypothesis; "method" which takes as its key the subject as subject and thus calls for "release from all logics, all closed systems or language games, all concepts, all symbolic constructs to allow an abiding at the level of the presence of the subject to himself";⁶ "method"

⁶ Frederick Lawrence, "Self-Knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan," in P. McShane, ed., *Language, Truth, and Meaning* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), p. 203.

as horizon inviting authenticity. I presuppose also that the dialectical-foundational thinking which issues from such a horizon is acknowledged as a movement that is qualitatively different from that which occupied the mainstream of western philosophy from Socrates to Hegel. This latter movement seeks a control of meaning in terms of system. It is the movement of the emergence of *logos* from *mythos*, of theoretically differentiated consciousness from what, because undifferentiated and precritically symbolic, bears some affinities with what is known in psychotherapy as the unconscious. This theoretic movement may archetypally be designated heroic, in that it is the severing *in actu exercito* of the umbilical cord binding mind to maternal imagination. It achieved its first secure triumph in the Aristotelian refinement of Socrates's insistence on *omni et soli* definitions. It may have pronounced its full coming of age as creative and constitutive in its Hegelian self-recognition as essentially dialectical, in its self-identification with the dialectic of reality itself, and in a *Wissenschaft der Logik* which would be the thinking of its own essence in and for itself on the part of this dialectical movement of reality as *Geist*. That Lonergan's articulation of method, with its key being the subject as subject, captures in a radically foundational manner the structure and dynamism of a new moment of the historical western mind, of an epochal shift in the control and constitution of meaning, has not gone unnoticed and is not a novel appreciation of his significance.⁷ Thus to propose to complement what can only be denominated an unparalleled achievement surely calls for more than a polite apology.

⁷The jacket to the book cited in footnote six, for example, refers to Lonergan's work as "a mode of thinking which some consider axial in Jaspers' sense." The reference is to the notion Jaspers sets forth in *The Origin and Goal of History* that "there is an axis on which the whole of human history turns; that axis lies between the years 800 and 200 B.C.; during that period in Greece, in Israel, in Persia, in India, in China, man became of age; he set aside the dreams and fancies of childhood; he began to face the world as perhaps it is." Bernard Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," in *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan*, ed. F. E. Crowe, S. J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p. 258.

Perhaps I can begin, then, by recalling that Lonergan himself acknowledges a twofold mediation of immediacy by meaning. The first is that which has occupied his attention throughout his career as scholar, teacher, and author, that which occurs "when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method." The second occurs "when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy."⁸ This statement would seem to imply that there are two modes or dimensions to our immediacy to the world mediated by meaning. One mode is cognitional, the other dispositional. These two modes, moreover, would seem to correspond more or less closely to the two primordial constitutive ways of being "there" according to Martin Heidegger: *Verstehen* and *Befindlichkeit*.⁹ They are interlocking modes of immediacy. Lonergan also speaks of "a withdrawal from objectification and a mediated return to immediacy in the mating of lovers and in the prayerful mystic's cloud of unknowing."¹⁰ Is this mediated return to immediacy, this second immediacy, exhausted by these two instances? Is it connected with the second mediation of immediacy by meaning?

Any human subject whose world is mediated and constituted by meaning is primordially in a condition of cognitional and dispositional immediacy to that world: an immediacy of understanding and of mood. The second mode of immediacy is accessible to conscious intentionality in the ever present flow of feeling which is part and parcel of one's concomitant awareness of oneself in all of one's intentional operations. "In every case Dasein always has some mood."¹¹ This dispositional immediacy is what we intend when we ask another, "How are you?" "The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself to-

⁸ Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 77. (Henceforth MIT).

⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 171 f.

¹⁰ MIT, p. 77.

¹¹ Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

wards something."¹² It is this mode of immediacy that is objectified in the second mediation of immediacy by meaning, that which occurs in psychotherapy. What is insufficiently acknowledged by Heidegger,¹³ hinted at by Lonergan, and trumpeted by Jung, is that this dispositionally qualified immediacy is always imaginally constructed, symbolically constituted. In every case it has an archetypal significance. But this imaginal constitution is not accessible to conscious intentionality in the same way as is the disposition itself. The symbolic constitution of immediacy must be disengaged by such psychotherapeutic techniques as dream interpretation and what Jung calls "active imagination." It is "unconscious," i. e., undifferentiated. But when disengaged it reveals how it stands between the attitude of waking consciousness and the totality of subjectivity. This disengagement is effected by the release of the transcendent function, by psychic conversion.¹⁴ The dynamic structure of the transformation of *Befindlichkeit* issuing from this release must be integrated into the epochal movement of consciousness effected in Lonergan's objectification of the structure of human intentionality. Its implications for theological method must be stated. Furthermore, its complementary function with respect to the objectification of intentionality will allow for the construction of a model of self-appropriation as a mediation of both the intentional and psychic dimensions of human interiority. Self-appropriation heads toward a second immediacy, which is always only asymptotically approached. It consists of three stages: intentional self-appropriation as articulated by Lonergan; psychic self-appropriation through the release of the

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 170.

¹³ What the Jungian analyst, Marie-Louise von Franz, says of the existentialists is also true of Heidegger: "They go only as far as stripping off the illusions of consciousness: They go right up to the door of the unconscious and then fail to open it." "The Process of Individuation," in C. G. Jung, ed., *Man and His Symbols* (New York: Dell Paperback, 1964), p. 164.

¹⁴ C. G. Jung, "The Transcendent Function," in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, Vol. 8: *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, tr. by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Bollingen Series XX, 1960), pp. 67-91.

transcendent function, facilitating the sublation of intellectually self-appropriating consciousness by moral subjectivity; and religious self-appropriation and self-surrender of both discriminated intentionality and cultivated psyche to the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* in the sublation of both intellectual and moral self-consciousness by religious subjectivity.¹⁵

Perhaps the complementary function of this model with respect to Lonergan's may be illustrated by commenting on the following statement:

I should urge that religious conversion, moral conversion, and intellectual conversion are three quite different things. In an order of exposition I would prefer to explain first intellectual, then moral, then religious conversion. In the order of occurrence I would expect religious commonly but not necessarily to precede moral and both religious and moral to precede intellectual. Intellectual conversion, I think, is very rare.¹⁶

Surely there is no dispute that the three conversions are quite different events. Nor need there be any argument with Lonergan's preferred order of exposition of these events. But there are very serious difficulties, I believe, with the overtones of the assertion that, in the general case, intellectual conversion is the last and the rarest of the conversions; that, in the general case, the intellectually converted subject is the fully converted subject.

¹⁵ Lonergan establishes this relation of sublation among the three conversions which qualify authentic subjectivity in his thought. I agree with this order, but suggest that psychic conversion is an enabling factor, perhaps even a necessary aid to the sublation of intellectual conversion by moral and religious conversion. Without the release of the transcendent function, the sublation may be forever blocked by

... the conscious impotence of rage
at human folly, and the laceration
of laughter at what ceases to amuse (T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding")

which may only become more acute and even chronic as a result of the ascent of the mountain of the understanding of understanding. The intrinsic finality of the methodical exigence is therapeutic, and thus demands the second mediation of immediacy as constitutive of self-appropriation at the level of existential subjectivity.

¹⁶ "Bernard Lonergan Responds," in *Foundations of Theology*, ed. P. McShane (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), pp. 221 f.

The assertion is modified considerably, though, by a further statement of the relations of sublation obtaining among the three conversions in a single consciousness. For the sublations occur in a reverse order. And sublation is understood, not in a Hegelian fashion with its intrinsic element of negativity, but along the lines suggested by Karl Rahner. "What sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context."¹⁷ On Lonergan's account, then, intellectual conversion is, in the general case, sublated by a moral conversion which has preceded it in the order of occurrence and to this extent is pre-critical; and both intellectual and moral conversion are sublated by a religious conversion which has preceded them and is also to this extent pre-critical.

But if religious conversion and moral conversion precede intellectual conversion, it would seem that, no matter how genuinely religious and authentically moral, they are infected with the cognitional myth that the real is a subdivision of what is known by extroverted looking. More precisely, pre-critical religious and moral conversion affect a consciousness which, from the standpoint of the cognitive function of meaning, is either undifferentiated or has achieved at best a theoretical differentiation. But beyond the common sense and theoretical differentiations of consciousness there is the exigence for differentiation in terms of interiority, the satisfaction of which is initiated by the elimination of cognitional myth which occurs in intellectual conversion. Lonergan's account would seem to imply, then, that a consciousness in the process of fidelity to this critical and methodological exigence is then sublated by a moral and religious consciousness that is at best, from a cognitive standpoint, theoretically differentiated. Can the sub-

¹⁷ *MIT*, p. 241.

Was the Catechism not religious in a manner that
 intellectual conversion would not promote to give holiness
 many of the virtues?
 But then with moral lapses, heretics (saints) of intellectual conversion

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lating then include the sublated, preserve all its proper features and properties, and carry them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context? Is it not rather the case that the exigence to differentiation in terms of interiority results in part from the existential inadequacy of pre-critical moral and religious conversion at a certain level of intellectual development, no matter how genuinely moral and religious these may be? What is there to guarantee that anything more survives the elimination of cognitional myth than a wan smile at one's former religious and moral naiveté? Intellectual conversion, it seems, is such a radical transformation of horizon, such an about-face, such a repudiation of characteristic features of the old, the beginning of such a new sequence, that it cannot be sublated by the old, but, if it is to be sublated at all, demands the satisfaction of a further exigence, the extension of the gains of intellectual conversion into the moral and religious domains. The sublating moral and religious consciousness must be not merely converted consciousness, but self-appropriating consciousness: existential subjectivity in the realm of differentiated interiority, and religious subjectivity in the realm of the discernment of spirits, the realm of differentiated transcendence. Neither moral nor religious conversion is identical with self-appropriation at the fourth level of intentional consciousness. But a moral and religious consciousness that can sublate intellectual conversion must be a morally and religiously self-appropriating consciousness. It may well be that

... the end of all our exploring
 Will be to arrive where we started
 And know the place for the first time.¹⁸

But then the end of all our exploring will not be intellectual conversion alone, but a mediated return to immediacy through the satisfaction of a further exigence to a second mediation of immediacy by meaning, a mediation which facilitates the self-appropriation of moral and religious consciousness and the sub-

¹⁸ T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding."

There seems no need for one to be a first-class philosopher
 in differentiation of consciousness if one is to
 be a truly even a virtuous man
 Neither Paul nor they nor they had modern philosophy
 They did not transcend picture thinking completely

lation of the cognitional subject by the existential and religious subject.

There are five clues provided in *Method in Theology* which I shall use to help me discuss the experience of this sublating moral and religious consciousness and the nature of its coming to pass. The clues are:

(1) there is a second mediation of immediacy by meaning, which occurs not when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method, but when one negotiates one's feelings in psychotherapy;

(2) feelings are the locus for the apprehension of values which mediates between judgments of fact and judgments of value;

(3) feelings are in a reciprocal relationship of evocation to symbols;

(4) the unified affectivity or wholeness of the converted religious subject is the fulfilment of the dynamism of conscious intentionality; and

(5) with the advance in the differentiation of the cognitive function of meaning, the spontaneous reference of religious experience shifts from the exterior, spatial, specific, and human to the interior, temporal, generic, and transcendent.

The relating of these clues with Jungian psychotherapeutic insights will form the web of an argument, then, that the finality of the methodical exigence is therapeutic, and thus that this exigence intends a second immediacy, an informed naiveté, the transformation of intentionality into kerygma, the deliverance of critically self-appropriating subjectivity into a condition where "I leave off all demands and listen."¹⁰

II. THE THERAPEUTIC FUNCTION OF INTELLECTUAL CONVERSION

Intellectual conversion is not the end of all our exploring, but the beginning of an answer to a therapeutic exigence.

¹⁰ Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, trans. by Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale, 1970), pp. 496, 551. For a rudimentary suggestion of an attempt to relate Ricoeur's project to Lonergan's, see my article, "Paul Ricoeur: Toward the Restoration of Meaning," *Anglican Theological Review*, October, 1973, pp. 443-463.

the relevant destination
the basic conversion
any of 3 basic conversions
may occur into the 2

the conversion works then to put
all 3 needed for proper
of each

We need not discuss in detail the nature of intellectual conversion. In its full sweep it is the mediation of immediacy which occurs when one answers correctly and in order the questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is that knowing? What do I know when I do that? The answer to the first question reveals the dynamic structure, promoted by questioning, of human cognitional process. The answer to the second question reveals that this process terminates in an affirmation of the real. What I know when I faithfully pursue the process is what I intended to know when I began it: what is, being, the real. The answer to the third question reveals the structure of the real. Concomitant with answering these questions is the elimination of the cognitional myth that the real is a subdivision of the already out there now and that it is to be known by looking.

There is a distinctively therapeutic function to this event. Not only is it a radical transformation of the subject in his subjectivity, but it is a movement toward an expanded or heightened self-knowledge precisely at a moment when such an increment is demanded because of the inadequacy of the subject's previous conscious orientation as an understanding Being-in-the-world. It is a knowing of what had previously been unknown, of the dynamic structure-in-process of the subject's cognitional activity. It is a self-conscious appropriation of what had previously been unappropriated and inarticulate, "unconscious."²⁰ The exigence for differentiation in terms of interiority has a cognitive dimension, located in the incommensurability

²⁰ The term, "the unconscious," is ambiguous. Sometimes it means "the psyche" and sometimes "the unknown." Jung seems to have consistently overlooked the fact that consciousness and knowledge are not the same thing. That he was kept from this insight by language—the German language and *Bewusstsein* in particular—at least partially excuses him, if not his English translators. Both Freudians and Jungians would aid their cause by clarifying the term, the unconscious, and at times choosing the appropriate substitute. Jungians could also rename "the collective unconscious" as "the archetypal function." This suggestion is not offered simply to please Wittgensteinians—as if anything could—but to correct a potential error of consequence for the dialogue of philosophy and depth psychology.

of theoretically differentiated consciousness and the undifferentiated consciousness of common sense. But the answers to the critical questions also help to thematize an event of archetypal significance in human history; namely, the heroic severing of the umbilical cord to maternal imagination which resulted in the theoretic control of meaning, the emergence of *logos* from *mythos* on the part of the western mind. This archetypally significant event is repeated in the ontogenetic development of the contemporary conscious subject who achieves a theoretic differentiation of the cognitive function of meaning. The answers to the critical questions tell us what we have done in insisting on *logos* in preference to *mythos* and on science in addition to common sense. They render consciousness present to itself in its heroic achievement, by thematizing that achievement which some two thousand years have brought to maturity.

That the raising and answering of these questions, however, is a matter of personal decision, that interiorly differentiated cognitional consciousness is never something one simply happens upon and always something one must decisively pursue, indicates, I believe, that the psychic demand met by heeding the invitation of *Insight* reflects a profound moral crisis. Intellectual conversion may be viewed, then, also as an answer to an ethical question, a question perhaps previously unnecessary, one not found in man's historical memory, a new ethical question which man never raised before because he never had to raise it, a moral question unique to a consciousness which has brought to some kind of conclusion the demands of the theoretic or systematic exigence. The questions promoting intellectual conversion are not raised out of mere curiosity, but because of a rift in subjectivity, which, if left unattended, will bring catastrophe to the individual, to the scientific community, to the economy, to the polity, to the nations, to the world. It is the rift manifested cognitively in the split between theoretically differentiated consciousness and common sense, but also experienced psychically as the lonely isolation of heroic consciousness from all that has nurtured it, as the self-chosen separation of

the knower from the primal parental ground of his being, as the alienation of the light from the darkness without which it would not be light, even as the guilt of Orestes or Prometheus, whose stories were told at the beginning of the heroic venture of western mind. What Lonergan has captured in his articulation of intellectual conversion is, in part, a cognitional thematizing of the psychically necessary victory of the knower over the uroboric dragon of myth, of the desire to know over the desire not to know, of the intention of being over the flight from understanding. This thematization is a help toward healing the rift in subjectivity which threatens civilization with utter destruction. It is a rendering known of the previously undifferentiated structure of a differentiation which itself had already occurred.

But it is only a beginning. In large part it articulates what we have already done, clarifies what has happened, thematizes what has occurred. But it does not heal the rift in subjectivity. The knower remains isolated, cut off from his roots in the rhythms and processes of nature, separated from his psychic ground, alienated from the original darkness which nourished him at the same time as it threatened to smother him, guilty over the primal murder of an ambiguously life-giving power. The difference is that he now knows what he has done, for to know what I am doing when I am knowing is also to know what the knower has done in overcoming the gods and claiming a rightful autonomy. But it is not to know the way toward wholeness, which can only come from a conscious reconciliation with the darkness; in fact, the knowledge of knowledge may even be the suspicion that all such reconciliation with the darkness is purely and simply regression, a cancelling of the victory of the knower, a repudiation of a bitterly won autonomy. Yet, we must ask, was not the cognitively manifested exigence for such reconciliation what gave rise to the questions leading to intellectual conversion? And is there not a second mediation of immediacy by meaning which might complement this first one? Being and knowing are isomorphic, says the self-affirming

knower. If so, is it not possible that the discovery of the imaginal roots out of which the powers of intelligent grasping and reasonable affirmation have violently wrested their birthright might disclose a sphere of being which itself can not only be encountered again—for merely to re-encounter it is the romantic agony—but intelligently grasped, reasonably affirmed, and delicately negotiated? Might the hero not revisit the realm of the Mothers without regression and self-destruction? Faustian, you say. Perhaps, but not necessarily so. Much, indeed all, depends on the nature of the pact agreed on before the descent, and on the character of its signers. If religious conversion has preceded intellectual conversion, the descent need not be Faustian. Faust's is not the only kenosis buried in the memory of man.

III. THE PSYCHE AND AN ETHIC OF WHOLENESS

Central to the work of C. G. Jung is the tenacious insistence that every answer to the question of the meaning of human life must be uniquely individual if it is to have any final significance. Any answer to the question in terms of collective identifications is a failure to understand the question itself. The central notion of Jungian thought is the notion of individuation as an ongoing process of self-discrimination and self-differentiation from everything collective, external and internal. Nonetheless, any facile charge of individualism, solipsism, sheer relativism or subjectivism levelled against Jung would miss the point. There are operative in Jung's thought certain directives for the process of individuation which might be called both heuristic and transcendental. The discovery of individual meaning universally depends on their employment. These directives, phrased in a language influenced by my own attempts at restatement of Jungian psychology,²¹ are:

(1) conscious intentionality is always in a process of commerce with an available fund of symbolic meanings constitu-

²¹ Robert M. Doran, *Subject and Psyche: A Study in the Foundations of Theology* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1975).

tive of its dispositional immediacy; this fund is constituted by both personal and archetypal factors;

(2) conscious intentionality must attend to this source out of which it continually emerges anew;

(3) it must also negotiate its demands intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly;

(4) thereby the whole of subjectivity will be afforded an optimum degree of life and development, as the subject continues on the journey to individuation.

The Jungian understanding of the moral crisis of the rift in subjectivity is detailed in two books by Erich Neumann: *The Origins and History of Consciousness* and *Depth Psychology and a New Ethic*. Throughout the following exposition of Neumann's position, which Jung affirms in forewords to both books, it should be kept in mind that the incommensurability of theoretically differentiated consciousness and common sense is the cognitive manifestation of the rift in subjectivity which Neumann understands in terms of a specifically psychic rift.

The theme of *The Origins and History of Consciousness* is that psychic ontogenesis is a modified recapitulation of the phylogenetic development of human consciousness. Thus:

... the early history of the collective is determined by inner primordial images whose projections appear outside as powerful factors—gods, spirits, or demons—which become objects of worship. On the other hand, man's collective symbolisms also appear in the individual, and the psychic development, or misdevelopment, of each individual is governed by the same primordial images which determine man's collective history. . . . Only by viewing the collective stratification of human development together with the individual stratification of conscious development can we arrive at an understanding of psychic development in general, and individual development in particular.²²

Thus the history both of mankind and of the individual is governed by certain "symbols, ideal forms, psychic categories,

²² Erich Neumann, *The Origins and History of Consciousness*, trans. by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Bollingen Series XLII, 1971), pp. xxf.

and basic structural patterns" ²³ which Jung has called archetypes and which operate according to "infinitely varied modes." ²⁴ The history even of western philosophy and science represents a series of cognitive manifestations of these archetypal patterns, which are the ground of all meaning.

The first part of Neumann's study describes the mythic projections of these archetypal patterns. Then he goes on to argue for the psychic ontogenetic recapitulation of these symbolic patterns in the consciousness of the individual. Mythic projections reflect developmental changes in the relation between the ego—the center of the field of differentiated consciousness—and the realm of the unknown and undifferentiated archetypal base out of which differentiated consciousness arises.

Just as unconscious contents like dreams and fantasies tell us something about the psychic situation of the dreamer, so myths throw light on the human stage from which they originate and typify man's unconscious situation at that stage. In neither case is there any conscious knowledge of the situation projected, either in the conscious mind of the dreamer or in that of the mythmaker. ²⁵

Moreover, the various archetypal stages of the relation between the ego and its collective psychic base form elements of the subjective development of modern man. "The constitutive character of these stages unfolds in the historical sequence of individual development, but it is very probable that the individual's psychic structure is itself built up on the historical sequence of human development as a whole." ²⁶ That the same stages occurred at different periods in different cultures reflects their archetypal structure rooted in a common and universal psychic substructure identical in all human beings.

The developmental process begins with an original undifferentiated unity which gives way first to a separation of ego from base—the hero myth—and in these latter days of western civilization to a very dangerous split, a rift in subjectivity. After the separation, the ego consolidates and defends its newly

²³ *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

won position, strengthens its stability, becomes conscious of its differences and peculiarities, and increases its energy. Phylogenetically, such a consolidation is represented cognitively, I believe, by the theoretic or systematic differentiation of consciousness in western philosophy and science. The ego even succeeds in harnessing for its own interests some of the originally destructive power of the unconscious so that the world continuum is broken down into objects which can be first symbolized, then conceptualized, and finally rearranged. Thus there emerges "the relative autonomy of the ego, of the higher spiritual man who has a will of his own and obeys his reason,"²⁷ and with this, I submit, a gradual unthematized discrimination of the cognitive, constitutive, effective, and communicative functions of meaning. The end of this development is the capacity "to form abstract concepts and to adopt a consistent view of the world"²⁸—that is, the satisfaction of the theoretic or systematic exigence. Physiologically, Neumann posits, the process involves the supersession of the medullary man by the cortical man, involving a "continuous deflation of the unconscious and the exhaustion of emotional components" linked with the sympathetic nervous system.²⁹

My present interest is in Neumann's analysis of the cultural disease to which this altogether necessary separation of psychic systems has brought us. For the division of the two systems has become perverse. The perversion is manifested in two directions: a sclerosis of the ego, in which the autonomy of the conscious system has become so predominant as to lose the link to the archetypal base, and in which the ego has lost the striving for the wholeness of subjectivity; and a possession of the creative activity of the ego by "the spirit," resulting in the illimitable expansion of the ego, the megalomania, the overexpansion of the conscious system, the spiritual inflation of Nietzsche's Zarathustra. The first direction is the more common.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 328.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

Here, spirit is identified with instrumental intellect, consciousness with manipulative thinking. Feeling, the body, the instinctual, are suppressed or, more tragically, repressed. Consciousness is sterilized and creativity doomed to frustration in a culture whose institutional structures have become autonomous from the human needs they were originally constituted to meet. The transpersonal is reduced to mere illusion, to personalistic ego data; archetypes become concepts, symbols signs. Not only is ego life emptied of meaning, but the deeper layers of the psyche are activated in a destructive way so as to "devastate the autocratic world of the ego with transpersonal invasions, collective epidemics, and mass psychoses."¹⁰ The affective collapse of the archetypal canon is coincident with the modern decay of values. The alternative courses open to the individual seem to be either regression to the Great Mother through external or internal recollectivization, or isolation in the form of exaggerated individualism. The contemporary relevance of Neumann's analysis for the American way of life is all too obvious in the light of our recent and still too gradual awareness of the real character of our political life.

Following the collapse of the archetypal canon, single archetypes take possession of men and consume them like malevolent demons. Typical and symptomatic of this transitional phenomenon is the state of affairs in America, though the same holds good for practically the whole Western hemisphere. Every conceivable sort of dominant rules the personality, which is a personality only in name. The grotesque fact that murderers, brigands, gangsters, thieves, forgers, tyrants, and swindlers, in a guise that deceives nobody, have seized control of collective life is characteristic of our time. Their unscrupulousness and double-dealing are recognized—and admired. Their ruthless energy they obtain at best from some archetypal content that has got them in its power. The dynamism of a possessed personality is accordingly very great, because, in its one-track primitivity, it suffers from none of the differentiations that make men human. Worship of the "beast" is by no means confined to Germany; it prevails wherever one-sidedness, push, and moral blindness are applauded, i. e., where-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 389.

ever the aggravating complexities of civilized behavior are swept away in favor of bestial rapacity. One has only to look at the educative ideals now current in the West.³¹

The ethical consequences of this situation as they affect the individual in his relation to the collective are detailed in *Depth Psychology and a New Ethic*. Neumann argues strongly and well that the wholeness of subjectivity, conceived as the consequence of healing the rift described above, is the ethical goal upon which the fate of humanity depends.

The turning of the mind from the conscious to the unconscious, the possible *rapprochement* of human consciousness with the powers of the collective psyche, that is the task of the future. No outward tinkering with the world and no social amelioration can give the quietus to the daemon, to the gods or devils of the human soul, or prevent them from tearing down again and again what consciousness has built. Unless they are assigned their place in consciousness and culture they will never leave mankind in peace. But the preparation for the *rapprochement* lies, as always, with the hero, the individual; he and his transformation are the great human prototypes; he is the testing ground of the collective, just as consciousness is the testing ground of the unconscious.³²

The categorial and ontic ethic which accompanied the separation of the psychic systems has disintegrated and is now dead. It is an ethic which "liberated man from his primary condition of unconsciousness and made the individual the bearer of the drive towards consciousness."³³ To this extent it was not only psychically necessary but constructive. The initial phases of the development of an autonomous ego must be sustained by the demands of the collective and its sanctions, by its juridical structures and dogmas, its imperatives and prohibitions, even its suppressions and attendant sufferings. But soon enough identification with the ethical values of the collective leads to the formation of a façade personality, the *persona*, and to re-

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 391.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 394.

³³ Erich Neumann, *Depth Psychology and a New Ethic*, trans. by Eugene Rolfe, (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1969), p. 63.

pression of everything dark, strange, unfamiliar, and unlived, the *shadow*. The ego is cumulatively identified with the façade and the shadow is projected upon various scapegoats. In our time, the distance between the two systems has become so wide that even the pseudo-solution of conscious identification with the collective ethic is subtly but publicly acknowledged as impossible. Thus Neumann can claim: "Almost without exception, the psychic development of modern man begins with the moral problem and with his own reorientation, which is brought about by means of the assimilation of the shadow and the transformation of the persona."⁸⁴ As the dark and unfamiliar, the "inferior function," is granted freedom and a share in the life of the ego, identification of the ego-persona with collective value orientation ceases. "The individual is driven by his personal crisis into deep waters where he would usually never have entered if left to his own free will. The old idealized image of the ego has to go, and its place is taken by a perilous insight into the ambiguity and many-sidedness of one's own nature."⁸⁵ Only the total personality is accepted as the basis of ethical conduct. No longer is St. Augustine's prayer of gratitude to God possible that he is not responsible for his dreams.⁸⁶

Neumann proposes, then, the foundations of a new ethic whose aim is "the achievement of wholeness, of the totality of the personality." He continues:

In this wholeness, the inherent contrast between the two systems of the conscious mind and the unconscious does not fall apart into a condition of splitness, and the purposive directedness of ego-consciousness is not undermined by the opposite tendencies of unconscious contents of which the ego and the conscious mind are entirely unaware. In the new ethical situation, ego-consciousness becomes the locus of responsibility for a psychological League of Nations, to which various groups of states belong, primitive and prehuman as well as differentiated and modern, and in which atheistic and religious, instinctive and spiritual, destructive and constructive ele-

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

ments are represented in varying degrees and coexist with each other.³⁷

Theoretical—I interpret: categorial or ontic, as opposed to transcendental-heuristic or ontological—prescriptions for ethical conduct are declared impossible,³⁸ since it is “impossible to predict the psychological form in which evil will appear in the life story of any given individual.”³⁹ Working through and negotiating our own individual darkness in an independent and responsible manner—becoming more fully conscious, in Jungian terms—now ranks as an ethical duty, implying that ego-consciousness is regarded as “an authority to create and control the relationship to wholeness of everything psychic.”⁴⁰ Psychic wholeness takes the place of sublimation. The latter is always “purchased at the cost of the contagious miasma which arises out of the repression and suppression of the unconscious elements which are not susceptible to sublimation.”⁴¹ Sublimation thus contributes to a “holiness” which is nothing other than a flight from life. The heart of the ethical implications of the Jungian myth are contained in the following formulation of principles of value:

Whatever leads to wholeness is “good”; whatever leads to splitting is “evil.” Integration is good, disintegration is evil. Life, constructive tendencies and integration are on the side of good; death, splitting and disintegration are on the side of evil. . . . Our estimate of ethical values is no longer concerned with contents, qualities or actions considered as “entities”; it is related functionally to the whole. Whatever helps that wholeness which is centred on the Self towards integration is “good,” irrespective of the nature of this helping factor. And, vice versa, whatever leads to disintegration is “evil”—even if it is “good will,” “collectively sanctioned values” or anything else “intrinsically good.”⁴²

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 107 f.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 120 f.

In my lengthier study of the theologically foundational role of psychic self-appropriation,⁴³ I have argued that it is precisely at this point that the Jungian myth collapses. Neumann's (and Jung's) campaign against the collective ethic is strikingly reminiscent of St. Paul's difficulties with the Law. But the outcome is in each instance just as strikingly different. It is worthy of note that, as Jung's thinking advanced, he came more to view the individuation process on the analogy of alchemy.⁴⁴ The latter is even viewed, perhaps quite correctly, as a mistaken projection onto matter of a striving for the *aurum non vulgi* of psychic wholeness. What Jung and, to my knowledge, all commentators on Jungian psychology, have missed, however, is that alchemy must be considered as one of the most remarkable failures in the history of human inquiry, a sustained insistence on asking the wrong question. And the question is wrong, not only in its projected form, but in its very origins, if indeed its origins lie where Jung placed them. The self-achievement of a differentiated wholeness, while it may be the deepest desire of the human heart, is also a useless passion, completely beyond the capacity of human endeavor to achieve. The bitterness of Jung's *Answer to Job* is expressive of this very frustration. This is a very interesting book on Wotan, but Jung called him Yahweh.

This is not at all to deny that one must take seriously to heart everything prescribed by Neumann except his fundamental ethical principle. We have indeed entered a new epoch in the evolution of human consciousness. It is an epoch marked by a new control of meaning in terms of interiority. It is ethically imperative on a world-historical scale that ego-consciousness engage in a conscious confrontation with the forces of darkness buried in the human psyche, come to terms with these forces in truthful acknowledgment, and cooperate in their transformation through acceptance and negotiation. But at this

⁴³ Doran, *Subject and Psyche*, *passim*.

⁴⁴ Jung's alchemical researches are reported in Vols. 12, 13, and 14 of his *Collected Works*.

point Lonergan's transcendental analysis of moral conversion becomes equally imperative. For it is only at the summit of moral self-transcendence in the love of God that wholeness becomes something of a possibility for man. There alone, "values are whatever one loves, and evils are whatever one hates," because there alone "affectivity is of a single piece."⁴⁵ The problems raised by Neumann, moreover, bring to light an element that is unfortunately all but missing in Lonergan's analysis of this summit: the experience of the forgiveness of sin. Only this experience, issuing from the realm of transcendence, is enough to render possible the embracing of the darkness called for by Neumann as ethically imperative for our age. The darkness has already been embraced in a kenosis quite different from Faust's, and in that divine embrace has been rendered powerless. Its very spontaneous tendency to separate man from the love of God has been transformed into a beneficent factor by the healing embrace of that love. Thus it is not only the hero's descent into the psychic depths that can save the world from suicide, but also the restoration in our troubled times of the genuine contemplative spirit.

IV. RELIGIOUS SELF-APPROPRIATION AND THE PSYCHE

Lonergan employs various phrases, some borrowed from other authors, to describe religious conversion. With Paul Tillich, he speaks of "being grasped by ultimate concern."⁴⁶ With St. Paul, he speaks of God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us.⁴⁷ In terms of the theoretical stage of meaning represented by Aquinas, religious conversion is operative grace as distinct from cooperative grace.

⁴⁵ Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 30. Lonergan has thus introduced an important and necessary qualification to an ethic of wholeness: wholeness is related to the realm of transcendence, not to that of interiority. It is a gift of God's grace, and in a Christian context is conditioned by the experience of the forgiveness of sin. The absence of this distinction is what traps Jungian analysis in an endless treadmill of self-scrutiny leading only to a perpetually recurring psychic stillbirth.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

But these theoretic categories are also reinterpreted in scriptural imagery. "Operative grace is the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of flesh, a replacement beyond the horizon of the heart of stone. Cooperative grace is the heart of flesh becoming effective in good works through human freedom."⁴⁸ In Lonergan's own terminology, suited more to the stage of meaning when the world of interiority becomes the ground of theory, religious conversion is "otherworldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations."⁴⁹ As such it is "being in love with God," which is "the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality. That fulfilment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfilment bears fruit in a love of one's neighbor that strives mightily to bring about the Kingdom of God on this earth."⁵⁰

The experience of this love is that of "being in love in an unrestricted fashion" and as such is the proper fulfillment of the capacity for self-transcendence revealed in our unrestricted questioning. But it is not the product of our knowledge and choice. "On the contrary, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing."⁵¹ As conscious but not known, the experience of this love is an experience of mystery, of the holy. It belongs to the level of consciousness where deliberation, judgment of value, decision, and free and responsible activity take place. "But it is this consciousness as brought to a fulfillment, as having undergone a conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

superseded, as ready to deliberate and judge and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. So the gift of God's love occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's intentional consciousness. It takes over the peak of the soul, the *apex animae*.⁵²

For Lonergan, there is a twofold expression of religious conversion. Spontaneously it is manifested in changed attitudes, for which Galatians 5.22 f. provides a descriptive enumeration: "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control." But another kind of expression is directly concerned with the base and focus of this experience, the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* itself. There is an enormous variation to be discovered in the investigation of such expression and Lonergan correlates this variety with the predominant stages of meaning operative in self-understanding and in the spontaneously assumed stance toward reality—i. e., with the manner in which one's world is mediated by meaning. He constructs a series of stages of meaning based on a cumulative differentiation of consciousness. In the western tradition there have been three such stages of meaning, and they can be ontogenetically reproduced in the life-history of a contemporary individual.

The first stage of meaning is governed by a common sense differentiation of consciousness. The second is familiar also with theory, system, logic, and science, but is troubled because the difference of this from common sense is not adequately grasped. The third stage is prepared by all those modern philosophies governed by the turn to the subject, which thus take their stand on human interiority. Here consciousness becomes differentiated into the various realms of meaning—common sense, theory, interiority, transcendence, scholarship, and art—and these realms are consciously related to one another. One

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 107. With the needed emphasis on the forgiveness of sin, the love of God may also be qualified as taking over the *depths* of the soul.

consciously moves from one to the other by consciously changing his procedures.

In all three stages, meaning fulfills four functions. First, it is cognitive in that it mediates the real world in which we live out our lives. Secondly, it is efficient in that it governs our intention of what we do. Thirdly, it is constitutive in that it is an intrinsic component of culture and institutions. And fourthly, it is communicative in that, through its various carriers—spontaneous intersubjectivity, art, symbol, language, and incarnation in the lives and deeds of persons—individual meaning becomes common meaning, and, through the transmission of training and education, generates history.

In the first stage, these functions are not clearly recognized and accurately differentiated. So the blend of the cognitive and constitutive functions, for example, brings about the constitution not only of cultures and institutions but also the story of the world's origins in myth. And just as the constitutive function of meaning pretends to speculative capacities beyond its range, so the efficient function of meaning pretends to practical powers which a more differentiated consciousness denominates as magic. Religious expression at this stage is a result of the projective association or identification of religious experience with its outward occasion. The focus of such expression is on what we, by hindsight, would call *the external*, *the spatial*, *the specific*, and *the human*, as contrasted with *the internal*, *the temporal*, *the generic*, and *the divine*. What is indeed temporal, generic, internal, and in the realm of transcendence is identified as spatial, specific, external, and occurring in a realm other than that of transcendence. Thus there result the gods of the moment, the god of this or that place, of this or that person, of Abraham or Laban, of this of that group, of the Canaanites, the Philistines, the Israelites.

The key to the movement from the first stage of meaning to the second is located in the differentiation of the functions of meaning. The advance of technique will enable the association of the efficient function with *poiesis* and *praxis* and reveal

the inefficacy of magic. But more far-reaching in its implications is the differentiation of the cognitive function of meaning from the other three functions. As the key to the religious expression of undifferentiated consciousness lies in insight into sensible presentations and representations, so the limitations of such consciousness to the spatial, the specific, the external, and the human will recede to the extent that the sensible presentations and representations are linguistic.⁵³ This does not mean, however, that a self-conscious transposition to interiority, time, the generic, and the divine occurs. Rather we have a movement away from all immediacy in favor of objectification. The return to immediacy in terms of interiority, time, the generic, and the divine must await the emergence of the third stage of meaning.

The second stage of meaning, then, is characterized by a twofold mediation of the world by meaning: in the realm of common sense and in that of theory. The split is troubling. It was interpreted by Plato in such a way that there seem to be two really distinct worlds, the transcendent world of eternal Forms and the transient world of appearance. In Aristotle, it led to the distinction, not between theory and common sense, but between necessity and contingency. The basic concepts of genuine—i. e., universal and necessary—science were metaphysical, and so the sciences were conceived as continuous with philosophy.

The introduction of the theoretical capacity into religious living is represented in the dogmas, theology, and juridical structures of Western religion. But just as the two tables of Eddington—"the bulky, solid, colored desk at which he worked, and the manifold of colorless 'wavicles' so minute that the desk was mostly empty space"⁵⁴—reveal the presence of a conflict between common sense and science, so in the realm of religion, "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is set against the God of the philosophers and theologians. Honoring the Trinity and feeling compunction are set against learned

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

discourse on the Trinity and against defining compunction. Nor can this contrast be understood or the tension removed within the realms of common sense and of theory."⁵⁵ And so, religiously as well as scientifically, there is demanded a movement to a third stage of meaning, the stage of the differentiation of consciousness through the appropriation of human interiority.

The sciences then come to be regarded, not as prolongations of philosophy, but as autonomous, ongoing processes; not as the demonstration of universal and necessary truths but as hypothetical and ever better approximations to truth through an ever more exact and comprehensive understanding of data. Philosophy is no longer a theory in the manner of science but the self-appropriation of intentional consciousness and the consequent distinguishing, relating, and grounding of the various realms of meaning, the grounding of the methods of the sciences, and the ongoing promotion of their unity. Theology then becomes, in ever larger part, an understanding of the diversity of religious utterance on the basis of the differentiation and interrelation of the realms of common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence.

The third stage of meaning, then, is the stage of the appropriation of human interiority. The cognitive dimensions of the exigence for this appropriation have been more than satisfactorily treated by Lonergan. The result of the cognitive step in this process is intellectual conversion. I have begun to suggest what the moral dimensions would entail. That the self-appropriation of the existential subject is something quite other than that of the cognitional subject is not at all obvious from *Insight*, but the work of Lonergan from 1965 to the present reveals a notable development in this regard, one perhaps best capsulized in "*Insight Revisited*."

In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In *Method* the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for de-

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

liberation, Is this worth while? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions. Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling.⁶⁶

Not only, then, is there a fourth level of intentional consciousness quite distinct from the first three, but the primordial entry of the subject onto this fourth level is affective, "the intentional response of feelings to values." Furthermore, affective response for Lonergan is symbolically certifiable, in that a symbol is "an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling."⁶⁷ Thus moral self-appropriation will be to a large extent the negotiation of the symbols interlocked with one's affective responses to values. It will be psychic self-appropriation. Neumann discusses the moral dimensions of this movement, while sharing in the Jungian failure to differentiate wholeness as human achievement from wholeness as God's gift. At the point in psychic self-appropriation where the issue becomes one of good and evil, the movement of appropriation shifts from the realm of interiority to the realm of transcendence, where God is known and loved. The initial move into psychic self-appropriation at the religious level, when the direction is as here indicated, occurs in the experience of the forgiveness of one's sins, the only genuine—in fact, the only possible—*complexio oppositorum* of good and evil. This experience is of wholeness, of the affective integrity of subjectivity. With this experience, religious conversion can begin to sublate moral and intellectual conversion in the movement of self-appropriation, i. e., at the third stage of meaning.

It is not only religious expression, but religious experience itself, which is affected by the movement into the third stage of

⁶⁶ Bernard Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," in Bernard Tyrrell and William Ryan, eds., *A Second Collection* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974), p. 277.

⁶⁷ *MIT*, p. 64.

meaning. Prior to this major breakthrough, one's religious living is pre-critical, and so will involve the projection characteristic of the first stage of meaning. It will be in terms of what interiorly differentiated consciousness, by hindsight, is able to denominate as spatial, specific, external, and human as opposed to what is temporal, generic, internal, and transcendent. To the extent that one's appropriation of interiority proceeds from intellectual conversion to self-appropriation at the fourth level of intentional consciousness, the spontaneous reference of religious experience will be to what is temporal, generic, internal, and transcendent. It will proceed as discernment of spirits. Such discernment has the same archetypal manifestations in dreams and other symbolic productions as has any other expression of the evaluative capacity of the existential subject. That these expressions are not specifically acknowledged in Jungian phenomenologies of individuation is due to a deficiency in Jung's understanding of existential subjectivity and the conspiracy it can engage in with the psyche.

V. PSYCHIC CONVERSION AS FOUNDATIONAL

If in addition to the mediation of immediacy by meaning which occurs when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method, there is that which occurs when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy, then intentional self-appropriation must be complemented by psychic self-appropriation. As related to the question of the process and function of theology, this would mean that, whereas Lonergan has developed a method for theology based on the mediation of intentional consciousness, we must attempt to show the implications for theology of the psychic mediation. The principal implication will be a fourth conversion foundational for theology, psychic conversion, aiding the relations of sublation among the three conversions specified by Lonergan. Through the twofold mediation of immediacy theological reflection will be able to accept the possibilities which now, perhaps for the first time in its history, are available to

It. For in our age not only are we confronted with the relativity of conceptual schemes of all kinds, in every area, but also, precisely because of this seemingly very uncertain and ambivalent state of affairs, the individual is given "the (often desperate, yet maximally human) opportunity to interpret life and experiencing directly. The historical crossroads of such a time is: either the reimposition of certain set values and schemes, or a task never before attempted: to learn how, in a rational way, to relate concepts to direct experiencing; to investigate the way in which symbolizing affects and is affected by felt experiencing; to devise a social and scientific vocabulary that can interact with experiencing, so that communication about it becomes possible, so that schemes can be considered in relation to experiential meanings, and so that an objective science can be related to and guided by experiencing."⁵⁸ What Eugene Gendlin here envisions for "objective science" can also be the goal of theology. To envision a theology whose schemes are related to and guided by experiencing, however, does not, within the horizon provided by self-appropriation, rule out of court a theology whose concern is with "things as they are related to one another" in favor of a theology preoccupied with "things as they are related to us." Rather, basic terms and relations, as psychological, are also explanatory. Such is the ultimate significance of fidelity to the methodical exigence.

The present essay, then, reflects an ongoing project to complement the work of Lonergan; it initiates a further essay in aid of self-appropriation. For beyond the intellectual conversion which occurs in self-conscious fashion when one answers correctly and in order the questions, "What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is that knowing? What do I know when I do that?", there is the self-appropriation which begins when one attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly learns to negotiate the symbolic configurations of dispositional immediacy. This latter self-appropriation is effected by the emer-

⁵⁸ Eugene Gendlin, *Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning* (Toronto: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 4.

gence of the existential subject into a mediated symbolic consciousness, in which individual, cultural, and religious symbols are treated—in what Paul Ricoeur has lucidly displayed as their archeological-teleological unity-in-tension⁵⁹—as *exploratory* of existential subjectivity and as referring to interiority, time, the generic, and the realm of transcendence rather than as *explanatory* or aetiological and as referring to exteriority, space, the specific, and the human. Psychic conversion is the recovery of imagination in its transcendental time-structure⁶⁰ through the psychotherapeutic elucidation of the symbols emerging spontaneously from one's psychic depths.

I share the conviction which led John Dunne to write *The Way of All the Earth*, the conviction that something like a new religion is coming into being.

Is a religion coming to birth in our time? It could be. What seems to be occurring is a phenomenon we might call "passing over," passing over from one culture to another, from one way of life to another, from one religion to another. Passing over is a shifting of standpoint, a going over to the standpoint of another culture, another way of life, another religion. It is followed by an equal and opposite process we might call "coming back," coming back with new insight to one's own culture, one's own way of life, one's own religion. The holy man of our time, it seems, is not a figure like Gotama or Jesus or Mohammed, a man who could found a world religion, but a figure like Gandhi, a man who passes over by sympathetic understanding from his own religion to other religions and comes back again with new insight to his own. Passing over and coming back, it seems, is the spiritual adventure of our time.⁶¹

The present essay reflects an effort to aid this adventure and the articulation of its truth. If theology is reflection on religion, then such articulation would be the theology appropriate to our age. Dunne says quite correctly, however, that the ultimate starting and ending point is really not one's own religion, but

⁵⁹ Paul Ricoeur, *ibid.*

⁶⁰ See Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. by James Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).

⁶¹ John S. Dunne, *The Way of All the Earth* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. ix.

one's life. At present I am attempting to highlight the contributions of depth psychology to the exploration of this homeland and the significance of these contributions for religious experience and for the reflection on this experience which is theology. The project here reported on is not only complementary to the work of Lonergan, however, but in some sense compensatory, in the same way as the psyche, as it manifests itself in dreams, is compensatory to the attitude of waking consciousness. "The relation between consciousness and unconscious is compensatory. This fact, which is easily verifiable, affords a rule for dream interpretation. It is always helpful, when we set out to interpret a dream, to ask: what conscious attitude does it compensate?"⁸²

Waking consciousness, as it moves from directed attention through insight, judgment, and decision, has been the sharp focus of Lonergan's work. Since theology is a matter of knowledge and decision, such a focus has enabled him to articulate the structure of theological method. Since I accept without reservation Lonergan's account of "what I am doing when I am knowing" and his eightfold differentiation of theological operations, the work I envision is complementary to his. But since I wish to lay emphasis on a different but equally valid source of data—which can still be grouped under Lonergan's notion of data of consciousness, since they concern interiority—the work would be compensatory to his, just as feeling is compensatory to thinking as a psychological function or as dreams are compensatory to waking consciousness as a psychic state.

If the first step in interpreting a dream is to ask: what conscious attitude does it compensate?, and if the work I envision is to be understood as compensatory to Lonergan's in a sense analogous to the compensatory effect of dreams, then it is only proper to indicate what attitude or atmosphere this work would compensate.

Thus Dunne speaks of climbing a mountain in order to discover a vantage point, a fastness of autonomy. The most com-

⁸² C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1933), p. 17.

plete autonomy comes, he says, from the knowledge, not of external things, but of knowledge itself.

A knowing of knowing would be like a view from a mountaintop. By knowing all about knowing itself one would know in some manner everything there is to know. It would be like seeing everything from a great height. One would see everything near and far, all the way to the horizon, but there would be some loss of detail on account of the distances. The knowing of knowing would mean being in possession of all the various methods of knowing. It would mean knowing how an artist thinks, putting a thing together; knowing how a scientist thinks, taking a thing apart; knowing how a practical man thinks, sizing up a situation; knowing how a man of understanding thinks, grasping the principle of a thing; knowing how a man of wisdom thinks, reflecting upon human experience.

... At the top of the mountain, as we have been describing it, there is a kind of madness—not the madness that consists in having lost one's reason. The knowing of knowing, to be sure, seems worthy of man. The only thing wrong is that man at the top of the mountain, by escaping from love and war, will have lost everything else. He will have withdrawn into that element of his nature which is most characteristic of him and sets him apart from other animals. It is the thing in him which is most human. Perhaps indeed he will never realize what it is to be human unless he does attempt this withdrawal. Even so, the realization that he has lost everything except his reason, that he has found pure humanity but not full humanity, changes his wisdom from a knowledge of knowledge into a knowledge of ignorance. He realizes that he has something yet to learn, something that he cannot learn at the top of the mountain but only at the bottom of the valley.⁶³

Nobody familiar with Lonergan can read these words about the knowing of knowing without thinking immediately of one of the most daring claims any thinker has ever offered for his own work, true as it is: "Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding."⁶⁴ Nonetheless, Lonergan is seeking

⁶³ John S. Dunne, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

⁶⁴ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p. xxviii.

greater *concreteness* on the side of the subject, in the domain of "the pulsing flow of life."⁶⁵ To the extent that his work aids this greater concreteness, one escapes the madness of having lost everything but one's reason. Nonetheless, there is much in the pulsing flow of life that enters into one's life without providing data for one's knowing of knowing. One may become aware of the dark yet potentially creative power at work in the valley and expend his efforts, perhaps first by means of a different kind of withdrawal—into a forest or desert, in imitation of Gotama or Jesus, rather than up to a mountaintop—at the negotiation and transformation of this dark power of nature so that it is creative of his own life. If he succeeds in this very risky adventure, it will be only because he will have undergone a profound conversion.

Conversion is the central theme in Lonergan's brilliant and, I believe, revolutionary recasting of the foundations of theology. And such it must be, for nobody who has gone to the top of the mountain can accept as the foundations of his knowledge anything exclusive of what happened to him there. He has achieved an intellectual autonomy as a result of which he will never be the same. But there is a different conversion that occurs in the valley or the forest or the desert. It is both complementary and compensatory to the conversion that takes place at the top of the mountain, to intellectual conversion. Nor is it the same as what Lonergan calls religious or moral conversion. I have called it psychic conversion. Its effect is a mediated symbolic consciousness, and its role in theological reflection is foundational as aiding the sublation of intellectual conversion by moral and religious conversion. Psychic conversion surrounds the other three conversions in much the same way as the "unconscious," according to Jung, surrounds the light of conscious waking life. More precisely, it permeates these conversions in much the same way as psyche permeates intentionality or as dispositional immediacy is interlocked with cognitional immediacy. It provides one with an atmosphere or texture which qualifies one's experiences of knowing, of ethi-

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xix.

cal decision, and of prayer. This atmosphere is determined by the imaginal or symbolic constitution of the immediacy of one's mediated world. "The imaginal" is a genuine sphere of being, a realm whose contents can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed.

The complementary aspect of psychic conversion with respect to intellectual conversion appears in its role as facilitator of the working unity of intellectual conversion with moral and religious conversion. Its compensatory aspect appears primarily in its function within a *second* mediation of immediacy by meaning, and thus in the disclosure it provides that the mediation of immediacy is twofold. Second immediacy can only be approached through the complementarity of the two mediations. Psychic conversion thus corrects what I believe to be a possible implicit intellectualist bias in Lonergan's thought, especially in *Insight*. According to this implicit bias, the intellectual pattern of experience would be the privileged pattern of experience. While the emergence of a fourth level of intentional consciousness and thus of a notion of the good as distinct from the intelligent and reasonable in *Method in Theology* implicitly corrects this bias, the explicit compensation comes from highlighting the psychic dimensions of this fourth level, the level of existential subjectivity.

When I refer with Dunne to a new religion coming into being in our age, what I am indicating is in part the convergence of insights from the various world religions in the life-story of many individuals who seek religious truth today. As Dunne has indicated, this search will probably be analogous to Gandhi's experiments with truth. The conversion I call psychic may provide one's criterion for evaluating these experiments and render the subject capable of reflecting on and articulating the truth he has discovered. It may enable him, in Dunne's phrase, to turn poetry into truth and truth into poetry. The latter poetry he may wish to include in his theology.

One may find that the further steps in self-appropriation reveal the need for a qualification of one's previous intellectual self-appropriation. While one will not revise the structure of

cognitive process which he has learned to articulate for himself through the work of Lonergan, he may be brought to revise his formulation of the notion of *experience* provided by Lonergan. The latter notion may be too thin, too bodiless. Having come back into the valley from Lonergan's mountaintop—or rather from his own mountaintop—he may re-experience, or re-cognize that he experiences, in a manner for which the atmosphere of the mountaintop was too rarefied.

This, however, may also lead to further specifications of the notion of theological method which he has learned from Lonergan. He will accept the basic dynamic and operational notion of method provided by Lonergan on the basis of the structure of intentionality and of the two phases of theology as mediating and mediated; but psychic conversion may influence his choice as to what qualifies as data for theology; the base from which he engages in hermeneutic and history; the horizon determining his view of, and influencing his decision about, the tensions of religious and theological dialectic; the bases from which he derives theological categories, positions, and system; and the way in which he regards the mission of religion in the world. The functional specialties will remain, their interrelationship being determined by the structure of intentional consciousness, but their nature may be modified as a result of one's exploration of the "objective psyche," the home of the imaginal, the transcendental imagination, *memoria*. The task of the philosopher or theologian educated by and indebted to Lonergan may now be to descend the mountain of cognitive self-appropriation so as attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly to appropriate and articulate the rich psychic bases of human experience. Such an appropriation and articulation will make possible the advent of that fully awake naïveté of the twice-born adult which Paul Ricoeur calls a second, post-critical immediacy.⁶⁶

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⁶⁶ Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, p. 496.

**SUBJECT, PSYCHE, AND THEOLOGY'S
FOUNDATIONS**

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Reprinted for private circulation from
THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION
Vol. 57, No. 3, July 1977
PRINTED IN U.S.A.

Subject, Psyche, and Theology's Foundations

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This paper has a twofold purpose. First, I wish to show that the intentionality analysis of Bernard Lonergan may be employed in the elaboration of categories explanatory of a process of psychic self-appropriation as an aid to the self-knowledge of the existential subject. Second, I wish to suggest the implications of psychic self-appropriation for the theological method proposed by Lonergan. The movement of my argument is thus reciprocal: Lonergan enables the construction of a semantics of depth psychology; this semantics complements Lonergan's attempt to construct a method for theology. The two parts of my argument will be taken up, respectively, in the second and third major sections of the paper. The first section attempts to clarify the notions of the psyche and of the existential subject and to discuss the relation between the referents of these two terms that seems implicit in Lonergan's later work.

THE PSYCHE AND EXISTENTIAL SUBJECTIVITY

The existential subject is the subject as evaluating, deliberating, deciding, acting, constituting the world, constituting himself or herself.¹ Existential subjectivity emerges on a level of consciousness distinct from and subsuming the three levels constitutive of human knowledge: experience, understanding, and judgment.² Existential subjectivity is consciousness at the fourth and fullest level of its potentiality: consciousness as concerned with the good, with value, with discriminating what is truly worthwhile from what is only apparently good.

The discussion of the existential subject as a notion quite distinct from the cognitional subject is a relatively recent development in Lonergan's thought.

¹ See, e.g., Bernard Lonergan, *The Subject* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968), p. 19; reprinted in *A Second Collection*, ed. William F. J. Ryan, S.J., and Bernard Tyrrell, S.J. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), pp. 69-86, with the relevant section beginning on p. 79.

² See *The Subject*, pp. 20 f. Although the schema of conscious intentionality is in this instance presented in six steps, there are four levels of intentionality for Lonergan. They are referred to as experience, understanding, judgment, and decision or existential subjectivity.

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It is correlated with the emergence of a notion of the good distinct from the notions of the intelligent and the reasonable. "In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In *Method* the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation, Is this worth while? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions."³

The emergence of a distinct notion of the good involves a relocation of the constitutive function of the psyche in the structured process of conscious subjectivity. Psychic development is defined in *Insight* as "a sequence of increasingly differentiated and integrated sets of capacities for perceptiveness, for aggressive or affective response, for memory, for imaginative projects, and for skilfully and economically executed performance."⁴ I shall use the term "psyche" to refer to this set of capacities. They have a basis, Lonergan says, in "some neural counterpart of association,"⁵ but this unconscious neural basis is "an upwardly directed dynamism seeking fuller realization, first, on the proximate sensitive level and, secondly, beyond its limitations on higher artistic, dramatic, philosophic, cultural, and religious levels," so that "insight into dream symbols and associated images and affects reveals to the psychologist a grasp of the anticipations and virtualities of high activities immanent in the underlying unconscious manifold."⁶

In *Insight*, this set of capacities is integrated by cognitional or intellectual activities. "The psyche reaches the wealth and fullness of its apprehensions and responses under the higher integration of human intelligence."⁷ Intellectual development sets the standard and provides the criterion for psychic, affective, and volitional development. Thus Lonergan speaks of reaching a "universal willingness that matches the unrestricted desire to know."⁸ But in *Method in Theology*, human intelligence and the psyche, especially in its affective and symbolic capacities, are sublated and unified by the deliberations of the authentic existential subject, for the apprehension of potential values and satisfactions in feelings, along with questions for deliberation, is what mediates between cognitional judgments of fact and existential judgments of value. Thus, "just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling."⁹ The development of existential subjectivity now sets the standard and

³ Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," in *A Second Collection*, p. 277.

⁴ Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p. 456.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 457.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 726.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 624.

⁹ Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," p. 277.

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provides the criterion for intellectual development,¹⁰ and the former development is intrinsically related to the refinement of affective response.

Affectivity and symbols are no less related to one another in *Method in Theology* than in *Insight*. Feelings are said to be symbolically certifiable, and a symbol is defined as "an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling."¹¹ One's affective capacities, dispositions, and habits "can be specified by the affects and, inversely, by the affects that evoke determinate symbols."¹² Thus "affective development, or aberration, involves a transvaluation and transformation of symbols. What before was moving no longer moves; what before did not move now is moving. So the symbols themselves change to express the new affective capacities and dispositions."¹³ These affective capacities and dispositions affect the existential subject, for feelings "are the mass and momentum of his affective capacities, dispositions, habits, the effective orientation of his being."¹⁴ It is in intentional feeling responses to objects and possible courses of action that values and satisfactions are first apprehended. Feelings thus initiate the process of deliberation that comes to term only in the decisions of the existential subject.

The transvaluation and transformation of symbols that goes hand in hand with affective development can be understood only when one realizes that symbols follow other laws than those of rational discourse.

For the logical class the symbol uses a representative figure. For univocity it substitutes a wealth of multiple meanings. It does not prove but it overwhelms with a manifold of images that converge in meaning. It does not bow to the principle of excluded middle but admits the *coincidentia oppositorum*, of love and hate, or courage and fear, and so on. It does not negate but overcomes what it rejects by heaping up all that is opposite to it. It does not move on some single track or on some single level, but condenses into a bizarre unity all its present concerns.¹⁵

The function of symbols, moreover, is to meet a need for internal communication that such rational procedures as logic and dialectic cannot satisfy. "Organic and psychic vitality have to reveal themselves to intentional con-

¹⁰ "As the fourth level is the principle of self-control, it is responsible for proper functioning on the first three levels. It fulfills its responsibility or fails to do so in the measure that we are attentive or inattentive in experiencing, that we are intelligent or unintelligent in our investigations, that we are reasonable or unreasonable in our judgments. Therewith vanish two notions: the notion of pure intellect or pure reason that operates on its own without guidance or control from responsible decision; and the notion of will as an arbitrary power indifferently choosing between good and evil" (Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* [New York: Herder & Herder, 1972], p. 121).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

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sciousness and, inversely, intentional consciousness has to secure the collaboration of organism and psyche. Again, our apprehensions of values occur in intentional responses, in feelings; here too it is necessary for feelings to reveal their objects and, inversely, for objects to awaken feelings. It is through symbols that mind and body, mind and heart, heart and body communicate."¹⁶

The elemental, preobjectified meaning of symbols finds its proper context in this process of internal communication. The interpretation of the symbol thus has to appeal to this context and its associated images and feelings.¹⁷ Because of the existential significance of the symbol, Lonergan evinces a strong sympathy with those schools of dream interpretation which think of the dream "not as the twilight of life, but as its dawn, the beginning of the transition from impersonal existence to presence in the world, to constitution of one's self in one's world."¹⁸

The position of the "later Lonergan" on the psyche, then, is that it reaches the wealth and fullness of its apprehensions and responses, not under the higher integration of human intelligence, but in the free and responsible decisions of the authentic existential subject. This position sets the stage for arguing that Lonergan's intentionality analysis can be complemented by psychic analysis and that the latter is a further refinement of the self-appropriation of the existential subject. Intentionality analysis, moreover, clarifies the finality of psychic analysis.

The argument for complementarity is bolstered by Lonergan's acknowledgment of a twofold mediation of immediacy by meaning. "Besides the immediate world of the infant and the adult's world mediated by meaning, there is the mediation of immediacy by meaning when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method and when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy."¹⁹ The second mediation can be understood as aiding the self-appropriation of the existential subject in much the same way as the first aids that of the cognitional subject. Intentionality analysis, as articulated in a pattern of judgments concerning cognitional fact, moral living, and religious experience, can be complemented by depth psychological analysis. If the latter is engaged in within the overall context of the former, it can critically ground moral and religious living in an expanding pattern of judgments of value that set one's course as existential subject, and it can facilitate the sublation of an intellectually self-appropriating consciousness by moral and religious subjectivity. The theological pertinence of this psychic complement to Lonergan's work will be foundational. According to the dynamic operative in Lonergan's articulation of theological foundations, the foundational reality of theology is the subjectivity of the theologian.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 66 f.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 77.

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Loneragan has articulated foundational reality in terms of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. While the conversions generally occur in this order, they also display relations of sublation in the reverse order.²⁰ I will posit a fourth conversion, psychic conversion, as an aspect of foundational reality. Psychic conversion is the release of the capacity for the internal communication of symbolic consciousness. By aiding existential self appropriation, it facilitates the sublation of intellectual conversion by moral conversion, and of both of these by religious conversion.²¹ The foundations of theology would then lie in the objectification of cognitive, psychic, moral, and religious subjectivity in a patterned set of judgments of cognitional and existential fact cumulatively heading toward the full position on the human subject.

TOWARD A SEMANTICS OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

My first contention is that Lonergan's intentionality analysis enables the construction of a semantics of depth psychology. To argue this, I will discuss first the finality of both intentionality analysis and depth psychological analysis under the rubric of second immediacy; second, the role of the depth psychological uncovering of symbolic consciousness in advancing the subject to second immediacy; third, the manner in which this uncovering can be integrated with Lonergan's intentionality analysis; and fourth, the notion of psychic conversion and its relation to Lonergan's notions of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. I will conclude this section with a brief statement of the relation of the psychology I am suggesting to the archetypal psychology of C. G. Jung.

Second Immediacy

Method as conceived by Lonergan may be understood as the objectification or mediation of the transcendental infrastructure of human subjectivity. I will call this infrastructure primordial immediacy. The basic structure of primordial immediacy is disengaged in Lonergan's articulation of conscious intentionality. This articulation is method. Method calls for "a release from all logics, all closed systems or language games, all concepts, all symbolic constructs to allow an abiding at the level of the presence of the subject to himself."²² The emergence of a distinct notion of the good and especially its relation to affectivity and symbols allows us to understand psychic self-appro-

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 241 ff.

²¹ See Robert Doran, *Subject and Psyche: A Study of the Foundations of Theology* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1975), pp. 240-46 and chap. 6, passim.

²² Frederick Lawrence, "Self-Knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan," in *Language, Truth, and Meaning*, ed. P. McShane (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), p. 203.

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priation as a portion of method. In psychic self-appropriation the existential subject disengages the symbolic ciphers of the affective responses in which values and satisfactions are apprehended. From this disengagement, the subject can gauge the measure of self-transcendence operative in his or her orientation as a world-constituting and self-constituting existential subject. Psychic analysis, then, is a part of self-appropriation at the fourth level of intentional consciousness. But method in its totality is the self-appropriation of the primordial immediacy of the subject to a world itself mediated by meaning. This immediacy is both cognitive and existential.

Second immediacy is the result of method's objectification of primordial immediacy, the probably always asymptotic recovery of primordial immediacy through method. Second immediacy is "the self-possession of the subject-as-subject achieved in the mediation of the transcendental infrastructure of human subjectivity, in the objectification of the single transcendental intending of the intelligible, the true, and the good, in the self-appropriation of the cognitional and existential subject which is the fulfilment of the *anthropologische Wendung* of modern philosophy."²³ From Lonergan's statement concerning the twofold mediation of immediacy, I infer that primordial immediacy is mediated through intentionality analysis and through psychic analysis. What is mediated by psychic analysis is the affective or dispositional component of all intentional operations, a component frequently and not too accurately referred to as the unconscious.

This affective component may itself be intentional, the apprehension of potential values and satisfactions in feelings. In that case, psychic analysis aids the emergence especially of existential subjectivity by mediating a capacity to disengage the symbolic or imaginal ciphers of the intentional feelings in which values are apprehended. But the dispositional component may also be a matter of one's mood, of one's nonintentional feeling states or trends.²⁴ Then it is what we intend when we ask another, How are you? One may find the question quite baffling, and if one adverts to this puzzlement over a period of time, one may be on the way to seeking help. One may become cognizant of being out of touch with something very important, something deceptively simple and in fact very mysterious and profound: the dispositional aspect of one's intentional operations as a knower and doer. One has acknowledged, however secretly and privately, that the question causes an uncomfortable confusion. One is out of touch. One does not know how one is, who one is. Because one's intentional affective responses are in part a function of one's nonintentional dispositions, one does not know where he stands, what he values, how his values are related to one another. Finally, while the appropriation of dispositional components in psychotherapy is obviously not dependent on cognitional self-appropriation, it can also figure as a part of

²³ Doran, p. 118.

²⁴ On intentional and nonintentional feelings, see Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 30 f.

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method, as a feature of the existential subject's heeding of the critical-methodical exigence. This exigence is at least in part therapeutic, for it is an exigence for a second immediacy, which is the fruit of the twofold mediation of primordial immediacy in cognitional analysis and in psychic analysis.

Symbolic Consciousness

In reliance on Lonergan's statement of the relation between feelings and symbols, I suggest that the dispositional component of immediacy is imaginatively constructed, symbolically constituted. It is structured by imagination and expresses itself in symbols. The interpretation of these symbols is the deciphering of this component of intentionality. Nonetheless, while this component is immediately accessible to intentional consciousness as the flow of feeling which accompanies all intentional operations, its symbolic constitution can often be retrieved only by specific techniques elaborated by depth psychological analysis. Principal among these techniques is dream interpretation. Particularly when one is out of touch with how one is, these techniques may be required in order that this dispositional component can be objectified, known, and appropriated. They reveal how it stands between the self as objectified and the self as conscious. They also enable one's self-understanding to approximate one's reality. Through these techniques, one gains the capacity to articulate one's story as it is and to guide it responsibly. One may have to reverse a cumulative misinterpretation of one's experience; this reversal will be painful, but it is escaped only at the cost of a flight from understanding, and indeed from understanding oneself. It is primarily in the existential, evaluative, and dialectical hermeneutic of one's dreams, one's own most radical spontaneity, that one recovers the individual and transpersonal core of elemental imagination which reveals in symbolic ciphers the affective component of one's intentionality.

The cognitive dimensions of method have been expressed in Lonergan's dictum, "Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood, but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding."²⁵ Of the roots of desire and fear in human imagination, we may say something similar: Come to know as existential subject the contingent figures, the structure, the process, and the imaginal spontaneity manifested in your dreams, and you will come into possession of an expanding base and an intelligible pattern illuminating the *vouloir-dire* of human desire as it is brought to expression in the cultural and religious objectifications of human history.²⁶ Furthermore, elemental dream symbols are spontaneous psychic productions. By deciphering them, one gains the

²⁵ Lonergan, *Insight*, p. xxviii.

²⁶ Doran, p. 166.

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potential of conscripting organic and psychic vitality into the higher integration of intentionality as it raises questions of intelligibility, truth, and value. One finds, too, significant clues regarding one's own potential drift toward the loss of existential subjectivity either in triviality or in fanaticism. Dreams do not resolve the tension they often reveal; this resolution is the task of the intentionality of the existential subject finding out for himself that it is up to him to decide for himself what he is going to make of himself. But the symbolic manifestations of dreams can provide access to the materials one has to work with in one's self-constituting operations. Dreams will reveal a story of development or decline according as they are dealt with by existential consciousness in the dialogic process of internal communication.

Sublations

Dream interpretation can be understood in terms of Lonergan's notion of successive levels of consciousness, where the lower-level operations are sublated by the higher integrations provided by the operations that occur on subsequent levels. If being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments,²⁷ then any true judgments about the symbolic ciphers of affectivity concern a sphere of being which we may call the imaginal.²⁸ The differentiation and appropriation of the dispositional constituents of immediacy, then, are enabled to come to pass by a sublation on the part of conscious intentionality that is additional to the sublations explained by Lonergan. In addition to the sublation of internal and external waking sensory experience by understanding, of experience and understanding by reasonable judgment, and of experience, understanding, and judgment by existential subjectivity, there is a sublation of dreaming consciousness on the part of the whole of attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, cooperative-intersubjective existential consciousness. Thus, in addition to the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible appropriation of one's rational self-consciousness effected by bringing one's conscious operations as intentional to bear on those same operations as conscious, there is the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible appropriation and negotiation of one's psychic spontaneity and irrationality. Such a sublation is implicit in Lonergan's reference to the approach of existential psychology, which, as we have seen, regards the dream as the dawn of life, as the beginning of the transition from impersonal existence to personal existence and self-constitution.²⁹ We may venture beyond Lonergan at this point and speak of an additional sublation mediating this dawn of

²⁷ Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 350.

²⁸ See Gilbert Durand, "Exploration of the Imaginal," *Spring: An Annual of Archetypal Psychology and Jungian Thought* (1971), pp. 84-100; and Henri Corbin, "Mundus Imaginalis, or the Imaginary and the Imaginal," *Spring* (1972), pp. 1-19.

²⁹ Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 69.

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consciousness to the existential subject. Through this sublation, the affective component of one's intentional orientation is released from muteness and confusion.

Dreams, then, may be regarded as an intelligible text or story whose meaning can be read by interpretative understanding and reasonable judgment and affirmed or reoriented by evaluative deliberation. The symbols of dreams are operators effecting internal communication, in much the same way as questions are operators promoting successive levels of intentional consciousness.³⁰ The ground theme of the internal communication is the emergence of the authentic existential subject as free and responsible constitutive agent of the human world. This theme is the basic a priori of human consciousness, the intention of intelligibility, truth, and value. It promotes human experience to understanding by means of questions for intelligence and understanding to truth by means of questions for reflection. So too it promotes truth into action, but in a thetic and constitutive manner, through questions for deliberation. The data for these questions are apprehended in intentional responses to values in feelings; the feelings structure patterns of experience; and the patterns can be understood by disengaging their imaginal ciphers and by insight into the images thus disengaged. Dream images, then, promote neural, sensitive, affective, and imaginative process to a recognizable and intelligible narrative. The narrative is the basic story of the ground theme. It can be understood; the understanding can be affirmed as correct, so that the images function in aid of self-knowledge; and beyond self-knowledge, there is praxis, where the knowledge becomes thetic: What am I going to do about it? The ultimate intentionality of the therapeutic process so conceived is thus coextensive with the total sweep of conscious intentionality. The psyche can be conscripted into the single transcendental dynamism of human consciousness toward the authenticity of self-transcendence. The imaginal spontaneity of dreams belongs to this dynamism, but it can be only disengaged by intelligent, reasonable, and decisive conscription, without which the psyche can fall prey to an inertial counterweight toward the flight from genuine humanity. This conscription must generally take place in a cooperative-intersubjective milieu, with the aid of a professional guide familiar with the vagaries of dreaming consciousness, a guide who is familiar with the dialectic of the psyche, who knows the need of healing of conscription is in some instances to take place, and who can instruct his dialogical counterpart on how to accept and befriend the dimensions of affectivity that need to be healed. The language of dreams is frequently so very different from that of waking consciousness that the process of negotiation usually demands that one seek such competent assistance.

³⁰ See Giovanni Sala, *Das Apriori in der menschlichen Erkenntnis: Eine Studie über Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und Lonergans Insight* (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1971).

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Psychic Conversion

The conscious capacity for the sublation of the imaginal sphere of being is effected by a conversion on the part of the existential subject. This conversion I have called psychic conversion.³¹ In this section, I will demonstrate how it meets all of Lonergan's specifications for conversion and how it is integrally related to the religious, moral, and intellectual conversions specified by Lonergan as qualifying authentic human subjectivity.

Lonergan first began to thematize conversion in his search for renewed foundations of theology. In a lecture delivered in 1967, he described the new context of theology in terms of the demise of the classicist mediation of meaning and the struggle of modern culture for a new maieutic, only to conclude that this new context demands that theology be placed on a new foundation, one distinct from the citation of scripture and the enunciation of revealed doctrines characteristic of the foundation of the old dogmatic theology. What was this new foundation to be?

Lonergan drew his first clue from the notion of method, considered as "a normative pattern that related to one another the cognitional operations that recur in scientific investigations."³² The stress in this notion of method is on the personal experience of the operations and of their dynamic and normative relations to one another. If a scientist were to locate his operations and their relations in his own experience, Lonergan maintained, he would come to know himself as scientist. And, since the subject as scientist is the foundation of science, he would come into possession of the foundations of his science.

Of what use is such a clue to one seeking a new foundation for theology? Lonergan says: "It illustrates by an example what might be meant by a foundation that lies not in sets of verbal propositions named first principles, but in a particular, concrete, dynamic reality generating knowledge of particular, concrete, dynamic realities."³³

Lonergan draws a second clue from the phenomenon of conversion, which is fundamental to religious living. Conversion, he says, "is not merely a change or even a development; rather, it is a radical transformation on which follows, on all levels of living, an interlocked series of changes and developments. What hitherto had been of no concern becomes a matter of high import."³⁴ Conversion of course has many degrees of depth of realization. But in any case of genuine conversion, "the convert apprehends differently, values differently, relates differently because he has become different. The new apprehension is not so much a new statement or a new set of statements, but

³¹ Doran, pp. 240-46. The present subsection is a slightly revised version of these pages.

³² Bernard Lonergan, "Theology in its New Context," *Theology of Renewal* (Montreal: Palm, 1968), 1:43.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

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rather new meanings that attach to almost any statement. It is not new values so much as a transformation of values.³⁵ Conversion is also possible as a change that is not only individual and personal but also communal and historical; and when viewed as an ongoing process, at once personal, communal, and historical, it coincides, Lonergan says, with living religion.³⁶

Now, if theology is reflection on religion, and if conversion is fundamental to religious living, then not only will theology also be reflection on conversion, but reflection on conversion will provide theology with its foundations. "Just as reflection on the operations of the scientist brings to light the real foundation of the sciences, so too reflection on the ongoing process of conversion may bring to light the real foundation of a renewed theology."³⁷ Such is the basic argument establishing what is, in fact, a revolutionary recasting of the foundations of theology.

For the moment, however, my concern is not theology but conversion. The notion is significantly developed in *Method in Theology*, where conversion is differentiated into religious, moral, and intellectual varieties. What I am maintaining is that the emergence of the capacity to disengage the symbolic ciphers of the feelings in which the primordial apprehension of value occurs satisfies Lonergan's notion of conversion but also that it is something other than the three conversions of which Lonergan speaks. As any other conversion, it has many facets. As any other conversion, it is ever precarious. As any other conversion, it is a radical transformation of subjectivity influencing all the levels of one's living and transvaluing one's values. As any other conversion, it is "not so much a new statement or a new set of statements, but rather new meanings that attach to almost any statement."³⁸ As any other conversion, it too can become communal, so that there are formed formal and informal communities of men and women encouraging one another in the pursuit of further understanding and practical implementation of what they have experienced. Finally, as any other conversion, it undergoes a personal and arduous history of development, setback, and renewal. Its eventual outcome, most likely only asymptotically approached, is symbolically described by C. G. Jung as the termination of a state of imprisonment through a cumulative reconciliation of opposites,³⁹ or as the resolution of the contradictoriness of the unconscious and consciousness (read of *psyche and intentionality*) in a nuptial *coniunctio*,⁴⁰ or as the birth of the hero issuing "from something humble and forgotten."⁴¹ But, like any other conversion, psychic conversion

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 44 f.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 45.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 44.

³⁹ C. G. Jung, *Collected Works*, vol. 14, *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series 20 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 65.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 81.

⁴¹ C. G. Jung, "Concerning Rebirth," *Collected Works*, vol. 9i, *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series 20 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,

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is not the goal but the beginning. As religious conversion is not the mystic's cloud of unknowing, as moral conversion is not moral perfection, as intellectual conversion is not methodological craftsmanship, so psychic conversion is not unified affectivity or total integration of psyche and intentionality or immediate release from imprisonment in the rhythms and processes of nature and mood. It is, at the beginning, no more than the obscure understanding of the nourishing potential of elemental symbols to maintain and foster the vitality of conscious living by a continuous influx of both data and energy; the hint that one's affective being can be transformed so as to aid one in the quest for authenticity; the suspicion that coming to terms with one's dreams will profoundly change what Jung calls one's ego, that is, the oftentimes too narrow, biased, and self-absorbed focus of one's conscious intentionality, by ousting this narrowed focus from a central and dominating position in one's conscious living and by shifting the birthplace of meaning gradually but progressively to a deeper center which is simultaneously a totality, the self.⁴² Slowly one comes to discover the complexity of dreams, and thus of one's affectivity, and to affirm the arduousness of the task to which he has committed himself. Slowly one learns that the point is what is interior, temporal, generic, and indeed at times religious, and not what is exterior, spatial, specific, and solely profane.⁴³ Slowly a system of internal communication is established between intentionality and one's organic and psychic vitality. Slowly one learns the habit of disengaging the symbolic significance associated with one's intentional affective responses to situations, people, and objects. Slowly one learns to distinguish symbols which indicate and urge an orientation to truth and value from those which mire one in myth and ego-centered satisfactions. Slowly one notices the changes that take place in the symbolic ciphers of one's affectivity. One becomes attentive in a new and more contemplative way to the data of sense and the data of consciousness. One is aided by this new symbolic consciousness in one's efforts to be intelligent, reasonable, and responsible in one's everyday commonsense living and in one's intellectual pursuit of truth. Some of the concrete areas of one's own inattentiveness, obtuseness, silliness, and irresponsibility are revealed one by one and can be named and quasi-personified. They are complexes with a quasi-personality of their own. When personified, they can be engaged in active imaginative dialogue where one must listen as well as speak. The dialogue relativizes the ego and thus frees the complexes from their counterrigidity. Some of them, those that indicate where one needs healing, can then even be befriended and transformed. When thus paid attention to, honored, and in a very definite

1971), p. 141.

⁴²C. G. Jung, "On the Nature of the Psyche," *Collected Works*, vol. 8, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, trans. R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series 20 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 223 f.

⁴³See Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 92.

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sense compromised with, they prove to be sources of conscious energy one never before knew were at his disposal. Such is psychic conversion. In itself it is not a matter of falling in love with God or of shifting the criterion of one's choices from satisfactions to values or of reflectively recognizing that knowing is not looking but the affirmation of the virtually unconditioned. It is not religious conversion or moral conversion or intellectual conversion. It is conversion, but it is something other than these.

A Note on Jung's Archetypal Psychology

C. G. Jung's notion of individuation as a cumulative process of the reconciliation of opposites under the guidance of responsible consciousness and with the aid of a professional guide obviously bears some similarity to the process of psychic self-appropriation that I have briefly described. Furthermore, his insistence that neither of the basic opposites of instinct or spirit is in itself good or evil,⁴⁴ that moral significance attaches rather to the process of reconciliation, is correct and illuminating. Jung's researches help us to reject a falsely spiritualistic and narrowly egoistic tendency to locate the root of evil in instinct and the body. Moreover, Jung is at home with a notion of elemental symbolism that is nonreductionistic and basically teleological. He would be quite in agreement with Lonergan's description of dreams as indicating "the anticipations and virtualities of higher activities immanent in the underlying unconscious manifold."⁴⁵ Thus Jung is the principal psychological contributor to my own position. Nonetheless, because of the intentionality analysis of Lonergan, with which I am seeking to integrate a process of psychic analysis, I wish to suggest that there is one pair of opposites that is not to be reconciled in the manner of the mutual complementarity of such contraries as spirit and matter, but that qualifies for good or for evil any such process of reconciliation. These opposites are authenticity and unauthenticity, where authenticity is understood as self-transcendence. These opposites are contradictory, not contraries. Their conflict is revealed, not in Jung's archetypal symbols that are taken from and imitate nature's cyclical processes, but in the symbols that Northrop Frye has called anagogic and that contain and express the orientation of the whole of human action in an irreducibly dialectical fashion. It is my suspicion that the recognition of such a distinction between archetypal and anagogic symbols would necessitate a reconstruction of those further outposts of Jungian thought where the question is one of good and evil, and where the religious import of the question is revealed in one's notion and image both of the self and of God. The progressive reconciliation of the opposites that Jung calls spirit and matter and that Lonergan calls transcen-

⁴⁴ Jung, "On the Nature of the Psyche," p. 206.

⁴⁵ Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 457.

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dence and limitation⁴⁶ takes place in what Lonergan calls the realm of interiority. But when the question is one of authenticity and unauthenticity, the resolution demands a movement into another realm of meaning, the realm of transcendence, where discriminated intentionality and cultivated affectivity surrender to the mystery of God's love and find their basic fulfillment in this surrender.⁴⁷ At this final point in the individuation process, the Christian symbol of the crucified can become quite significant. Here, too, anagogic images are to be negotiated, principally that of the Father, a symbol left relatively unexplored in Jung's archetypal researches. The exploration of the symbolic dimensions of this negotiation will provide a needed complement, I believe, to Jung's phenomenology of the psyche.

PSYCHE AND THEOLOGY'S FOUNDATIONS

In this section, I move to the second portion of my argument. It is to the effect that the semantics of depth psychology suggested by Lonergan's intentionality analysis complements Lonergan's notion of the foundations of theology. I will discuss, first, the development of Lonergan's thought on foundational reality or the subject; second, the pertinence of my suggestions regarding depth psychology for Lonergan's later thought on the subject; and third, the effect that this expanded notion of the subject will have on the articulation of the functional specialty, foundations.

Lonergan on Foundational Reality

The emergence of a distinct notion of the good in Lonergan's later work effects a very significant change in his notion of the foundational reality of theology. In *Insight*, the basis of any philosophy lies in its cognitional theory. The further expansion of the basis is formulated in the philosophy's pronouncements on metaphysical, ethical, and theological issues. Now, the formulation of the basis necessarily will entail a commitment on three philosophical questions: reality, the subject, and objectivity. Lonergan has advanced his own positions on these issues in the twelfth, eleventh, and thirteenth chapters of *Insight*, respectively. One's commitments on these three issues will be positions open to development if they agree with the positions advanced in these chapters, and counterpositions inviting reversal if they are in conflict with these positions. Thus:

⁴⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 472-77. On archetypal and anagogic symbols, see Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 95-128. For the relevance of Frye's work to my own concerns, I am indebted to Joseph Flanagan, "Transcendental Dialectic of Desire and Fear" (paper delivered at the Boston College Lonergan Workshop, June 1976).

⁴⁷ On the realm of transcendence, see Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 83 f.

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The inevitable philosophic component, immanent in the formulation of cognitional theory, will be either a basic position or else a basic counterposition.

It will be a basic position,

(1) if the real is the concrete universe of being and not a subdivision of the "already out there now;"

(2) if the subject becomes known when it affirms itself intelligently and reasonably and so is not known yet in any prior "existential" state; and

(3) if objectivity is conceived as a consequence of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, and not as a property of vital anticipation, extroversion, and satisfaction.

On the other hand, it will be a basic counter-position if it contradicts one or more of the basic positions.

. . . Any philosophic pronouncement on any epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, or theological issue will be named a position if it is coherent with the basic positions on the real, on knowing, and on objectivity; and it will be named a counter-position if it is coherent with one or more of the basic counter-positions.⁴⁸

According to the second of these basic positions, the subject becomes known when it affirms itself intelligently and reasonably. But *nothing* is known unless it is intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed. The self-affirmation intended by Lonergan is the intelligent and reasonable affirmation of one's own intelligence and reasonableness. It is the judgment, "I am a knower," where knowledge is the compound of experience, understanding, and judgment. Thus the basic position on the subject in *Insight* is the position on the knowing subject. The self-affirmation of the knower, along with positions on the real and objectivity, are what constitute the foundations or basis of metaphysics, ethics, and (at least philosophical) theology.

These three basic positions are reached as a result of what Lonergan later calls intellectual conversion. Intellectual conversion, according to the later Lonergan, generally follows upon and is conditioned by religious and moral conversion. There is a realism implicit in religious and moral self-transcendence which promotes the recognition of the realism of knowing. Moreover, in Lonergan's later work a primacy is assigned to the existential subject, the subject as religious and moral. The basic position on the subject includes but exceeds that on the knowing subject. It reaches to the position on the deciding, deliberating, evaluating subject. Furthermore, if the intellectual conversion which issues in the basic positions is consequent upon religious and moral conversion, then the foundation of one's metaphysics, ethics, and theology would seem to lie in the objectification of all three conversions in a patterned set of judgments concerning both cognitional and existential subjectivity. And such is indeed what happens to foundations in *Method in Theology*. The foundations of theology include but go far beyond *Insight's* basic positions on knowing, the real, and objectivity—not by denying them but by adding that the

⁴⁸ Lonergan, *Insight*, pp. 387 f.

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basic position on knowing is not the full position on the human subject. The foundational reality of theology is the intellectually, morally, and religiously converted theologian. The intentionality of human consciousness, the primordial infrastructure of human subjectivity, is a dynamism for cognitional, existential, and religious self-transcendence. That subject whose conscious performance is self-consciously in accord with this dynamism is foundational reality. The objectification of this dynamism in a patterned set of judgments of cognitional and existential fact constitutes the foundations of theology. Lonergan's thought thus becomes not primarily cognitional theory, but an elucidation of the drama of the emergence of the authentic subject.

Psyche and Foundational Reality

The basic position on the subject finds expression only when judgments of cognitional fact are joined with judgments of existential and religious fact. Moreover, on the basis of Lonergan's treatment of the existential subject, it is fair to say that the formulation of the position on the subject demands not only the functioning of intelligence and reasonableness grasping and affirming intelligence and reasonableness, but also a satisfactory transcendental analysis of the human good. This analysis includes a set of judgments detailing the authentic development of feelings. This development, in my analysis, is a matter of the dispositional component of primordial immediacy. If the story of the development and aberration of feelings can be told by disengaging the spontaneous symbols produced in dreams, if the habit of such disengagement is mediated to the subject by psychic conversion, if psychic conversion is foundational reality, if the objectification of conversion is the functional specialty, foundations, then psychic conversion is an aspect of foundational reality and an objectification of psychic conversion will constitute a portion of foundations.

There are counterpositions on the real, on knowing, and on objectivity that are incoherent with the activities of intelligent grasping and reasonable affirmation. But there are also counterpositions on the subject that are incoherent, not specifically with these activities alone, but with the emergence of the authentic existential subject. Only in this latter incoherence are they suspected of being counterpositions, for they are apprehended as articulations of countervalues in the feelings of the existential subject striving for self-transcendence, and they are judged to be such in the same subject's judgments of value. They are incoherent, not specifically with the self-transcendence intended in the unfolding of the desire to know, but with the self-transcendence toward which the primordial infrastructure of human subjectivity as a whole is headed. The subject who contains implicitly the full position on the subject is not the intelligent and reasonable subject, but the experiencing, intelligent,

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reasonable, responsible, religious subject. In fact, if one is looking for the full position on the human subject by scrutinizing only one's intelligence and reasonableness, one is heading for the articulation of a counterposition on the subject. One is then the victim of an intellectualist bias perhaps still too easily confirmed by the writings of the early Lonergan in those readers whose personal history has been characterized by a hypertrophy of intellectual development at the expense of the underlying neural and psychic manifolds. The emergence of the notion of the good as distinct from, though not contradictory to, the intelligent and reasonable in the writings of the post-1965 Lonergan decisively shifts the atmosphere of his work as a whole. Human authenticity is a matter of self-transcendence. Self-transcendence can be in one's knowing, in one's free and responsible constitution of the human world and of oneself, and in one's religious living as a participation in the divine solution to the problem of evil. The struggle between the dynamism for self-transcendence and the flight from authenticity provides the ground theme unifying the various aspects of this achievement.

This ground theme is invested with a distinct symbolic significance. Not only does intentionality in its dynamic thrust for self-transcendence have the potential of conscripting underlying neural and psychic manifolds into its service through the dialectical disengagement of their intention of truth and value; but psyche insists on stamping the entire drama with its own characteristic mark by giving it a symbolic representation, by releasing in dreams the ciphers of the present status of the drama, by indicating to the existential subject how it stands between the totality of consciousness as primordial infrastructure to be fulfilled in self-transcendence and the subject's explicit self-understanding in his intention of or flight from truth and value. The articulation of the story of these ciphers, the disengagement of their intelligible pattern in a hermeneutic phenomenology of the psyche would constitute what we might call, in a sense quite different from Kant's, a transcendental aesthetic. This aesthetic would, I wager, follow Jung's phenomenology of the psyche quite closely until one comes to the farthest reaches of subjectivity, which also constitute its center. There hermeneutic becomes dialectic, in Lonergan's quite specific sense of this word as indicating an interpretation that deals with the concrete, the dynamic, and the contradictory.⁴⁹ For the issue becomes that of good and evil, grace and sin, authenticity and unauthenticity. At that point psychology as a path to individuation must bow to an immanent *Ananke* and give way to religion.⁵⁰ Intentionality and the psychic

⁴⁹ Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 129.

⁵⁰ Thus Jung relates a dream he had prior to writing *Answer to Job*, his most controversial work. In this dream, he is led by his father to the center of a mandala-shaped building and into the "highest presence." His father knelt down and touched his forehead to the floor. Jung imitated him, but for some reason "could not bring my forehead quite down to the floor—there was perhaps a millimeter to spare" (C. G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston [New York: Vintage, 1961], p. 219). Jung then expected, after such a dream,

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manifold it has conscripted into its adventure must at this point surrender to the gift of God's love. One symbol of this surrender, the embodiment of the self at these far reaches of the psyche, is found in the Crucified, where alone there is forgiveness of sin. The transcendental aesthetic issues in kerygma, proclamation, manifestation, in the return to the fullness of language simply heard and understood, in the second naiveté intended in the writings of Paul Ricoeur.⁵¹ This return is mediated by the process of self-appropriation in its entirety, by the objectification of the primordial infrastructure of intentional and psychic subjectivity in a twofold mediation of immediacy by meaning.

Psyche and the Functional Specialty, Foundations

The functional specialty, foundations, would seem to have a twofold task: that of articulating the horizon within which theological categories can be understood and employed, and that of deriving the categories which are appropriate to such a horizon. What is the relationship of psychic self-appropriation to this twofold task?

I have spoken of the first task in terms of framing a patterned set of judgments of cognitional and existential fact cumulatively heading toward the full position on the human subject. Psychic self-appropriation is a contribution to this patterned set of judgments and thus to the full position on the subject. Implicit in this statement is the claim that psychic self-appropriation is a needed complement to the self-appropriation of intentionality aided by the work of Lonergan. It is even an intrinsic part of transcendental method, a necessary feature of the objectification of the transcendental infrastructure of human subjectivity. It is demanded by the task set by Lonergan, the task of moving toward a viable control of meaning in terms of human interiority.⁵² The psyche is no accidental feature of the transcendental infrastructure of human subjectivity. It achieves an integration with intentionality, however, only in the free and responsible decisions of the existential subject who is cognizant of the psychic input into and reading of his situation. The integration of psyche and intentionality, to be sure, is not the only task confronting the existential subject. It is a task that for the most part affects his effective freedom, and there is the more radical question which he must deal with at

severe trials, including the death of his wife, to which he was unable to submit completely. "Something in me was saying, 'All very well, but not entirely.' Something in me was defiant and determined not to be a dumb fish; and if there were not something of the sort in free men, no Book of Job would have been written" (ibid., p. 220). Neither, we might add, would an *Answer to Job* have been written if, in this dream, Jung had touched his forehead to the floor, when led into the highest presence, the realm of transcendence.

⁵¹ See Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970).

⁵² See Bernard Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," in *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan*, ed. F. E. Crowe (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), pp. 252-67.

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the level of his essential freedom:⁵³ What do I want to make of myself? The integration of psyche with intentionality occurs in the framework established by his answer to that question and may affect and modify this framework. But occur it must, if this more radical answer is to bear fruit in the effective constitution of himself and of his world.

Lonergan speaks of placing "abstractly apprehended cognitional activity within the concrete and subsuming context of human feeling and of moral deliberation, evaluation, and decision."⁵⁴ Until cognitional activity, no matter how correctly apprehended, is so placed, it remains abstract in its apprehension. The move toward greater concreteness on the side of the subject, then, calls for a second mediation of immediacy by meaning. Only such mediation brings transcendental method to its conclusion. This is no easy task. It is at least as complicated as comprehending and affirming cognitional activity. Equally sophisticated techniques are needed for its execution. But without it the movement brought into being by Lonergan is left incomplete and those influenced by this movement are left the potential victims of an intellectualist bias. Students of Lonergan's work have not yet sufficiently attended to the shift of the center of attention from cognitional analysis to intentionality analysis, from the intellectual pattern of experience to self-transcendence in all patterns of experience as the privileged domain of human subjectivity. This shift means that the exigence giving rise to a new epoch in the evolution of human consciousness—an epoch governed by a control of meaning in terms of interiority—only begins to be met in the philosophic conversion aided by Lonergan's cognitional analysis. The radical crisis is not only cognitional but also existential, the crisis of the self as objectified becoming approximate to the self as primordial infrastructure. And the psyche will never cease to have its say and to offer both its potential contribution and its potential threat to the unfolding of the transcendental dynamism toward self-transcendence. Psychic self-appropriation is quite necessary if the concrete sublation of appropriated cognitional activity within the context of human feeling and moral decision is to take place.

Psychic analysis, then, is a necessary contribution to the maieutic that is the self-appropriating subject. And an articulation of psychic conversion is a constituent feature of the patterned set of judgments of cognitional and existential fact cumulatively heading toward the full position on the human subject that constitutes the renewed foundations of theology.

Foundations, however, has a second task, that of deriving categories appropriate to the horizon articulated in the objectification of conversion. What is the relation of psychic self-appropriation to *this* foundational task?

All theological categories have a significance that has psychic and affective

⁵³ See Lonergan, *Insight*, pp. 619–22.

⁵⁴ Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 275.

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resonances. The *general* theological categories, those shared by theology with other disciplines, are derived from the transcendental base giving rise to the emergence of the authentic cognitional and existential subject. The narrative of this emergence can be disengaged by the deciphering of dreams. The emergence itself is the ground theme of the dialogue and dialectic between intentionality and psyche. It can be objectified in a transcendental aesthetic. The *special* theological categories, those peculiar to theology as it attempts to mediate between the Christian religion and the role and significance of that religion within a given cultural context, reflect a collaboration between God and man in working out the solution to the radical problem of this ground theme, the problem of evil. As the emergence of the existential subject is the drama of human existence, so the Christian religion in its authenticity is for the Christian theologian the fruit of the divinely originated solution to that drama. As the psyche will continue to have its say in the drama even when intentionality has proclaimed a relative autonomy from imagination, as in our day, so at the farthest reaches of the psyche there stands the image of the crucified, the anagogic symbol of universal willingness, whose surrender to the Father reveals the finality of the psyche as a constituent feature of primordial immediacy.

Psychic self-appropriation, then, is a part of the objectification of the transcendental and transcultural base from which both general and special theological categories are derived. It affects the self-understanding in terms of which one mediates the past in interpretation, history, dialectic, and the special research generated by their concerns. And it gives rise to the generation of theological categories appropriate to the mediated phase of theology, the phase which takes its stand on self-appropriation and ventures to say what is so to the men and women of different strata and backgrounds in different cultures of the world of today. It gives rise to the possibility of theological categories, doctrines or positions, and systems which are legitimately symbolic or poetic or aesthetic. It makes it possible that such categories, positions, and systems can be poetic without ceasing to be explanatory, without ceasing to fix terms and relations by one another. A hermeneutic and dialectical phenomenology of the psyche would be the objectification of psychic conversion that is a constituent feature of the foundations of theology from which appropriate explanatory categories can be derived. Ray L. Hart's desire, then, for a systematic symbolics⁵⁵ is an ambition that is methodologically both possible and desirable. But its valid methodological base is found, I believe, only in the mediation of immediacy in which one discovers, identifies, accepts one's affectivity by disengaging its symbolic ciphers.

Second immediacy will never achieve a total mediation of primordial immediacy. Complete self-transparency is impossible short of the ulterior finali-

⁵⁵ Ray L. Hart, *Unfinished Man and the Imagination* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1968).

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ty of man in the vision of God. Only in seeing God as he is will we know ourselves as we are. But there is a poetic enjoyment of the truth about man and God that has been achieved in many cultures, at many times, within the framework of many differentiations of consciousness, and related to different combinations of the various realms of meaning. The second mediation of immediacy by meaning can function in aid of a recovery of this poetic enjoyment. Even of the theologian, it may be said with Hölderlin and Heidegger:

Full of merit, and yet poetically, dwells
Man on this earth.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Quoted by Heidegger in "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry," in *Existence and Being*, trans. Douglas Scott (Chicago: Regnery, 1949), p. 270.

*Soul-making is an aesthetic task;
given the self-transparency of soul,
theology's next challenge is to ar-
ticulate its grammar and a semantics
for understanding its process.*

AESTHETICS AND THE OPPOSITES

ROBERT M. DORAN

THEOLOGY IS THE PURSUIT OF ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING regarding the moments of ultimacy in human experience, the referent of such moments, and their meaning for the individual and cultural life of humankind. In the last analysis, the sole foundational issue of theology is transcendence. And yet Christian theologians of both Protestant and Roman Catholic persuasion have yet to meet on the question of God, on its origins in the pure question that is the native drive of human intelligence and evaluation, and on the sources and outcome of its cumulative resolution within the fabric of human experience. The reason, I believe, is that theology's foundations are in need of further elaboration. In this paper, I will suggest an important and relatively neglected dimension of these foundations, the aesthetic dimension.

WHY METHOD?

A sufficiently broad anticipation of the options now confronting human consciousness would seem to provide proper persuasiveness to the opinion that the most significant movement within the theological community in the last two decades has been the gradual emergence of a preoccupation with theology's method and foundations. In retrospect it may be surmised that the preoccupation arose in response to an at first dimly conscious suspicion that something of perhaps evolutionary significance was being demanded of human subjectivity. It may indeed be melodramatic to portray the option before postmodern humankind as one of survival and extinction. Perhaps it is more accurate, and surely more inspiring, to understand the issue as an option between survival and liberation from mere survival, between the rigidifying of certain ranges of schemes of recurrence and the emergence of the beginnings of new series of ranges of schemes of recurrence in human

living. The question is not biological but human, not whether there will be life on earth, but whether there will be human life on earth. It is a question concerned not so much with living as with the art of living.

The questions of method and foundations in theology, oddly enough, originated in the suspicion that perhaps a qualitative mutation in the evolutionary process was in preparation, failing which human life on earth would cease, even if men and women were to go on living. There is evidence that this suspicion is correct, and for this evidence we need not turn to objective studies of society and culture, of politics and economics, though these studies may and indeed will support the suspicion. The evidence is given more radically in human consciousness trying to find its way into a human future. We each know in the depths of our being that the most endangered species is the human individual, that the only moral problem is the loss of self, that this loss can happen at any moment, and that if perdured in it means the end of my human life, the destruction of perhaps the only work of art of which I am capable. I can at any moment switch gears, indeed switch direction from the careful construction of my own work of art in favor of transference, i.e., of participation in or subservience to systems of interpersonal, psychological, social, economic, political, cultural, educational, religious domination. The truth that sets free, one that always has to be wrested by an inner violence, is that I need not capitulate, that I can be linked rather to transcendent creativity, and that this link is the key as to whether I will be attentive or drifting, intelligent or stupid, rational or silly, responsible or more or less consciously sociopathic. It is up to me whether I will be oppressed or free, oppressing or liberating. It lies in no one else's hands whether I will be my own man or woman, or whether I will lose my very self. And everyone who loses self is in the very loss a sociopath, destructive of human relationships and of the striving toward that achievement of common meanings and values that is human community.¹

The theologians who have acted on this perhaps once dim suspicion have thus turned their attention to the human self or subject. That this attentiveness has simultaneously resulted in groundbreaking efforts at clarifying theology's method and foundations ought not be surprising, though why this was the case has only recently become clear. For a method is nothing other than a self-conscious interrelating of various operations in

¹ The point is well and simply expressed in Lanza del Vasto's journal of his pilgrimage to India and Gandhi, *Return to the Source*:

"The policy of Gandhi is incomprehensible if one does not know that its aim is not political but spiritual victory.

"Whoever saves his own soul does not only serve himself. Although bodies are separate, souls are not. Whoever saves his own soul saves the Soul and accumulates riches that belong to all. Others have only to perceive the treasure to partake of it." Lanza del Vasto, *Return to the Source* (New York: Pocket Books, 1974), pp. 110f. It seems obvious from the overall tenor of del Vasto's book that his reference to "the Soul" is figurative, and not an intrusion of Averroistic metaphysics into contemporary spirituality.

the interests of a set of cumulative results.² Thus the more clearly one discriminates one's own operations—and presumably such discrimination would follow from inquiring attentiveness to oneself—the more fully one comes into possession of a method. If the one discriminating his or her operations is a theologian, then the method one comes to articulate is the method of theology. And if the operations thus discriminated are a necessary condition of theology's performance, then their articulation constitutes at least a part of theology's foundations.

If these theologians have happened to be right in their discrimination of the operations of the human self, however, their discoveries have a significance beyond theology. Indeed, to the extent that they articulate basic terms and relations defining human operations, they are laying the foundations of a new science of the art of being human. And this new science, the cumulative articulation of a collaborative enterprise, is the knowledge that will inform the new series of ranges of schemes of recurrence that is demanded if human life is to continue to unfold on this earth.

The present paper suggests a contribution to the twofold endeavor of articulating theology's method and of developing the *scienza nuova*. My debt to Bernard Lonergan is undoubtedly clear already, to C. G. Jung and Ernest Becker and, through Becker, to Otto Rank, soon to become manifest. I hope it not a presumptuous projection to predict that these guides through the labyrinthine ways of interiority will be principal among the makers of postmodern intentionality. For they came to know human desire with penetrating precision and exacting subtlety. Moreover they have opened that desire upon itself in its native spontaneity. Together, I believe, they render asymptotically possible the self-conscious recovery of intentionality which Paul Ricoeur calls a second, post-critical immediacy.³ The knowing withdrawal from deceptive self-fragmentation rendered possible by their mutual qualification one of the other is the conviction which motivates the suggestion I offer here, a suggestion consisting of hints toward a new essay in aid of self-appropriation. My subject is the human soul and the science of that soul which alone qualifies for the title, psychology. I suggest we recruit for theological method the discoveries of Jung and Becker and rearticulate these discoveries with the aid of Lonergan. Finally, I risk the claim of suggesting a more explicit horizon for the new science of being human than has been cleared by any of these principal contributors to human evolution taken singly. The horizon I suggest is not more inclusive than that cleared by Lonergan, but a

² "A method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results." Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 4.

³ Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, translated by Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale, 1970), p. 496.

substantial portion of it would be more precisely articulated if the complement I suggest were incorporated into it.

SOUL-MAKING AND THE OPPOSITES

The human subject or self is inescapably a Protean commingling of opposites. The opposites are spirit and matter, archetype and instinct, or, perhaps most precisely of all, intentionality and body.⁴ The operator of their progressive integration is the human soul, or psyche, or imagination: the three are the same.⁵ But soul, when undifferentiated, is also the defective operator of disintegration. And soul is usually undifferentiated, in fact almost always more or less not transparent to itself.

The differentiation of soul or imagination is as arduous a task as that of spirit or intentionality. For the human psyche is in one sense not a *tertium quid* in addition to body and intentionality, but the place of their meeting. And this place is not a point but a field or a dense jungle or a cavernous pit. As the place where body meets intentionality, psyche shares in both. Thus she—for soul is always *anima*⁶—is both transparent and opaque to herself.

⁴ It is important how the opposites are conceived. For Ernest Becker, they are called self and body. This conception involves Becker, I believe, in an exaggerated dualism from which he never manages to extricate his thought on man. Part of Becker's point, of course, is that the dualism is inescapable, a hopeless existential dilemma, that every attempt to transcend it is a lie. I do not wish to detract from the value of Becker's profoundly moving closure of twentieth century depth psychology on authentic religion, for I believe he is correct in his synthesis of psychoanalytic and religious insight. However, the dualism can be transcended without lying and without jeopardizing Becker's conclusions on the finality of the psychoanalytic movement, its inevitable and ironic—considering its origins in Freud—disclosure of a necessary religious spirituality at the heart of the human condition. Becker finds that "in recent times every psychologist who has done vital work" has taken the problem of the opposites as the main problem of his thought. Ernest Becker, *The Denial of Death* (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 26. He includes in his list of psychologists Jung, who, I believe, points the way beyond the opposites. Part of Jung's technique involves reserving the term "self" for the totality beyond the opposites, thus including body in self. Equally important is the triple constitution of the self, with psyche as mediating the opposites of spirit and matter. See Jung's programmatic essay, "On the Nature of the Psyche," in C. G. Jung, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, translated by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Bollingen Series XX, 1972), pp. 159–234. The key to the issue is the nature of the symbol. Becker is unfortunately imprecise on this central question, whereas Jung offers a most accurate notion of the symbol. Part of my emphasis on Jung's importance for theology is based on his contribution to the elucidation of the symbol. In brief, Jung's notion harmonizes with Paul Ricoeur's on the structure of the symbol but radicalizes beyond Ricoeur the primordial place of symbolic activity in human life. See my *Subject and Psyche: A Study in the Foundations of Theology* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1975), Chapter Three.

⁵ I am dependent for my notion of imagination on Martin Heidegger's analysis of *Einbildungskraft* in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951). The German word is helpful: the art of forming into one. So is the *Bild* aspect of the word. I hope soon to compose an argument that the *Einbildungskraft* of Heidegger and the psyche of depth psychology can be understood as one and the same. If I am correct, then Heidegger's *Einbildungskraft* is removed from its abstract formalism while the psyche of depth psychology is given ontological status.

⁶ See James Hillman's radicalizing of the Jungian notion of *anima* (and, by implication, also of *animus*) beyond contrasexuality, in "Anima," *Spring: An Annual of Archetypal Psychology and Jungian Thought*, 1973, pp. 97–132.

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and she is somehow thus *through and through*. The writings of Lonergan display the potentialities of spirit or intentionality for self-transparency. The first portions of a Jungian analysis render soul transparent to spirit. But only the mysterious latter phase of the *opus* disclosed by Jung renders soul transparent to herself, and even then only very precariously, at least for a long period of time. *In patientia vestra possidebitis animas vestras*.

The human subject has been disclosed by Lonergan as the center and source of at least two very different kinds of operations. Those Lonergan has most clearly elucidated are cognitional. The other operations are evaluative or existential. They regard decision and action in the world. The delicacy of Lonergan's uncovering of the operations of knowing would lead us to suspect that the evaluative operations can surely be no more subtle than the cognitional. But this is not the case. For existential consciousness begins in feelings,⁷ and feelings are liable to an opaqueness exceeding that of cognitional process. Moreover, self-transparency in the dimension of affectivity is seldom if ever to be achieved by reading a book, whereas there are many who can verify that Lonergan's work has performed precisely this function with respect to cognition. The mediation of affective immediacy calls upon other techniques than those employed in the self-affirmation of the knower. Many of these techniques have been elaborated by the practitioners of psychotherapy. Others survive in the accumulated wisdom of the great world religions. Ernest Becker points to the synthesis of these two sources of existential mediation of the self. But always the techniques are of soul-making,⁸ the subtlest of all human arts.

But is there a way of understanding this subtle art that will enable it to be integrated with Lonergan's contribution to our knowledge of ourselves? If so, the integration would represent a kind of *coniunctio*, a marriage of the archetypally masculine (intentionality) and the archetypally feminine (psyche) within the conscious subjectivity of self-appropriating men and women.⁹ Furthermore, the art of soul-making would then be the self-owning of the subject as an evaluating and existential subject, in a manner paralleling the way in which cognitional analysis results in a

⁷ Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 37f.

⁸ The expression, soul-making, is James Hillman's, but I assign to the phrase a meaning congruent with a closure of psychotherapy on spirituality that Hillman would disavow. The Dionysian quality of Hillman's work is tempting, but in the seductive manner of a soul only half made. Ultimately it must be said that Hillman, surely the most creative and original mind to emerge from the Jungian school of psychology, falls victim to and promotes the "romantic agony," the capitulation of intentionality to the ambiguities of a half-made psyche that Jung himself escapes potentially if not in fact by his relentless insistence on the intention of a unification of the self which Hillman seems to have abandoned as a futile enterprise. See James Hillman, *The Myth of Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern, 1972) and *Re-Visioning Psychology* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

⁹ How this *coniunctio* is experienced in feminine consciousness remains as a problem to be dealt with by a woman. It is noteworthy that Jung's original followers were predominantly women, and that the speakers at the various Lonergan workshops have been almost exclusively men. Psyche is archetypally feminine, intentionality masculine.

self-owning of the subject as intelligent and reasonable. If the latter analysis grounds that portion of theology's foundations in which there is articulated the horizon-shift on knowledge which Lonergan calls intellectual conversion, soul-making would ground the articulation of the two other horizon-shifts which for Lonergan constitute theology's foundational reality, moral conversion and religious conversion.¹⁰ The subtle art of soul-making would then be as foundational for theology's future as Lonergan's explorations of the knowing mind. The two movements of the mediation of cognitive immediacy through cognitional theory-praxis and the mediation of existential immediacy through soul-making would somehow be of equal footing, both for theology and for the new human science that takes its stand on self-appropriation and that issues in a new series of ranges of schemes of recurrence in cultural life.

This *coniunctio* is perhaps not far from Lonergan's mind when he writes: "Besides the immediate world of the infant and the adult's world mediated by meaning, there is the mediation of immediacy by meaning when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method and when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy."¹¹ And yet soul-making is something other than psychotherapy, even if the therapeutic process is to date its most frequent starting-place as an explicit performance of the human subject. Soul-making is life, not therapy, and the place of soul-making is the dramatic stage of life: human relationships, the passages of the subject from childhood to youth, youth to adulthood, adulthood to age, and the conscious recapitulation of those relationships and passages that occurs when I tell my story. As Otto Rank has made so clear in his singular contribution to psychology's understanding of itself, we live beyond psychology, and therapy must give way to the soul beyond psychology.¹²

¹⁰ On the three conversions as theology's foundational reality, see Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 267-9. Intellectual conversion would seem to coincide with intellectual self-appropriation, while moral and religious conversion obviously occur without such objectification. The art of soul-making facilitates the objectification of one's moral and religious being.

¹¹ Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 77. Emphasis added.

¹² Otto Rank, *Beyond Psychology* (New York: Dover, 1958). The conclusion of Rank's lifelong pursuit of the meaning of psychoanalysis as a human and cultural phenomenon is expressed in the following words from the preface to this extraordinary book, Rank's final and posthumously published work: "Man is born beyond psychology and he dies beyond it but he can live beyond it only through vital experience of his own—in religious terms, through revelation, conversion or re-birth." P. 16. A helpful introduction to Rank is provided by Ira Progoff, *The Death and Rebirth of Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill Paperbacks, 1973), Ch. 7. But it is Becker who has persuasively shown the towering significance of Rank's critique of psychotherapy. I view Rank's *Beyond Psychology* as something akin to the final word on the subject. Nonetheless, neither Rank himself nor Becker seems to have appreciated the significance of Jung's contribution to the transition beyond psychology. Progoff has caught this better. Part of the problem is the tenacious insistence with which Jung's followers have created an orthodoxy of psychological redemption out of his work and thus perpetuated as illusion to which Jung's work remains vulnerable, even though Jung himself, I believe, continued to remain free of this illusion himself. My experience at the C. G. Jung Institute in

Soul-making but begins when I discover, identify, and accept previously submerged feelings. That perhaps necessary beginning—necessary at least in this age of the rift of human intelligence from nature—introduces into human living a new series of ranges of schemes of recurrence that represent in effect the elaboration of soul. But surely to speak of discovering, identifying, and accepting submerged feelings in psychotherapy does not capture the rich fabric of soul-making which begins to be woven in Jungian analysis. It is the weaving of that fabric of withdrawal and return that constitutes the second mediation of immediacy by meaning toward which Lonergan is stretching in the sentence I have quoted from his *Method in Theology*. And weaving that fabric is a more intricate maneuver than is involved in naming feelings. It is the much more concrete task of negotiating the figures of one's own makeup as a self: fathers and mothers, soul-partners, lovers, heroes, friends, enemies, gods, and demons. It is in this respect akin to the Hegelian enterprise of *Geist's* recapturing of its own evolution, though it occurs on the plane of realism. It is telling a story, first perhaps by repeating the story that has been going forward without one's being able to tell it as it is, but then by creating the story as one lives it, creating it in all its richness and variety and patterns of differentiated response. Soul-making, we said, is life and not therapy. It is living the dream forward, as a living symbol, a symbolic man or woman, and yet as removed from the symbol one is by a detachment from both inner states and outer objects.

This detachment is important. Its failure is inflation, hardly the desired outcome of soul-making. The presence of this detachment is individuation, the self-constitution of the human subject in his or her uniqueness as the individual, as "only this," with a matter-of-factness or just-soness that springs from a retrieved or second immediacy. This immediacy must be won back from lostness in the world of the figures one negotiates in the process of soul-making. Its retrieval is ever precarious but is nonetheless cumulatively solidified in the suffering of love that is the name of this subtle art.

Despite the fact that our quotation from Lonergan does not capture the full texture of soul-making, it bears a significance that must be sensitively articulated. It places the soul-making toward which Lonergan is stretching by speaking of psychotherapy, on the same level of discourse as the work to which he has devoted a lifetime of research, writing, and teaching. Lonergan's work is the discrimination of the intentionality of the human subject as human subject. The portion of that intentionality to whose articulation Lonergan has devoted most of his energies is human

Zurich, where I completed writing my doctoral dissertation on Lonergan and Jung, has convinced me of the acuteness of Jung's expectation that this enterprise would outlive its creative uses within a generation of its establishment. See Laurens van der Post, *Jung and the Story of Our Time* (New York: Pantheon, 1975), p. 4. Psychology, indeed Jung's psychology above all, is beyond Jungianism.

knowledge. Thus he speaks of "objectifying cognitional process." This is precisely what he has done in *Insight*:¹³ to raise to the level of self-recognition the operations that enter into every process of human knowledge. In this sense he is mediating, or providing the occasion for us to mediate for ourselves, our cognitive immediacy to the world. The world itself, by the nature of our knowledge, is mediated to us by meaning. What the objectification of cognitional process does is to mediate by meaning our cognitive immediacy to a world itself mediated by meaning.

Soul-making, then, is an analogous process. What goes forward in soul-making is the mediation by meaning of a different dimension of immediacy to the world. This immediacy is not so much cognitive as dispositional. It is Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit*.¹⁴ But even to speak of it as dispositional provides too much of a therapeutic meaning to the mediation. Perhaps the immediacy mediated by meaning in soul-making is better referred to as dramatic. Soul-making is the mediation of immediacy by a story. It is the elevation to story-telling of a story that already was going forward without being told very well. And it is also the elevation to story-making, to self-constitution, of a story that otherwise would continue, without being either made or told. It is the elevation of the subject from a condition of being dragged through life to a condition of walking through life upright.¹⁵ It is the discovery of the paradoxical yielding without which one cannot walk through life upright. It is first the elucidation and then the knowing participation in creating the drama that one's life is. Soul-making, then, is the mediation by meaning of dramatic immediacy, the immediacy of the fears and desires of a self-conscious animal haunted by the inevitability of death, but also of the dramatic component in the struggle for authenticity in one's knowing, one's doing, and one's religion.

BEYOND CRITICISM AND THERAPY

Surely the two mediations are spoken of as separate only for the purpose of analysis. For the two immediacies, while distinct, are not separate from one another. Cognition surely figures in one's dramatic living, just as there is something dramatic about insight and the pursuit of truth. The analytic separation is important, though; Lonergan would never have written *Insight* had he concerned himself also with soul-making; and the question before a person seeking psychotherapeutic assistance is hardly Lonergan's concern, What am I doing when I am knowing? But the conjunction of the two mediations, and so of the two immediacies, is the concern of this paper. That conjunction through mediation is a second immediacy, a retrieved

¹³ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957).

¹⁴ See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 171f.

¹⁵ The expression is from John Dunne, *The Way of All the Earth* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 152.

spontaneity, a post-critical and post-therapeutic naïveté. Perhaps it is closely aligned with what religious traditions have called wisdom. I suspect it is. But even wisdom need not be mediated to itself by criticism or therapy, and in most instances has not been. Moreover, most efforts at critical and therapeutic mediation have not issued in wisdom. But they have been pointing toward such a term. That pointing is itself the historical meaning of modern philosophy's turn to the subject and of psychoanalysis. The post-modern era may take its stand, then, on the achievement to which modernity, in its philosophy and depth psychology at least, has been pointing.

Before taking its stand, though, the post-modern era must reach that achievement, and what is at stake in the achievement of a post-critical and post-therapeutic wisdom is a new control of meaning, and consequently the beginnings of a new epoch in the evolution of human consciousness.¹⁶ Post-critical and post-therapeutic humanity is the beginning of new ranges of series of schemes of recurrence in human history, analogous to but superseding the schemes introduced by critical man—in, e.g., the Socratic maieutic art—and by therapeutic man in psychoanalysis. Post-critical humanity is a retrieval of criticism as it springs from the human mind, of criticism in its roots in spontaneous intelligence and reflecting reasonableness. Post-therapeutic humanity is a retrieval of what criticism criticized, of mythic or, more broadly, symbolic consciousness, but again a retrieval *in radice*. And the root of mythic consciousness is the maternal imagination of man or *anima* or soul. Post-critical and post-therapeutic humanity takes its stand on this twofold retrieval of the roots of the stages of meaning that have preceded it.¹⁷ In so taking its stand, it ushers in a new stage of meaning. Our age is as pregnant for a radically different future as was the Greece of 800–200 B.C. that saw the emergence of criticism from myth, the *miraculum Graecum*. Interestingly enough, though purely by coincidence, Jung has predicted, on the basis of dreams, another period of roughly 600 years before the new stage of meaning, or the “new religion” as he put it, has taken firm hold.¹⁸ In the meantime, there will be much darkness and

¹⁶ On the relation between the control of meaning and cultural epochs, see Bernard Lonergan, “Dimensions of Meaning,” in F. E. Crowe, ed., *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. 252–267.

¹⁷ On the stages of meaning; see Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 85f.

¹⁸ See Max Zeller, “The Task of the Analyst,” *Psychological Perspectives*, (Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring, 1975), esp. p. 75, where Zeller relates a dream that was visited upon him at the very end of a three-month period in Zurich during which he was seeking to answer the question of how he was to understand what he was doing as an analyst. The dream is as follows: “A temple of vast dimensions was in the process of being built. As far as I could see—ahead, behind, right and left—there were incredible numbers of people building on gigantic pillars. I, too, was building on a pillar. The whole building process was in its very beginnings, but the foundation was already there, the rest of the building was starting to go up, and I and many others were working on it.” Jung called the temple the new religion, said it was being built by people from all over the world, and indicated that dreams of his own and others indicated that it would take 600 years until it is built. I owe to a student of mine, Bozidar Molitor, the precious insight that the dream, so interpreted, reverses the myth of the Tower of Babel.

many explorations of blind alleys, many collapses and breakdowns, wars and rumors of war. But the temple is already being built, its foundations are laid, and its eventual construction, Jung says, is something of an inevitability. That is all that matters. The foundations of the temple consist in the two mediations of immediacy, cognitive and dramatic. The lowest level of the temple begins to build on these foundations, demonstrating their capacity to complement one another in one movement of foundational subjectivity. That is where we are now. The temple is in its very beginnings, so much so that the foundations themselves need to be strengthened before building further. It must be shown that *one* temple can be built from these two sets of foundations that have opposed one another so often in human history: intentionality and psyche, spirit and soul. It must be shown that such a temple will not collapse like a house of cards in the gentlest breeze, in fact that it can sustain the torrential rains of an epochal change in human conscious performance. Neither transcendental method alone nor archetypal psychology alone can found post-critical and post-therapeutic humanity; each needs and implies the other, in fact, *implicates* the other by the very non-separability of cognition from drama and of drama from cognition. And if post-critical and post-therapeutic humanity is a temple, it is because transcendental method and archetypal psychology, in their mutual implication one of the other, both give way to the mystery beyond criticism and beyond psychology.

CRITICISM AND THE SOUL

The philosophy of self-appropriation, when limited to the dimension of spirit, is a matter of coming into possession of one's own infinite curiosity, one's unrestricted impulse for correct and thorough understanding. It is, if you want, the differentiation of the thinking function of human consciousness. But Jung, at least, speaks of three other functions of human consciousness: sensation, feeling, and intuition.¹⁹ These constitute an infrastructure of the body and the psyche. Their clarification, rendering them more self-transparent, is another matter than possessing one's unrestricted desire to know. In fact, even to raise the question of this additional self-clarification, this illumination of the dark side of life, is unsettling for the self-appropriating thinking function. For the dark side, and perhaps especially feeling, where the dark side shows its own intentionality in the function of evaluation, is a threat to thinking. Darkness penetrates the domain of light, and the light does not comprehend it. The body, sexuality, intersubjectivity, time, femininity, and the dream—these are all threatening to *animus*, to intelligent intentionality in its penetrating capacities to let light shine, to differentiate, and to conquer. For it has indeed *never* conquered in this domain, and it knows that this is the case. It

¹⁹ C. G. Jung, *Psychological Types*, translated by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Bollingen Series XX, 1971).

feels a negotiation, for that in itself would be erotic, and so it flees the question and ridicules the concern with an obscurantism that it would despise if manifested in any other dimension of human living. Its flight and ridicule widen a rift that is already the major cultural problem of our age. There are certain things that even an infinite curiosity would prefer not to be curious about, that even an unrestricted desire to know would rather not have to face. The issue is Oedipal, but in the sense of the conflict between the desire to know and the desire not to know, the intention of being and the flight from what can be understood and affirmed. Even an infinite curiosity will find certain questions unsettling.

Moreover, the questions it finds unsettling are remarkably *proximate* to the domain opened up by spirit's self-appropriation. If the appropriation of spirit is the subject coming into possession of intelligent and reasonable consciousness, the appropriation of soul is the subject coming into possession of the *two* levels that surround intelligent and reasonable consciousness, namely empirical consciousness, both dreaming and waking, and existential consciousness, particularly as it primordially apprehends values in feelings.²⁰ Somehow the marriage of spirit and soul is terribly elusive, even though they interpenetrate so fully. One abhors the other. They are indeed opposites.

And yet to call them opposites seems somewhat contradictory to what we said above, where *matter* was spirit's opposite, and where soul was said to share in both matter and spirit. This latter formulation is in fact more rigorous. But soul *does* seem more at home with matter than with spirit, and surely matter is more at home with her than spirit is. Matter is not afraid of feeling, sensation, and intuition, of the light buried within the dark side. Spirit is. Spirit fears its own corruption by the dark side—with good reason—and knows where it cannot conquer. But, being spirit and thus arrogant, it will not settle for negotiation. It would prefer to disown its very self, to cut short its questioning in the name of a strange intellectualistic

²⁰ On the levels of consciousness: "We are subjects, as it were, by degrees. At a lowest level, when unconscious in dreamless sleep or in a coma, we are merely potentially subjects. Next, we have a minimal degree of consciousness and subjectivity when we are the helpless subjects of our dreams. Thirdly, we become experiential subjects when we awake, when we become the subjects of lucid perception, imaginative projects, emotional and conative impulses, and bodily action. Fourthly, the intelligent subject sublates the experiential, i.e., it retains, preserves, goes beyond, completes it, when we inquire about our experience, investigate, grow in understanding, express our inventions and discoveries. Fifthly, the rational subject sublates the intelligent and experiential subject, when we question our own understanding, check our formulations and expressions, ask whether we have got things right, marshal the evidence *pro* and *con*, judge this to be so and that not to be so. Sixthly, finally, rational consciousness is sublated by rational self-consciousness, when we deliberate, evaluate, decide, act. Then there emerges human consciousness at its fullest. Then the existential subject exists and his character, his personal essence, is at stake." Bernard Lonergan, "The Subject," in *A Second Collection*, ed. by Bernard Tyrrell and William Ryan, p. 80. I have argued in *Subject and Psyche* for an extension of the sublations to include the sublation of dreaming consciousness by experiential, intelligent, rational, and existential consciousness.

bias, to cease being curious but in the name of intelligence! It is infinitude preoccupied with being infinite. In its preoccupation it becomes finite by obscurantism, schizophrenic. Its refusal to negotiate finitude in the body is the despair of infinitude disembodied.

And yet the advocate and ally of spirit's own self-possession, Lonergan, has, as we have seen, himself opened us upon *soul's* self-transparency. The breakthrough is significant. It is the essence of Lonergan's later development. *Insight* alone can be an alienating book. The word "alone" is important. *Insight* can also be a first step into a new epoch of human consciousness. The epoch itself will be the overcoming of alienation within human consciousness, and thus, viewed historically, *Insight* would not be alienating at all, but a contribution to wholeness and liberation. In fact, perhaps one of its principal contributions is the liberation from the illusion of a wholeness that is not self-transcending, the futility of the project of psychological redemption to which psychotherapy itself is too prone. But the book is alienating if it is taken as a complete anthropology. This is precisely what it is not. It is primarily a study of the intellectual pattern of experience. If taken as an anthropology, it encourages a dangerous rift of intelligence and reason from the body. If placed within the broader horizon established by complementing spirit's self-appropriation with soul's self-transparency, the book takes its rightful place as a contributor to human evolution. The movement of self-owning instituted by the author of *Insight* extends to soul, to a second mediation of immediacy by meaning, and such an extension opens upon an appropriation of a moral and religious subjectivity that are capable of sublating a self-owning spirit, an intellectually self-appropriating consciousness. Let it be noted that not all moral and religious subjectivity can sublimate such a consciousness. There is a moral and religious consciousness that precedes the moment of spirit's preoccupation with owning itself. This consciousness, while converted, is not self-appropriating. Moral and religious self-appropriation are hastened into being by spirit's insistence on coming of age. This occurs through soul's self-transparency. Without it, even spirit's insistence on self-owning might become immoral and irreligious, a demonic power-drive. With it, spirit's self-owning becomes spirit's self-surrender.

The surrender is to the earth. For soul is tied to body, and body is of the earth. The moral and religious consciousness that is given in soul's self-transparency is womanly consciousness, roaming the expanse of the earth, at home there, able to kiss and embrace the ground. But it is woman as wisdom, Sophia. Only woman as wisdom is transparent to herself in a second immediacy. And spirit's surrender is to wisdom, where soul performs the wedding that keeps spirit from the demonic, the wedding of spirit to body: to a moral and religious consciousness that are humble, *humilis*, of the earth, grounded, in the body, "just this."

LONERGAN AND THE *SCIENZA NUOVA*

The issue is of import for the co-operation of disciplines. But the disciplines must first find themselves. Lanza del Vasto has said that philosophy is lacking in the West, that those who talk about it and teach it do not know what it is about. They lack the joint "between what they believe, what they think, what they know, what they feel, what they want and what they do."²¹ He is correct. The joint is the self, and self's joint is soul or psyche. And yet psychology in the West does not help philosophy to find psyche. What is taught in university departments of psychology surely has nothing to do with psyche. It has in fact very little to do with humankind. It would, James Hillman says, better be called statistics, physical anthropology, cultural journalism, or animal breeding.²² If philosophy and psychology were in possession of themselves—i.e., if philosophers and psychologists were moving toward self-transparency—it would be fair to speak of the import of our issue for interdisciplinary co-operation.

Perhaps all talk of interdisciplinary co-operation is an evasion of the issue, however. Are we not really talking about an entirely new science of being human? What current so-called humanistic discipline, aside perhaps from literature, would be at home with the claims here registered? Perhaps the humanistic disciplines as we have known them are themselves passé. I suspect they are. Nonetheless, it can be maintained that the issue opened by Lonergan and extended here means at least a unity-in-differentiation of three previously separate disciplines: philosophy, depth psychology, and theology. The statement is too cautious, but nonetheless true.

Theology was not mentioned above as a discipline in trouble. This is not because theology is free of the alienation from its subject that afflict philosophy and psychology. Far from it. And who is theology's subject? The theologian: spirit and soul and body. Lonergan has provided a maieutic for theologians to employ to help them overcome alienation and the ideologies that justify it. These ideologies are usually called dogmatics or systematics. But here again, we have no more than a beginning. The method of theology is a method of *knowing*. Fair enough, since theology is knowledge. But the *atmosphere* of knowing, the drama inseparable from insight—only soul's self-transparency can provide a grid for this. And only with this is alienation overcome.

This drama, however, depends for its elucidation on an accurate understanding of insight as an activity and as knowledge. Here we locate Lonergan's contribution to the new science of the art of being human. No

²¹ Lanza del Vasto, *Return to the Source*, p. 230.

²² James Hillman, *Re-Visioning Psychology*, p. xii.

articulation of consciousness according to which being is laid out before it, and where the problem of knowledge is one of moving from "in here" to "out there" will provide us with more than a melodrama. And the essence of melodrama as opposed to drama is that it could have been avoided by understanding things correctly from the beginning. The question of how I move from "in here" to "out there" in my knowledge is not the right question, does not reflect the problem which obtains between knowing and being. The problem, Lonergan has shown, is one of advancing from the real as experienced to the real as known. The real as known is being, and to reach it one does not move from interiority to exteriority, subjectivity to objectivity. One rather passes from subjectivity as experientially objective to subjectivity as absolutely objective. And this one does by letting subjectivity be normatively objective. What constitutes the normative objectivity of subjectivity is the desire to know, and the first imperative of this desire is understanding. The drama of insight is constituted within interiority, for in addition to the desire to know there is a flight from understanding. Being is a task.

This means too that the rejection of Cartesian subjectivity cannot be made on Cartesian terms. That is, it will not do simply to deny gratuitously the alienation of subjectivity from being which Cartesian subjects gratuitously posit. The real as experienced is not the real as known, and so cannot be affirmed as real until it is known. The affirmation of an unknown as real is naïve realism. Here too there is no drama of insight. There is, in fact, not even a melodrama. There is only a kind of crude epistemological striptease. Neither Cartesian subjectivity nor naïve realism consummates the marriage of knowing and being, for neither is normatively objective. Both flee understanding, and become victims of the desire not to know which is responsible both for the drama of insight and for the failure of insight into the drama of living.

Lonergan's acknowledgment of a second mediation of immediacy by meaning is tied to an appreciation of the subject and of the objectivity of subjectivity that is more nuanced than the treatment accorded these topics in *Insight*. In fact, the development of Lonergan's thought from *Insight* to *Method in Theology* is more than a matter of greater nuance in respect to interiority. It involves something of a transformation. The subject as existential is now accorded a primacy or priority of importance previously granted to the subject as cognitional. The issue of subjectivity is now the drama of living, and cognitional analysis is intended to be in aid of that drama. A new and quite distinct level of consciousness is now acknowledged. The subject's evaluations and deliberations about decision and action are no longer reducible to the questions of whether one is being intelligent or stupid, reasonable or silly, for the human good is something distinct from the intelligent and reasonable.²³ Nothing is gainsaid of

²³ This is expressly acknowledged by Lonergan in "Insight Revisited," in *A Second Collection*, p. 277.

cognitive analysis. It is a secure, massive, and irrevocable achievement of the human mind's knowledge of itself. But it is not a sufficient anthropology, for there is more to be appropriated than one's capacity for meaning and truth.

EXISTENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS AESTHESIS

The remainder is, I believe, best understood as the *aesthetic* dimension of the subject. It is this dimension that calls for a second mediation of immediacy by meaning, one that for subjects hitherto negligent of the aesthetic may begin as therapy but that more radically is soul-making. Soul is aesthesis. And soul-making is thus the recovery of aesthetic subjectivity. If values are primordially apprehended in feelings, then aesthetics is the foundation of existential subjectivity and thus of ethics and religion. Soul-making, as the recovery of the aesthetic dimension, is the post-therapeutic basis of morals and prayer. Lonergan's opening of a distinct level of consciousness that has to do with value, dialectics, and foundations as something distinct from, including, but more than and subsuming meaning and truth, is really an opening upon aesthetic consciousness as distinct from, including, but more than and subsuming cognitive consciousness. Ethics is radically aesthetics; and the existential subject, concerned with character as his or her issue, is the aesthetic subject. Soul, beyond intelligence and reasonableness, is the key to character.

Jung was concerned with character, but ambiguously. There are romantic interpretations of his thought which seem to prescind from this concern in favor of his love of soul.²⁴ Jung's ambiguity appears above all in his somewhat confusing and inconsistent semantics of evil,²⁵ which may well conceal a hidden agenda. But character and soul are bedfellows. Character is a dance-step one must work out with soul. Character emerges from "that refining fire Where you must move in measure, like a dancer."²⁶ And the rhythm of this movement is aesthetics. What Lonergan hints at is

²⁴ I refer particularly to James Hillman's disparaging of the theme of the heroic in *Re-Visioning Psychology*. But the same intonations can be heard in more orthodox Jungian publications, e.g., in Marie-Louise von Franz, *C. G. Jung: His Myth in Our Time* (New York: C. G. Jung Foundation, 1975). Jungians can too easily overlook the correct estimation of Laurens van der Post that Jung's main concern was *consciousness*, not the unconscious. See van der Post, *Jung and the Story of Our Time*, p. 61. The fact is that raising what is dark and inferior in oneself to the same level as what is light and superior was conceived by Jung as something to be done without the surrender of the previously affirmed values, which for most of us in the West are the values inculcated by Christianity. See *ibid.*, p. 199. Perhaps the common misconception concerning Jung on this point is related to the lack of a developed image of the father in his own psyche and in his psychology. See *ibid.*, p. 79, as well as my own work, *Subject and Psyche*.

²⁵ David Burrell has offered preliminary suggestions for cleaning up Jung's language on this point. See the chapter on Jung in Burrell's *Exercises in Religious Understanding* (South Bend: Notre Dame, 1974).

²⁶ T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding," *Four Quartets* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Harvest Books, 1971), p. 55.

that the deliberating, evaluating, deciding, existential subject is also the aesthetic subject. The uppermost level of intentional consciousness is art. In its originating moment, apprehension of value in feelings, and in its terminating moment of fidelity to decision, it is radically aesthetic. Aesthetics, in its education or *Bildung*,²⁷ must pass through dialectic. For dialectic is a portion of the refining fire. Lonergan's positioning of dialectic as a matter of existential subjectivity is of the utmost significance. It is in fact a breakthrough in understanding this subtle movement of subjectivity. For it means that in the last analysis dialectic is a matter of the heart more radically than of the mind. Better, it is an issue of the *drama* of insight. It is as insight issues from the struggle with the flight from understanding that the refining fire is at work. To get stopped in dialectic is to suppose dialectic to be a matter principally of mind, and mind to be something whose significance is other than dramatic. Both suppositions are mistaken. The ulterior finality of mind or spirit is existential subjectivity. If this is true, then mind's dialectic is subordinate to and sublated by the dialectic of the heart in morality and religion. The dialectic of the heart moves toward the condition of complete simplicity, where the fire and the rose are one. This condition beyond the opposites, Eliot reminds us, costs not less than everything.²⁸ The "everything" includes even a kind of *sacrificium intellectus*, in the sense that there is another mediation beyond the cognitional. Dialectic is in the service of a story.

We may, then, safely begin from the presumption that Lonergan's *opus* constitutes an irrevocable achievement on the part of the human mind's knowledge of itself and thus an essential contribution to theology's foundations. The burden of proof surely now lies on the shoulders of one who would refute this presumption. But Lonergan's opening of consciousness upon existential subjectivity as of primary concern for itself, and thus his explorations of value, dialectic, and foundational subjectivity, still constitute no more than a problem. He has opened the door to a room which he has not furnished for us, and it is the central room of our dwelling-place, the living room. I do not fault him for this. To fault one whose achievement is unparalleled for what he has left to others to do is, to put it mildly, an irresponsible escape from accepting the possibility that one may oneself be one of those others. It also constitutes an unrealistic expectation even of genius. But one also must be realistic about one's self-expectations, and so I hasten to conclude with a comment about what we cannot claim or ambition to do. No thinker can furnish the living room. More precisely, I can furnish only my own dwelling-place, and you yours. But I can suggest where the materials are to be found and how the task of their arrangement can most artistically be approached. In this sense the task I propose, while complementary to *Insight*, is of another order. No workbook in the

²⁷ See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury, 1975), pp. 10-19.

²⁸ T. S. Eliot, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

dialectic of the heart can be written, no set of five-finger exercises for style and aesthesis proposed. The self-transparency of soul is of another order than that of spirit. All anyone can try to do is articulate its grammar and propose a semantics for understanding its process and implications. But even this is a task not yet accomplished with any adequacy by any author with whom I am familiar. Since it is the next task to be undertaken beyond that so artfully executed by Lonergan, I wager it is worth the attempt, however elusive, that I have suggested in this paper.

**AESTHETIC SUBJECTIVITY AND GENERALIZED
EMPIRICAL METHOD**

**BY
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[Reprinted from *THE THOMIST*, 43, 2, April, 1979.]

AESTHETIC SUBJECTIVITY AND GENERALIZED EMPIRICAL METHOD

THE GENERALIZED EMPIRICAL method proposed by Bernard Lonergan¹ effects a mediation through self-appropriation of the subject's intelligent, reasonable, and responsible intentionality. More precisely, the work of Lonergan is a quite thorough maieutic of intelligent and reasonable consciousness, of what Lonergan would call the second and third levels of conscious intentionality,² and a significant pointer to the other levels. The developing articulation of the dynamics of the fourth level, the level of responsible or existential consciousness, is currently the principal concern of many of Lonergan's students.³ What constitutes self-ap-

¹ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957); as applied to theology, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).

² On the levels of consciousness, see *Method in Theology*, Chapter One. Lonergan there discusses four levels. Consciousness is so structured as to move by questioning from experience of the data of sense and of the data of consciousness (the empirical level) to insight into the experienced data and conceptualization and formulation of one's insights (the intelligent level), and then to reflection on the adequacy of one's understanding and to judgment in accord with the adequacy reflectively grasped (the reasonable level), and finally to deliberation, decision, and action, i.e. to constitution of the world and of oneself (the responsible or existential level). In the lecture, "The Subject" (*A Second Collection*, edited by William F. J. Ryan, S.J., and Bernard J. Tyrrell, S.J., Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974, pp. 60-80, cf. esp. p. 80), Lonergan adds a lower level of dreaming consciousness, and in *Philosophy of God, and Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973, p. 38), he adds a highest level of religious love.

³ Scholars Press is undertaking the publication of papers delivered at the annual Lonergan Workshops held at Boston College. The volumes, edited by Frederick Lawrence, will be entitled *Lonergan Workshop*. One volume was published in 1978. Almost all of the papers in some way reflect concern with the mediation of existential subjectivity. Furthermore, an annual seminar at the American Academy of Religion meeting is devoted to the study of what Lonergan means by dialectic, a functional specialty in Lonergan's method that is correlated with the fourth level of consciousness.

appropriation of the level of consciousness concerned with evaluation, deliberation, decision, and action? The present paper proposes to advance discussion of this issue.

The core of my argument is to the effect that the self-appropriation of existential subjectivity depends on a maieutic of consciousness distinct from but complementary to that proposed by Lonergan, a second mediation of the subject as subject, a psychic mediation of one's dramatic artistry, of the aesthetic subjectivity whose concern is to make a work of art out of one's living.⁴

The aesthetic and dramatic dimension of our being attends the operations which occur at all levels of conscious intentionality. There is a drama not only to one's self-constitution as existential subject and to one's constitution of the world through decisive action but also to one's pursuit of intelligibility and truth.⁵ The drama is more than adverted to in Lonergan's

⁴It is obvious, then, that I am employing the term, aesthetic subjectivity, in a manner quite different from the usage of Hans-Georg Gadamer (*Truth and Method*, New York: Seabury, 1975). For Gadamer, the term is pejorative, and designates an immediacy of taste that would empty the work of art of its distinctive claim to truth. In my usage, the term also designates an immediacy of feeling, but to a world already mediated and constituted by meaning. As such, it is not simply the immediacy of empirical consciousness to data of sense, but permeates all of the levels of conscious intentionality disclosed by Lonergan. Thus, insights, judgments, and decisions are all dramatic events; permeating their quality as intentional operations is a dispositional character, a quality of feeling, of "mass and momentum," of energetic compositions and distributions, without which "our knowing and deciding would be paper thin" (Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 30-31). When I speak of aesthetic subjectivity, I am referring to the following facts: "Because of our feelings, our desires and our fears, our hope or despair, our joys and sorrows, our enthusiasm and indignation, our esteem and contempt, our trust and distrust, our love and hatred, our tenderness and wrath, our admiration, veneration, reverence, our dread, horror, terror, we are oriented massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning. We have feelings about other persons, we feel for them, we feel with them. We have feelings about our respective situations, about the past, about the future, about evils to be lamented or remedied, about the good that can, might, must be accomplished" (*Ibid.*, p. 31).

⁵That feeling permeates not only existential consciousness but also cognitive levels is clear from the illustrative instance of insight with which Lonergan opens the first chapter of *Insight*: Archimedes running naked from the baths of Syracuse, crying excitedly: "I've got it!" See Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 3.

repeated references in *Insight* to the struggle between the desire to know and the flight from understanding.⁶ The mediation I am proposing, then, is an objectification of the whole of conscious intentionality in its dramatic dimension. Nevertheless, its special importance emerges only when one asks whether there is an access to the data of interiority that will allow self-appropriation at the level of existential subjectivity to be as complete, as thorough, and as explanatory as that which Lonergan renders possible at the levels of intelligent and reasonable subjectivity. Thus it is not without reason that Lonergan's discussion of feelings⁷ occurs, not when he is explicating our cognitive operations, even though these too are permeated by affectivity, but when he is articulating his notion of the human good, of the concern for value that is the distinctive mark of the fourth, existential level of consciousness.

It will be obvious from my argument that I believe that the archetypal psychology of C. G. Jung contains the seeds of a potential contribution to the aesthetic mediation that is the focus of my concern. But Jung proves useful only as a consequence of a dialectical encounter between his phenomenology of individuation and Lonergan's heuristic account of human development.⁸ As it stands, without such a dialectic, Jung's project is mired in the quicksands of romanticism, in a short-circuiting of the finality of the subject due to an inadequate treatment of the problem of evil. But to discover the relation of the self-transcendence of intentionality to the psyche is to obviate the difficulties raised by Jung, whose extraordinary familiarity with the psyche was not matched by an appreciation of the self-transcendent dynamism of the imperatives of authentic consciousness.⁹

⁶ For example, *ibid.*, pp. 199-203, and pp. xif.

⁷ Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 30-34.

⁸ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, pp. 458-479.

⁹ For Lonergan, the self-transcendent capacities of the levels of intentional consciousness are normative for authenticity. Corresponding to each level is a precept, and the complex of imperatives constitutes the law of human nature. The imperatives or "transcendental precepts" are: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be

Aesthetics and the existential subject

In this section I propose to argue from Lonergan's analysis of the role of feelings at the fourth level of consciousness and from his discussion of the relationship of symbols to feelings, first, that aesthetic subjectivity in the form of dramatic artistry is the psychic correlative of moral and religious intentionality; second, that aesthetics is the basis of ethics; third, that aesthetic or dramatic self-appropriation is the key to self-appropriation at the fourth level; and fourth, that these three conclusions ground a methodological affirmation of a psychic conversion through which aesthetic self-appropriation becomes possible.

The existential subject, then, is the subject as evaluating, deliberating, deciding, acting, and in one's actions constituting

reasonable, Be responsible, Be in love. See *Method in Theology*, p. 20. The failure of the Jungian project is summarized by Paul J. Stern, *C. G. Jung: The Haunted Prophet* (New York: Dell, 1970), pp. 250 f.: "The myth of the emergence of the God-man was the culmination of Jung's quest for the great synthesis that would resolve his inner duality. This quest also led Jung to propound a variety of other syntheses: the fusion of religion and empiricism in analytic psychology; the coupling of ego and unconscious in the archetype of the self; the confluence of spirit and matter in the symbols of alchemy; the blending of the singular and the universal in the collective unconscious.

"But in the last analysis Jung's search for the Holy Grail of conjunction failed. His syntheses did not eventuate in genuine union; they were makeshift soldering jobs, contrived amalgamations, rather than transcendent integrations of the opposites.

"In the intellectual realm, Jung's great synthesis remained very much at the level of mere verbal operations whose superficialities were concealed by an impressive array of erudition. Jung's often-noted lack of lucidity, his turgid style, the leakiness of his logic, his inability to distinguish between hypotheses and facts are as many telltale signs of this lack of integration." Stern balances this harsh judgment with an appropriate recognition of Jung's intimations of forthcoming differentiations and integrations of human consciousness. I view Jung as a precursor of a very important movement in the evolution of consciousness, a movement that he could not himself systematize because of his inadequate conceptualizations concerning the intentionality of the human spirit. I have suggested elsewhere that the root of Jung's problem lies in misplacing the opposites, a fact that appears most obviously in his hopelessly jumbled treatment of the problem of evil. See "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning," in *Lonergan Workshop II* and "The Theologian's Psyche: Notes toward the Reconstruction of Depth Psychology," in *Lonergan Workshop I*. See also "Aesthetics and the Opposites," *Thought*, June, 1977.

the world and oneself. Existential consciousness is a level of consciousness distinct from but subsuming the three levels of consciousness constitutive of human knowing. It is consciousness as concerned with the good, with value, with the discrimination of what is truly worthwhile from what is only apparently good.

The discussion of the existential subject as a notion quite distinct from the cognitional subject is a relatively recent development in Lonergan's thought. It reflects the emergence of a notion of the human good as distinct from the notions of the intelligent and the reasonable. Lonergan acknowledges this development and the attendant recognition of the role of feelings in existential subjectivity.

In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and the reasonable. In *Method* the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation. Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions. Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling.¹⁰

Feelings, then, and with them the whole of the psyche, are no longer integrated by knowledge, as in *Insight*, but by self-constituting existential subjectivity. In *Insight*, the psyche "reaches the wealth and fullness of its apprehensions and responses under the higher integration of human intelligence."¹¹ In *Method in Theology*, both human intelligence and the psyche are sublated and unified by the deliberations of the existential subject, for affective apprehensions of potential values mediate between cognitive judgments of fact and existential judgments of value. The new notion of the good, then, involves a relocation of the significance of the psyche for generalized empirical method.

¹⁰ Bernard Lonergan, "Insight Revisited," *A Second Collection*, p. 277.

¹¹ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 726. The psyche is implicitly defined in terms of "a sequence of increasingly differentiated and integrated sets of capacities for perceptiveness, for aggressive or affective response, for memory, for imaginative projects, and for skillfully and economically executed performance." *Ibid.*, p. 458.

The import of this relocation becomes more pronounced when we consider the relationship of symbols to the feelings in which values are first apprehended. "A symbol is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling."¹² One's affective capacities, dispositions, and habits "can be specified by the symbols that awaken determinate affects and, inversely, by the affects that evoke determinate symbols."¹³ Thus "affective development, or aberration, involves a transvaluation and transformation of symbols. What before was moving no longer moves; what before did not move now is moving. So the symbols themselves change to express the new affective capacities and dispositions."¹⁴ And affective capacities and dispositions, as we have seen, initiate one's existential response to potential values and satisfactions. They are the effective orientation of one's being.¹⁵

The transformation and transvaluation of symbols, then, goes hand in hand with one's affective development. But it can be understood only when one realizes that symbols follow other laws than those of rational discourse.¹⁶ The function of symbols is to meet a need for internal communication that rational procedures cannot satisfy.¹⁷ The elemental, pre-objectified meaning of symbols finds its proper context in this pro-

¹² Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 64.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹⁶ "For the logical class the symbol uses a representative figure. For univocity it substitutes a wealth of multiple meanings. It does not prove but it overwhelms with a manifold of images that converge in meaning. It does not bow to the principle of excluded middle but admits the *coincidentia oppositorum*, of love and hate, of courage and fear, and so on. It does not negate but overcomes what it rejects by heaping up all that is opposite to it. It does not move on some single track or on some single level, but condenses into a bizarre unity all its present concerns." *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁷ "Organic and psychic vitality have to reveal themselves to intentional consciousness and, inversely, intentional consciousness has to secure the collaboration of organism and psyche. Again, our apprehensions of values occur in intentional responses, in feelings; here too it is necessary for feelings to reveal their objects and, inversely, for objects to awaken feelings. It is through symbols that mind and body, mind and heart, heart and body communicate." *Ibid.*, pp. 66 f.

cess of internal communication. The interpretation of the symbol thus has to appeal to this context and to its associated images and feelings.¹⁸

Such an interpretation of symbols and of their relation to feelings and to the intention of value is obviously significant for one's evaluation of the significance of dreams. Thus Lonergan manifests a clear sympathy for those schools of dream interpretation that think of the dream "not as the twilight of life, but as its dawn, the beginning of the transition from impersonal existence to presence in the world, to constitution of one's self in one's world."¹⁹ Later I shall argue for the privileged position of the dream in the task of internal communication that is the proper role of symbols for human consciousness. For the moment, though, I wish simply to correlate what I mean by aesthetic subjectivity with the dimension of our being marked by the reciprocal influence of symbols and feelings in our initial response to values. Aesthetic subjectivity is the psychic correlative of our intentional existential orientation in the world mediated by meaning.²⁰ Already it would

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 69. This represents a different evaluation of the function of the dream from that proposed by Lonergan in *Insight*, pp. 194-196.

²⁰ That there must be such a psychic correlative is argued also by Lonergan in *Insight*: "Man's concrete being involves

(1) a succession of levels of higher integration, and
(2) a principle of correspondence between otherwise coincidental manifolds on each lower level and systematizing forms on the next higher level. Moreover, these higher integrations on the organic, psychic, and intellectual levels are not static but dynamic systems; they are systems on the move; the higher integration is not only an integrator but also an operator; and if developments on different levels are not to conflict, there has to be a correspondence between their respective operators.

"... On the intellectual level the operator is concretely the detached and disinterested desire to know. It is this desire, not in contemplation of the already known, but headed towards further knowledge, orientated into the known unknown. The principle of dynamic correspondence calls for a harmonious orientation on the psychic level, and from the nature of the case such an orientation would have to consist in some cosmic dimension, in some intimation of unplumbed depths that accrued to man's feelings, emotions, sentiments. Nor is this merely a theoretical conclusion, as R. Otto's study of the non-rational element in the *Idea of the Holy* rather abundantly indicates." *Insight*, p. 532. Cf. also pp. 546 f.:

appear that a disciplined exploration of one's psychic being would complement intentionality analysis and would mediate one's self-appropriation especially of the existential level of one's being. Through such an exploration, one would be investigating the aesthetic or dramatic dimension of one's moral and religious responses. There must be a psychological contribution to the position on the subject, one that would aid especially moral and religious self-appropriation and that would facilitate the sublation of an intellectually self-appropriating consciousness by moral and religious subjectivity.²¹ Such a mediation would contribute to the articulation of what Lonergan calls foundational reality,²² i.e., to the basic explanatory and dialectical position on the subject.

Lonergan has articulated foundational reality in terms of religious conversion, moral conversion, and intellectual conversion. But neither religious nor moral conversion is a matter of religious or moral self-appropriation. Neither is a matter of explanatory self-knowledge, as is intellectual conversion.²³

"[The] unrestricted openness of our intelligence and reasonableness not only is the concrete operator of our intellectual development but also is accompanied by a corresponding operator that deeply and powerfully holds our sensitive integrations open to transforming change. . . . Man's explanatory self-knowledge can become effective in his concrete living only if the content of systematic insights, the direction of judgments, the dynamism of decisions can be embodied in images that release feeling and emotion and flow spontaneously into deeds no less than words." In "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning," I have identified the sensitive operator as psychic energy and have related my understanding of this sensitive dynamism to Jung's.

²¹ On the sublations here referred to, see Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 241-243. What I am seeking is a way to render moral and religious self-appropriation as much a matter of explanatory self-knowledge as is the intellectual self-appropriation aided by *Insight*. I am suggesting that we can develop a psychological self-mediation that would display the ground of one's being as a moral and religious subject, by uncovering the symbols that awaken and fail to awaken one's affective responses, and by enabling one to trace the story of the transvaluation of symbols in one's sensitive orientation.

²² See Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 267-269.

²³ Strictly speaking, intellectual conversion has two meanings for Lonergan. There is a sense in which, as Lonergan says, the Church reached intellectual conversion at the Council of Nicaea. That is, a particularly vexing and critical problem was resolved by the exercise of human intelligence as orientated beyond the *priora*

The position on foundational reality would seem to demand some explanatory understanding of religious and moral conversion.²⁴ In effect, what I am suggesting amounts to the affirmation of a psychic conversion that would be the base of moral and religious self-appropriation, that would play the same function in explanatory existential self-knowledge as the aesthetic dimension of subjectivity itself plays in the decisions of the concrete existential subject. As aesthetic subjectivity is the ground of moral and religious response, by being the locus of the apprehension of values, so aesthetic self-appropriation is the ground of moral and religious self-appropriation. Authentic self-appropriation in an explanatory mode is conditional upon the release of the capacity to disengage in explanatory fashion the orientation of one's spontaneous symbolic system on the move. This release is psychic conversion. As contributing to explanatory existential self-understanding, it aids the sublation of intellectual conversion by a moral and religious conversion that are advancing in a mediated possession of

quoad nos to an affirmation of the *priora quoad se*, even though the latter affirmation involves prescinding from the familiarity of images that correspond to the content of one's affirmation. Thus the meaning of the Nicene definition of consubstantiality was expressed by Athanasius: "All that is said of the Father is also to be said of the Son, except that the Son is Son, and not Father." See Bernard Lonergan, *The Way to Nicene: The Dialectical Development of Trinitarian Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976), p. 47. But this exercise of human intelligence was not mediated to itself by cognitional analysis. The Nicene definition issues from intelligence in act, but is not accompanied by a reflective account of what precisely one is doing when one is so using one's intelligence. The second and most proper meaning of intellectual conversion is the change in one's being brought about by cognitional analysis. Thus Lonergan in *Method in Theology* equates intellectual conversion with this explanatory self-understanding in the third stage of meaning. Intellectual conversion is a liberation from long-ingrained habits of thought and speech about one's knowledge, a liberation "that is to be had only when one knows precisely what one is doing when one is knowing." See pp. 238-240.

²⁴ Explanatory understanding is not critical grounding but critical mediation. Moral and religious conversion are self-grounding, self-authenticating. Explanatory understanding of them would move beyond descriptive phenomenology to a formulation based on insights that fix terms and relations by one another: i.e. beyond the *priora quoad nos* to the *priora quoad se*.

themselves, i.e. the moral and religious subjectivity of interiorly differentiated consciousness in the third stage of meaning.²⁵

The mediation of aesthetic subjectivity

In an attempt to grasp the immanent intelligibility of an explanatory mediation of aesthetic subjectivity, I suggest that we begin with an interpretation of Lonergan's writings and of what we are about in studying his work. Let us regard the thought of Lonergan as the mediation by meaning of our intentional immediacy. Lonergan provides us with at least one statement that encourages such an interpretation. "Besides the immediate world of the infant and the adult's world mediated by meaning, there is the mediation of immediacy by meaning when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method and when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy."²⁶ Obviously the immediacy mediated by meaning in these two processes is not that of the infant, who lives exclusively in a world of immediacy, but that of the adult, of the subject who lives in a world mediated and constituted by meaning and motivated by

²⁵ The third stage of meaning is the epoch in the history of consciousness upon which we are called to enter in our time, an epoch in which meaning is controlled neither by practicality nor by theory but by a differentiation of consciousness that occurs through explanatory self-understanding on the part of human interiority. See Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 93-96. As intellectual conversion, so psychic conversion can have two meanings. The first is analogous to the intellectual conversion in *actu exercito* manifested in the Nicene treatment of consubstantiality. It is manifest in many religious and literary documents and in the lives of countless men and woman even in the first, common-sense stage of meaning. It corresponds to the first meaning of genuineness in Lonergan's treatment of this topic in *Insight* (see p. 475). The second and proper meaning, however, is the third-stage meaning I am giving to the term in this paper: the release of the capacity to disengage in explanatory fashion—with terms and relations fixing one another—the dynamic process of one's spontaneous symbolic sensitivity on the move. As such, it is dependent on intellectual conversion and *per consequens* on moral and religious conversion. See Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 243, for a treatment of intellectual conversion as following upon religious and moral conversion.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

value.²⁷ The immediacy that itself is mediated by meaning in transcendental method and in psychotherapy is an intentional immediacy to the human world, to a world mediated and constituted by meaning.

Transcendental method and psychotherapy are similar processes, then, in so far as they render known what previously was conscious but not objectified. In the one case this is the structure of intentional cognitional operations, in the other the energetic compositions and distributions that are one's feelings.²⁸ Nonetheless, there is a significant difference between the two processes, for transcendental method aims at an explanatory self-understanding, where the terms and relations of intentional process fix one another. Psychotherapy is neither so thorough nor so explicitly explanatory in its objective. Nonetheless, as we shall see, it *does* provide us with a clue to our solution. Perhaps a heuristic structure of psychotherapies would point the way to a mediation of explanatory knowledge of the aesthetic and dramatic components of our being.²⁹ Basic to this heuristic structure would be a distinction between primordial immediacy and second immediacy.

Primordial immediacy is the experiential infrastructure of conscious human performance. It is the subject as dreaming, experiencing, inquiring, understanding, conceiving, formulating, reflecting, judging, deliberating, evaluating, deciding, acting. Its basic structure has been disengaged by Lonergan's intentionality analysis. Second immediacy is the mediated recovery of primordial immediacy through explanatory self-appropriation, through transcendental or generalized empirical method, which, strictly speaking, mediates not only cognitional process but the

²⁷ See Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," in *Collections: Papers by Bernard Lonergan*, edited by Frederick E. Crowe (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. 252-255.

²⁸ On feelings as intentional, see Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 80-83.

²⁹ On the need for a heuristic structure of psychotherapies, see Bernard Tyrrell, "'Dynamics of Christotherapy' and the Issue of a *De Jure* Psychotherapeutic Pluralism" in *Lonergan Workshop II*.

process and structure of intentionality as a whole. But because of the origin of the fourth level of intentional consciousness in the affective apprehension of values by feelings, explanatory self-appropriation of existential consciousness will be dependent upon an explanatory mediation of affectivity, of authentic subjectivity, of dramatic artistry. And because the levels of cognitive consciousness are continuous, not only in an upward moving direction with existential consciousness, but also in a downward moving direction with dreaming consciousness, it seems reasonable to propose that the dream's significance reaches up to existential subjectivity, indeed that it might be the key to the knowledge not only of existential consciousness but to the aesthetic and dramatic dimension that permeates the single thrust of intentional consciousness to intelligibility, truth, reality, and value.³⁰

The negotiation of one's dreams may begin in a psychotherapeutic context, but their finality and ultimate significance must be extended beyond the narrow confines of ordinary psychotherapy and into the context provided by the third stage of

³⁰ This proposal is obviously not without its difficulties. First, two leading proponents of a hermeneutic of dreams, Freud and Jung, are dialectically opposed to one another as far as their interpretative principles are concerned. Furthermore, I will disagree with both Freud and Jung. Secondly, a leading philosophical investigator of Freud, Paul Ricoeur, has relegated dreams to the lowest level of symbols, the level of sedimented symbolism with nothing but a past. See Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, translated by Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale, 1970, pp. 504-506). Thirdly, many psychologists have turned from the depth therapy that works with dreams to the height therapies that concentrate on conscious but unobjectified cognitive and existential orientations. Nonetheless, Bernard Tyrrell, an advocate of the height-therapy approach, has indicated that my position emphasizing depth approaches and his concentration on height therapies are complementary. See his paper referred to in the previous footnote. While I concur with Tyrrell's judgment, I also admit that, before the dream can function as central to an explanatory mediation of affectivity, and so of existential subjectivity, its function in the infrastructure of primordial immediacy will have to be both clarified and vindicated. Several of my own papers are contributions to this task, most notably "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning." Because of the complexity of the issue, I can do no more here than refer the reader to this paper and to my book, *Subject and Psyche: Ricoeur, Jung, and the Search for Foundations* (Washington: University Press of America, 1977).

meaning, whose base is transcendental method as articulated by Lonergan. Then it will be acknowledged that the same dreams that provide some forms of psychotherapy with a principal source of data on the client are in fact dramatic ciphers in a symbolic mode of the emergence or failure of emergence of authentic intentionality.³¹ From the standpoint of my position on psychic conversion, the negotiation of dreams is basically the mediation of the drama that permeates the struggle between the dynamism for self-transcendence and the inertial counterweight of self-absorption, and particularly as this drama affects our sensitive consciousness. Dreams provide materials for one's work of dramatic artistry, images for insight, reflection, and decision in the forging of a work of dramatic art. They provide access to the plots and themes³² that are operative in both one's cognitional structuring and one's decisive shaping of the world. They provide to consciousness an accessibility to the sometimes otherwise mute intentionality of the subject. They interpret the subject in his or her dispositional immediacy to the world mediated by meaning, his or her affective and so real self-transcendence.³³

Jung calls the capacity of waking consciousness to negotiate the imaginal configurations of dreams the transcendent function.³⁴ Transposing Jung's insight into the framework of a gen-

³¹ I have argued this rather major claim in the last-mentioned paper and book. To verify and affirm the claim for oneself, however, one must be thoroughly familiar with the dimensions of one's subjectivity which Lonergan has disclosed. My statement of the function of dreams departs somewhat from that presented by Lonergan in *Insight*, pp. 194-198, though it is consonant with his few remarks on dreams in *Method in Theology*. In a public dialogue session at the 1977 Boston College Workshop, Lonergan indicated agreement with my restatement of the position of *Insight* on the dream.

³² On the distinction of plots and themes, see Joseph Flanagan, "Aesthetic Conversion," in *Lonergan Workshop II*.

³³ On dispositional immediacy as distinct from but interlocked with cognitional immediacy, see Robert Doran, *Subject and Psyche*, Chapter Two.

³⁴ C. G. Jung, "The Transcendent Function," in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, Vol. 8: *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, translated by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series XX, 1969), pp. 67-91.

eralized empirical method as proposed by Lonergan, we might say that, when the transcendent function becomes habitual, it enables the existential subject to receive, interpret, affirm, evaluate, and negotiate symbolic materials for the drama of one's emergence as an authentic subject. I regard the transcendent function so understood to be conditioned by psychic conversion.

The function of psychic conversion within generalized empirical method may be understood, then, in terms of the relations of sublation that obtain among the various levels of consciousness. Lonergan has spoken of the sublation of the sensitive stream by understanding, of sensitivity and understanding by reasonable judgment, and of experience, understanding, and judgment by existential subjectivity. The operators of these successive sublations are, respectively, questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, and questions for deliberation. But prior to waking experience, there is dreaming consciousness. It is in the dream that we first become conscious. And so in addition to the sublations specified by Lonergan, there is the sublation of the dream by waking consciousness through memory, and then by understanding, judgment, and decision. The dream is a set of symbols arranged in a dramatic sequence, whose meaning can be read by interpretative understanding and reasonable judgment, and in whose regard decisive action can be taken by the existential subject. Dream symbols are operators effecting the internal communication of organism, psyche, and mind. The ground theme of the internal communication is set by the concerns of the dramatic artist to make a work of art out of his or her life, by the inescapable task of the existential subject as free and responsible constitutive agent of the human world. This ground theme is the basic a priori of human consciousness. It is this theme that promotes human experience to understanding by means of questions for intelligence, and understanding to truth by means of questions for reflection. So too this basic a priori promotes knowledge into action, but in a thetic and constitutive manner, through questions for deliberation. The data for these questions are appre-

hended in feelings; the feelings are linked with symbols; and the symbols that tell the story of the dramatic base of our existential performance are unlocked in our dreams. This narrative can be understood, the understanding can be affirmed as correct, and the self-knowledge thus gained can be employed in the ongoing constitution of one's world and concomitantly of oneself. Such is the basic scheme of the contribution of psychic conversion to our development. The ultimate intentionality of psychic conversion is thus coextensive with the total sweep of conscious intentionality. Through psychic conversion, the psyche is conscripted into the single transcendental dynamism of human consciousness toward the authenticity of self-transcendence.

It may be, too, that psychic conversion throws special light on the first of the transcendental precepts that Lonergan links with the levels of consciousness: Be attentive. Psychic conversion allows us to speak of attentiveness as contemplation, letting-be, listening, responsivity, active receptivity. With the release of the transcendent function, dream interpretation consists in the attentive reception of dreams as already interpretative of the subject in his or her dramatic artistry; in insight into what is thus received; in the reflective judgment that the insight is correct; and in the responsible negotiation of this self-knowledge in the thetic projects of the existential subject.

The unconscious and the dream

The psyche of the dreaming subject frequently is called the unconscious. More properly, though, it is better conceived as the beginning of consciousness. What is unconscious is all energy in the universe that is not present to itself. Energetic compositions and distributions at the neural level are elevated to consciousness in the systematization and representation granted them by the dream. At this point energy becomes psychic energy. It is informed not just physically, chemically, and botanically, but psychologically. The underlying neural manifold so integrates its own physical and chemical aggregates

as to promote its elevation to the higher integration of the dream. The dream thus discloses in sensitive consciousness a complex of underlying physiological transformations. It integrates these transformations by granting them psychic representation in the form of elemental symbols. These symbols then can find their own higher integration as they are sublated into waking consciousness through memory, into intelligent consciousness by insight, into truthful consciousness by reflective understanding of the adequacy of one's insight, and into responsible consciousness by decisions which in turn will operate further transformations of the underlying sensitive manifold. Dream symbols thus provide materials for one's work of dramatic art.

Our understanding of psychic energy is still quite rudimentary. We know that there are different kinds of dreams or, better, different kinds of symbols that integrate underlying physiological transformations. We can list at least seven ideal types. The first have to do with dreams of the night, the other six with dreams of the morning.⁸⁶

Dreams of the night will not concern us here, for the reasons that they involve merely a psychic integration of physiological processes, are very seldom subject to recall, and are usually devoid of existential or dramatic significance. Dreams of the morning, however, have to do with the materials presented to one's dramatic pattern of experience for the shaping of a work of living artistry. The figures and themes of these dreams may take six distinct forms. Two of these are personal, one archetypal, one anagogic, one prophetic, and one synchronistic.

Personal dreams of the morning may be either primarily symbolic or almost entirely literal in their meaning. What qualifies

⁸⁶ On the distinction of dreams of the night and dreams of the morning, see Bernard Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," p. 263. The distinction is, I believe, not so much temporal as existential. Dreams of the night are occasioned by somatic disturbance. In dreams of the morning, "the existential subject, not yet awake and himself, still is already busy with the project that shapes both him himself and his world" (*Ibid.*). Lonergan here draws from Ludwig Binswanger and Rollo May.

them as personal is that the figures in these dreams are taken from the acquaintances of one's own dramatic existence, and that the themes relate directly to this existence. But in some instances the figures and places are symbolic of complexes or undercurrents in one's own psychological interiority and in other instances they mean the actual personages and locations they represent. Moreover, the dream does not attempt to read the events in one's existential living against a background of more universal significance. Thus, in a fundamentally literal personal dream, one meets one's boss, with whom in waking life one has an unspoken strained relationship. In the dream one bites the bullet and begins to assert oneself and one's own intentions in a more forthright manner. The dream is quite direct. Nor is it in all likelihood a matter of Freudian wish-fulfillment, but is better interpreted as an indication of a real existential possibility, desirability, necessity. A bit more symbolically, a graduate student struggling through a make-it-or-break-it course from an extremely demanding teacher dreams of being pursued, hunted, by the professor, who is intent on killing or decisively wounding him. More symbolically still, a man is about to cross a bridge suspended over a dangerous chasm, but just before he sets foot on the bridge it collapses into the ravine below. It is not time to attempt a transition, to "cross the great water."¹⁶

Dreams become archetypal to the extent that the symbolic figures that constitute them, whether they be taken from one's personal waking life or are strangers, assume a more universal and usually mysterious significance permeated with deeply resonant emotion. The themes of archetypal dreams are taken from the more or less universal mythical reflections of human possibility embodied in the traditional lore of many widely divergent nations and cultures. Certain symbols lend them-

¹⁶ This is an expression that frequently appears in the Chinese book of oracles, *I Ching* or *Book of Changes*. On the *I Ching* and Christian discernment of spirits, see Vernon Gregson, "Chinese Wisdom and Ignatian Discernment," *Review for Religious*, Vol. 93, no. 4, July, 1974, pp. 828-835.

selves easily to archetypal significance and interpretation: water, fire, maternal symbols, animals. But these symbols, as in personal symbolic dreams, are imitative analogues of the natural figures they represent. A maternal symbol means, not one's personal mother, but the life-giving or destructive powers of nature. And the symbol is set into a context in which it participates in a story that is clearly mythical in its significance. In such dreams, the process of one's existential living is interpreted against the backdrop of more or less universal human themes of development and decline.

Anagogic dreams differ from archetypal dreams in that the context in which they set the symbols they employ is an ultimate context of human redemption or loss. Anagogic symbols may be taken from nature but their meaning is super-natural. Thus a Christian mystic may dream on the night between Holy Thursday and Good Friday of a conflict that represents the drama of human salvation being remembered and celebrated by his church community at this time. The meaning of anagogic dreams is even more ineffable than that of archetypal dreams. Contemplation of the ultimate mystery alone begins to be an appropriate existential response, for such dreams are most likely to be interpreted as originating more or less directly from the realm of absolute transcendence. While a correct philosophical theology will regard God as the first agent in every event, and thus also in every dream, there are some dreams in which the process of universal instrumentality⁸⁷ engages the individual subject directly as a principal actor in world constitution or discloses to him immediately an ultimate context of love and awe.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ On universal instrumentality, see Bernard Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, edited by J. Patout Burns (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp. 80-84.

⁸⁸ The distinction of archetypal and anagogic meaning is Northrop Frye's, and appears in *The Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 116-138. I have drawn on it in an effort to provide a needed differentiation of symbols beyond that arrived at by Jung. For Jung, the self is "a borderline concept, expressing a reality to which no limits can be set." C. G. Jung, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12: *Psychology and Alchemy*. (Prince-

Prophetic dreams may be either literal or symbolic, and the symbolism may be personal, archetypal, or anagogic. What these dreams do is actually foretell an event that will occur in the external drama of human life. Synchronistic dreams, which also may be either literal or symbolic, reflect an external event that is occurring at the same time it is being dreamt. In either prophetic or synchronistic dreams, there is not so much a challenge to a decision as the reporting of a fact.

As indicated above, our scientific understanding of the energetic processes that are integrated in these different varieties of dreams is extraordinarily incomplete. Obviously what is occurring is that unconscious neural-physiological process is finding a higher integration in psychic representation. It is entering into consciousness, and will find yet higher forms of conscious integration to the extent the dream is remembered, understood correctly, and responded to in attitude or, as the case may be, decision. But, despite our relatively inchoate understanding of psychic energy, it is possible to indicate heuristically the method that must be employed in studying it. The method is genetic, for the basic heuristic assumption is development. A study of development demands an appreciation of the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of the world of possible experience, understanding, and judgment. Such dynamism is finality as a present fact heading for fuller being, more specifically differentiated perfection. Finality is unconsciously operative in neural process, but is elevated to consciousness in the dream and is conscripted into the conscious intention of a living work of art by the psychically converted subject genuinely engaged in the dramatic pattern of experience.²⁰

ton: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series XX, 1970, p. 355). Such a notion is inflationary. Anagogic ciphers of absolute transcendence are images of God's action or call, not properly speaking of the self.

²⁰ The notions of finality, development, genetic method, and genuineness are explained in Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, Chapter 15. I have related them more amply to psychic energy in "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning."

The transcendental imagination

There are many correspondences between the imaginal configurations mediated through psychic conversion and the Kantian-Heideggerian transcendental imagination.⁴⁰ But the latter is transposed out of the formalism of German philosophy and into the context of a maieutic of concrete subjectivity. For Heidegger, the transcendental imagination institutes primordial time, not only as the form of inner sense, but as the very constitution of the immediacy of understanding and mood that is *Dasein*. But the time-structure of imagination, and thus of our concern for the world, is fragile and disproportionate. Thus existential psychiatry would regard neurosis as the victory of a temporal disproportion. Anxiety weights the disproportion in favor of the future, guilt in favor of the past. In either case, the spontaneity of the subject is paralyzed. At the extremes of either disproportion, the subject utters the "I am nothing" of depression or the "I am everything" of inflationary schizophrenia, and not the "I am this" of self-possession. The recovery of the primordial time-structure of one's immediacy is thus therapeutic. It involves a progressive and cumulative reconciliation of the duality of human subjectivity.

The opposites are, I believe, best formulated by Lonergan, for whom there is a tension in all development between limitation and transcendence.⁴¹ In human development, this tension is conscious. It is a tension between the self as one is and the self as one is to be. It is appropriately negotiated by correct apprehensions of the starting-point, the term, and the process between them at any stage of one's development, so that there is a correspondence between the facts of one's development and one's apprehension of these facts. Coincident respectively with limitation and transcendence, one may, at least descriptively, list past and future, body and intentionality, matter and spirit,

⁴⁰ For Heidegger's retrieval—some would say mauling—of the transcendental imagination from Kant's first critique, see Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951).

⁴¹ See Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, pp. 472-475.

instinct and archetype, potentiality and project, origin and outcome, the unconscious and consciousness. The psyche is essential to the establishment of the reconciliation of these related dualities.⁴² It functions by releasing images that integrate underlying biological manifolds but that are also the materials for insight, reflection, and decision in the forging of a work of dramatic art. The images reflect in a personal, archetypal, or anagogic fashion the present economy of the duality of the subject. The reconciliation of the duality, however, is not to be conceived of as a removal. The opposition is ineluctable.⁴³ But it is destructive of dramatic artistry only when it is displaced by bias and consequent misunderstanding. As Paul Ricoeur insists in *Fallible Man*⁴⁴ and Lonergan in his treatment of genuineness,⁴⁵ the disproportion is ontological, not psychological. It is the disproportion of infinitude and finitude in the human subject.

The discovery and cultivation of the psychic mediator of limitation and transcendence may begin in psychotherapy, but because its fruition is in the dramatic stage of life, the process of a differentiated psychic self-transparency is better understood as a matter of aesthetics than of psychotherapy. If values are apprehended in feelings, aesthetic subjectivity lies at the basis of existential subjectivity, or morals and religion. Lonergan

⁴² See C. G. Jung, "On the Nature of the Psyche," *Collected Works*, Vol. 8: *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, pp. 169-234. The mediatory role of the psyche is located heuristically by Lonergan, for whom human development is a matter of the appropriate interlocking of organic, psychic, and intellectual development. "In the organism both the underlying manifold and the higher system are unconscious. In intellectual development both the underlying manifold of sensible presentations and the higher system of insights and formulations are conscious. In psychic development the underlying neural manifold is unconscious and the supervening higher system is conscious. . . . Organic, psychic, and intellectual development (in the human subject) are not three independent processes. They are interlocked with the intellectual providing a higher integration of the psychic and the psychic providing a higher integration of the organic." Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, pp. 407, 400-470.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 474.

⁴⁴ Paul Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, translated by Charles Kelbley (Chicago: Regnery).

⁴⁵ Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, pp. 475-478.

gan's opening of generalized empirical method upon a fourth, existential level of consciousness concerned not with intelligibility or truth but with value is also an opening of method onto aesthetic consciousness. Ethics is radically aesthetics, and the existential subject for whom the issue is one of personal character is at base the aesthetic subject, the dramatic artist.

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Jungian Psychology and Lonergan's Foundations: A Methodological Proposal

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ABSTRACT

A theology is subject to the theologian who constructs it, and the theologian is subject to what has been disclosed in his or her individuality. The foundations of a theology lie in the intellectual, moral, religious, and affective development of the theologian. Jung's psychology as a maieutic of the psychic constituents of individuality can complement Lonergan's intentionality analysis in disclosing the concrete subjectivity that structures theology. The paper argues the complementarity issues from dialectic.

Methodological considerations are treated first. Eight points are asserted and defended. First, Jungian psychology is seen as a disclosure of experience, not as a conceptualistic determination of reality. It is a negotiation of sensitive psychological complexes, objectified in story, and integrated into ongoing development. Second, Jungian psychology is thus pertinent for the existential—as distinct from and subsuming the intellectual—portion of theological foundations. Third, the teleological orientation of Jung's psychology gives it a relatively more adequate status in this regard than is enjoyed by Freudian psychoanalysis. The respective views of Jung and Freud on psychic energy are contrasted in the context of Lonergan's treatment of human development. Fourth, symbols are related to energetic transformations, and, fifth, it is shown how this correlation makes Jungian psychology not simply parallel to, but an integral feature of, a fully transcendental method. Sixth, I posit a notion of psychic conversion to complement Lonergan's intellectual, moral, and religious conversions. Seventh, the need of psychic conversion within Lonergan's method is asserted, and the room for it there is indicated. Eighth, the significance of my addition for political theology is stated and explained.

The paper then moves to stating the implications of such a foundational complement both for theology and for Jungian psychology itself. Theology's method, modalities of education, and categories are treated, as is the subjectivity of the theologian. The changes called for in Jungian psychology as a result of its contact with methodical theology occur in both the praxis of individuation and in the theoretical superstructure. In the area of praxis, the heuristic notion shifts from wholeness to self-transcendence. In the order of theory, three changes are highlighted: the clearer delineation of the tripartite constitution of the human person—spirit, psyche, organism—already anticipated by Jung; the Jungian understanding of the symbolic significance of Christ; and the need to distinguish archetypal from anagogic dimensions of symbolism, thus effecting a change in the Jungian understanding of evil.

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The archetypal psychology of Carl Gustav Jung has for several decades aroused considerable interest in the Christian and Jewish theological communities (Heisig). For the past seven years, I have been attempting to meet some of the fundamental issues that are at stake in the dialogue among theologians and Jungian psychologists. The present paper represents a synthetic statement of the cumulative advances in my own thinking over this period (Doran).

Protestant theologian Bernard Loomer has written that "theology is subject to what has been disclosed in the concreteness of individuality" (1974). The extensive work in theological methodology done by the Roman Catholic theologian, Bernard Lonergan (1957, 1972), enables us to recognize that Loomer's prescription is not simply a description of our contemporary theological situation, but expresses an inevitability. An historically conscious age, mindful of cultural pluralism and relativity, is becoming aware of the structuring role of the theologian as subject in the development of any theology at any stage of the history of consciousness. Theology is subject to the theologian who constructs it, and the theologian is subject to what has been disclosed in one's intellectual, moral, religious, and psychic individuality. For any theologian to articulate the foundations of theology is for that theologian to discover and appropriate the self as an intellectual, moral, religious, and psychic subject of self-transcendent operations in the cognitive and existential orders.

In this light, the potential significance and fruitfulness of the Jungian maieutic of selfhood for a methodologically grounded theology becomes clear. The whole point of the Jungian-guided process of conscious individuation lies in the discovery and appropriation of the psychic constituents of one's concrete subjectivity, as these are revealed in the elemental symbols of dreams, twilight imaging (Proffoff), and associative fantasy. Jungian psychology, it seems, can function for the theologian at the level of psychic self-appropriation in a manner analogous to the functioning of the intentionality analysis of Lonergan at the level of intellectual self-appropriation. As Lonergan's cognitional theory helps one to answer the question, "What am I doing when I am knowing?" so Jungian psychological analysis promotes the self-appropriation of what one has done and is doing to create a work of dramatic art out of the materials of one's life: a human story

with a meaning, with a direction, and with the integrity that comes from heightening and expanding one's consciousness through negotiating the various complexes of affect and image that constitute one's sensitive participation in the historical drama of life, and in the dialectic of history itself (Lonergan, 1957: chaps. 7, 18 and 20). In each instance, with Lonergan as with Jung, there is a disclosure of the concreteness of individuality, and so an appropriation of a portion of the foundations of one's affirmations and systematic understanding as a theologian.

In this paper, I will presume that the cognitional-theoretic disclosures of Lonergan and their significance for the self-appropriation of theology's foundational subjectivity are sufficiently public as to need no further exposition. Within the context set by the methodological gains that I find to accrue from Lonergan's work, I will attempt to specify the complementary significance of Jungian psychology. My paper will treat, first, a series of methodological considerations and, second, an indication of the changes that must occur in Christian theology and in Jungian psychology if the two are to prove mutually enriching.

Eight Methodological Considerations

I begin with methodological considerations, because I find that it is here that the principal difficulties have arisen in the incipient and often aborted dialogues between theology and Jungian psychology. Before we can establish the precise pertinence of Jung's psychology for the concreteness of individuality that is theology's foundational reality, we must determine just what it is that we are about in such an exercise.

First, then, when we are talking about Jungian psychology, we are referring only derivatively to a set of categories that feature in a conceptual system--ego, shadow, persona, anima, animus, archetypes, collective unconscious, etc. (Jacobi; Whitmont). Jungian psychology is primarily a praxis of psychological analysis through which the experiential base of such categories is disclosed (Adler). It is against this base that these categories are to be judged for their relative adequacy as disclosive of psychological reality. Jungian psychology is a set of existential and interpersonal exercises through which one embarks upon a journey through "inner space" that promotes the conscious and self-knowing individuation of the concrete subjectivity that one is. In this sense, Jungian psychology parallels, but in a quite distinct medium of

communication, the set of exercises for the appropriation of one's intelligence and rationality in act that Lonergan presents in *Insight* as cognitional theory. And the theologically foundational role of Jungian psychology, like that of Lonergan's work in transcendental method, is not primarily but only derivatively categorical, conceptual, and theoretical. Here as elsewhere, praxis grounds theory. In the case of Lonergan, the praxis of understanding grounds the theory of understanding. In the case of Jung, the praxis of individuation grounds the theory of individuation. And for the theologian, the praxis of Jungian analysis grounds any attempt at correlating or mediating theological and depth-psychological categories. The question of the pertinence of Jungian psychology for theology must be pushed back one step, to become the question of the pertinence of Jungian analysis for the disclosure of the concreteness of the theologian's individuality. That question can be answered only by reflection on the concrete praxis of Jungian analysis.

Through the medium of analysis, then, one discovers in an explanatory fashion the factors that have been at work either consciously or with relative unconsciousness or non-differentiation in the development of the person one has become. One negotiates these factors or complexes (Jung, 1972a:6-14) with the deliberate intention of integrating them through conscious dialectical procedures into the creation of one's own work of dramatic art. One objectifies in narrative form one's ongoing development as a conscious human subject in relation to one's own psychological depths, to the significant others in one's life, to the cultural and political drama of one's age, to the universe of being, and to the transpersonal mystery one discovers and relates to along the way /1/. Theologically pertinent questions inevitably arise in the process, but the process itself is required if the contributions of Jung to the construction of theological foundations, positions, and systematics are to bear fruit.

Secondly, Jungian psychology is pertinent for the objectification of the *existential portion* of theology's foundational reality. Theological foundations are understood by Lonergan to consist in an objectification of intellectual, moral, and religious authenticity or conversion. From such an articulation, one derives the categories that one will employ in one's theology, whether it be in the work one does to interpret, judge, and evaluate the past--research, interpretation, history, and dialectic--or in one's

assuming responsibility for speaking *in oratione recta* to one's contemporaries--doctrines, systematics, and communications (Lonergan, 1972: chap. 5). The categories are twofold. General theological categories are shared with other disciplines. Special theological categories are proper to theology. Both sets are to have a transcultural base, which is however always objectified in culturally relative formulations. The base of general theological categories is the basic method of conscious intentionality itself, the interlocking set of terms and relations that constitute the unity of empirical, intelligent, rational, and existential consciousness. The base of special theological categories, in Christian terms, is found in God's gift of love. The historically conditioned objectification of the twofold base constitutes theological foundations.

The data, then, for theological foundations are found in the operations of one's own *knowing* and *choosing* and in the process of one's *development as a religious subject*. The data in one's *knowing* are retrieved and systematized in the objectification that is possible by the time one has reached Chapter Eleven of Lonergan's *Insight*, "The Self-Affirmation of the Knower." But, as Frederick Crowe has indicated, the data on one's *choosing*, on one's existential subjectivity, are not so easily retrieved.

We can quite easily practice experiencing; we have only to open and close our eyes repeatedly. We can practice understanding, though not so easily; we have to make up problems and puzzles, or find them in a book. To practice judgment is still more difficult; in the nature of the case the judgmental process has to be slow and thorough, concerned with the real world instead of the fictitious one of artificial problems, and so cases for practice do not come readily to hand. But when we turn to decision it seems that cases for practice are excluded on principle. If it is a real decision, it involves me existentially, and then it is no mere 'practice'; if it is a mere exercise, an example chosen for the practice, then it is no real decision, for it does not involve me existentially. (Crowe: 19)

The same may be said, a fortiori, for the retrieval of the data on religious conversion and development. When one is engaged existentially, one is not practicing operations, so as to amass a field of data for self-appropriation. One is rather dramatically operating in such a way as to promote or to hinder one's very development as a person. The self-appropriation of one's moral and religious being is not achieved in the same manner as is the self-appropriation of one's intellectual and rational operations.

My second methodological consideration, then, has to do with the manner in which the theologian is to objectify the existential portion of theology's foundational subjectivity. What is existential also is dramatic, and so the appropriation of the existential is the construction, the weaving, the patterning, the telling, of *the story that is one's life*. It is precisely here that we can locate the theological significance of the techniques that have been developed by twentieth-century depth-psychological analysis. These techniques are meant to bring the subject into personal possession of the existential and dramatic significance of one's personal history. The disclosure of this significance is meant, moreover, not only to bring one to a new series of decisions through which one's self-constitution may proceed more smoothly to the realization of one's unique selfhood, but also to mediate in explanatory fashion the positive or negative significance for one's development of previous existential, decisional moments in one's life. In the interpersonal maieutic of selfhood developed by depth psychology, we find a process of existential self-mediation that parallels what Lonergan's cognitional analysis does for the subject in the intellectual order. Through this existential maieutic one gains a control of meaning through interiorly differentiated consciousness that enables one to construct the dramatic narrative of one's moral and religious being. This control of meaning is analogous to that which issues from Lonergan's cognitional analysis, in that both investigations are explanatory of one's subjective interiority.

Thirdly, I must indicate what I find to be the relative superiority of Jungian analysis over Freudian psychoanalytic techniques for this existential self-mediation. The critical grounding of a preference for Jung over Freud lies for me in Lonergan's cognitional analysis itself, and more precisely in its vigorous and repeated arguments against reductionism and in favor of the relative autonomy of the sciences of sensitive psychology and of human consciousness from the biological, chemical, and physical sciences. In terms of the constitutive notions of the science of human psychology, the radical methodological difference between Freud and Jung manifests itself in their respective treatments of psychic energy or *libido*. But let me first locate their argument in a metaphysical framework.

Lonergan suggests that we identify energy with the metaphysical element, prime potency (1957:443). Characteristic of all

development in the concrete universe of being proportionate to human experience, human understanding, and human judgment is a tension between limitation and transcendence. This tension is rooted in potency, i.e., in the individuality, continuity, coincidental conjunctions and successions, and non-systematic divergence from intelligible norms, that are to be known by the empirical consciousness of a mind intent on explanatory understanding. Potency grounds tension because it is the principle both of limitation and of the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of proportionate being that Lonergan calls finality. Prime potency is the principle of limitation of the lowest genus of proportionate being and, since each higher genus is limited by the preceding lower genus, prime potency is the universal principle of limitation for the whole range of proportionate being. Lonergan wants to conceive prime potency as a ground of quantitative limitation and to relate quantitative limitation to the properties verified by science in the quantity it names energy.

A methodological problem arises, however, when the object of scientific inquiry is the organism, or psychic sensitivity, or human intelligence itself, for in these instances, and increasingly as one moves from one to the next, "measuring loses both in significance and in efficacy." The loss in significance is due to the fact that these higher integrations in the universe are relatively independent of the exact quantities of lower manifolds. The loss in efficacy is due to the fact that the heuristic notion for explanatory understanding of organism, psyche, and intelligence is not some indeterminate function to be determined by the use of differential equations, but the general notion of development, for which quantitative measurement "possesses no assignable efficacy" (Lonergan, 1957:463). Thus when the scientific intention is one of understanding human psychic systematizations of otherwise coincidental underlying manifolds of neurological events, quantitative techniques provide little or no assistance.

Paul Ricoeur has spotted a methodological inconsistency in Freud on precisely this issue. In his exegesis of Freud's early (1895) "Project for a Scientific Psychology," Ricoeur notes that, while Freud attempted to force a mass of psychical data into a quantitative framework, he specifies no numerical law or set of laws to govern his notion of quantity, which he understood at that time as "a summation of excitation homologous to physical energy" (Ricoeur: 73). In this and later psychoanalytic works of Freud,

"the quantitative framework and the neuronic support recede into the background, until they are no more than a given and convenient language of reference which supplies the necessary constraint for the expression of great discoveries" (73).

The great discoveries, of course, are of another order than the quantitative. Despite Jung's relative imprecision of language compared to Freud, the operative heuristic notion in his thought for understanding human psychical reality approximates much more clearly the notion of development. Lonergan has defined development as "a flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of principles of correspondence and emergence" (1957: 454). The principle of emergence states that "otherwise coincidental manifolds of lower conjugate acts [events] invite the higher integration effected by higher conjugate forms" (451). The principle of correspondence is to the effect that "significantly different underlying manifolds require different higher integrations" (451). With respect to Freud and Jung, these metaphysical principles mean that energetic compositions and distributions emergent on the psychic level in the form of images and associated affects are not to be explained by moving backwards to one basic and unsurpassable desire whose real object is sexual and whose other object-relations are displacements from the sexual object. Rather, there is to be affirmed a polymorphism of human desire, with a corresponding multiformity of energetic compositions and distributions at the sensitively psychic level. For Jung, psychic energy is a surplus of energy from the standpoint of biological purposiveness. Its original orientation is upwardly but indeterminately directed. It is not tied to a destiny in reverse (Ricoeur: 452), and its changes in orientation are to be explained, not as relatively healthy or relatively neurotic *displacements*, but as *transformations*. Psychic energy has no determinate object from which to be repressively displaced. Transformation of energy occurs not by repression, but by a thoroughly natural process that occurs when the conscious subject adopts the proper attitude toward the process of energetic composition and distribution--in Jungian terms, complex formation--that constitutes what for depth psychology is called the unconscious. This proper attitude is one of therapeutically tutored attentiveness. It is learned in the interpersonal dialogue of Jungian analysis. It puts one in touch with

the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of one's psychic finality that is headed toward the fuller being that Jung designates as wholeness or individuation. Thus Jung, in contrast to Freud, adopts a teleological orientation both in his theory and in the praxis of analysis that grounds that theory (Jung, 1970b: 269-306; 1972b,d).

Fourthly, Jung correlates the transformation of psychic energy with the process of elemental symbolization (1967:121-444), and consequently provides a notion of and a familiarity with symbols that not only promote the subject's psychic self-appropriation or individuation, but that also can provide the theologian with a useful hermeneutic tool (Via) and with the foundational possibility of critically grounding the use of symbols in the construction of one's own theological positions and systematics (Doran, 1977c: chap. 6).

Freud and the early Jung regarded all fantasizing and dreaming as an intrusion of the pleasure-oriented, nonrealistic unconscious psyche into the domain of the reality principle or ego, and consequently as wishful thinking. But in Jung's mature position, fantasies and dreams are spontaneous products of a layer of subjective being that has its own distinct meaning and purpose. This purpose is to compensate for an unbalanced conscious attitude (Jung, 1971:337-341, 510-523), or, in instances where the conscious attitude is already well integrated, to complement and confirm the ego's orientation to wholeness (Jung, 1971:405-407). Fantasies and dreams thus cooperate in the interests of the transformation of energy in the direction of the wholeness of the personality. They do not merely *point to* the transformation of energy, but *give* what they symbolize. They are not just symbols of transformation, but transforming symbols. Wholeness, then, is a generic goal of energetic process that becomes increasingly specific through the transformation that occurs in and because of the symbolizing process, given the correct conscious attitude. As one deliberately enters upon the inner journey through the world constituted by one's elemental symbolizing, one comes into contact with the dimension of human reality whence have issued the symbolic productions of the mythopoetic imagination in the religions of human history.

Fifthly, this release of what Jung calls the transcendent function (1972e), through which one established a bridge between one's ego-consciousness and the symbolizing process of psychic

energy, can be integrated with Lonergan's intentionality analysis in such a way as to render Jungian analysis not simply a parallel and complementary maieutic of selfhood, but an integral and constitutive feature of a truly transcendental method. The technique of this integration is quite simple: it involves extending the relations of sublation that Lonergan shows to obtain among the various levels of waking consciousness, so as to include dreaming consciousness in the analysis of intentionality. For Lonergan, empirical consciousness of the data of sense and of interiority is sublated by the intelligent consciousness that grasps relations among the data; intelligent consciousness is sublated by the rational consciousness that reflects on one's understanding so as to judge its adequacy to the data; and rational consciousness is sublated by the existential consciousness of the subject who is concerned to do what is good. The integration of the transcendent function in the intentionality of the human spirit toward the intelligible, the true and the real, and the good, is effected by the recognition that consciousness begins, not when we awake but when we dream, and so a transcendental method that would approximate a retrieval of the dimensions of consciousness itself must acknowledge that the first level of consciousness really is the dream. Dreams are sublated into waking empirical consciousness by memory; into intelligent consciousness by the interpretation whose art one learns in the analytic sessions; into rational consciousness by critical reflection on one's interpretation; and into existential consciousness by one's quest for integrity in one's decisions and actions. The finality of the dream, then, is harmonious with that of the normative order of inquiry: authentic cognitive and existential praxis.

These relations may also be understood by reflecting on Lonergan's discussion of the dramatic pattern of experience in *Insight* (187-206). The dramatic pattern of experience is that sequence of sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations, associations, bodily movements, and spontaneous intersubjective responses that are organized by one's concern to make a work of art out of his or her living, to stamp life with a style, with grace, with freedom, with dignity. The dramatic pattern is operative in a preconscious manner, through the collaboration of imagination and intelligence in the task of supplying to consciousness the materials one will employ in structuring the contours of one's life as a work of art. These materials emerge into consciousness in the form of images and accompanying affects.

The preconscious collaboration of intelligence and imagination in selecting images for conscious insight, judgment, and decision may be either authentic or inauthentic, open to truth or biased. The bias of the inauthentic collaboration is an always individual blending of the dramatic bias that overwhelms consciousness by elementary passion, of the egoistic bias that excludes materials that would challenge one's own narrowly conceived advantage, of the group bias that collapses the human good into what is expedient for one's group or class or nation, and of the general bias that despises the detachment of theoretical insight (Lonergan, 1957:191-203, 218-242). The authentic dramatic artist, on the other hand, is open to receiving into consciousness the images that are needed for the insightful, truthful, and responsible construction of a work of dramatic art.

Dreams are a privileged instance of such images, for in dreams symbols are released in such a way that they are not prevented from entering into consciousness by the dramatic, egoistic, group, or general bias of waking consciousness or the ego. When we sleep, the distorted censorship of inauthentic imagination and intelligence is relaxed enough that neural demands find an appropriate conscious complement in images that, were they negotiated by the waking subject, would provide some of the materials that are needed for the insights, judgments, and decisions through which one structures a work of dramatic artistry.

Sixthly, the release of the internal communication that occurs through the habit of negotiating one's dreams intelligently, rationally, and responsibly can be understood in terms of a fourth modality of conversion beyond the intellectual, moral, and religious conversions that for Lonergan constitute theology's foundational reality. Jungian analysis promotes what I have called *psychic conversion*, which I understand as the release of the capacity for internal communication through the discovery, interpretation, and existential negotiation of the elemental symbols of dreams, through which neural process enters into conscious participation in the drama of one's life. If an objectification of conversion constitutes theological foundations, such foundations must provide an explanatory account of the elemental symbolization process with which the subject gains cognitive and existential familiarity through psychic conversion. A phenomenology of the sensitive psyche as operator of elemental symbols, or at least a heuristic structure of such a phenomenology, will provide a portion of theological foundations.

Seventhly, such a development in transcendental method, if it is accurate, resolves a peculiar difficulty in Lonergan's account of conversion. Lonergan, it seems, is quite correct in speaking of religious conversion as generally occurring prior to moral conversion, and of religious and moral conversion as generally occurring prior to intellectual conversion. But religious and moral conversion are pre-critical. That is to say, while they are self-validating experiences, they also do not involve self-appropriation in the technical sense of explanatory self-knowledge. Intellectual conversion, on the other hand, is coincident with intellectual self-appropriation. It is acquiring "the mastery in one's own house that is to be had only when one knows precisely what one is doing when one is knowing" (Lonergan, 1972:239-240). Lonergan's account of conversion, then, leaves unanswered the question of how one gains religious and moral self-appropriation.

There are certain clues, however, in Lonergan's development of the notion of value that lead me to recommend psychic conversion as the key to religious and moral self-appropriation. For value, Lonergan says, is apprehended in *intentional feelings* before it is discriminated by questions for deliberation and affirmed in judgments of value (1972:31). And feelings enjoy a reciprocal relationship of evocation with *symbols*. "A symbol is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling" (1972:64). Thus to acquire the habit of internal communication through the cognitive and existential negotiation of the elemental symbols of one's sensitive psyche is to gain familiarity with the orientations and motivations of one's intentional feelings, and consequently is to disengage one's moral and, as the case may be, even religious orientation in a world that is not only mediated and constituted by meaning but motivated by value. One's dreams are a story, told by the sensitive psyche, of one's dramatic participation as a morally and religiously authentic or inauthentic subject whose decisions and actions affect for better or for worse the constitution of the human world.

Eighthly, and finally, then, there is a political significance to the disclosures rendered possible by psychic conversion, and consequently a potential fruitfulness for political theology lies ready to be tapped in the maieutic of the psyche whose essential elements are provided with some relative adequacy by Jung. The situations that provide the context of the subjective dialectic of waking consciousness and neural process are established by the

dialectic of community and of history, whose twofold and opposed generative principles are, on the one hand, the biases, and on the other hand, the converted subjectivity of authentic persons (Lonergan, 1957:218; 1972:52-55). Psychic conversion promotes proximately the appropriation of the inner dialectic of the subject. But this dialectic makes no sense whatsoever unless the analysis of it sets it within the context of the dialectic of history. This means, then, that one's dreams gain an accurate interpretation only when the drama they reveal is placed in the environing context of the dialectic of progress and decline in history in which the subject is necessarily a participant. The theologian educated by the maieutic of the psyche is equipped for the kind of theological reflection, then, that brings to bear on the course of history itself the mediation of Christian faith with the contemporary dialectic of social, cultural, personal, and religious values.

Theological and Psychological Implications

The remainder of this paper deals with the effects of the above methodological positions on the doing of theology and on the praxis and theory of Jungian psychology. I begin with theology.

In a paper delivered at the November, 1977 meeting of the American Theological Society, midwest division, Professor Walter Kukkonen of the Lutheran School of Theology in Chicago disengaged four areas of influence on theology that would follow from theology's encounter with Jungian psychology (1977). I have decided to list these influences as Professor Kukkonen mentioned them, and also to comment on them in the light of my own methodological position. The first of Kukkonen's recommendations has to do with theological method, the second with theological education, the third with theological categories, and the fourth with the theologian's consciousness or subjectivity.

First, then, a theology structured by a mind and heart informed by the Jungian maieutic of selfhood will have restored to its *method*, in Kukkonen's words, an element of *madness*: that is, of prophecy, of initiation, of the paradigmatic, of poetry, of love, of mysticism. What this means is that the grounding experiences of one's theology will be one's own numinous experiences, shimmering with the primal emotion of the elemental and the archetypal. These experiences are participatory, a share in the mystery of transcendence, precisely as mystery, i.e., as ultimate context

and interpretative framework for the events of existence in the world. Religious experiences of awe and wonder, of incomprehensible and inarticulable transcendent reality, will be restored to the position of being the founding experiences of a theological vision. For, as David Burrell has expressed the matter, "If one undertakes the inner journey to individuation, he cannot fail to meet God" (1974:221).

The implications for theological *education* are both clear and far-reaching. Kukkonen limits his recommendations to specifying the introduction into seminary curricula of practical training in pastoral dialogue. I want to expand this suggestion, in light of my reliance on Lonergan, to recommend extensive education of all theological students, academic and ministerial, in the functional specialties of dialectic and foundations, where the grounding experiences of one's theological positions are retrieved in a dialogic situation. What I add to Lonergan's position is that the objectification of conversion, as mentioned above, will profit immensely from depth psychological analysis of a Jungian variety.

Theological *categories*, Kukkonen argues, will be experientially grounded if the theologian is under the influence of the Jungian maieutic of his or her own selfhood. I acknowledge that in theology itself one can find many contributions to such an experiential grounding of categories, of which Lonergan's prescription for the derivation of categories is one of the more sophisticated. But the point of introducing the Jungian maieutic into the foundational task is more profound: not only is experience granted a role as ground of theology, but the experience itself is deeply enriched when one allows oneself to be introduced to the organizing principles or forms that guide one's activity, those principles that Jung calls archetypes (1968a).

Finally, and grounding the other influences of Jungian psychology on theology, there will be established the explicit connection of the theologian's consciousness with the elemental symbolic function that Jung called the collective unconscious. Through this connection, effected by what I have called psychic conversion, the theologian gains a hermeneutic tool for the interpretation of the religious expressions of other men and women at other times and places and in other cultures, and a foundational framework for introducing into one's own theological systematics the use of categories that are unapologetically symbolic, poetic, aesthetic, and yet explanatory, because derived from thoroughgoing interior self-differentiation /2/.

It remains that something must be said of the changes in Jungian psychology that will result from the encounter with a methodical theology grounded in transcendental method. The changes must be spoken of in two manners, for we distinguished above between the praxis of individuation and the theoretical system developed by reflection on that praxis.

All human praxis is guided by heuristic notions through which one anticipates the objectives of one's operations. The praxis of individuation on the part of a theological consciousness tutored by the above methodological emphases on conversion will be in search of *self-transcendence*. The heuristic notion that will govern the development of self-possession will shift from *wholeness* to *self-transcendence* or authenticity. Self-transcendence is four-fold: it is cognitive, moral, religious, and affective. The Jungian maieutic of the sensitive, symbolizing psyche will be particularly helpful in the pursuit of affective self-transcendence. The wholeness of the personality will be regarded from this standpoint as a by-product of one's advance in authenticity, and will not be pursued for its own sake.

Affective self-transcendence is *detachment*, the inner freedom from both inner states and outer objects and situations that is the goal of authentic ascetical and mystical disciplines. Mysticism, it seems, are twofold: there is an intentionality mysticism whose most appropriate expression is an apophatic theology; and there is a romantic mysticism that bogs down in the archetypal, the paradigmatic, the elementally symbolic, and that is ultimately tied to a pantheism or an atheism or an immanentism or a nature religion. In a romantic mysticism, the symbols of the psyche, however spontaneous and elemental and thus uncontrived they may be, in the last analysis cease to be exploratory of intentionality's reaching toward the non-representable, and become ends in themselves. Their term is not *in re*, but *in se*. In an intentionality mysticism, on the other hand, detachment extends to symbolic productions themselves, to visions, dreams, and images, even when these are genuine results of the union of the subject with the world-transcendent goal of intentional striving (St. John of the Cross: 150-192). The key to the difference in the *praxis* of these mystical disciplines lies in the heuristic notions that govern them. The heuristic notion of an intentionality mysticism is absolute or vertical self-transcendence, while the guiding notion of a romantic mysticism has affinities with Jung's absolutization of the notion of wholeness.

Wholeness is for Jung best symbolized in mandala images (1968b:95-223). Mandalas, of course, are symbols of the integration of opposites, and they will continue to play this function in an individuation praxis governed by the heuristic notion of self-transcendence. But development is not only integration. *Integrators* of development are a function of *operators* of development (Loneragan, 1957:464-467, 476-477, 532-533), and development, again, is "a flexible, linked *sequence* of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence" (1957:454). Clearly, when such a generic notion is used of conscious human development, the operative heuristic notion guiding the sequence is self-transcendence. The wholeness of the personality will be a by-product of authentic intentionality.

Loneragan's term for affective self-transcendence in its full flowering is "universal willingness" (1957:623-624). The term highlights well the referent in *existential consciousness* of such detachment. The affectively self-transcendent subject is one whose home is the universe of being, and whose intentionality is oriented to the discovery and execution of a unique individual vocation within a universal order whose immanent intelligibility is not some statically fixed system but an emergent probability governed by classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical laws (1957:123-128, 171-172, 209-211, 462, 698). The discovery and execution of one's unique vocation in such an order is possible only by the implementation of the transcendental precepts that govern the operations of consciousness at each of its emergent levels: imperatives for attentiveness, for understanding, for rationality, for moral responsibility, and for faithful and self-sacrificing love (Loneragan, 1972:3-25). With each imperative, we are called to a more self-transcendent mode of being-in-the-world. The integration of our being as persons is a function of our fidelity to these imperatives.

The symbols of our dreams become from this perspective a narrative told by the sensitive psyche of an intentional human subject --a narrative whose dialectical theme is the emergence of the authentic historical agent, of the knower, the doer, the lover. Dreams are a cipher for the discernment of the "pulls and counter-pulls" experienced by the existential subject in search of authentic direction in the movement of life (Voegelin). The praxis of

individuation that emerges from a methodically grounded foundational subjectivity will sublate the dream into a conscious intentionality governed by the imperatives that are concomitant with one's capacities of empirical, intelligent, rational, moral, and agapic consciousness.

The Jungian *theory* of individuation will undergo a number of changes as a result of the encounter with the praxis that emerges from theological foundations. Many of the operative concepts in Jungian theory will suffer greater differentiation and clarification than was provided them by Jung. I limit my comments to three areas of necessary change that are particularly apropos of theology.

First, we need a clearer delineation than Jung provides us of the tripartite constitution of the human person. For Jung the elements of this constitution are matter or instinct, psyche, and spirit or archetype (1972c:200-216). Matter and spirit Jung heuristically characterizes as psychoid, that is, to be understood by analogy with our understanding of the psyche. More precisely, though, what we need is a sharper clarification of the organic and spiritual dimensions of the person, and a concomitant delimitation of the referent of the term, psyche. Spirit must be more clearly differentiated from psyche, and the role of spirituality, which I take to include the operations of human understanding, judgment, decision, and agapic love (Lonergan, 1957:516-520), must be specified as it relates to the individuation process that is reflected in and promoted by the images of the psyche's dreams.

Secondly, the Jungian treatment of the symbolic significance of the person of Jesus Christ will not emerge uncriticized from the dialogue of theology and analytical psychology (Doran, 1978a). For Jung, the person of Christ is represented as the hero who, by being faithful and completing his journey, became the Way for others to accomplish theirs; and Christ is also "our nearest analogy of the self and its meaning," "the supreme symbol of the Self" (Kukkonen). Both aspects of the Jungian thought on Christ I find suspect from a theological point of view. The principal difficulty resides in Jung's notion of Christ as archetype of the Self.

In his later writings on this issue, and especially in his book *Aion* (1963), Jung provides us with an interpretation of Christianity such that, if individuation as Jung understands it were to be correlated with any specifically theological category from Christian tradition, it would be, not with such notions as conversion, justification, transformation in Christ, or redemption, but

with the Origenistic notion of *apocatastasis*. For in *Aion*, we are presented with a notion of the Self which is only partly expressed in the Christian imaging and understanding of Christ. The other half, as it were, of the Self is expressed in the Christian imaging and understanding of Satan. These two halves of the Self, Jung tells us, have been warring with each other during the astrological age of Pisces, but in the emerging age of Aquarius they will blissfully embrace in the movement of the individuated personality to a position beyond good and evil.

This, I believe, is pure wishful thinking in a quite Freudian i.e., Oedipal, sense. Sebastian Moore, in his recent book, *The Crucified Jesus is No Stranger*, provides us with a far more helpful model of how Christ can be understood as a symbolic incarnation of the true Self of human subjects. It is in his crucified condition that Christ embodies the Self--the Self that is killed, victimized, by the ego that is infected by the sinfulness of the denial of its own contingency. The Christian contemplative experience of entering into the Crucified has been, Moore says, also an experience of the emergence into life of the Self that the ego has killed, an emergence that is empowered by the forgiveness of the sin of the ego meeting with love the murderous acts that victimized the self. With reference to Jung's derivative understanding of Christ as symbolic of the heroic quest, then, we might say that, if Christ is our way to God, it is only because more radically he is God's way to us, God's way of transforming what we have victimized and killed into the center of a life that stretches to the limits of agapic love. For Moore, we exist throughout our lives in the polarity of crucifier and crucified. The implications of Moore's model for the reworking of the Jungian theory of the final stages of the analytic process are substantial. In brief, Moore preserves from Jung a helpful insight into our customary misidentification of the locus of evil in instinct, but removes definitively the hopeless ambiguity of Jung's own treatment of evil in its relation to goodness.

Thirdly, then, and with more specific reference to the problem of evil, Jungian psychology will have to make a distinction between two quite distinct dimensions of the transpersonal elemental symbolism that originates in what Jung calls the collective unconscious. I draw here on Northrop Frye for a distinction between the archetypal and the anagogic (1957). As transposed from Frye's context to my own, archetypal symbols are taken from nature and imitate nature's

processes: a helpful maternal symbol in one's dreams is an analogue of the personal mother in her nourishing and life-giving capacities. Anagogic symbols are taken from nature and from history, but they are not so much imitative as radically transformative of the dimension from which they are derived. They are the stuff of eschatology and apocalyptic, and they provide, I think, the inclusive symbolic horizon in terms of which all other elemental symbolic productions will receive their most adequate interpretation.

With such a distinction, one is enabled to differentiate those opposites that admit of natural reconciliation with one another and those whose contradictoriness is resolved only by a divinely originated solution. Among the former, for instance, are the opposites that join in the psychological androgyny--the masculinity of intentionality and the femininity of the psyche (Jung, 1970a). The latter are the opposites of authenticity and inauthenticity. These never join, because of the radically unintegratable quality of that dimension of evil that, despite Jung's protestations to the contrary, is not superficially but most profoundly understood by such Christian theologians as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas as *privatio boni*. But this point would demand another article, and so I bring these suggestions to a conclusion on a note that will probably prove annoying to an orthodox Jungian, but that is, I am convinced, the locus where the dialogue among theologians and Jungian psychologists will become dialectical. But even the inevitability of dialectic on this point is evidence in favor of the natural irreconcilability of evil as *basile sin* (Lonergan, 1957:666) with graced authenticity.

NOTES

/1/ That all of these relationships are clarified in Jungian analysis can be verified only in practice. Gerhard Adler (1961) shows the clarification in the case of one individual's analysis.

/2/ This represents, I believe, an advance on Loneragan, who tends to view with suspicion the explicit use of symbolic categories in an explanatory systematics. I have dealt with the point more extensively in 1978c.

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