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Theology as Public Discourse

The Psychological Present
of the Academic Community

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Preface

If there is to be a massive shift in public minding and kindness and discourse in the next century, there must be a proportionate shift in the mind and heart of the academy and the arts at the end of this century, with consequent changes in operating schemes of recurrence from government to kindergarden. This three part essay deals in preliminary fashion with elements of the academic shift.

The first part was written for the Halifax Lonergan Conference on Interdisciplinary Philosophy. Distributed through that part there are seven underlined sections which were the original summary of that paper. That summary in fact indicated that the problem was larger than one of interdisciplinary philosophy, and so, the seventh section of the summary (see page 18 below) leads naturally to the problems of the second part. The third part moves into strategic public discourse on a core aspect of the academic problem within the field of theology. Other parts, hopefully, will follow, dealing with other aspects of the problem in other areas of the academy.

Apart from the works of Fr. Lonergan, two other recent books are referred to regularly here: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge edited by I. Lakatos and Blessed Rage for Order by Fr. David Tracy. Both books deal with criticism and knowledge, order and method, but in quite different areas and ways. The inclusion of some considerations of Fr. Tracy's work seemed particularly worthwhile, in that the book has been selected as a workshop topic. I am indebted to Fr. Tracy, not only for enabling me to glimpse contemporary American theological concerns, but also for stimulating me to make precise certain issues which were previously obscure to me.

I append here immediately three texts from the writings of Fr. Lonergan which I selected as keynote texts for the three sections of the present paper. As the paper emerged, the texts turn out to be surprisingly more apt than I had originally envisaged.

Part 1 The Psychological Present of the Interdisciplinary Philosopher.

"Philosophy is the flowering of the individual's rational consciousness in its coming to know and take possession of itself. To that event, its traditional schools, its treatises, and its history are but contributions; and without that event they are stripped of real significance. It is this aspect of personal development and personal commitment that the scientist turning to philosophy is, perhaps, most likely to overlook."

(B. Lonergan, Insight, 429).

Part 2 The Psychological Present of the Contemporary Academic.

"The goal of the method is the emergence of explicit metaphysics in the minds of particular men and women. It begins from them as they are, no matter what that may be. It involves a preliminary stage that can be methodical only in the sense in which a pedagogy is methodical, that is, the goal and the procedure are known and pursued explicitly by a teacher but not by the pupil. The preliminary stage ends when the subject reaches an intelligent and reasonable self-affirmation. Such self-affirmation is also self-knowledge."

(B. Lonergan, Insight, 401).

Part 3 The Psychological Present of the Contemporary Theologian.

"In both Barth and Bultmann, though in different manners, there is revealed the need for intellectual as well as moral and religious conversion. Only intellectual conversion can remedy Barth's fideism. Only intellectual conversion can remove the secularist notion of scientific exegesis represented by Bultmann. Still intellectual conversion alone is not enough. It has to be made explicit in a philosophic and theological method, and such an explicit method has to include a critique both of the method of science and of the method of scholarship."

(B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 318).

Part 1

The Psychological Present of the Interdisciplinary
Philosopher

1. A first context is the mood of Husserl's search for "intentional origins and unities of the formation of meaning", of Jasper's "standpoint of the encompassing", of Heidegger's stress on mindfulness of, care of, being.

In this short introductory paper I would like to share a mood of inquiry and also to indicate general and specific directions of solution to contemporary problems of methodology. The mood I wish to share is one which I find most sympathetically present in the German existentialist tradition. In so far as one has shared that tradition, not merely in scholarly stance but in the resonance of carefilled reading which Bachelard so well intimates¹ one needs no more than this hint. In so far, however, as one fits into the general mood of the contemporary academy with its less than encompassing stance,² not a hint but a horizon-shift is required. And if it is a horizon-shift that is required, I have no illusion about specifying it for and in a reader in the introductory remarks of a paper or a conference. Fichte's "Sun-clear statement to the Public at large concerning the true nature of the Newest Philosophy. An attempt to force the reader to an understanding",³ has the air of such an illusion. Sun-clarity in the present issue results only from a life-long self-attentive climb out of the prevalent cultural cave. What is it to care for, to be mindful of, being? The answer is a mustard-seeded personal history of adult-growing anamnesis and prolepsis which may be mainly before one.⁴ I recall here, as symbol, the recollected "man on giant stilts" at the conclusion of Proust's novel.⁵ I recall, as model, Husserl's

life work.⁶ Husserl, in his last great incomplete work, specifies the problem with which my paper deals, that of the psychological present of the interdisciplinary philosopher, in terms of recollection as a strategy of reaching "the intentional origins and unities of the formation of meaning." "Recollection, above all, exercises the intentional function of forming the meaning of the past Likewise, in expectation or anticipatory recollection, again understood as an intentional modification of perception (the future is a present-to-come), is found the meaning-formation from which arises the ontic meaning of that which is in the future. And the deeper structure of this can be revealed in more detail. This represents the beginnings of new dimensions of temporalization...."⁷

Successfully incarnated, the new dimension of temporalization grounds what Jaspers would term a contemporary axial shift,⁸ what Lonergan speaks of when he discusses the two times of the temporal subject.⁹ Therein is grounded the possibility and probability¹⁰ of an epochal shift in the control of meaning,¹¹ and part of that probability is the concrete possibility of asking and answering with contemporary precision Jasper's basic question: "Beyond asking: 'what is Being?', he asks: 'How can we and how must we think Being if we want to speak of Being?'"¹²

2. A second context is the Popper-Kuhn controversy regarding normal and revolutionary science, as paradigmatic of contemporary normal metascience. (cf. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Lakatos and Musgrave, Cambridge, 1970, where Popper, Kuhn, Toulmin etc. revisit Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions).

The previous context, mounting to that final care-filled question, is remote from the controversy to which we now turn, and it is deeply foreign to most of English-speaking philosophy. But I would note that this large community unavoidably speak about being, and speak about speaking about being, even as they rule out such speech. What Lonergan remarks about Leslie Dewart is a generally valid thesis. I quote at length because, I would suggest, it is an extremely good starting point for tackling the opaqueness regarding truth mentioned in the fifth section: Tarski too is strangely silent on judgments,¹³ "I have no doubt that concepts and judgments (on judgments I find Dewart strangely silent) are the expression of one's accumulated experience, developed understanding, acquired wisdom; and I quite agree that such expression is an objectification of one's self and of one's world.

I would urge, however, that this objectification is intentional. It consists in acts of meaning. We objectify the self by meaning the self, and we objectify the world by meaning the world. Such meaning of its nature is related to a meant, and what is meant may or may not correspond to what in fact is so. If it corresponds, the meaning is true. If it does not correspond the meaning is false. Such is the correspondence view of truth, and Dewart has managed to reject it without apparently adverting to it. So eager has he been to impugn what he considers the Thomist theory of knowledge that he has overlooked the fact that he needed a correspondence view of truth to mean what he said.

Let me stress the point. Dewart has written a book on the future of belief. Does he mean the future of belief, or something else, or nothing at all?"¹⁴

The question of a correspondence metaview of truth coterminous with a basic position on being¹⁵ will occupy us later.

Immediately however I wish to note a more evident parallel. The contributors to the volume Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge have written a book about the past, present and future of science and indeed of scientific belief. Do they mean the past, present and future of science? Or what do they mean? Of what, from what, do they speak? The questions point to the key implicit problem of the volume we are considering, and of the Kuhn-Popper tradition of the philosophy of science. That problem and these questions deserve detailed and lengthy treatment which I would hope to give them later.¹⁶ But in the present short paper I will continue to be impressionistic.

Margaret Masterman, in an illuminating contribution to the volume in question, notes a certain aggressiveness in the various contributions, and permits herself "A little pro-Kuhn aggressiveness."¹⁷ I too feel that I might indulge in what may be called a little honest aggressiveness.

I first came across Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions when I was in Oxford in the mid-sixties. The book failed to impress me. That failure was related to the fact that I had come to it from a background of mathematical science and of a mode of metascientific reflection related to the third context. I could of course sympathize with Kuhn more than I could with Popper, and here I would echo Masterman's delightful aggressiveness: "the one thing working scientists are not going to do is to change their ways of thinking, in doing science, ex more philosophico, because they have Popper and Feyerabend pontificating at them like eighteenth-century divines; particularly as both Popper and Feyerabend normally pontificate at even more than eighteenth-century length."¹⁸ I sympathize with Kuhn because, as Masterman indicates, "Kuhn has really looked at actual science"¹⁹ just as Lakatos,

in Proofs and Refutations has introduced a new complexity and realism into our conception of mathematics, because he has taken a closer look at what mathematicians really do."²⁰ Yet my sympathy is limited to the degree that the manner of 'looking at', 'talking about' of this genuinely struggling tradition has the radical²¹ limitations to be specified by raising such questions as are already raised above: of what, from what, are they talking? in what sense are they looking?

Kuhn asserts that his and Popper's views of science "are very nearly identical. We are both concerned with the dynamic process by which scientific knowledge is acquired rather than with the logical structure of the products of scientific research."²² From the first context I would raise the issue of the measure of their concern; anticipating the third context I would question the seriousness of their focus on the dynamic process. One might perhaps describe their handicap as that of a deeply embedded tradition of detached conceptualism. Toulmin describes well one facet of that limited care: "The term concept is one that everybody uses and nobody explains - still less defines. On the one hand, the word has a familiar currency in twentieth century history and sociology, psychology and philosophy alike. For many twentieth-century philosophers, indeed, concepts provide their central subject matter, their very bread and butter Many of them would even describe the central task of philosophy itself as being that of conceptual analysis. Yet, despite all their scrupulous care in the actual practice of conceptual analysis, the precise meaning of the terms 'concept' and 'conceptual' is rarely made explicit and frequently left quite obscure."²³

The limitation runs deep through European intellectual history by way of Plato, Neo-platonism, and the pervasive influence of Scotus.²⁴ Such an influence leads with a narrowing cogency to the mistaken identification of the task of philosophy as conceptual analysis. The struggling tradition I speak of is limited by the near-dogmatic presence of the mood of that mistake, but it is gradually bringing forth the possibility and probability of locating the task of philosophy as an elucidation, not of concept, but of process, not of 'Whiteheadian' process, but of intellectual process.²⁵

Lakatos describes his own development of interest in a manner that usefully intimates that emerging probability,²⁶ and so I quote the description at length:

"The problem of continuity in science was raised by Popper and his followers long ago. When I proposed my theory of growth based on the idea of competing research programmes, I again followed, and tried to improve, Popperian tradition. Popper himself, in his (1934), had already stressed the heuristic importance of 'influential metaphysics', and was regarded by some members of the Vienna Circle as a champion of dangerous metaphysics. When his interest in the role of metaphysics revived in the 1950's, he wrote a most interesting 'Metaphysical Epilogue' about 'metaphysical research programmes' to his Postscript: After Twenty Years - in galleys since 1957. But Popper associated tenacity not with methodological irrefutability but rather with syntactical irrefutability. By 'metaphysics' he meant syntactically specifiable statements like 'all-some' statements and purely existential statements. No basic statements could conflict with them because of their logical form. For instance, 'for all metals there is a solvent' would, in this sense, be 'metaphysical', while

Newton's theory of gravitation, taken in isolation, would not be. Popper, in the 1950's, also raised the problem of how to criticize metaphysical theories and suggested solutions. Agassi and Watkins published several interesting papers on the role of this sort of 'metaphysics' in science, which all connected 'metaphysics' with the continuity of scientific progress. My treatment differs from theirs first because I go much further than they in blurring the demarcation between (Popper's) 'science' and (Popper's) 'metaphysics': I do not even use the term 'metaphysical' any more. I only talk about scientific research programmes whose hard core is irrefutable not necessarily because of syntactical but possibly because of methodological reasons which have nothing to do with logical form. Secondly, separating sharply the descriptive problem of the psychologico-historical role of metaphysics from the normative problem of how to distinguish progressive from degenerating research programmes, I elaborate the latter problem further than they had done."²⁷

Lakatos focuses his attention on the methodology of scientific research programmes, such programmes consisting "of methodological rules: some tell us what paths of research to avoid (negative heuristic), and others what paths to pursue (positive heuristic)."²⁸ In such focusing, and in the wish to "only talk about research programmes whose hard core is irrefutable" there is certainly an advance. But there remains that central opaqueness which calls for the question, of what, from what, does he talk and mean? What is his psychological present?

3. A third context is the emergence (1928-75) of the psychological present of Lonergan.

"Numberless experiences extending over several years are gradually co-ordinated and the total synthetic whole finds expression, it may be, on some particular occasion A genius may be defined as a man who is exceptionally rich in recoverable contexts."²⁹

I quote, not without purpose, from Sullivan's account of Beethoven's spiritual development: the quotation grounds an evident and fruitful parallel, but also a reaching for a less evident twist of meaning related to the twist of Jasper's axial period. The twist of meaning will be specified somewhat better in the next sections, but we must begin that specification immediately.

I speak in this present section of a third context, and that third context has to do with the spiritual development of "a man who is exceptionally rich in recoverable contexts." But this third context cannot personally be glimpsed unless one seeks within oneself for "a needed clarification of the notion of the spiritual."³⁰ That clarification is reached by grasping that "the adjective, intelligible, may be employed in two quite different senses. Ordinarily, it denotes what is or can be understood, and in that sense the content of every act of conceiving is intelligible. More profoundly, it denotes the primary component in an idea; it is what is grasped inasmuch as one is understanding; it is the intelligible ground or root or key from which results intelligibility in the ordinary sense. Moreover, there is a simple test for distinguishing between the ordinary and the profounder meaning of the name, intelligible. For the intelligible in the ordinary sense can be understood without understanding what it is to understand; but the intelligible in the profounder sense is identical with the understanding, and so it cannot be understood without understanding what understanding is."³¹ That clarification in turn gives rise

to some little appreciation that while the spiritual development of Beethoven did not require, much less pivot on, the presence of a similar clarification in Beethoven, in Lonergan's spiritual development the reaching and ever fuller reaching of that clarification was the centre-piece of that development.

I have used, in the previous sentence, the words "some little" in relation to our appreciation. In doing so I take a stand which puts me out of sympathy with the predominant mood of the contemporary academy. That mood would expect here a summary, instead of a set of pointers. Whereas, indeed, I have no intention of giving a clear set of pointers here - they are available elsewhere³² - my intention is to intimate, to raise the question of, a counter-mood. It is a counter-mood only secondarily relevant to the study of Bernard Lonergan: primarily it is relevant to one's own adult growth. The incarnate questing of that counter-mood might well initially be focused, by student or professor alike, in such elementary existential questions as, what is a doctoral dissertation, a beginning or an end? Is contemplative intellectual growth an accelerating accretion of insight to habitual insight, mediated by an axial shift, so that grown wisdom's articulation is little more than an invitation to ascend, or is intellectual growth a matter of diminishing returns, the addition of grey-haired footnotes to a tired world view?³³

Sympathy with the counter-mood is easier to win in the field on music than in the field of mind: it seems easier to admit the feebleness of our resonance with a great composer than to admit it in relation to a great thinker.³⁴

Yet it is not foolish but human to make that admission in the second case. Is what Sullivan says of Beethoven in the realms of music only implausibly applied in the realms of mind? "The human mind may be likened to some kind of multiple plant, here in full bloom, there still in bud. Different minds have flowered in different ways. Beethoven had reached relative maturity in directions where those of us who respond to him are still in the stage of embryonic growth. And in some people, it is obvious, there is no germ of consciousness akin to the state of awareness manifested by the late Beethoven."³⁵

I may usefully recall now some of my own earlier gropings towards what I would now name as the psychological present of the elder interdisciplinary philosopher or theologian - normatively speaking. There is the fact that "all we know is somehow with us; it is present and operative within our knowing, but it lurks behind the scenes...."³⁶ There is the eccentric achievement of James Joyce: his friends of the 1930's recorded their impression of him at work and bore witness to the fact that "he held an incredibly complex form of the Wake in his mind as a single image, and could move from one section to another with complete freedom."³⁷ And, to return to the field of music, there is the manner in which a temporally structured composition challenges our 'disposition to the present', to use a phrase of Schenker: "We know how difficult it is to grasp the meaning of the present if we are not aware of the temporal background. It is equally difficult for the student or performer to grasp the 'present' of a composition if he does not include at the same time a knowledge of the background. Just as the demands of the day toss him to and fro, so does the foreground of a composition pull at him. Every change

of sound and figuration, every chromatic shift, every neighbour note signified something new to him. Each novelty leads him further away from the coherence which derives from the background."³⁸ I recall, further, that in the composition Method in Theology there is a Background and a Foreground, and that the Background is a set of instrumental acts of meaning inviting the theologian or philosopher towards a self-constitution which would redeem him from the trivialization of some novelty in the Foreground. Finally, to come full circle - in good Joycean Viconesque fashion! - I would recall F.E. Crowe's remark regarding the two parts of Insight, that the first part is liable to be neglected and the second part disputed,³⁹ and give that remark this new context.

What I am touching on here is the concrete possibility of absentmindedness or presentmindedness, the meaning of both of these depending on the meaning of 'psychological present'. What, then, is the psychological present?

The psychological present "is not an instant, a mathematical point, but a time-span, so that our experience of time is, not a raceway of instances, but a now leisurely, a now rapid succession of overlapping time-spans whether slow and broad or rapid and short, the psychological present reaches into its past by memories and into its future by anticipations."⁴⁰ Such is Lonergan's indication of the nature of the psychological present. One may recall here my earlier quotation from Husserl. Yet the psychological present achieved by Lonergan leaves clearly behind the opaqueness concerning fact that haunted the mind of Husserl. Constitutive of the spiritual that is the kernel of mind is understanding, and in particular that reflective understanding by which we grasp the unconditioned, "and

inasmuch as we are grasping the unconditioned, we are attaining the lucid, fully rational factualness that contrasts so violently with the brute factualness with which instances similar in all respects still are different instances, with which the multiplicity of the continuum is non-countable because non-ordinable, with which actual frequencies diverge from ideal frequencies in any manner provided it is non-systematic. But if insight and grasp of the unconditioned are constituted quite differently from the empirical residue, so also are the inquiry and critical reflection that lead to them and the conception and judgment that result from them and express them."⁴¹ But the lucidity, the constitution, the psychological present, and the spiritual development related to it, which are our concern here, are of a different order. It is a lucidity for which and from which the content of the previous quotation is habitually lucid. It is a lucidity, a psychological present, which emerges from the slow shift from presence to self to knowledge of self. It emerges from the habituation, with incarnate resonances, of the conception, affirmation and implementation of the heuristic that is the kernel spiritual self. Through that development the "position on being" becomes a present, serene and carefilled answer in the interweaving of questions and answers which is an actual context.⁴²

There is much more to be said in regard to such a psychological present, whether in regard to Fr. Lonergan's spiral⁴³, or in regard to the vortex of its genesis in ourselves.⁴⁴ But perhaps enough initial indication has been given. I may note in conclusion that the lucid reaching into the past by memories and into the future by anticipation of the human subject may take on all the subtlety of complexly differentiated consciousness⁴⁵ and of functional specialization.⁴⁶

4. The three contexts are related dialectically by a speaking of, and from, an actual context (cf. Method in Theology 163) regarding actual contexts. This relating and speaking is identified as meaning, with third stage meaning, (cf. Method in Theology, 94-99) a psychological present of the interdisciplinary philosopher.

How can one relate these three contexts? Obviously this is the question of the present section. Yet I would *note* that if I indicated a twist of meaning⁴⁷ in the previous section, I move forward now in the actual context of that twist of meaning. The question of the present section is not one of actually relating but of the context and strategy of relating. The twist is most neatly indicated by the fact that I identify the metaunderstanding of context as the central issue of the relating of the contexts.

"But what precisely is meant by the word, context? There are two meanings. There is the heuristic meaning the word has at the beginning of an investigation, and it tells one where to look to find the context. There is the actual meaning the word acquires as one moves out of one's initial horizon and moves to a fuller horizon that includes a significant part of the author's.

Heuristically, then, the context of the word is the sentence. The context of the sentence is the paragraph. The context of the paragraph is the chapter. The context of the chapter is the book. The context of the book is the author's opera omnia, his life and times, the state of the question in his day, his problems, prospective readers, scope and aim.

Actually, context is the interweaving of questions and answers in limited groups."⁴⁸

Actual context is in a mind, and the relevant actual context here must be one from which comes forth adequate dialectically-relating speech regarding all contexts. Nor do we have here some shadow of the problem of the class of all classes. We have here, not the problem of avoiding with Russell the semblance of conceptual self-inclusion, but the much deeper issue of reaching asymptotically towards intentional luminosity, of achieving a dynamic perspective⁴⁹ on science, scientists, and perspectives on science in the weave of history. It is the issue of context raised and heuristically contextualized by the author of the book Insight: "There is the noësis or intentio intendens or pensée pensante that is constituted by the very activity of inquiring and reflecting, understanding and affirming, asking further questions and reaching further answers. Let us say that this noetic activity is engaged in a lower context when it is doing mathematics or following scientific method or exercising common sense. Then it will be moving towards an upper context when it scrutinizes mathematics or science or common sense in order to grasp the nature of noetic activity. And if it comes to understand and affirm what understanding is and what affirming is, then it has reached an upper context that logically is independent of the scaffolding of mathematics, science, and common sense. Moreover it can be shown that the upper context is invariant...."⁵⁰

We may recall Lakatos' "focusing of attention" on method and his desire to "talk about" research programmes. I may now specify my claim regarding the limitations of his project briefly and accurately as an absence in Lakatos of the adequate actual context, a context which can be mediated only by the serious admission of generalized empirical method⁵¹ as the strategy of attention-focusing and the

source of more than descriptive "talk about". "Philosophy finds its proper data in intentional consciousness. Its primary function is to promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and incomprehensions. It has further, secondary functions in distinguishing, relating, grounding the several realms of meaning and, no less, in grounding the methods of the sciences and so promoting their unification."⁵²

Yet not 'it', not 'philosophy', but you and I and the tradition struggling with the history and method of science that must focus on that data, so that later generations may emerge, in a developed third stage meaning, to mean and speak with adequate presentmindedness of the past and future of science in history.

5. Issues relating to the truncated (cf. Lonergan, A second Collection, 73) interdisciplinary philosophers' neglect of meaning and of the anthropological turn in the higher sciences and the arts are left to the other speakers. Essential elements in the genesis of the adequate psychological present of any interdisciplinary philosopher are indicated by reference to the two lower and the two middle sciences. Such essential elements are contrasted with contemporary metascientific opaqueness regarding truth, hierarchy theory, statistical science and the heuristics of evolution.

I can be legitimately brief here, for my indications are, fairly literally, by reference. What is at issue is a genetical-dialectic specification of the life of the interdisciplinary philosopher, and the mediation of his or her adult growth through the appropriation of the lower and middle sciences, and these are topics I have already dealt with at some length.⁵³

Still, I would like to lay further emphasis on the "necessary beginning",⁵⁴ however long it may take one,⁵⁵ which is the personal

thing of a coherent position on truth. Kuhn sees Popper's acceptance of Quine's semantic conception of truth as a fundamental difficulty,⁵⁶ and rightly so. That fundamental difficulty lies at the heart not only of the Kuhn-Popper traditions discussion of verification and proof, but of the main stream of contemporary theological, philosophical and scientific confusion. One does not easily move out of that main stream.

The opaqueness regarding truth clouds all other metascientific issues, in particular those mentioned in the summary statement above. The most obvious way of handling the problem of the evident hierarchy of sciences and things is to deny through reductionism its ultimate relevance. But one may not be willing to settle for that cluster of errors. Then one joins forces with such systems theorists as Ludwig von Bertalanffy.⁵⁷ Evidently there are layers of systems corresponding to levels of science: but the metaevidence is as opaque as the systems theorists' view on truth. Now, they may ask, are these layers linked? "Although the world appears to function as a whole, our best representations come out piecemeal. If the world is a whole there should be some complex, multilevel representation possible. The design of such a multilevel construct depends on a methodology for the valid organization of systems into suprasystems. Whereas the inverse problem of analytic resolution of a system into subsystems is readily treated by such top-down approaches as deduction, and single level systems are amenable through induction or statistical procedures, there is no corresponding technique for vertical bottom-up organization. This lacuna is a task for a new epistemology."⁵⁸ But the new epistemology requires as centre the conception and affirmation of the isomorphism of knowing, with its term truth, and being. Only from this centre can one think and speak with metaprecision of things, real things, entities, aggregates of entities, and the manner in which "a concrete plurality of lower entities may

be the material cause from which a higher form is educed":⁵⁹ clear-headed non reductionism.⁶⁰ And only on the basis of that heuristic clarity can one build a precise and powerful principle of evolution.

6. Against this background one may move to a more precise specification of the adequate psychological present of the interdisciplinary philosopher, and the community of interdisciplinary philosophers, in the third stage of meaning.

If the reader is to some extent with me at this stage the meaning of the phrase "against this background one may move" will not be lost. The precise specification in question is the term of a decade and more of adult philosophic growth. Undoubtedly the basic possibility of the specification is rooted in the solitary searcher's anamnesis and prolepsis. But the more than random recurrence of successful search requires the linkage of community, and the basic shift in schedules of probability of adult philosophic growth requires the emergence of complex supporting schemes of recurrence.⁶¹ Such schemes are remote from present schemes. The scattered community of interdisciplinary philosophers in this immature period of the third stage of meaning is in the main characterizable by what Lonergan says of "undifferentiated consciousness in the later stages"⁶² of meaning. As Berger remarks in his recent book, "it is, in principle, impossible to 'raise the consciousness' of anyone, because all of us are stumbling around on the same level of consciousness - a pretty dim level."⁶³ His book, with the seventh section of the summary of this paper with which I presently conclude, provides an indicative context for the issues to be dealt with in Part 2. The book is a "Political ethics - in quest of a method,"⁶⁴ but the quest lacks basic strategy, and the method does not emerge. He does, however, focus attention on the need for intermediate structures: "The paramount task, as Durkheim saw, is the quest for intermediate structures as

solutions to this dilemma of modern society - structures which will be intermediate between the atomized individual and the order of the state."⁶⁵

Undoubtedly, in the short run, various partially adequate intermediate structures of living may emerge. But for the long run, the longer cycle,⁶⁶ the task and the quest must be itself incarnate in an intermediate structure. That paramount task is not one for some community of interdisciplinary philosophers: it is the evident task, it seems to me, of the academy. It is a task of academic self-definition and self-constitution.⁶⁷ What is involved is a sophisticated functionally-differentiated Wendung zur Idee that, quite precisely, goes beyond present dreams.

7. At this stage interest is shifted to the community of academics, in their commitment to, and pursuit of, their particular disciplines. The question of their interpretation of their special fields to themselves, to their colleagues, to their students, is raised.

There emerges the suggestion that a personal and communal cultivation of the third context, above, in the mood of the first context, is vital to the countering of evident contemporary academic decay, vital to 21st century adult growth. Without that cultivation by the professionally non-philosophers, normal science and scholarship will remain under the muddled influence of a personal consciousness which is relatively compact, and of a normal metascience which is paradigmatically determined by a long-surviving tradition of what may be precisely defined as an absent-mindedness of professional philosophers.

Part 2

The Psychological Present of the Contemporary Academic.

"The emancipation of the methods of the other sciences and philosophies from trivialization or fanaticization is not done by any direct intervention in their methods by theology. Rather it is done indirectly and heuristically inasmuch as political theology would succeed in interrelating the intellectual praxis of science with the moral praxis of political social life and the religious praxis of ecclesial institutions. Theology would thereby be an instance of socio-critical concern within the academic world just as the church should be one within the political world. For it would oppose any conceptualism that would separate theory from praxis."¹

The quotation from Fr. Lamb's work gives a tone to our present enterprise and also adds a further problematic context. One might shift from the sciences to the arts to add further contexts: neither literary criticism nor music criticism are in good health.² But I must leave such additions to the interests of different readers. The broad issue is the psychological present of academics.

Moreover, that broad issue increasingly manifests itself as an issue, not just of knowledge, but of values. As Joseph Haberer remarks, "For science, the age of innocence is over. That innocence to which J. Robert Oppenheimer alluded in his famous, if somewhat enigmatic, remark that 'scientists have known sin,'³ began to disintegrate some decades before the blinding flash of Alamogordo...."⁴ Peter Berger's book, already cited, makes the point with factual vigour, and his final thesis gives us yet another point of departure: "We need a new method to deal with questions of political ethics and social change (including those of development policy). This will require bringing together two attitudes that are usually separate - the attitudes of 'hard-nosed' analysis and of utopian imagination."⁵

What I wish to do in this part is to add two more interlocking ongoing methodological contexts of Fr. Lonergan, under the titles "Generalized Empirical Method" and "From Implementation to Praxis". These contexts add a new precision to the meaning of "the growth of knowledge", but more particularly to the meaning of "criticism", and so we move in a brief penultimate section to a discussion of criticism. It is in that section that we spiral back into metatheological discussion, but perhaps the topic deserves a word here.

I do not think that a high percentage of contemporary theologians are psychologically present in the twentieth century. The same, of course, could be said of a large number of other academic sub-groups such as generalist historians or students of literature. Herbert Butterfield is of the view that the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes, mere internal displacements, within the system of medieval Christianity."⁶ Fr. Lonergan repeatedly draws attention to the mediation by science of adequate interiority: "The Greek achievement was needed to expand the capacities of commonsense knowledge and language before Augustine, Descartes, Pascal, Newman could make their commonsense contributions to our self-knowledge. The history of mathematics, natural science, and philosophy and, as well, one's personal engagement in all three are needed if both common sense and theory are to construct a scaffolding for an entry into the world of interiority."⁷ below I note the possibility of a growing respect for empiricity, a respect which mediates a growing incarnate authentic nescience. I think that such adult growth is normally greatly mediated by the type of prolonged inquiry one has to do, say, in the most elementary science, physics, to arrive at the limited contemporary understanding of the electron. The

contemporary theological community may not have both time and talent for such footholds on modernity, but surely there might be fostered some shift in statistics of educational schemes of recurrence of later generations of theologians.

Generalized Empirical Method

In Insight, generalized empirical method stands to the data of consciousness as empirical method stands to the data of sense.⁸

In "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation", Lonergan remarks that "Insight sets forth a generalized empirical method that operates principally on the data of consciousness to work out a cognitional theory, an epistemology and a metaphysics".⁹ A little further on, he speaks of method's reversal of the priorities of logic: "Method reverses such priorities. Its principles are not logical propositions but concrete realities, namely, sensitively, intellectually, rationally, morally conscious subjects".¹⁰

In the three lectures, Religious Studies and Theology¹¹, Lonergan returns at greater length to the topic of generalized empirical method. In the first lecture, it is defined as a method, "a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations that yield ongoing and cumulative results" and one may recall the slightly different definition of method in Method in Theology.¹² But now "generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects". It is a generalization of the notion of method, going behind the diverse methods of natural sciences and of history and hermeneutics, to discover the ground of their harmonious combination in human studies. Its appeal is "not to

the individual subjectivity that is correlative to the world of immediacy but to the individual subjectivity that is correlative to the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value".¹³ And finally, in the context of a discussion of authentic and inauthentic traditions, Lonergan points out that "since disintegration and decay are not a private event, even generalized empirical method is experimental. But the experiment is conducted not by any individual, not by any generation, but by the historical process itself."

Now what seems to be going forward here is a growing respect and care,^{and} a thematization of that respect, for adequate and balanced empiricity. It is a many faceted growth and respect and its tracing in the thought of Lonergan is a task beyond our present effort. Fr. Crowe remarked in 1970, in an article very relevant to the present issue of ongoing learning, "there is no doubt that Lonergan's thinking has undergone a profound reorientation in the last five years, and that in a way which bears directly on the present question. If we take his De Deo Trino to mark a kind of term in the prior phase and compare it with some of his later work, we find extremely significant differences. In the trinitarian treatise we read the assertion, like a kind of refrain, that theology rests on truths not data...."¹⁴ In his reply to Fr. Crowe, Fr. Lonergan acknowledges a shift from truths to data, adding "this raises a complex issue that cannot be treated fully at once"¹⁵ and spelling out some aspects of the shift. The reorientation of Fr. Lonergan's thinking of the last five years would seem to be no less remarkable.¹⁶ A casual following up of indices of recent volumes¹⁷ reveals a growing emphasis on the relevance of method over that of static, though essential, logic. Again, there is the regular recalling, with growing detail,¹⁸ of the shift from the Aristotelian notion of science to the modern notion: and here too I would note the difficulty of a serious appreciation of that shift without some personal involvement in the modern activity. "One may easily use the phrase 'Newtonian mood' but to enter^{into} serious meta-discussion of the topic requires as a minimum some familiarity, e.g., with the integration of the Newtonian equations of motion".¹⁹

But now I would note an inverse difficulty: serious involvement with the equations of physics, or with any endeavour of science, scholarship or art, requires, in the modern problematic context, a personal thematization of the grounds of the shift. And both these difficulties are related, it seems to me, to what I have called Lonergan's growing respect for adequate balanced empiricity.

There are two aspects to this respect, the first being contextual to the second, and both being contextualized, as we shall see, by Praxis.

The first aspect is very much like a thematization of Aquinas' "It is all straw". What alone is invariant in mind is the concrete structure of intentionality in human subjects. The suprastructure that is the ongoing and cumulative result of that dynamic structure, despite its present popular titling as an explosion of knowledge and technology, is predominantly a frail network of elementary suspicions the most palatable²¹ of which are overhastily objectified in history's constructs and schemes of recurrence. In the article by Fr. Crowe already cited he puts forward a useful metaphor: "The dogmas are not a continent but a beachhead, not the sea of infinity but little islands scattered on the sea".²² But the respect I am noting goes beyond the theological zone into all realms of human knowing and doing²³: we are each of us vortices²⁴ of quest of very finite achievement in an infinite ocean.

The second aspect emerges when one considers that the respect is for an adequate and balanced empiricity. The respect is a subtle methodological respect, whose thematization expresses a strategy relevant to the "cultivation of the third context, above, in the mood of the first context"²⁵ by the community of academics.

Generalized empirical method, one might say, is academic method for the twenty first century. How else can science and common sense be reoriented and transformed by metaphysics?²⁶ How else can there emerge a harmonious interlocking of the searchings and findings of sciences, scholarship and the arts in human studies?

The problems of such reorientation, transformation and interweaving are enormous, but let me note here just one small aspect of them, which is present below the level of study of meaning as well as within it: the aspect of aggreformic expression, an expression to be born of clear-headed non-reductionism or aggreformism.²⁷

I have indicated this problematic aspect of expression previously in some detail in sample areas of botany²⁸, zoology²⁹ and musicology³⁰. Present language there is in the main reductionist, mechanist, even cybernetic. Are we to expect a transformation of such language³¹ ab extrinseco, by encyclopedists of a new enlightenment? or should we not hope that the academic be at the level of his time?

At all events, generalized empirical method invites him or her to be thus at the level of the times.³² "It does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects". It requires a balanced adequacy of empirical interest: otherwise one is, so to speak, walking through modernity with one overgrown leg in a cultural gutter.³³ That requirement and strategy grounds the cultivation of the mediation of interiority by science, scholarship, art: and vice versa. It is a strategy generative of Jasper's "standpoint of the encompassing," and of a more radical care.

But the question of the care of being leads us to our next topic, the pragmatic thematization of communal care.

From Implementation to Praxis

The book Insight was an implementation of a conception of metaphysics: "I would contend that the conception of metaphysics that has been implemented in the present work yields unique results".³⁴ The conception was constitutive, to a certain level of development,³⁵ of the writing subject. Moreover, the conception included a conception of implementation: "Explicit metaphysics is the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being",³⁶ features of that implementation being the transformation of common sense and science,³⁷ of theology,³⁸ indeed of history both written³⁹ and lived.⁴⁰ Moreover, the conception of implementation included all the heuristic complexity of schedules of probabilities ranging over actual, probable, and possible schemes of recurrence, things, environments, some of which possible schemes and environments included things that conceived of such implementation.⁴¹ Neither the implementation, however, nor the conception of implementation, were as fully mediated, rendered luminous, by the heuristic conception of the notion of value as they are by Lonergan now.⁴²

In a previous paper,⁴³ I took up briefly this issue of the inclusion of implementation within metaphysics and noted that, since the metaphysical enterprise was sublated in the new enterprise of Method in Theology, there would be a refinement of the task of implementation. Indeed, the second phase of theology seemed likely enough to involve a distribution of labour ranging from categories of implementation to strategies of communication and execution. But I do not think that this does justice to Lonergan's ongoing methodological context. I suspect, indeed, that there is an altogether more profound shift involved, and I will attempt here to trace out lines of this shift.

The pure notion of value⁴⁴ puts us in open indeterminate harmony within the passionate finality⁴⁵ of the universe. "The levels of consciousness are united by a single transcendental intending"⁴⁶ and the intending of the good sublates all other intendings. Also "just as the notion of being intends, but, of itself, does not know being, so too the notion of value intends, but does not know value. Again, as the notion of being is the dynamic principle that keeps us moving toward ever fuller knowledge of being, so the notion of value is the fuller flowering of that same dynamic principle that now keeps us moving towards ever fuller realization of the good."⁴⁷ Furthermore, let us recall the previous section on generalized empirical method, where there emerged some leads on the appreciation of just how limited our knowledge of being is, and recall that such limited knowledge is itself an instance of the limited achieved good. In so far as one labours over, spirals round, these clues, I think there comes forth a new context which I call conveniently Praxis-Weltanschauung.

The finite functioning of our notion of being, a segment of our dynamism, generates in itself a puny limited knowledge. Reflection on that reach and its limited achievement indeed grounds a heuristic notion of being, but it is a dwarf achievement. The fuller truth is beyond, the fullness of truth infinitely remote, and what counts is, not so much the notion of being as the notion of value, what counts is not so much Thomas' natural desire to know God as Augustine's restless heart.⁴⁸ And what counts is the praxis-thematization of what counts.

Let us return here to Insight's discussion of metaphysics: "Just as the notion of being underlies and penetrates and goes beyond all other notions, so also metaphysics is the department of human knowledge that underlies, penetrates, transforms and unifies all other

departments."⁴⁹ But now what underlies and penetrates and goes beyond all other notions would seem to be the notion of value. What then becomes of metaphysics?

We are not here dealing with a deductive system. What becomes of metaphysics is an ongoing discovery, with Method in Theology expressing a stage in its genesis.

But there is an ambiguity here. As "metaphysics is something in a mind,"⁵⁰ so one may say that method in theology is in a mind such as Lonergan's. But more properly one has to say that method in theology is in a community. And just as one can note the gap between adequate metaphysics as in an implementing mind and its implementation in others' minds and lives, so one may note the gap between Method in Theology as adequately conceived and its realization in community.

But the gaps are different, and related to that difference is a discontinuity in statistics of emergence and survival.

We are speaking here of the concrete process of the meshing of the history of ideas with history, but the envisagement of details of that process must be left to the reader.⁵¹ In popular terms, Insight is an invitation to modernity and intellectual self-transcendence which can be, has been, too easily dodged, or reduced. Its strategy might be adequate for an age of innocence which does not exist: the restless heart has its mix of stone. But with Method in Theology there emerges such an ongoing praxis-thematization of the mix of restlessness and stone in human hearts as can twist, with a new statistics,⁵² the actual selection from the manifold of series⁵³ in the probable seriation of schemes of recurrence towards the fuller realization of the impossible dream.

In place, then, of the optimism of an invitation to intellectual self-appropriation and of "implementation", there is an unavoidable "use": "the use of the general theological categories occurs in any of the eight functional specialties"⁵⁴; and there is the spiralling interplay⁵⁵ of the specializations contributing to a genetic and dialectic development of categories and their use. That spiralling is, normatively, shot through with the new heuristic notion of value and a genetic-eschatological view of man's development. The entire set of operations is praxis, and foundations is Praxisweltanschauung.⁵⁶

Criticism

Praxis is critical, and continually brings forth a new definition of criticism. Underpinning it is "the transcendental principle of all appraisal and criticism, the intention of the good."⁵⁷ The direction of development here is given in some detail by Fr. Lonergan in reply to a question from Fr. Tracy - is the functional specialty foundations dogmatic or critical?⁵⁸ Fr. Lonergan replies that foundations consist in a decision, an operation of the level on which consciousness becomes conscience.

"Operations on this level are critically motivated when the deliberation has been sufficiently comprehensive and when the values chosen and the disvalues rejected really are values and disvalues respectively. But the sufficiently comprehensive deliberation is secured through the functional specialties of research, interpretation, history, and dialectic. The value-judgements are correct when they occur in a duly enlightened and truly virtuous man and leave him with a good conscience. Due enlightenment and true virtue are the goals towards which intellectual and moral conversion move. Conscience, finally, is

the key, and its use by humble men does not encourage dogmatism in the pejorative sense of that word.

Is this critical? On views I consider counter-positions it is not critical. On views I consider positions it is critical."⁵⁹

Just as in Insight, so in Method in Theology, Lonergan takes his stand on the dynamism of the human spirit. Just as in Insight, he presents a strategy which can facilitate the subject's ongoing thematization of the subject's cognitive dynamism, so in Method in Theology a strategy emerges which facilitates the community's ongoing objectification of authenticity. The latter strategy broadens⁶⁰ the meaning of criticism just as the notion of value goes beyond the notion of being. The strategy is intrinsically critical, and the criticism is grounded in the open dynamism of the human spirit. Fr. Tracy recognizes the strategy as methodological, facilitating collaboration. But he maintains that "it does not, however, provide critical grounds for the enterprise itself - more precisely, for the truth value of the claims to ultimacy of religious and explicitly theological language."⁶¹

I would make two brief points. First, the enterprise itself is grounded in the concrete critical (in the wider sense noted above) spirit within the subsuming dynamism of religious experience: the critical spirit "cannot criticize itself"⁶²; the subsuming dynamism finds in itself "its own justification."⁶³ Secondly, the previous statement expresses a foundational claim, a complex component in a Praxisweltanschauung, intrinsic to that claim being a claim to its truth and value.

Conclusion

The new view of criticism places the Lakatos volume on criticism, and the Kuhn/Popper debate in a new context. The history of science finds itself bracketted between other functional specialties, and

the use of inadequate categories spiral into a context of a hermeneutics of a deeper suspicion and a more vigorous recovery.

The new view of praxis would seem to locate more precisely Fr. Lamb's discussion of the role of political theology and to meet Berger's quest for a method meshing 'hard-nosed' analysis and utopian imagination: an invariantly structured critical multivortexed⁶⁴ praxisanamnesis blossoming into a strategy of ongoing policy-making, planning and execution umbrellaed by a Praxisweltanschauung that includes concrete finite fantasy⁶⁵ and an Eschaton.⁶⁶

The new view of generalized empirical method places a burden of modernity on academics.

That burden should be most evident to theologians: "A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix".⁶⁷ For this "the theologian needs the alliance of fuller enlightened scientists"⁶⁸ and of fuller enlightened scholars and artists. But such an alliance cannot remain at the level of commonsense exchange: indeed the only level of exchange adequate to our times is an exchange within interiority mediated by strategic insights and incarnation⁶⁹ in the relevant area.

The fundamental issue for the academic is being in the world but not of it: the issue of psychological absence.

I come finally to comment on, to sublate, the text from Insight which I selected for this part:

"The goal of the method is the emergence of explicit metaphysics in the minds of particular men and women. It begins from them as they are, no matter what that may be. It involves a preliminary stage that can be methodical only in the sense in which a pedagogy is methodical, that is, the goal and the procedure are known and pursued explicitly by a teacher but not by the pupil. The preliminary stage ends when the subject reaches an intelligent and reasonable self-affirmation. Such self-affirmation is also self-knowledge."⁷⁰

We have reached, perhaps, some glimpse of a new meaning of "men and women as they are", for we have noted a larger and more concrete pedagogy than was involved, invited to, in Insight.

But that larger pedagogy includes and sublates the strategy of Insight. It contextualizes the invitation to modernity and cycles its fruits through eight specialties in an ongoing genesis of the psychological present. But far from removing the need to reach the end of the preliminary stage of intellectual self-transcendence, it places that need in an epiphanal context as a circulating opaqueness,⁷¹ a recurrent topic,⁷² a focal feature of public academic discourse. That need was noted as a problem of conversion as early as 1951,⁷³ not alluded to as such in Insight, and more recently spoken of by Lonergan as intellectual self-transcendence: "Intellectual self-transcendence is taking possession of one's own mind."⁷⁴ The opaqueness for those who never investigate their adult cognitional procedures is asserted with a new vigour of metaphor: "What goes on between the input from sense and the output in language, that is obscure, vague, unconvincing. To them the human mind is just a black box. The input is clear enough. The output is clear enough. But the inner working is a mystery." The core strategy of achievement remains the same, but in so far as the attempt is not made the character of one's cultural input and output is left in no doubt:

"For intellectual self-transcendence a price must be paid. My little book, Insight, provides

a set of exercises for those that wish to find out what goes on in their own black boxes. But it is only a set of exercises. What counts is doing them.

Should one attempt to do them? As long as one is content to be guided by one's common sense, to disregard the pundits of every class whether scientific or cultural or religious, one need not learn what goes on in one's black box. But when one moves beyond the limits of commonsense competence, when one wishes to have an opinion of one's own on larger issues, then one had best know just what one is doing. Otherwise one too easily will be duped and too readily be exploited. Then explicit intellectual self-transcendence becomes a real need."

Part 3

The Psychological Present of the Contemporary Theologian.

The quotation from Method in Theology which I selected as focus of this part¹ speaks of the revelation of the need for intellectual conversion, for intellectual self-transcendence. That quotation concludes the last of a series of sections on the discovery and ongoing discovery of mind which are distributed throughout the book² and which perhaps take on new meaning now in the light of our discussion of contexts in Part 1 and of ongoing methodological contexts in Part 2. The task of this third part is to contribute further to the revelation, the discovery, the epiphany,³ of the need for intellectual self-transcendence in the contemporary theological community. Briefly, I am following through the elementary strategy of making intellectual self-transcendence "a topic",⁴ giving it its due place in public academic discourse. I will do so, moreover, not by reaching towards a more refined thematization of the psychological present of a theologian growing within that core self-constitution but by entering into methodological dialogue with some theologians of process thought, in somewhat the same manner as Fr. Lonergan does when he comments on contentions of linguistic analysts in Method in Theology.⁵ My methodological dialogue will fall far short of the subtle strategy of dialectic,⁶ but at least it draws attention to it.

Before entering into that dialogue I would like to add two comments. The first, on the importance for theologians of the topic, intellectual self-transcendence, supplements the concluding discussion of Part 2. The second comment regards the unfairness of the strategy crystallized originally on page 388 of Insight.

The use of the general theological categories occurs in all eight functional specialties.⁷ Without intellectual self-transcendence

becoming a topic, much less occurring, that use will predominantly remain at best opaque and archaic, at worst basically disoriented. Yet, at present, Biblical theologians, pastoral theologians, historians, etc., are little more enthusiastic about the topic of intellectual self-transcendence than physicists of fifty years ago were about discussing tensor fields and eigenfunctions.⁸ They may even echo in their hearts what Lonergan reports as spoken by a professor of philosophy "Would some one please tell me what is all this fuss about ens?"⁹ But even fundamental or foundational theologians can be reluctant to put forward precise views of their own on reality, knowledge and objectivity. There are those no doubt who would claim that the object - or subject - of their theological reflections transcends any finite view, or view based on the finite realm, of reality, knowledge and objectivity. But even those would surely acknowledge that clarity on the finite realm would throw light on its unacceptability. There are those, on the other hand, who admit some continuity: with those I would argue that clarity on the finite realm more evidently is to be sought.¹⁰

Again, intrinsic to the importance of making intellectual self-transcendence a topic is the manifestation of its difficulty and the concomitant manifestation, epiphany, of our humanity. Lonergan regularly returns to the aspect of difficulty, perhaps most clearly in answer to a question during the talk on "Consciousness and the Trinity", which I have quoted at length in Part 1.¹¹

Far from solving the problem in a youthful course on epistemology, the real question regularly only emerges in a later context and within community. In so far as intellectual self-transcendence and its difficulty do become topics, there can be a shift in the statistical distribution of those who rise to a Praxisweltanschauung which regards the real as completely intelligible and, apart from

successful achievement, a shift towards an increased tonality of mystery in the theological community concomitant with a discouragement of commonsense eclecticism.

My second comment regards the seeming unfairness of the strategy of Insight 387-8. So, for instance, if I take my stand, as I do, with Fr. Lonergan, that "the formulation of cognitional theory cannot be complete unless some stand is taken on the basic issues in philosophy", that the position is as indicated on the following page, that any other view is a counterposition, it does not seem like playing the game. There is an evident unecumenical unfairness in calling other views counterpositions; there is a more fundamental unfairness of introducing an undesirable topic - if you like, of changing the rules of the game.

The unfairness seems to fade when one places the dialogue within the context of dialectic. It is for each investigator to take his or her own stand on what he or she considers the roots of progress, where progress is discerned ongoingly by the ongoing process of criticism. But all this makes the unfairness more evident: one may not want to talk about progress or criticism, no more than one wants to talk about being. But here we come to the fundamental unfairness: if one does not want to talk about being, what does one want to talk about - non-being?

The fundamental unfairness of the strategy of Insight, 388 is its modern third stage of meaning extension of the old dodge of getting the sceptic to talk.

I turn now to my reflections on such matters in process thought, not in general but in dialogue with Professor Schubert Ogden as he expresses himself in "Lonergan and the Subjectivist Principle"¹²

and with Fr. David Tracy as he expresses himself in dependence on Professor Ogden in his recent book.¹³ I will proceed through a series of ten points.

1. In the first place, I do not think that Professor Ogden is clear about the meaning or strategy of Lonergan's work. So, for example, speaking of Lonergan's identification of the task of philosophy he remarks: "presupposed by this identification is the view that there is a 'duality' in human knowing in that 'in each of us there exist two quite different kinds of knowledge'."¹⁴ There is the kind of knowledge whose basis is 'the data of sense' and whose most refined and fully developed form is empirical science. But there is also the kind of knowledge whose primary object is not the known but the knowing subject and which is based, therefore, on the 'data of consciousness'.¹⁵ Now, Lonergan's strategy does not presuppose the view mentioned: it arrives at it. Furthermore, the two kinds of knowing mentioned by Lonergan in the passage quoted are not at all the two Ogden goes on to speak about. Ogden proceeds to argue against Lonergan's derivation of categories resembling the substance-quality categories. But I doubt if Ogden is thinking of derivation as Lonergan does: "The derivation of the categories is a matter of the human and the Christian subject effecting self-appropriation and employing this heightened consciousness both as a basis for methodical control in doing theology and, as well, as an a priori whence he can understand other men, their social relations, their history, their religion, their ritual, their destiny."¹⁶ Ogden's strategy, indeed, and his expectation of strategies, would seem to resemble some type of concrete deductivism as described and criticized by Lonergan in his discussion of metaphysical methods.¹⁷ Lonergan's strategy is not a faulty acceptance of the subjectivist principle: it is an open acceptance of generalized empirical method.

2. There is disagreement on the meaning of the word 'experience'.

Ogden remarks: "I am not at all questioning that Lonergan holds experience to be presupposed by human understanding, at least to the extent that it extrinsically conditions such understanding. My point is simply that the experience of which he holds this to be true is not the experience we actually enjoy and undergo, but only so much of it as is focally understood, because it is given clearly and distinctly as consciousness."¹⁸ Perhaps I might let Fr. Lonergan answer for me from his most recent writing, in the course of which he treats of the ambiguity of experience. There is the usual meaning of the word experience that occurs in such phrases as 'the man of experience'.

"But there is another meaning at times given to the word, experience, and it is this meaning that concerns us here. It occurs in certain analyses of the various components that together make up human knowing. It is employed to denote an infra-structure within knowing, and its significance resides in a contrast between this infra-structure and a supra-structure.

To take a first illustration, any scientist will distinguish sharply between his hypothesis and the data to which he appeals. To the data the hypothesis adds a supra-structure of context, problem, discovery, formulation. But the data, as appealed to, are not yet the infra-structure. For, as appealed to, the data are named. That naming supposes a scientific supra-structure of technical language and of the scientific knowledge needed to employ the technical language accurately. In turn, the technical language

and the scientific knowledge presuppose an earlier ordinary language and commonsense style of knowing that were employed in learning the science in the first place. Only when one goes behind ordinary language and commonsense knowing does one come to the infra-structure in its pure form. It is pure experience, the experience underpinning and distinct from every supra-structure. As outer experience it is sensation as distinct from perception. As inner experience it is consciousness as distinct not only from self-knowledge but also from any introspective process that goes from the data of consciousness and moves towards the acquisition of self-knowledge."¹⁹

Obviously, the infrastructure is not "given clearly and distinctly in consciousness." Furthermore, while it can be admitted in more than one sense that Lonergan "starts from understanding to understanding experience"²⁰ still these different senses need to be distinguished. First of all one may note that Insight "was not a study of human life but a study of human understanding."²¹ The experience, then, that was the focus of Lonergan's effort in Insight was the experience of understanding.²² Secondly, the study of human understanding led Lonergan to an integral heuristic structure pertinent to any experience of "the man of experience".²³ Thirdly, the study enabled him to determine "that the empirical residue lies in the individuality, the continuity, the coincidental conjunctions and successions, and the non-systematic divergence from intelligible norms, which are to be known by experiencing and only by experiencing."²⁴

3. Ogden's further discussion²⁵ of experience and knowledge in Lonergan is clouded by the ambiguity of experience. Lonergan remarks in reply: "If Professor Ogden were to discover that Whitehead meant something similar (to the ongoing self-correcting

process of learning) when he took his stand on experience, the distance that separates us would in some measure be reduced."²⁶ Still, Ogden's discussion gives a very definite impression that he does not like the idea that objectivity is a matter of answering questions: such an idea would belong to a philosophic tradition that "wrongly looks to intellect for the objectivity that experience as we actually live it quite adequately provides for itself."²⁷ But it is the live subject, the man of experience, that asks questions.

I suspect that the basic issue here is one which Fr. Lonergan himself once put in question form: "Is it a fact that our intellectual knowledge includes an apprehension, inspection, intuition, of concrete, actual existence? Or is it a fact that our intellectual knowledge does not include an apprehension, inspection, intuition, of concrete, actual existence?"²⁷

4. "Finally, the limits of Lonergan's thought are indicated with particular clarity by the range of alternatives he considers in defining his cognitional theory."²⁹ Now the manner in which Lonergan considers the range of alternatives to his own view is complex. Existentially the range of alternatives clearly entered into his own search.³⁰ In Insight, and indeed in Method in Theology the alternatives provide the possibility of clarification by contrast.³¹ In Praxis the existential genesis of his own view, through ever widening anamnesis, becomes praxisthematized and clarification by contrast is sublated into dialectic.³² However, to return to Ogden's objection, even in Insight it is clear that Lonergan's considerations focused, not on alternatives, but on his own experience, in the widest sense, as a modern subject in increasingly adequate anamnesis. Ogden would counter, perhaps, that Lonergan's focus on experience is abstractive, whereas

Whitehead's is not and so Whitehead moves "not to discover intellect, but to rediscover experience."³³ We are back at the question of experience, but we have added the issue of abstraction. It is a large issue, but of far wider importance than one might suspect. As in the previous point, so here, we have a basic issue which may be put in question form:

What is it to rediscover experience? What is it to rediscover? Is rediscovery enriching or impoverishing? Is abstraction enriching or impoverishing? Is rediscovery not abstraction?³⁴

5. I am led to suspect that a thematization of Ogden's position would result in a view on reality, knowledge and objectivity which would be a sub-category of the general category of counterpositions:

- (1) the real is a subdivision of the 'already-out-there-now' and the 'already-in-here-now';
- (2) the subject is known prior to affirmation in an existential state;
- (3) objectivity is a property of vital anticipation, extroversion, satisfaction.

6. Ogden's view, as he notes, has its origin in Whitehead. Within an adequate dialectic, one of the "good things"³⁵ that will be made precise is Whitehead's rejection of the substance-quality categories of Locke, Hume, etc.³⁶ But Lonergan altogether more radically rejects these categories.³⁷ The difference between Whitehead and Lonergan is that Whitehead's process theory is falsifiable in any instance of scientific knowing, whereas Lonergan's view of things, of central and conjugate forms, of genera and species and their emergence, of biological and zoological development, etc., is verifiable in the operations of the widest range of scientific thinkers.³⁸

7. Fr. Tracy, who shares Ogden's view,³⁹ has previously considered this particular problem, Lonergan's rejection of a notion of substance involving "any confusion or mixture of elements taken both from the notion of a thing and from the notion of a 'body' in its primary sense."⁴⁰ On the distinction between 'things' and 'bodies' Fr. Tracy remarks: "The distinction (perhaps his best known one) is easy enough to grasp if the previous chapters have been understood."⁴¹ I cannot agree. The heuristic notion of the notion of thing is extremely difficult to grasp, even if one is competent in all the fields alluded to in the first seven chapters of Insight and solidly initiated into intentionality analysis. I should say that the "grasping the grasp" involved here puts one well on the road to intellectual self-transcendence.

8. Fr. Tracy regularly associates Frs. Lonergan and Rahner and Coreth as transcendentalists.⁴² Moreover, in The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan he speaks of "the 'critical realism' of Lonergan-Coreth-Rahner et al."⁴³ Here again, I have to disagree. Neither Lonergan's strategy nor Lonergan's critical realism are shared by Rahner or Coreth. I have no doubt that Rahner and Coreth have struggled to move out of a deficient tradition of philosophy and theology. But neither have I any doubt that their struggle has not been successful. Such an assertion is broad, and an adequate dialectic would add precise qualifications. But my existential dialectic leads me to this component of Praxiswelt-anschauung regarding what is going forward in the twentieth century. Lonergan's strategy and achievement is not just a new ball game: it is on a new type of field with a "startlingly strange"⁴⁴ ball.

9. Fr. Tracy is indebted to Professor Ogden, not only for the general Whiteheadian view of experience, but also for his "articulation of the need for the theologian to develop 'criteria of appropriateness' as well as 'criteria of adequacy' to common human experience"⁴⁵ which Fr. Tracy seeks to develop in his book.

Something has already been said in Part 2 of this paper on the nature of criticism and the search for criteria. My interest here is not in the development but in the position that Fr. Tracy would adopt on reality, knowledge and objectivity. No more than Professor Ogden does Fr. Tracy give a precise thematization of a viewpoint on these. One has to work from the clues of expression. In so far as the interpretation of the clues are incorrect clearly I am subject to correction. But that is precisely the strategy sublatable into dialectic, where it will lead both Fr. Tracy and myself and others "to ask themselves some basic questions, first, about others, but eventually, even about themselves."⁴⁶

As in the discussion of Ogden's view, the ambiguity of the word "experience" creates problems of interpretation. Fr. Tracy remarks that "If one shifts one's focus away from the sense-perception of objects ('experience') as the paradigm case for reality to the self's full range of unconscious, conscious, and knowing experiences of the self as the paradigm case for reality, a change in basic metaphysical categories occurs. In place of the essentially non-temporal and non-relational categories of 'substance' and 'being' of the classical metaphysical tradition, the categories 'process,' 'sociality,' and 'time' emerge."⁴⁷ Now "the self as the paradigm case for reality" suggests to me something very like a rejection of "the real is the concrete universe of being",⁴⁸ where being has a definition genetically related to that expressed in chapter 12 of Insight, in favour of the view on the real that I attributed to Professor Ogden. The difficulty of this interpretation is that the self's full range of experiences does, in the subtle sense defined by Insight, pp.319-388, yield "the paradigm case for reality." Still, I do not think that Fr. Tracy is thinking in this sense, since this sense involves notions of 'substance' and 'being' which he would seem to find no more acceptable than the classical tradition.

Again, Fr. Tracy speaks of the "immediate experience of the self-as-a self."⁴⁹ Here one might with sufficient distinction regarding

'immediacy' and 'experience', show that this represents what I would call a position. But its most evident meaning is a negation of the positional fact that "the subject becomes known when it affirms itself intelligently and reasonably and so is not known yet in any prior 'existential' state."⁵⁰

Finally, I do not find any precise view on the third feature of the position, objectivity, in Fr. Tracy's book. Still, his general sympathy with Ogden, his rejection of classical categories, and his discussion of the objectivity of God, lead me to suspect that he would follow Ogden here also. The weave of his views does not seem consistent with an explicit position that "objectivity is conceived as a consequence of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection."⁵¹

10. Both Fr. Tracy and Professor Ogden have a good deal to say about Fr. Lonergan's view of God. It may be taken for granted that I find their own views unacceptable, but I prefer, on principle, to avoid entering into a discussion of them here. The principle involved is the Principle of the Dog, and it is worth spelling out. It is a principle I became fond of when I was dealing with people like Anthony Flew during my courses on the philosophy of God. Briefly, it springs from my reluctance to discuss philosophy of God with anyone who is confused about the philosophy of dogs. More precisely, there are sets of contingent affirmations about dogs which occur in the science of zoology: they are not mysterious, but they do require metazoological self-appropriation if they are not to remain opaque. If a thinker is content to leave them opaque and venture on into a discussion of contingent affirmations about God, I follow the strategy of trying to lead him back to the topic of dogs.⁵² Moreover, the Principle of the Dog has an added refinement relating to generalized empirical method. Dogs have their own objectivity: "dogs know their masters, bones, other dogs, and not merely the appearances of these things".⁵³ The investigation of that objectivity is a task within zoology which present zoology handles badly.⁵⁴

But there is the ongoing genesis of methods and there is a set of pressure points in the relatively young science of zoology.⁵⁵

One of these decades zoologists will be driven and drawn, by empirical demands, to face the problem of understanding animal objectivity and its genesis in a novel fashion less foreign to the third stage of meaning than their present strategies. The facing of that problem, in turn, will make the problem of intellectual self-transcendence a topic, a centrepiece of public zoological discourse, in a way that it is not a topic for physicists, chemists, botanists. And the light generated by that development will, it is hoped, shine revealingly through views such as Ogden's and Santayana's: "Ogden maintains that 'faith' or 'belief' is a fundamental factor in the life of every human being, not simply every explicit religious believer. On a first level, which human beings share with the other animals, there exists what Santayana named 'animal faith', i.e., that instinctive confidence of an animal in the environment as permissive of its struggle to live and reproduce its kind. On a second, distinctively human level, one finds the phenomenon of 'self-consciousness', i.e., the ability to understand and reflect upon that instinctive confidence."⁵⁶

Conclusion

It is time to call a halt to this three part invention.⁵⁷ We have been spiralling round the intention of the "is" of judgement and verification and worthwhileness and discourse. Praxis is such a spiralling round and central to it is that focusing on "is". Like Fr. Crowe "I take courage from the fact that God has planted a fifth column within them (those who in rejecting "metaphysics" practice metaphysics): they cannot stop using the word "is". Using it, they cannot forever refrain from asking what it means, not for more than five or ten thousand years anyway, much less if they are willing to learn with and from tradition."⁵⁸

FOOTNOTES

1. Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, Beacon Press, Boston, 1970, 14, 21, 39, 47, 83.
2. On Jaspers notion of encompassing, see Gerhard Knauss, "The Concept of The 'Encompassing' in Jaspers' Philosophy", The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, edited by P.A. Schilpp, New York, 1957, 141-175.
3. Fichte's Sun-Clear Statement was printed, in the English translation of A.E. Kroeger, in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. II, 1868.
4. This is the main thesis that emerges from my work of the past five years, to appear under the title The Shaping of the Foundations: Being at Home in Transcendental Method.
5. Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, Random House, New York, Volume II, 1123.
6. My emphasis here is more on attitude than achievement. For the same point in a complementary context see the Epilogue, "Being and Loneliness", to my Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations: Self-Axis of the Great Ascent, Exposition Press, New York, 1975.
7. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Northwestern University Press, 1970, 168-69.
8. Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, London, 1953, chapter 1.
9. Bernard Lonergan, De Deo Trino II, Pars Systematica, Gregorian Press, Rome, 1964, 199.
10. The precise meaning here may be gleaned from the discussion of possible, probable and actual serializations of schemes of recurrence in B. Lonergan, Insight, Philosophical Library, New York, 1957, 119-120.
11. B. Lonergan, Collection, Herder and Herder, New York, 1967, "Dimensions of Meaning", 255-56.
12. Gerhard Knauss, op. cit., 167.
13. See Alfred Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth", Readings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, New York, 1949, p. 53, where he indicates his primary interest in the notion of truth for sentences.
14. B. Lonergan, "The Dehellenization of Dogma", A Second Collection, Dorton, Longman and Todd, London, 1974, 15.

15. The issue is technical. See Insight, 388.
16. Still some years away, with title The Structure of an Academic Revolution.
17. Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm", Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, 61. This volume will be referred to later as Criticism.
18. Ibid., 60.
19. Ibid., 59.
20. Ibid., 60.
21. For the meaning of 'Radical', one must draw on Insight 356-59; see also Method in Theology, index, under Notions.
22. Thomas Kuhn, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?", Criticism, 1.
23. Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding, Vol. 1, Oxford, 1972, 8.
24. The issue is complex, See the lengthy footnote 122, pp. 25-26 of B. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, University of Notre Dame Press, 1967.
25. Intellectual Process has been the focus of Lonergan's attention in at least four of his major works: those cited already in footnotes 9, 21 and 24.
26. Recall footnote 10. There is an underlying Theory of history involved here which is a filling out, through the inclusion of concrete details of actual, probable and possible significant shifts of meaning - schemes, in the complexity of globe-netting statistical distributions, within the basic viewpoint of generalized emergent probability. See Insight, index under Emergent Probability; Method in Theology, 286-88.
27. Imre Lakatos, "Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes", Criticism, 183-84.
28. Ibid., 132.
29. J.W.N. Sullivan, Beethoven: His Spiritual Development, Vintage, New York, 1960, 85.
30. Insight, 647.

31. Insight, 646-47. See also 515-20.
32. Obviously the basic pointers are the works of Lonergan themselves. Helpful points of entry are the articles reprinted in the two collections cited above in footnotes 11 and 14. I would refer forward here, however, to my comments, in the text at footnote 38, on background, foreground and the parts of Insight. Method in Theology, the two collections, and other works are too easily erroneously grafted into contemporary theological and philosophical debate if the challenge of part one of Insight is not met. See Method in Theology, 260.
33. ".... as though his mind had become dull, or his brain exhausted, or his judgment had lapsed into the error of those that forgot man to be potency in the realm of intelligence" Insight, 748.
34. I recall here Friedrich Schlegel's remark, quoted in H.G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen, 1960, 274, footnote 2: "A classic is a writing that is never fully understood. But those that are educated and educate themselves must always want to learn more from it."
35. Sullivan, op. cit., 150. I would like to quote at length here from a more recent biography of Beethoven. It serves to bring out rather concretely some of the points I have been trying to make regarding growth and the relative inaccessibility of classics: "The works which occupied him almost exclusively in the last years were the final five string quartets. These late-harvest products are unique, unique for Beethoven, unique in all music. The quartets carry music to a summit of exaltation and to the deepest depth of feeling. There is no "message" in these works, no "philosophy." They are beyond definition in words. To probe their variety of mood, sweetness, power, intensity, humor, compassion, assertion of life, a book by itself is needed, one which it would be beyond my ability to write. Yet we may let the music speak - without a preliminary word. Each of the five quartets is an experience which makes one break out in perspiring superlatives. (I think that the slow movement of Opus 135 is the most beautiful piece of music ever written.) Each is peerless. They have a reputation for being difficult, and some listeners shy away from them. Difficult they may be, as The Tempest or Faust or The Idiot is difficult; but not abstract, not severe, not inaccessible, save possibly the Great Fugue (Op. 133).
All great artists travel the road upward. For some the climb is not a steep one, and the level they reach lies near the level at which they started. Others ascend continuously from youth to age, and reach so high a plateau that they leave their early works far in the valley. Raphael and Mendelssohn were accomplished artists almost from the start, and while their work shows development, it is not a startling development. (Both died young, however.) Beethoven is like Rembrandt: a world separates "The Anatomy Lesson," painted when Rembrandt was twenty-six, from the "Self Portrait" in the Frick museum, painted at the age of fifty-two. When Beethoven was twenty-six, he worked on the Piano Sonata, Op. 7, a charming piece known in his lifetime as "The Maiden in Love"; when he was fifty-two he was thinking of the first of the last quartets. It was an immense journey." George R. Marek,

Beethoven, Biography of a Genius, Kimber, London, 1970, 602.

36. B. Lonergan, Insight, 278
37. A. Walton Litz, The Art of James Joyce: Method and Design in Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, London, 1961, 92-3.
38. Heinrich Schenker, "Organic Structure in Sonata Form," Journal of Musical Theory, 12, 1968, 180.
39. F.E. Crowe, "The Origin and Scope of Bernard Lonergan's 'Insight,'" Sciences Ecclesiastiques 9 (1957).
40. B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 177
41. Insight, 517
42. The next section deals with actual context, the "position on being" is that to which the first XXX + 388 pages of Insight invites the reader. We are discussing here something more remote, more refined, more incarnate than that preliminary achievement, but the dimensions of the preliminary achievement should not be minimized: "Unfortunately, some people have the impression that while Tertullian and others of his time may have made such a mistake, no one repeats it today. Nothing could be further from the truth. For until a person has made the personal discovery that he is making Tertullian's mistake all along the line, until he has gone through the crisis involved in overcoming one's spontaneous estimate of the real, and the fear of idealism involved in it, he is still thinking just as Tertullian did. It is not a sign that one is dumb or backward. St. Augustine was one of the most intelligent men in the whole Western tradition and one of the best proofs of his intelligence is in the fact that he himself discovered that for years he was unable to distinguish between what is a body and what is real." B. Lonergan, in a talk on "Consciousness and the Trinity" 1964 (unpublished).
43. "To strike out on a new line and become more than a week-end celebrity calls for years in which one's living is more or less constantly absorbed in the effort to understand, in which one's understanding gradually works round and up a spiral of viewpoints with each complementing its predecessor and only the last embracing the whole field to be mastered." (B. Lonergan, Insight, 186).
44. I recall here the aspirations of the Vorticist movement, to digest and bring forth the past. See Hugh Kenner, The Pound Era, University of California Press, 1971, 238-39.

45. See B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 258-62, 273-76, 303-5.
46. Ibid., Cp. 5 and Part Two.
47. Recall the text at footnote 11 and the reference there.
48. Method in Theology, 163.
49. For the meaning of 'perspective' see Method in Theology, index under Perspectivism. For light on the meaning of dynamic see B. Lonergan, Philosophy of God and Theology, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973, index under Viewpoint.
50. Insight, xxv-vi.
51. Insight, 72, 243. See Part 2 for a more developed view.
52. Method in Theology, 95.
53. See Randomness, Statistics and Emergence, Gill Macmillan and Notre Dame, 1971; also chapter 1 of The Shaping of the Foundations.
54. Insight, xxviii.
55. See footnote 42.
56. Criticism, 265-66. See also the text above at footnotes 13 and 14.
57. See, for example, Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of Complex Systems, edited by Howard H. Pattee, George Braziller, New York, 1973.
58. Albert Wilson, "Systems Epistemology" in The World System, edited by Ervin Laszlo, Braziller, New York, 1973, 125-26.
59. B. Lonergan, Collection, 20.
60. I have treated this in some detail in Randomness, Statistics and Emergence, Cp. 9.
61. On Schemes of Recurrence see Randomness, Statistics and Emergence, Cp. 10.
62. Method in Theology, 97-99.
63. Peter Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice, Basic Books, New York, 1974, xii.

64. The title of its final chapter.
65. Ibid., 213.
66. Insight, 226-42.
67. What is said here, and spelt out in Part 2, will be placed in a larger context in Part 3. Clearly, one may "speak of the church as a process of self-constitution occurring within worldwide human society" (Method in Theology, 363).

1. M. Lamb, History, Method and Theology. A Dialectical Comparison of Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology, (Doctorate thesis, University of Munster, 1974, 42: to be published).
2. On literary criticism R.P. Blackmur remarks: "Every critic like every theologian and every philosopher is a casuist in spite of himself". "A Critic's Job of Work", Five Approaches of Literary Criticism, edited by Wilbur Scott, Collier Macmillan, New York, 1962, 316. The book is a useful survey of different English language views. On music criticism, see "Metamusic and Self-Meaning" to appear as chapter two of The Shaping of the Foundations.
3. J. R. Oppenheimer, The Open Mind, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1955, 88.
4. J. Haberer, "Politicalization in Science", Science, Vol. 178, 1972 (713-724), 713.
5. P. Berger, op.cit., xiv
6. Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, Bell and Sons, London 1965, vii, see also chapter X.
7. Method in Theology, 261-2.
8. Insight, 72, 243.
9. Journal of Religion, 1974; at footnote 14.
10. Ibid. This point is central in dealing with Schubert Ogden's "Subjectivist Principle": see Part 3.
11. The Donald Methers Memorial Lectures, delivered by Fr. Lonergan in March 1976 at Queen's University.
12. Method in Theology, 4.
13. This, and the quotation to follow, are from the last of the three lectures.
14. F.E. Crowe, "Dogma versus the Self-Correcting Process of Learning", Foundations of Theology (ed. P. McShane), Gill, Macmillan and Notre Dame, 1971, 26.

15. "8. Lonergan Responds", Foundations of Theology, 224.
16. I recall the parallel drawn in Part 1 between Beethoven's development and Lonergan's. Present occasional lectures, like the last quartets, may be expected to go far beyond earlier symphonic volumes.
17. The indices of Method in Theology, A Second Collection, Philosophy of God and Theology.
18. See, for example, the lecture "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation" (Journal of Religion, 1975), and the later lectures Religion, Theology and Religious Studies (1976, to be published).
19. P. McShane, Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations, Exposition Press, New York, 1975, 96. The remark is made in the context of a discussion of "the menace of experiential conjugation". See Insight, 542.
20. I recall here Lonergan's metaphor of the rock on which one can build, including "the more important part", Method in Theology, 19.
21. Insight, 227, provides an immediate context. The larger context is an understanding of the types of bias meshed into a grasp of the flow of meanings in history: see Method in Theology, 178.
22. "Dogma versus the Self-Correcting Process of Learning", 29.
23. I cannot enter here into the intricacies of its entry into the realms of feelings. "The principle of dynamic correspondence calls for a harmonious orientation on the psychic level, and from the nature of the case such an orientation would have to consist in some cosmic dimension, in some intimation of unplumbed depths that accrue to man's feelings, emotions, sentiments." (Insight, 532). And there is the ongoing mediation of sophistication in such intimations. See also in this Part, footnotes 31 and 65 and in Part 3 footnotes 3, 34.
24. See footnote 51 of Part 1.
25. Part 1, section 7 (p.18).
26. Insight, 393.
27. See Part 1, the text at footnotes 57 - 60.

28. The Shaping of the Foundations, chapter 1, at footnote 75.
29. Ibid., chapter 3, at footnote 50.
30. Ibid., chapter 2, the text after footnote 65, especially the quotation at footnote 80.
31. There is a problem here of concrete expectation: like suspecting that Finnegans Wake would emerge from the tail of Ulysses, or more precisely from the tail of "The Oxen of the Sun" episode. Not that Finnegans Wake is aggreformic expression, though it does open various Win-d-ohs! There is the wider problem of linguistic feedback in the third stage of meaning: see Method in Theology, 88 footnote 34. See also in this Part, footnotes 23, 65 and, in Part 3, footnotes 3, 34.
32. I recall here the basic text from Insight, selected for this Part, and quoted in the preface. We are gradually recontextualizing the text and will return to it at the conclusion to Part 2.
33. "The culture becomes a slum" (Method in Theology, 99): the comment occurs in a discussion of undifferentiated consciousness in the later stages of meaning.
34. Insight, 735.
35. See footnote 23, above, and the citation there from Insight. Note the ambiguity of the phrase "the conception was constitutive", and consider the meaning, within later actual contexts, of the statement "self-transcendence is the eagerly sought goal not only of our sensitivity, not only of our intelligent and rational knowing, not only of our freedom and responsibility, but first of all of our flesh and blood that through nerves and brains have come spontaneously to live out symbolic meanings and to carry out symbolic demands." (from the second of the three lectures cited in footnote 11).
36. Insight, 391. It is perhaps significant that in the sublation of Insight into foundations Lonergan does not include the word implementation. Embracing all heuristic structures is "the integral heuristic structure which is what I mean by a metaphysics." This section can be seen as a case for its non-inclusion there.

37. Insight, 392-95.
38. Ibid., Epilogue.
39. Ibid., 530-1.
40. Ibid., 227.
41. On the latter point, Insight 209-11; 226-27; 698.
42. I am being both precise and cautious here. Fr. Crowe remarks, at the beginning of a paper to which I will refer immediately, "it is possible that in some respects we are dealing, not with a development of Lonergan's thought, but with a further stage of its manifestation." It is all too easy to latch on to such statements of Lonergan as "In Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method the good is a distinct notion" (A Second Collection, 263: Lonergan of 1972) as if Insight, the fruit of twenty-eight years of philosophy, had a fatal flaw.

The paper of Fr. Crowe to which I refer, and to which I am deeply indebted, is his paper for the Boston Lonergan Workshop of 1974, "An Exploration of Lonergan's New Notion of Value". Needless to say, the shift in the notion of value merges with the more evidently illuminating shift to functional specialization. The latter shift, and its interplay with the former, is a matter for detailed research.
43. "Authentic Subjectivity and International Growth: Foundations", Boston Lonergan Workshop 1975. To appear as the Epilogue of The Shaping of the Foundations, at footnote 80.
44. A distinction is not a separation. What operates is the subject which I elsewhere speak of as a notion of survival, "you at core and in kilos", Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations, cp. 10 "The Notion of Survival".
45. Lonergan's view on finality has undergone an enrichment which parallels the developments indicated. In "Mission and Spirit", 1974, he speaks of the passionateness of being as underpinning, accompanying, reaching beyond the subject as experientially, intelligently, rationally, morally conscious. Lonergan's classic treatments of finality are in "Finality Love Marriage" (1943) and in Insight, 442-51. I recall however my cautionary comment in footnote 42.

46. B. Lonergan, "The Subject", A Second Collection, Darton Longman and Todd, 1974, 81.
47. Ibid., 82.
48. I am indebted here to Fr. Crowe's paper for the Boston Lonergan Workshop of 1974: "An Exploration of Lonergan's New Notion of Value".
49. Insight, 390.
50. Ibid., 396.
51. One might think of the meshing primarily in terms of failure - the failure of Mandarinism - but one can also think of it in terms of ripening times, with hope and fantasy within the Praxis mediation of which we are speaking. See footnote 65, below.
52. "The concrete possibility of a scheme beginning to function shifts the probability of the combination from the product of pqr,...., to the sum of p+q+r...." Insight, 121. I have discussed and illustrated this in Randomness, Statistics and Emergence, Chapter 11, "Probability-schedules of Emergence of Schemes". In the present instance, a useful imaginative crutch is the vortex. The structure of Praxis is a large vortex bringing together sets of previously unintegrated ranges of macro- and micro- vortex movements, with resultant discontinuities in angular velocities and accelerations. Since the vortices involve human subjects and communities, the velocities and accelerations involve six levels of change. See further indications in footnotes 23, 35, 64 and 69 of this Part.
53. Insight, 119.
54. Method in Theology, 292.
55. M. Lamb, op.cit., footnote 1, 180-193, 514, speaks of a functional feedback model.
56. In Religious Studies and Theology, Fr. Lonergan speaks of method as praxis and of praxis becoming an academic subject with the passing of the age of innocence. One cannot do brief justice to such points. A helpful illustration that Fr. Lonergan cites of the dynamic orientation in question is Heiler's view of the mission of the history of religions to lie in a preparation of the cooperation of religions.

57. B. Lonergan, "The Subject", A Second Collection, 83.
58. Fr. Lonergan's brief expression of one of the issues raised in Fr. Tracy's article, "Lonergan's Foundational Theology: An Interpretation and a Critique", Foundations of Theology, 197-223.
59. "Bernard Lonergan Responds", Foundations of Theology, 230-31.
60. In the article already mentioned (footnote 42) Fr. Crowe spells out the analogy of questioning and of criticism.
61. Op. cit., 214.
62. Insight, 332: this is the rock of Method in Theology, 19.
63. Method in Theology, 283-4: this is "the more important part of the rock" of Method in Theology, 19, footnote 5.
64. See footnote 51 of Part 1 and footnote 52 of Part 2. I refer here also to the large vortex of the interplay of functional specialties and to the set of turns of the subject involved in the practice of Method in Theology, 250, 11.15ff.
65. "Without fantasy, all philosophic knowledge remains in the grip of the present or the past and severed from the future, which is the only link between philosophy and the real history of mankind." (Herbert Marcuse, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro, Boston, 1968, 155. See also here Part 2, footnotes 23, 31; Part 3 footnotes 3, 34. In the third stage of meaning one must expect, hope for, envisage imaginatively, work to, new levels of humour, music, prayer, public kindness and discourse.
66. The foundational theologian is committed to conceive of the invariants of progress and decline and of "our future destiny", Method in Theology, 291.
67. Method in Theology, xi.

68. Insight, 747. I may permit myself a valuable anecdotal aside here. Fr. Lonergan's work in economics in the 30's and 40's is quite extraordinary. I recall now correspondence from him in the late 60's raising the question of collaborators with him in economics. None "fully enlightened" emerged (see my comments on A. Lowe's On Economic Knowledge, Harper and Row, 1965 in Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations, cp. 10). That "full enlightenment" is of course related to the issue of generalized empirical method.

69. Three points. First of all, academic meaning ranges through all the types and functions of meaning outlined in Method in Theology, chapter 3. Secondly, one should note that adult growth in general heuristics involves an epiphanous reading stance towards words and things. "Incarnation" is more and more fully read in the clarity of the heuristic conception of the six-levelled hierarchy of aggregates which is man: $f(p_i, c_j, b_k, z_l, u_m, r_n)$, where for instance c_j connotes a subset of chemical conjugates. Other complexities emerge when one considers the heuristics of nerve and muscle, eye and brain. Thirdly, the above two points serve very clearly to bring out the need for generalized empirical method in human studies.

70. Insight, 401.

71. See Part 1, at footnotes 56 and 57.

72. Method in Theology, 253.

73. In notes for lectures at the Thomas More Institute in Montreal (unpublished).

74. This and the following two quotations are taken from a lecture Lonergan delivered at Hobart and William Smith Colleges (October 10th, 1974) entitled "Self-Transcendence: Intellectual, Moral, Religious".

1. Method in Theology, 318. See the preface above, ii.
See also Method in Theology, 297.
2. Method in Theology, 85-99, 302-318. These in turn are contextualized by the classifications of differentiations of consciousness, 81-85, 257-62, 271-76.
3. I think here of Narziss' intimation of the single word as epiphany (Hermann Hesse, Narziss and Goldmund, Penguin, 64) as well as the epiphany of Joyce's Ballast Office clock (Harry Levin (ed.) The Essential James Joyce, Penguin, 12) or of Marcel Proust's little madeleine (op.cit., footnote 5, Part 1, 35). The little word of interest to us here is "is" (see the conclusion to this Part), but one must be mindful of the fact that the word is an expression of the incarnate subject. If it is to be uttered with new mindfulness in public discourse, one must expect, on the principle of dynamic correspondence (Insight, 532), resonant changes in the total subject and community. See also Part 2, footnotes 23, 31, 65; Part 3, footnote 34.
4. Method in Theology, 253.
5. Ibid., 254-262. See the comments in footnotes 31, 32 below.
6. See Part 2, footnote 52 and the text there.
7. Method in Theology, 292.
8. Insight, 581.
9. B. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 20.
10. There is a strategy involved here related to Lonergan's restriction of discussion to proportionate being in a large part of Insight (Insight, 391). I will return in the conclusion to this topic under the rubric "The Principle of the Dog".
11. See footnote 42, page 22 above.
12. I quote the article as it appeared in Language, Truth and Meaning (ed. P. McShane), Gill Macmillan and Notre Dame, 1972.
13. Blessed Rage for Order, Seabury Press, New York, 1975, 39 n.42, 57 n.4, 101, 103-4, 114 n.44, 153-6, 166 n.41, 179, 202 n.101.

14. Insight, xvii.
15. Op. cit., 218-9.
16. Method in Theology, 292. See footnote 10 of Part 2 and the text there.
17. Insight, 404-06. This point is worth lengthier considerations than are possible here. Ogden's subjectivist principle is "that the primary object of philosophic reflection is my own existence as an experiencing self" (Foundations of Theology, 225) and he remarks of it: "logically this principle can imply nothing less than what he (Whitehead) speaks of as the 'deposition of substance-quality'." (Foundations of Theology, 223-4). In so far as the idea of logical implication can be taken seriously here, the questions that Lonergan raises with regard to deductive methods in Insight 402ff., can be raised. Even if Ogden claims that the phrase is used loosely, one may still ask for more precision regarding his metaphysical method.
18. Op.cit., 227.
19. Religious Studies and Theology, 1976, (to be published), the first lecture.
20. S. Ogden, op.cit., 226, 227.
21. "Bernard Lonergan Responds", Language Truth and Meaning, 310.
22. A relevant elementary context is Insight 274.
23. Insight, 392-95.
24. Insight, 432. Notice the new context given to this by the text cited at footnote 19, above, and by the discussion of generalized empirical method in Part 2.
25. Op. cit., 227-8.
26. Language Truth and Meaning, 310.
27. S. Ogden, op.cit., 228.
28. B. Lonergan, "Insight: Preface to a Discussion", Collection, 162-3.
29. S. Ogden, op. cit., 228.

30. It would take at least a substantial article to handle this issue. Lonergan himself speaks of his passage through nominalism, Molinism etc., and his debt to Aquinas. Moreover, that personal passage to Aquinas and beyond, in ongoing learning, provided evident grist for the mill of growth into Method in Theology. One aspect of that is touched on in the immediately following text and footnotes.
31. In Insight, Clarification by Contrast occurs explicitly in chapter 4, section 3; chapter 11, sections 10 and 11; but also in shorter discussions of counterpositions, as well as in the sifting through "The Dialectic of Method in Metaphysics" (Insight, 401-30). In Method in Theology the same strategy is used throughout the book, most evidently in "The Dialectic of Methods" (253-65) which complements the treatment of this topic in Insight.
32. Method in Theology, 250, is the key description of the process. It should be noted that clarification by contrasting, in the ongoing genesis of method, normally involves the strategy of developing positions and reversing counterpositions.
33. S. Ogden, op. cit., 229.
34. On abstraction see especially Insight 87-89; Method in Theology, 10-11. There is the larger question here of the mutual mediation of richer experience and enriching abstraction which we cannot enter into here. This is related to the comments made in footnote 3 of this Part, and in Part 2, footnotes 23, 31, 65.
35. Method in Theology, 250.
36. The point has been made by Lonergan in Philosophy of God and Theology, Darton Longman and Todd, 1973, 64.
37. The basic texts for reflection are Insight, chapter 8, and the discussion of relations in Insight 490-97 and in De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica, Gregorian Press, Rome, 1964, Appendix 3.
38. For an introduction to the substantiation of the claim see my Randomness, Statistics and Emergence, Gill Macmillan and Notre Dame, 1970. Obviously the strategy of verification or falsification involved should be that of the developed view on generalized empirical method.
39. See footnote 13 above.

40. Insight, 254.
41. D. Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, Herder and Herder, New York, 1970, 121-2.
42. Blessed Rage for Order, 82 n.12, 156, 168 n.62, 172, 193 n.14.
43. The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 153.
44. See Insight, xxviii.
45. Blessed Rage for Order, 57 footnote 4.
46. Method in Theology, 253.
47. Blessed Rage for Order, 173.
48. Insight, 388.
49. Blessed Rage for Order, 65, 69, 71.
50. Insight, 388.
51. Ibid.
52. See footnote 10 above. The primary difficulties expressed in recent years regarding cp.19 of Insight are difficulties which are rooted in an implicit unacceptability of earlier parts of Insight, especially pp.348-88. Secondary difficulties are difficulties of contextualization: see B. Tyrrell, Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God, Gill Macmillan and Notre Dame, 1974.
53. B. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 7.
54. Wyburn et alii, Human Senses and Perception, spend the last 100 pages of their book on the senses surveying views of perception, present a further possible view, and conclude: "even if the suggested solution is unacceptable, one thing at least is clear: the bankruptcy of the orthodox theories shows only that by some radical revision of fundamental concepts can success be obtained."
55. I have discussed some of these pressure points in "Zoology and the Future of Philosophers", to appear as chapter 3 of The Shaping of the Foundations.
56. D. Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, 153. Note that we are back to the questions posed in the text above at footnote 28.

57. An invention is a short piece for the keyboard in contrapunctal style. I recall the quotation at the conclusion of Part 2, from Fr. Lonergan regarding the little book Insight, which he has elsewhere called five-finger exercises. I recall too Bach's purpose in writing his Inventions: to provide "upright instruction wherein the lovers of the clavier, and especially those desirous of learning, are shown a clear way not alone to have good inventiones but to develop the same well."
58. F. E. Crowe, "Christologies: how up-to-date is yours?", Theological Studies 29 (1968), 101. Fr. Crowe's thesis fits clearly into the view of ongoing contexts which I have been indicating here, not only in the main text but in a sequence of footnotes such as Part 2, footnotes 23, 31, 65; Part 3, footnotes 3, 34. Adding Fr. Crowe's thesis to these suggestions gives the larger context inclusive of quasi-operators. History, generalized empirical method, Praxis, lead towards a greater epiphany of the opaque usage of the word "is".