

of the infant and the cognitional activities of the adult, and (3) the criteria ruling proper cognitional performance in the infant and the criteria ruling proper cognitional performance in the adult.

Ordinarlily human infants live in a world of immediacy while human adults have moved into a world mediated by meaning and motivated by values. The transition is as ^{complicated yet} ~~simple~~ familiar as learning to talk, to talk intelligibly, to talk correctly, relevantly, interestingly. But if all adults complete this transition with some measure of success, few ^{more than a vague and ~~glum~~ inadequate} indeed have ~~any~~ apprehension of the enormous differences between (1) the world as apprehended by the infant and, on the other hand, the world as apprehended by the adult, (2) the activities by which the infant apprehends his world and, on the other hand, the activities by which the adult has come to know his ~~■~~ world, and (3) the criteria that rule infantile cognitional activity and, on the other hand, the criteria that rule the cognitional activiites of adults. Now it commonly happens that, where differences are not properly grasped, confusions result and, in the present instance, the resulting confusion is philosophic and it goes by the name of naive realism.

Naive realism, then, is the set of assumptions that proceed from the indubitable premise that infants live in the same world as do ¹adults, and that conclude that, while there are no doubt accidental differences, still there is a substantial identity between the world as known by an infant and the world as known by an adult, the cognitional activities

There is an interdependence of (1) cognitional acts, (2) cognitional theory, (3) epistemology, and (4) metaphysics.

This interdependence is both logical and real.

Logically metaphysics is presupposed by epistemology, epistemology by cognitional theory, and cognitional theory by cognitional acts.

Really cognitional theory rests on cognitional acts, epistemology on cognitional theory, metaphysics on epistemology.

Either order may be followed, but different purposes dictate different procedures. Thus, in composing an abstract treatise the order of logical priority is preferable. In conducting an investigation or in teaching the order of real priority is preferable. Finally, sophists insist on assuming tacitly that one is following the logical order when one is following the real order, and vice versa.

3. Phenomenological

I use the term, phenomenological, in the strict sense of Edmund Husserl's epoche.

In Scholastic language, human experience, whether external (sensitive) or internal (consciousness), stands to insight, as does matter to form.

Our present situation, then, and also the basis for any organized, large-scale attempt to combat atheism

Such is our present situation and it is anything but favorable for launching an organized, large-scale attempt to combat atheism. Traditional scholasticism is discreditedⁱ and abandoned. Few substitutes have been proposed and none ^{is} commonly accepted. It would seem quite unrealistic to anticipate the emergence in the ~~near~~ foreseeable future of a theoretically satisfactory and generally accepted basic position.

It remains that such considerations do not really settle the matter. Unbelief will be overcome not by knowledge but by belief. It will be overcome by the persuasiveness for the most part by the persuasiveness not of those that know but of those that believe. ~~Not only their audience but the preachers and teachers as well have little or no interest in~~ those that believe. As the audience, so too the preachers and teachers have little aptitude for grasping any theoretical position. No doubt, all would like to feel that there is real fire beneath the symbolic smoke billowing around the altar