

Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity, Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1971

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Part I: Marx and the Hegelian Background

GEIST

14: "spirit" not "mind"

15: Geist is Reason

not just faculty for drawing logical conclusions

"Reason knows, rules, the world" speaks of a compound of Aristotelian Nous and Jewish-Christian God (omniscient, omnipotent, active, revealed in history as divine providence)

Hence we are rational in so far as we participate in Reason

16: "Reason pervades the world" is not a metaphor but a literal fundamental truth

18: "Geist according to Hegel turns out ~~to~~ not only to be the final cause of the world, it is also the material, efficient, and formal cause. It is the material cause in the form of the natural and spiritual realms (the spiritual realm is the realm of history). It is the efficient cause, for through the "cunning of Reason" (List der Vernunft) which works in devious ways through the passions of men, Geist is the agent of historical development. It is the formal cause, ~~xxxx~~ for as Nous, it is the source of the rational structure or form of the world. And it is the final cause, because Geist guides history to its true and final aim -- the complete realization of freedom. Hegel is claiming that if we take a world historical perspective, we will see that there is an inner logos to the seemingly chaotic multiplicity of events. This logos has a teleological form. There is a narrative or story to be discovered in history -- this is the epic of the devious ways in which Geist is realizing itself, moving from ~~to~~ freedom and self-determination as an abstract idea to its concrete embodiment in human institutions."

20: "There has been a lot of loose talk about Hegel's dialectic being a movement from thesis through antithesis to synthesis. Not only do these concepts play an insignificant role in Hegel's philosophy, they are essentially static concepts and completely misrepresent what Hegel means by "dialectic." The dialectic of Geist is essentially a dynamic and organic process. One "moment" of a dialectical process, when it is fully developed ~~or~~ or understood gives rise to ~~its~~ its own ~~negation~~ negation; it is not mechanically confronted ~~with~~ by an antithesis. The

process here is more like that of a tragedy where the "fall" of the tragic hero emerges from the dynamics of the development of his own character. When Geist is disoriented, alienated from itself, a serious struggle takes place between the two "moments." Out of this conflict and struggle, out of this negativity, emerges a "moment" which at once negates, affirms, and transcends the "moments" involved in the struggle -- these earlier moments are aufgehoben. In the course of Geist realizing itself, this process which involves a stage of self-alienation that is subsequently aufgehoben is a continuous, restless, infinite one. The logic of the development of Geist is dialectical, where Geist struggles with what appears to be "other" than it -- a limitation, or obstacle that must be overcome. Geist "returns to itself" when it overcomes the specific obstacle that it encounters/21/ only to renew the dialectical process again. Geist finally "returns to itself" when all obstacles and ~~its~~ determinations have been overcome, whenever everything that has appeared "other" than itself is fully appropriated and thereby subjectivized. This is the final aim or goal of Geist. The negativity and activity of Geist come into focus in this dialectical characterization."

21: It should be manifest that by negativity Hegel means an ~~active~~ active process. Geist is the principle of self-activity itself. "The very essence of spirit is action. It makes itself what it essentially is; it is its own product, its own work." This is the ~~main~~ dimension of Hegel's Geist that most fascinated and deeply influenced Marx.

22: .. when Hegel writes a logic laying bare the fundamental categories of the Concept (Begriff); or a phenomenology of the developing stages of consciousness, self-consciousness, and spirit; or a philosophical analysis of world history or the evolution of political society, he is not telling ~~many~~ different "stories" but the same ~~basic~~ basic story of Geist from different perspectives.

23: He (Hegel) examines three stages of our cognitive awareness of objects: sense certainty, perception, and understanding... .. in each stage contradictions and conflicts emerge in the quest for immediate certainty that force us to a higher stage. We think for example that in confronting the mere object denoted by such expressions as "here" and "now" we are directly

~~xxxxx~~ grasping the particular which stands before us. But Hegel not only seeks to expose the speciousness of this claim to immediate knowledge of particulars... he wants to show us that the hard objectivity of the "facts" before us dissolve into subjectivity. This forces /24/ us to a more comprehensive stage of perception where our basic category is the thing or substance manifesting different properties. But this stage is unstable and so we are led to the next stage where we postulate entities that are neither sensed nor perceived in order to account for what confronts us.

24 note 21: ~~xxx~~ parallel between these early stages of the phenomenology of spirit and the evolution of analytic philosophy in this century.

25: "Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or recognized."

Hence dialectic of Lordship and Bondage; pp 25-28

Stoic, Skeptic, Unhappy consciousness p. 28.

29: Hegel not idealist

Bernstein proceeds from Cartesian disjunction of thinking substance and extended substance, whence rationalist and empiricist philosophies

Hegel aims at sublation of these opposites, with emphasis and priority on reason.

30: In Logic on Wesen Hegel aims at sublation of all major dichotomies of Western philosophy. Identity and difference, ground and existence, matter and form, content and form, are just different moments in a single unified totality.

31: Hegel is not idealist but rather one that challenges the very framework within which the materialist/idealist dichotomy arises.

Bernstein would not deny that for Hegel matter is the self-alienation of Geist. He denies that Hegelian is idealist in the traditional sense (no matter).

32: Sublation of dichotomy between passion and reason. Reason without passion is empty and passion without reason is blind.

33: For Hegel philosophy as the world "apprehended in thoughts" is reaching its fulfilment. But to the extent that one argues that history and culture have not yet reached fulfilment, then the task of philosophy still remains to be accomplished.

With this Marx agrees

"It is as if Marx were saying to Hegel, 'Yes, you are right, the task of philosophy is to interpret the world, but /34/ with your System that task is completed and we can now understand for philosophy for what it really is and pass beyond or overcome philosophy. For the point is to change the world. What is needed is an Aufhebung of philosophy.'"

34: "There is then an ultimate harmony -- theoria and praxis -- not in the sense that philosophy guides action, but rather in the sense that philosophy is the comprehension of what is; it is the comprehension of the logos as ingredient in praxis, i. e., praxis as the self-activity of Geist... There is an ultimate unity of theory and practice, a unity that becomes intelligible when we understand that Geist is at once praxis and, in its self-reflective form, theoria. And we shall see that Marx accepts the unity of theoria and praxis and dialectically transforms it -- in Marx, Hegel's unity of theoria and praxis is aufgehoben."

The Hegelian Origins of Praxis

35: 'In a letter to Ruge dated March 1843 Marx writes the following comment about Feuerbach's provocative Thesen: "The only point that I do not like about /36/ Feuerbach's aphorisms is that he talks too much about nature and too little about politics. The latter is the only means by which present philosophy can become a reality.'"

36: Before his study of political economy Marx disagreed with Hegel's view that the bureaucracy was a universal class. He considered it concerned with its own interests. He cast the proletariat in the role of ~~the~~ the universal class.

37: By twisting Hegel's defence of the right of primogeniture, Marx arrived at the view that under the system of private property it is an illusion to think of man as master of his property. Man himself is made into an object of property, and his own products master and enslave him.

its// 38: The Philosophy of Right cannot be viewed as an afterthought or an appendix to ~~x~~ Hegel's system. If one takes the Hegelian impulse toward concreteness with full earnestness, then the crucial test of the system is ~~the~~ ability to explain and comprehend existing political institutions. This is a demand entailed by Hegel's most central convictions about what philosophy is. Marx does not reject the claim that the theoretical understanding can and ought to explain what ~~is~~ is. But the cumulative result of his critique of Hegel is that Hegel has failed -- completely and in detail -- to comprehend the nature and meaning of existing political institutions; Hegel glosses over real and fundamental contradictions in these institutions. Marx is, in effect, applying Hegel's own criterion to the evaluation of Hegel's political philosophy. Hegel ~~is~~ would be the first to insist that if one discovers unresolved conflicts and contradictions, this is a sure sign that one has not yet at a true rational account of what is. Marx's ~~is~~ attack in the Critique of the Philosophy of Right ~~is~~ is an immanent dialectical critique of the master himself; it could only be performed by one who identified himself with the Hegelian project of rational comprehension.

38: According to Feuerbach, Hegelian philosophy ~~is~~ is a mystification because it ~~is~~ always inverts the subject-predicate relation. "It is important that Hegel always converts the Idea into the subject and the particular actual subject, such as political sentiment, into the predicate. Geist or Reason is not a subject; it is not a source of agency. It is a predicate, the ~~is~~ result of real, active subjects. But Hegel, so Marx claims, has mistaken these real subjects as mere consequences, effects, or predicates of Geist. Over and over again Marx attempts to show how Hegel's detailed analyses are guilty of this reversal and this mystification. The transformative method may at first seem like a logical gimmick, and it is too simple to say that either Feuerbach or Marx simply reverses the roles of subject and predicate in Hegel. But one should not underestimate the powerful overtones of this transformation. What Feuerbach noted -- and what Marx took over from Feuerbach -- was that the /39/ grand dialectic of Geist is basically a myth. Like powerful myths it contains a latent truth, one which needs to be uncovered. The story of the development of Geist with all its

divine attributes which ends in the realization of freedom is nothing but the story of ~~man~~ the development of man with his ideal human attributes. And the successive forms of the self-alienation of Geist turn out to be nothing but the forms of human alienation. In the 1844 Paris manuscripts, Marx writes:

"Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical relation to Hegel's dialectic, who has made genuine discoveries in this field, and who above all is the true conqueror of the old philosophy....

"Feuerbach's great achievement is: (1) proof that philosophy is nothing more than religion brought to and developed in reflection, and thus is ~~nothing more than~~ equally to be condemned as another form and mode of the alienation of man's nature;

(2) the establishment of true materialism and real science by making ~~the~~ the social relationship of 'man to man' the fundamental principle of his theory;

(3) by opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-subsistent positive ~~the~~ positively grounded on itself.

40: Marx's "depth" reading of Hegel shows that the Phenomenology is not properly a phenomenology of Geist but of man. The point here is the way in which Marx transforms the meaning of the activity of Geist, of its self-realization in history. This is in reality a concealed way of describing and criticizing the development of man as ~~is~~ a process. "Process is not a vague general term; it refers to human activity in the form of work. Just as the objectifications of Geist are to be properly understood, according to Hegel, as the ~~ways~~ ways in which Geist congeals itself, objectifies itself, and thereby alienates itself, so too the products that man produces are not just accidental by-products; they are the objectification, the concrete expression of what he is. And under prevailing conditions of political economy, it is the very process of objectification, production, that results in human alienation. Human alienation is the true latent content of Hegel's myth of Geist. Nevertheless human alienation finds its expression in the actual social and political institutions that encompass man. There exist practical contradictions in the world, contradictions which have the consequence of dehumanizing man and of ~~the~~ separating him from his true species-being. And just as in Hegel there is an incessant

drive to overcome (aufheben) all contradictions, so too ~~is~~ Marx sees the demand for an Aufhebung of the practical contradictions that exist. It is only a short ~~is~~ step to the demand for ~~is~~ "revolutionary praxis" as the way of overcoming the forms of human alienation which have existed ~~is~~ until now and of achieving a humanistic society in which man reappropriates his own essence, his own species-~~being~~life.

41: By 1845 Marx was already far ~~is~~ beyond most of his contemporaries. The intellectual journey that began with the critique of Hegel culminated in a critique of political economy. Along with his contemporaries, Marx engaged in the critique of philosophy, the critique of the state and the law, and ~~is~~ the critique of religion. But the criticism of religion results in the demand for unmasking "human self-alienation in its unholy forms..." There is direct continuity from the critique of Hegel to the critique of political economy to (as we shall ~~is~~ see) the diagnostic analysis of the contradictions inherent in capitalism.

‡ Praxis as human activity and human alienation

43: From its origins in the 1840's ~~is~~ through its later development Marx's materialism is properly understood as a synthesis of both traditional materialism and idealism.... Marx's materialism can best be understood as an Aufhebung -- in precisely the sense in which Hegel used this concept -- of previous materialistic and idealistic doctrines; he at once negates, affirms, and goes beyond these polar moments.

One extremely important consequence of this synthesis... is Marx's relocation or reinterpretation of consciousness. "Consciousness" is not something other than "sensuous human activity" or praxis. It is to be understood as an aspect or moment of praxis itself. Further more the forms that "Consciousness" takes in society are to be understood within the context of the forms of social praxis.

44: .. we are inclined to think of a person working on a thing, shaping it, or using it ~~is~~ in some way. But we will say that the person and the thing that he shapes are distinct, that they belong to different ontological categories.... But both Hegel and Marx are challenging this ontological division. The object or thing produced is not something merely external and indifferent

to the nature of the producer. It is his activity in an objectified or congealed form... Everything that is of fundamental importance in Marx's outlook depends on grasping this manner of viewing the relation of the objects that a man produces and his activity; it is essential for understanding what praxis means, the precise significance of human alienation, the concept of a "humanized" nature, and even the labor theory of value that dominates Capital.

45: In short, to understand Marx, we must grasp the sense in which a product can ~~be~~ both be and not be an expression of the producer (just as in Hegel the slave is and is not his products). It is the producer in the sense that in it is a congealed form of his most distinctive attribute -- activity. But in an alienated society, it is not he in the sense that the product assumes an independent, hostile ¹ dimension which dehumanizes the producer.

46: .. Marx ridicules the Hegelian notion that nature is objectified ~~or congealed~~ or congealed spirit. Nature is rather the source of the objects that man employs or consumes in order to satisfy his needs or desires. There is nothing about the intrinsic nature of production or objectification that results in alienation. But alienation is a form of objectification. Objectification becomes alienation only in a given historical setting.

Alienation has no fundamental ontological status, it is a historical condition, and one of Marx's chief endeavors was to lay bare the structures of the historical social situations in which objectification becomes alienation.

47: But unlike many existentialists who have ~~been~~ focused on this aspect of Hegel, Marx is perfectly clear that it is not objectification per se that results in alienation. The contrast to an alienated society is not one in which objectification no longer takes place -- this is impossible..... An unalienated society is one in which it is no longer the case that "the process of production has mastery over man" but the process is controlled by him to satisfy and give expression to his human needs and desires.

48: conclusions on alienation

First, alienation is clearly, for Marx, a social category -- a category for understanding political economy, not an ontological category rooted in the nature of man.

Secondly, in recent times "alienation" has widely been used to designate some sort of psychological condition in which the individual feels frustrated, unsatisfied, unfulfilled. This is not primary for Marx but secondary and derivative; the working class of his time ~~was~~ was in an alienated condition with no full awareness of their condition. Hence Marx's criticism of those that fancy that the amelioration of the basic frustrations of the working class gets at the political and economic roots of alienation. Hence his letter to Ruge "The reform of consciousness exists merely in the fact that... one awakens the world out of its own dream, that one explains to the world its own acts...."

Thirdly, the technology that has ~~resulted~~ resulted and continues to be developed by capitalism is neither the intrinsic source nor cause of human alienation. . . Marx sees... in technology the sole means for overcoming alienation.

From "Relentless Criticism" to "Revolutionary Practice"

50:

51: "Even though the construction of the future and its completion for all times is not our task, what we have to accomplish at this time is all the more clear: relentless criticism of all existing conditions, relentless in the sense that the criticism is not afraid of its findings and just as little afraid of the conflict with the powers that be."

.. the young Hegelians thought of "relentless criticism" as criticism of religion and philosophy. For Marx this was only the beginning not the end of criticism. Criticism of philosophy, religion, and even the political state led inevitably to the roots of all criticism -- the forms of alienation and the practical contradictions inherent in the actual institutions of political economy. "Our slogan must ~~therefore~~ therefore be: Reform of consciousness, not through dogmas, but through analysis of the mystical consciousness that is unclear about itself, whether in religion or politics."

51: Marx's remarks help us to appreciate his life-long preoccupation /52/ with understanding present institutions rather than speculating about the future. Projecting future possibilities, speculating about the nature of utopian future societies, is idle and irrelevant. One must understand the tendencies inherent in present institutions. At many stages in his career Marx insisted that it is only by understanding and criticism of what is now taking place that we can successfully come to understand what are the real possibilities for society. These reflections also indicate Marx's view of ideology, the general outlook of the world accepted by men. Ideology does not conform to the way things really are, although it tells us something important about social reality. It is not accidental that men conceive of social reality in the ways that they do. Their "thought forms" are a reflection of this reality only they do not understand this. In a passage that is frequently quoted and misinterpreted, Marx illustrates what he means by ideology.

Religious suffering is ~~not~~ suffering the expression of real suffering and at the same time the protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people.

The abolition of religion as people's illusory happiness is the demand for their real happiness. The demand to abandon illusions about their condition is a demand to abandon a condition which requires illusions. The criticism of religion is thus in embryo a criticism of the vale of tears whose halo is religion (Y. M., p. 250; I, pp. 488-489).

Criticism, then, is not a matter of arbitrarily condemning an institution or belief but of understanding it.

53: The most important feature of these early reflections is that they indicate what praxis originally meant for Marx. Although his ideas were rapidly developing, he never abandoned the view that the task of the revolutionary intellectual -- the "educator" -- is in the first instance "relentless criticism of all existing institutions," a criticism that demands a correct theoretical analysis of existing institutions and the contradictions inherent in them. Throughout his life Marx heaped scorn on those who were ready to plunge into action without such critical understanding....

But how could such a program of criticism be efficacious?

53: Marx says: "The weapon of criticism obviously cannot replace the criticism of weapons. Material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses when it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem when it becomes radical." "Theory is actualized in a people only when it actualizes their needs." No more than Hegel did Marx believe that men are primarily motivated by conscious rational conclusions. /54/ For both of them history is the playing out of men's deepest passions. The reason why criticism can be efficacious is that it speaks directly to these passions. It has the power, not of delineating some utopian ideal which is to be striven for, but of revealing to men a critical understanding of what they are suffering. Unless criticism does this, it is idle speculation; the test of the correctness of a radical critique is its ability to bring genuine human problems suffered by men to a "self-conscious human form."

54: His early Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right indicates Marx's acceptance of the Hegelian principle that a correct analysis of politics and political economy -- the pay-off of the System -- leads to a critical understanding of political institutions.

[In these early critiques] Marx still speaks as a philosopher. "As philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, the proletariat finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy...."

But even in the article in which Marx speaks of this interplay of philosophy and the proletariat, he was already moving this view to a third moment in the understanding of praxis. He speaks of transcending philosophy and warns, "you cannot transcend (aufheben) philosophy without ~~xxxx~~ actualizing it." /55/ By the time he wrote the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, this aspect of Marx's view had crystallized. "Practical-critical" activity becomes "revolutionary practice." Marx's own critique of philosophy had led him beyond philosophy -- this is the point of the last thesis; it is not a call for a new direction in philosophy. Philosophy which had reached its culmination in Hegel, had led to the ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ full articulation of the demand for freedom to be realized -- not the freedom of Geist but the freedom of human sensuous individuals. But philosophy was impotent to bring about this freedom, impotent to bring about revolution. This had been revealed by philosophy itself.

Praxis as Labor-Power

- 55 B rejects as fiction the sterile view that there were two Marx's, either the early humanistic M followed by the later rigidified degenerate M of Capital, or the early immature speculator followed by the later mature scientific author of Capital.
- 56 B affirms Marx as an instance of self-correcting development, of dialectical advance.
- 57-66 B deals with three arguments of opposition
 M rejects early philosophic speculation, drops praxis, alienation
 M in Capital reduces all concepts to economic categories
 M in Capital thinks of man as class animal swept along by a web of impersonal forces.
- 64 "... the point of Capital is not to sanctify the immutability of "economic laws" but to reveal their mutability in history. Capitalist society has brought about the most complete and thorough form of alienation that has yet existed. Or to use the distinctive language of Capital, capitalism is based upon and increases exploitation and the "rational" efficient use of surplus value to increase capital. Without surplus value -- the value of products appropriated by the capitalist which is over and above the ~~the~~ portion of value needed to sustain the producers and the means of production -- there is no capitalism. But the story that Marx tells through the three volumes of Capital is of an economic mode of production that is inherently unstable and contradictory. The more capitalism succeeds in its aim of increasing capital, the more it succeeds in undermining itself."
- 65/ "Marx proceeds to review "the complete mystification of the capitalist mode of production" whereby it becomes perfectly natural " for the actual agents of production to feel completely at home in these estranged and irrational forms of capital-interest, land-rent, and labor-wages, since these are precisely the forms of illusion in which they move about and find their daily occupation."
- 66 "The end of history -- or as Marx claimed the end of prehistory and the beginning of human history -- comes when man finally triumphs over the "blind forces of Nature" and economic regularities and laws which have determined what he has been thus far, not in the sense that man is finally free from all law-like regularity, but in the sense that he rationally and freely regulates his life in a way that is most favorable and worthy of his human nature."

Species-Being, Praxis, and Alienation

67 Review of typical instance of Marx's own progressive dialectical development in which he negates affirms and passes beyond an earlier stage in his thinking

"In order to understand the dynamics of Geist (and consequently praxis) a double perspective is needed. Geist is concretely realized in the actual stages of history and is also the dynamic potential to overcome all forms of alienation. Without this double perspective it would not make sense to claim that Geist is not "satisfied or fulfilled" in any of its determinate forms. Nor would we be able to say that Geist continually strives to overcome all determinations and objectifications and to infinitize itself. The same double perspective is needed to account for Marx's own analysis of praxis as human alienation."

"For Feuerbach, this ideal of what man can become (and will become) is expressed in the concept of species-being -- this is the truth implicit in the Hegelian notion of Geist once the transformative method is applied to it.... God for Feuerbach is a projection and reification of the human species. When man acts so that he is conscious of himself as a species-being /68/ his acts are qualitatively different from those when he acts as a single individual. The idea of a human species is that of all human perfection concretely realized."

68: "But for all the importance of that species-being plays for Marx in these early writings, there is no serious attempt to analyze and justify this crucial concept. When Marx criticizes this concept in the sixth thesis on Feuerbach and says that the essence of man is "in its actuality the ensemble of social relationships," he is already foreshadowing his concept of class as the appropriate social category for understanding what man is."

"By the time that Marx wrote Capital, he was quite explicit about /69/ the abandonment of species-being and its replacement by the concept of class.... "In the course of our investigation we shall find in general that the characters who appear on the economic stage are but the personifications of the economic relations that exist between them."

69

B challenges the alternate views that

a Marx was a moralist or a prophet holding before us a vision of what man is to become or

b Marx was confusedly shifting between unwarranted descriptive and evaluative claims

B argues that "Marx's central thought is that a correct understanding of present political economy and its historical origins provides the sole basis for revealing genuine human potentialities. The point is nicely expressed by Lobkowitz when he says, 'Neither Hegel nor Marx measures man's 'alienated state' either against a transhistorical human nature or against a 'logically predetermined' future. Rather they measure it against a human potentiality revealed by the very phenomenon of alienation -- against a human potentiality which though it first emerges in an alienated /70/ state, allows one to envisage a previously unknown possibility of ultimate human self-actualization.'"

70

"Such an orientation cuts at the very ~~heart~~ heart of the modern dogma that there is an unbridgeable gap between the descriptive and the prescriptive, or between fact and value, or between 'is' and 'ought.' For Marx human alienation is an objective social condition. On the basis of ~~the~~ a critical understanding of the roots and causes of this alienation, we can come to discover real human potentialities and 'envisage a previously unknown possibility of ultimate human self-actuation '"

"Just as there is no clear 'fact-value' or 'is-ought' dichotomy in Aristotle, so there is none in Marx."

".. for Marx both man's actuality and his potentiality change in the course of man's historical development.* Genuinely new potentialities arise as a result of human praxis. Marx's understanding of human potentialities rooted in history foreshadows themes that have been central to contemporary phenomenology with its insistence that the basic reality that man encounters is his Lebenswelt, and that it is only by sensitively understanding this Lebenswelt that one ~~can~~ discovers new human potentialities."

B concludes to ineptness of objection that Marx provides no more than sketchiest outline of future communist or humanist society. For Marx as for Hegel speculation about future possibilities which is not grounded in a critically understanding of present institutions is idle and unrealistic.

71 "Marx's central concepts such as alienation and praxis demand a fundamental rethinking of the most fundamental epistemological concepts that have preoccupied modern philosophers."

72 "What Marx found in Hegel is an attempt, indeed the most ambitious attempt in post-Kantian philosophy, to overcome the dichotomy of the 'is' and the 'ought', and throughout his life Marx's polemics against those who insisted on some version of this dichotomy were no less vehement than Hegel's similar critiques. "To sharpen our sensitivity to the issues involved, consider again the passage cited from Lobkowitz, in which he says that Hegel and Marx measure man's alienated state against a human potentiality which, though it first emerges in an ~~an~~ alienated state, allows one to envisage a previously unknown ~~possibility~~ possibility of ultimate human self-actuation."

BL distinguish (1) intelligibility emergent in data as merely subjective (empiricist), as really out there (intuitionist), as possibly relevant to correct understanding (BL) and (2) moral aspect of data on human conduct, as non-existent in data of natural science, as non-objective in the sense of objectivity of the judgement of fact (virtually unconditioned), as coming to ~~the~~ light through ~~the~~ refined moral feeling, as pronounced to be objective by moral judgement (criterion of good conscience in virtuous man).

72 f Wilfred Sellars, Georg Lukacs, Leszek Kolakowski, ? Sartre

74 "When Marx describes the condition of man as an alienated one, he is not imposing arbitrary value judgements on a value neutral world; he is uncovering and revealing the social reality in which we find ourselves. But this social reality is not man's fixed permanent human reality. It is itself the resultant of the dynamics of human social praxis congealed into a world of 'things' and alienated institutions. This is what Marx means when he says that 'In bourgeois political economy -- and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds -- this complete elaboration of what lies within man, appears as the total alienation, and the destruction of all fixed, one-sided purposes as the sacrifice of the end in itself to a wholly external compulsion.'"

- 75 "But if it is true that man's present reality and world is an objectively alienated one, then the abstract possibility of a 'humanized world' only becomes a real possibility through a radical transformation of this objectified alienated condition -- by revolutionary praxis.
- B disclaims the opinion that Marx solved for all time the problem of 'is' and 'ought'
- B claims that to approach Marx from the viewpoint of that dichotomy is to distort what he sought to achieve.
- In later life Marx far from metaphysical or epistemological issues Still one cannot overemphasize the ~~xx~~ change in perspective on social reality that Marx was attempting to bring about
- ~~Bx~~ claims that his view fits in with Marx's scorn of utopian thinking, his relentless criticism of existing institutions of political economy, his attacks on Kantians of all varieties;
- 76 also that it hits off the essential problem of subsequent Marxist interpretation (as crypto-positivist or crypto-moralist)
- 76-78 Current revival in Marxist studies a counter-movement to Communist dogmatics; scholarly, religious, political
- 79 While there is isn't a single claim or thesis articulated by Marx that does not demand significant critical rethinking, starting with Marx's reflections on praxis provides us with some of the most fruitful leads in understanding and criticizing our present social reality, for coming to a better grasp of what man is and can become.
- 79-83 Contrast ~~xx~~ with existentialists, pragmatists, analysts
- Existentialist danger of solipsism (BL but can reveal origin of alienation in existential subject)
- Pragmatist brings to light self-correcting process of learning, make practical ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ dominant, approach ~~x~~ man through social categories
- but Dewey's reformism not radical enough for Marx, and Marx radicalness has been interpreted as ruthless totalitarianism
- Analysts concerned with social but their questions end just where Marx begins to be incisive.