

The Unconscious

Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of our Time, NY 1937 WWNorton

pp 68 f. "By definition the result of repressing an affect or an impulse is that the individual is no longer aware of its existence, so that in his conscious mind he does not know that he has any hostile feelings toward another. How then can I say that he "registers" the existence of ~~the~~)69(the repressed affect within himself? The answer lies in the fact that there is no strict alternative between conscious and unconscious, but that there are, as H. S. Sullivan has pointed out in a lecture, several levels of consciousness. Not only is the ~~repressed~~ repressed impulse still effective-- one of the basic discoveries of Freud -- but also in a deeper level of consciousness the individual knows about its presence. Reduced to the most simple terms possible this means that fundamentally we cannot fool ourselves, that actually we observe ourselves better than we are aware of doing, just as we usually observe others better than we are aware of doing -- as shown, for example, in the correctness of the first impression we get from a person -- but we may have stringent reasons for not taking cognizance of our observations. For the sake of saving repetitive explanations I shall use the term "register" when I mean that we know what is going on within us without our being aware of it."

Wilhelm STEKEL, Compulsion and Doubt, NY Grosset & Dunlap 1962

ch 7 The Role of the Unconscious in Compulsive Disorders pp 225-257

227: "All psychic processes are capable of becoming conscious. I do not believe that in the psyche there are thoughts incapable of becoming conscious, or thoughts which can become conscious only by the psychoanalytic process.

"This view is not quite new. I have held it for a long time and I have suggested that the word "unconscious" be replaced by "para-conscious."

228: 'Does psychoanalysis prove the existence of an unconscious? Is it capable of evoking memories which have been absolutely unconscious prior to the analysis? This is the main question.

'After an experience of twenty years I can look back only to very few moments when I was told by patients: "Such and such recollection is absolutely new to me. It was entirely repressed."

'I am not able now to re-examine these rare instances. But I have a hunch that in these cases I was dealing with excuses by patients for having concealed the truth for so long.'

229: 'Our thinking is a polyphony. There are always several thoughts working simultaneously, one of which is the bearer of the leading voice. The other thoughts represent the medium and low voices. The dream does not cease to be dreamed during the day. At night, the low voices of the dream take the lead.

'In this framework the whole material with which we deal in analysis is capable of becoming conscious. It is to be found predominantly in the lower voices. It is covered up by other voices. To quote Klages, thing in question is not so much a thing that is not thought as one that is not recognized.

'Obsessions have the function of subduing the voice of more important ideas. Compulsions are bus substitutes for actions which have been rejected by the moral ego. Affects in compulsions cover over other deeper affects and impulses. We must consider here the histrionic nature of the patients. They are acting both for us and for themselves. They do not want to see the truth nor do they want to hear it.'

Wilhelm Stekel, Compulsion and Doubt

252 'However, one cannot pass so lightly over the unconscious as Bumke did. W Freud has a point against Bumke which he cites in The Ego and the Id:

"A consciousness of which one does not know anything seems to me much more absurd than an unconscious psyche." He should have said, "A consciousness about which one does not want to know anything..." Then it no longer sounds absurd.

"The entire misunderstanding derives from the word "consciousness." We have a latent knowledge of which we are not conscious, which, however, we can transpose into consciousness any ~~ix~~ time. Freud distinguished two kinds of unconscious: the latent one that can become conscious and the repressed which cannot become conscious by itself. "We shall call," he says, "that latent unconscious which is unconscious only in a descriptive, ~~xxxxx~~ not in a dynamic sense, preconscious the term unconscious now only applies to the dynamically unconscious repressed, so that now we have three terms: conscious, preconscious, and unconscious."

256: 'We do not fight against mysterious, unconscious ideas. We tell the patient: "You know but you do not want to know."

'Why do all these patients tremble at the idea of hypnosis? They may pretend they want to be hypnotized; yet no hypnotist will ever succeed in inducing a really deep hypnosis in a compulsive. The patient will remain conscious. He is afraid he might say something that would betray him, for all these patients harbour a secret which they do not want to give away.

'Our approach demands intuition and a change from the present passive therapy to an active one.'

257: 'Compulsion is basically a great dream. It is the task of the analyst to separate these two worlds: the world of dreaming and the world of waking.'

Raymond Hostie SJ, Religion and the Psychology of Jung, NY S&W 1957

72: 'Jung himself insists that "the essence of consciousness is a riddle the solution of which is beyond me."¹ From the psychological point of view, consciousness is to be described as "the relatedness of psychic contents to the ego... in so far as they are sensed as such by the ego."² We must not ignore the limitation involved in the second term of the definition, for it is of capital importance. Jung refuses to use "consciousness" in the strict sense of the word unless he is concerned with contents which the subject relates consciously and explicitly to his own ego. In his own words, therefore, consciousness equals reflective consciousness.

'This definition of consciousness needs to be strongly emphasized, otherwise it is impossible to grasp the reasons for Jung's repeated statements about the "unconscious" state of children and primitives. These statements do not mean at all that children and primitives are incapable of any autonomous psychic life, but only that they are unable to lead a reflective psychic life or to take up a "conscious" attitude towards the inner or outer world... In a very generalized way Jung sums up his position as follows: "Psychic processes and psychic functions came into existence long before the dawn of consciousness. Men had ideas long before some particular man thought of saying: 'I am conscious that I am thinking.'³

Raymond Hostie, Religion and Psychology of Jung

p 72 notes to above

- NY Harcourt Brace 1928
 1 Contributions to Analytical Psychology, p. 81 London KeganPaul 1928
 2 Psychological Types, p. 535 London KeganPaul 1923 NY HarcourtBrace 1923
 3 Bewusstsein, Unbewusstes und Individuation, p. 262, Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie, xi, 1939, 257-70

Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth, NY WWNorton 1950

162: 'Despite endless variations, however, one characteristic seems to be pertinent for all neuroses of any severity. Awareness, strength and kind of feelings are determined mainly by the pride system. Genuine feelings for self are dampened or diminished, sometimes to a vanishing point. In short, pride governs feelings.

'The neurotic is liable to play down those feelings which run counter to his particular pride and to overemphasize those which add to it. If in his arrogance he feels vastly superior to others, he cannot allow himself to feel envy. His pride in asceticism may put a lid on feelings of enjoyment. If he is proud of his vindictiveness, vindictive rage may be keenly felt. However, if ~~in~~ his vindictiveness is glorified and rationalized in terms of dealing out "justice," he does not experience vindictive rage as such, although it is so freely expressed that nobody else has any doubt about it. Pride in absolute endurance may prohibit any feeling of suffering. But if suffering plays an important part within the pride system -- as a vehicle for expressing resentment and as a basis for neurotic claims -- it is not only emphasized in front of others but actually felt more deeply. A feeling of compassion may be choked off if it is regarded as weakness, but may be fully registered if regarded as a godlike attribute.....

163: 'Up to this point pride acts as a kind of censorship, encouraging or forbidding feelings to come to awareness. But it may govern feelings in a still more basic way. The more pride has taken over, the more a person can respond emotionally to life only with his pride. It is as if he had shut away his real self in a soundproof room and could hear the voice of pride alone... the suffering he consciously feels is mainly a suffering of his pride.....

'Only when the pride system is considerably undermined does he begin to feel true suffering. Only then can we feeling sympathy for this suffering self of his, a ~~x~~ sympathy that can move him to do something constructive ~~ammmmmmm~~ for himself. The self-pity he felt before was rather a maudlin writhing of the proud self for feeling abused. He who has not experienced the difference may shrug his shoulders and think that it is irrelevant -- suffering is suffering. But it is true suffering alone that has the power to broaden and deepen our range of feelings and to open our hearts for the suffering of others. In De Profundis Oscar Wilde has described the liberation he felt when, instead of suffering from injured vanity, he started to experience true suffering.'