

Critique of Pure Reason denies the absolute objectivity both of sense and of thoughts, not to discover the absolute objectivity and transcendence of rational judgement, but to take its stand on the normative objectivity of a transcendental logic.

Seventhly, it is not self-evident and it has not been proved that a philosophic doctrine must be either proved that the only possible alternatives are (1) cognitional atomism, (2) phenomenism, and (3) critical idealism. Quite obviously,

Seventhly, besides the normative aspect of intelligence and rationality, there is a normative aspect to every nature. But the two are not to be confused. Normative objectivity is the normative aspect of man's intellectual nature. Truly affirmed formulations of normative objectivity ~~are~~ ^{pertain to} knowledge of man's intellectual nature. But it remains that man knows other natures as well. He does so by experience, understanding, and true judgement, and it is the fallacy of Pure Reason to suppose that knowledge can be attained by imagination, understanding, and thought. Imagine the symbols, A, R, B. Assign them any intelligible meaning you please such that, by definition, A possesses the relation, R, to B. Then of necessity every A has the relation, R, to some B; and it is impossible for there to be an A without the relation, R, to some B. Now are A, R, B merely objects of thought? Is the necessity merely an object of thought? Is the impossibility merely an object of thought? The answers depend upon the context. There are meanings of A, R, and B, such that it is true that (1) A exists and (2) A of its nature has the relation R to B. There are other meanings such that the same propositions are probably ~~not~~ true. There are still other meanings such that ~~the~~ A, R, and B belong to a context in which, with respect to other ~~terms~~ serially related terms, judgements of existence and of nature occur. Finally, there are other meanings ~~in~~ in which A, R, and B are merely objects of thought. On this basis one may distinguish (1) strict analytic principles, (2) provisional analytic principles, (3) serially analytic principles, and (4) mere analytic propositions.

"Every A must have the relation, R, to B," and "There cannot be an A without the relation, R, to some B," are true de facto, for no less than their source, which is knowledge of an existent nature, they depend on experiential objectivity. Still, while they are true only de facto, it remains that they also are analytic. Such a conjunction of de facto truth and analyticity may, perhaps, be named an analytic principle.

In the fourth case, when the nature is merely thought, the resultant formulations also are merely thought. They are none the less analytic, for a nature does not lose the characteristic^B of a nature even when it is nothing but an object of thought. To distinguish the fourth case from the first