

philosophy; he found the composition of the book onerous and baffling, and once it was published he refused to be drawn into controversy. This was unfortunate: his psychological analysis is both penetrating and sound, his argumentation is solid; what is objectionable in his super-structure of theory might have been removed by ~~little~~ correlation *
 Within the scope of this essay
 between his and previous theory. ~~Really~~ there are ~~only~~ two points that stand in the way of acceptance of the Grammar: 1) the impression that the intellect restricts itself to recognising those minimal elements of rationality which are called self-evident principles and consequently is not continually weighing the evidence for and against principles of more immediate interest, and even deciding that some are self-evident to itself if ~~to~~ not to the whole race of men; 2) the impression that inference is a subsumption of particular under general, when in fact inference consists in seeing the same truth both as true itself and as implying other truth. I have called both 'impressions' because they have usually usually been assumed in a vague way, because they have rarely been asserted, because they have not been proved. On the contrary they seem to be merely a natural consequence of ^{an} absorption in philosophy which led implicitly to the idea that syllogism and first principles were not only scientific method par excellence but also accounted for true opinion.

Language has two quarrels with syllogism. In the first place language has elaborated a magnificent instrument for the expression of simple declarations. What we are thinking about is expressed by the subject of the sentence which may be a noun, a substantive phrase or a substantive clause and which may be further defined by adjectives, adjectival phrases, and adjectival clauses. What we think about the subject is expressed either by copula ^{and} ~~of~~ predicate or by verb with or without ~~i/~~ objects direct and indirect; the verb with its moods and tenses may be further defined by adverbs, adverbial phrases and adverbial clauses; the object may be qualified as in the same way as the subject. Now when it is admitted that language has difficulty in keeping pace with the mind, it would seem almost perversity to restrict language to ~~a~~ one meagre type of proposition in formal inference. But there is a second and more significant quarrel; this is that language has constructed a form or pattern of inference, far superior to the pattern that syllogism substitutes. I have never found a grammar that belied the ordinary opinion that all subordinate clauses were either substantive, adverbial or