<u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> denies the absolute objectivity of thoughts as well as the absolute objectivity of sense; it does not discover the structure of human knowing or the structure of its objectivity; it settles for the normative objectivity of a transcendental logic that is claimed, mistakenly, to validate human cognitional **astisity** activity with respect to a world of possible experience.

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Seventhly, the cognitional atomist, since he can appeal neither to the facts of cognitional activity nor to any but the most confused notions about objectivity, naturally enough seeks to bolster his position by claiming his atomism to be the sole realist possible alternative to phenomenalism or idealism. In fact, realism is not such a poverty-stricken doctrine But this argument presupposes that the cognitional atomist is in a position to define what the set of main possible philosophic positions are and to establish that his definition is true. It is would be far simpler for him

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criterion is found, it may be put to quite different uses. It may effect no more than a division of the "already, out, there, now," into two parts, one real, the other unreal; and in that case there is no transformation of the structure of consciousness, no shift in the centre of one's being, no becoming what one is to be.

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There is, however, a prior question and stand answer to it is not at all obscure. Am I to be a man? Is my knowing to be human knowing? Is my knowing to be a compound of experiencing, understanding, and judging? On these questions the spontaneous, theoretic, and critical subjects agree. All three know by experiencing, understanding, and judging. For all three what is known is what is truly affirmed to be. The differences between them are relatively minor differences that consist in no more than an acquired dexterity in transforming the structure of one's consciousness. But besides the spontaneous subject, there is the mythic subject; besides the theoretic subject, there is the ideologist; besides the critical subject, there is the lost existentialist. The mythic subject, the ideologiast, the lost existentialist will say that they are to be men; they will say that their knowing is to be human knowing; but for them "man" and "human" have another meaning; for beyond their horizon, beyond their comprehension, kax beyond the range of statements that have a possible meaning for them, is the statement that human knowing is a compound of experiencing, understanding, and judging; and in like manner for them it is meaningless to say that "being," that what becomes known in the moment of true judgement, is the "real."

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Mythic subjects tell many different tales; ideologists construct an enormous variety of counter-philosophies; lost existentialists have each their manner of getting lost. But the root difficilty is always the same. In a man the alternatives the human knowing are either morely animal knowing or some mixture of anaimal knowing with elements of human knowing the vast-multiplicity

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if their conclusions differt vastly, their common starting-point is not hard to find. Prior to the man, there is the child. A man is what the child is to be; but a man is what the child, as yet, is not. In that prior period the child is said to have not yet attained the age of reason. It is not yet responsible because as yet there is an inadequacy about its distinction between right and wrong. It is not yet properly rational because as yet there is an inadequacy about its distinction between true and false. Though human knowing is natural to human beings, still what is had at birth has yet to be developed. As it is only in time that the body of the infant becomes the body of a man, so too it is only in time that the potential intelligence and potential rationality of the infant become intelligence in act and rationality in act. Before sunrise, there is the dawn. In that slow recession of night the child learns to distinguish mere dreams from reality, mere images from reality, mere stories from reality, mere make-believe from reality. But what does the x child mean by reality? Negative answers are easy: the real is not merely a dream, merely anxima a flight of imagination, merely a story, merely make-believe. But there is also a further begative answer that is more significant. for the child the weaks to not being, where by "being" is meant what becomes known in the moment of true judgement; the identification of the peal with being presupposes (1) that one is master of the distinction between thet true and the false and (2) that one has met the "existential" issue by effecting the most fundamental of all the transformations of the structure of conseiousness

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