

vR = Georges van Riet, L'epistemologie thomiste, Louvain 1946

GT<sup>1 2 3 4 5</sup> = E. Gilson, Le thomisme, 1920, 1922, 1927, 1942, 1945<sup>4</sup> 1948

Grm = E. Gilson, le realisme methodique,

- = Le realisme methodique, Philo sophia Perennis, Ratisbon, 1930, II 745-55
- Realisme et methode, RSPT 21 1932 161-186
- La methode realiste, rev de Phil, 35 1935 97-108

Grt = E Gilson, Realisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance, 1939

First position, GT<sup>3</sup>, vR 497-503

The simplest hypothesis that explains the agreement of our thoughts is that they refer to things

Our thoughts can be conceived as referring to things by reverting from concept to intellect itself, in grasping that intelligence is the capacity to become the other by way of representing it. De ver 1, a. 9

Second position, Grm & Grt (except final pages of Grt), vR 503-504

Intellect knows universal; hence we must appeal to sense to account for knowledge of existence of things. The criterion of existence is sensation. Prior to knowing truth, there is knowing that is true; prior to knowledge of equation between knower and known there is the 'adequation vecue de l'intellect meme avec le reel'

Third Position, Grt (final pages) and GT<sup>4</sup>, vR 505-508

Grasps insufficiency of sensation; actus essendi is metaphysical, and sense does not know metaphysics

Distinguishes essential and existential: existing tree, &c

Existence is neither proper sensible nor common sensible; hence knowledge of existence is activity of coniunctum

First act of intellect is intelligentia indivisibilium, of essences; existence known on this level inasmuch as 'le concept d'etre s'offre a la conscience comme une perception intuitive, lorsque l'etre concu est celui d'un sensible intuitivement percu' ~~ETA~~ Grt 226; vR 508

Fourth position, GT<sup>4</sup>, vR 508 f.

Third position maintained: L'experience existentielle fondamentale est 'la saisie directe d'une realite intelligible, par un intellect que sert une sensibilite' GT<sup>4</sup> 326

Still, 'le jugement seul peut atteindre L'existence' GT<sup>4</sup> 61 and 'il est seul capable d'atteindre, par dela l'essence des etres que le concept apprehende, cet ipsum esse dont on sait qu'il est la source meme de toute realite' GT<sup>4</sup> 323

In GT<sup>5</sup>, 1945, p. 519: 'Il est vrai qu'on ne peut pas voir l'existence, mais on sait qu'elle est la, et l'on peut du moins la poser, par un acte de jugement, comme la racine cachee de ce qui peut se voir et de ce que l'on peut tenter de definir'

Notion of Realisme methodique, vR, p 514

'En 1930, le realisme neothomiste est, pur M. Gilson, un realisme purement methodique: il se justifie uniquement par des considerations tirees tirees de l'histoire'. A Masnovo caracterises this position as merely pragmatic.

E. Gilson, Being and some Philosophers, Toronto, PIMS, 1949

3 p. 204: 'Thomas Aquinas was fond of repeating, with Avicenna, that being is  
6 what falls first into the mind, and this is true; but it does not mean that  
9 our cognition is an abstract cognition. What comes first is a sensible perception  
whose object is immediately known by our intellect as "being," and this  
direct apprehension by a knowing subject immediately releases a twofold  
and complementary intellectual operation. First, the knowing subject apprehends  
what the given object is, next it judges that ~~it~~ the object is, and this  
instantaneous recomposition of the existence of given objects with their  
essences merely acknowledges the actual structure of these objects. The  
only difference is that, instead of being simply experienced, such objects  
now are intellectually known.'

12 p. 204 'To repeat, every ens is an esse habens, and unless its esse be  
included in our cognition of it, it is not known as an ens, that is, as a ~~being~~  
be-ing.'

15 p. 204 'In short, the very notion of a purely essential cognition of being  
is self-contradictory

16 p. 204 f. '... all real knowledge is by nature both essential and existential.'

17 p. 207 'Idealism... A product of pure thinking, it is entirely irrelevant to  
knowing.'

1: being first falls into the mind  
the notion of being, the desire to know being, underpins all contents

3: a sensible perception whose object is immediately known by our intellect as  
"being", and this direct apprehension by a knowing subject  
immediately releases a twofold and complementary intellectual operation

it is not known immediately as being but only when one judges  
there is a direct apprehension by a knowing subject inasmuch as the subject  
qua sensible - of the sensible ~~app~~ presentation  
qua inquiring - of the sensible apprehension subsumed under the question, Quid sit  
the immediate release is true, but he suggested immediate performance is false  
cum volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ratiocinando  
and this product of inquiry is just an object of thought and time is taken  
to make the judgement

6: The knowing subject apprehends what the object is

'apprehends' only an object of thought; thinks what the object is, with only  
per se infallibility; to know existence, rational judgement required

8: this instantaneous recomposition  
the recomposition may be instantaneous when the philosopher is considering  
his process of knowing what he already knows without inquiry or reflection

9: merely acknowledges the actual structure of these objects

by reflecting on its processes intellect can discover that anything it  
can know will be a compound of essence and existence

10: the only difference is that, instead of being simply experienced, such  
objects are now intellectually known

there is the further difference that by experience one knows neither  
essence nor actus essendi but by intellectual insight and judgement one  
knows both; intellect does not merely ~~re~~ reproduce spiritually what is given to sense