

Insight

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|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| A 667 | 668 | 676 | 680 | 725 | 737 | 753 |
| B 695 | 696 | 704 | 718 | 753 | 765 | 789 |

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|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| A 615 | 614 | 602 | 783 | 789 | 791 | 798 |
| B 643 | 642 | 630 | 811 | 817 | 819 | 826 |

817 828
845 856
650

Scheme

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|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|--------|
| A 674 | 684 | 679 | 682 | 683 | 684 | 141 |
| B 702 | 692 | 707 | 710 | 711 | 712 | 190 |
| | | | | | | AS 180 |

621, 623

1598 f 6626 f KS 504 " 'being'... is purely the
positing of a being, or of certain determinations,
as existing in themselves --- as small
word 'is' adds no new predicate, but
only serves to posit the predicate in its relation
to the subject "

Hb10 B 638 KS 512 "... we take as the
starting-point of our inference an actual
instance (an experience in general) -- "

of Hb14 B 643 as for KS 514

Hb16 B 644 KS 515 "... the two principles,
as merely heuristic or regulative, --

Ibid "... I can never complete the
regress to the conditions of existence
save by assuming a necessary being,
and yet am never in a position to
begin with such a being." [the latter
because] "whatever it may be that
exists, nothing prevents me from
thinking its non-existence"

might KS 575 A618 B 643
 514 614 642
 507 602 630

A619 B 647 KS 517 "... the ideal of
 the supreme being is nothing but a
regulation principle of reason,
 which directs us to look upon
 all connection in the world as
 if it originated from an all-
 sufficient necessary cause."

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A578 B606 KS 492 Quarta via
 A390 B618 KS 500 experience of existence

B276-KS245- immediate awareness of
 other things outside us

A509 B537 KS 450 constitution regulative

A525 B553 KS 459 BODY

These synthetic a priori - constructs ^{by mind} objects

Pure Reason cannot proceed in this fashion

1^o oversight & insight as resulting from

[logical
data] I, 84, T, c

2^o as yielding many structures

↳ formalized geometry

↳ space science

↳ chemistry physics Biology

3^o as not missing the concrete except in
special case of 'scheme of experience'

4^o oversight of Critique of P. Reason as being
a construction of knowing

~~601~~ 621 623 645 ~~626~~ ~~631~~ 633

637 ~~643~~ ~~650~~ 657, 659, 665

656 f f 661 665

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A priori.

Introduction

B 1 KS 41

KS 42

But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself.

B 2 KS 43

In what follows, therefore, we shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience, (B 3) but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience. (cf above house falling in because foundations undermined)

B 3 KS 43

Thus, for instance, the proposition, 'every alteration has a cause,' while an a priori proposition, is not a pure proposition, because alteration is a concept which can be derived only from experience.

Ibid. propositions a priori if strictly universal or strictly necessary

B 5 KS 45 concepts a priori if something remains after all empirical features have been removed (eg space, substance, inherence)

Reason does not really generate any concept. The most it can do is free a concept of understanding from the unavoidable limitations of possible experience, and so to endeavour to extend it beyond the limits of the empirical.... This is achieved in the following manner. For a given conditioned, reason demands on the side of the conditions... absolute totality, and in so doing converts the category into a transcendental idea.

A 322 B 379 KS 316

The transcendental concept of reason is, therefore, none other than the concept of the totality of the conditions for any given conditioned. Now since it is the unconditioned alone which makes possible the totality of the conditions, and, conversely, the totality of the conditions is itself always unconditioned, a pure concept of reason can in general be explained by the concept of the unconditioned, conceived as containing a ~~the~~ ground of the synthesis of the conditioned.

A 565 B 593 KS 483

Concluding Note in the whole Antinomy of Pure Reason.

So long as reason, in its concepts, has in view simply the totality of conditions in the sensible world, and is considering what satisfaction in this regard it can obtain for them, our ideas are at once transcendental and cosmological. Immediately, however, the unconditioned (and it is with this that we are really concerned) is posited in that which lies entirely outside the sensible world, and therefore outside all possible experience, the ideas become transcendent. They then no longer serve only for the completion of the empirical employment of reason -- an idea (of completeness) which must always be pursued, though it can never be completely achieved. On the contrary, they detach themselves completely from experience, and make for themselves objects for which experience supplies no material, and whose whole objective reality is not based on completion of the empirical series but on pure a priori concepts. Such transcendent ideas have a purely intelligible object; and this object may indeed be admitted as a transcendental object, but only if we likewise admit that, for the rest, we have no knowledge in regard to it, and that it cannot be thought as a determinate thing in terms of distinctive inner predicates.

A 416 B 443 f KS 391

... what reason is really seeking in this serial, regressively continued, synthesis of conditions, is solely the unconditioned.

K CPR A643 B671 KS 532

Reason

533

Reason is never in immediate relation to an object, but only to the understanding; and it is only through the understanding that it has its own specific empirical employment. It does not, therefore, create concepts (of objects) but only orders them, and gives them that unity which they can have only if they be employed in their widest possible application, that is, with a view to obtaining totality in the various series. The understanding does not concern itself with this totality, but only with that connection through which, in accordance with concepts, such series of conditions come into being. Reason has, therefore, as its sole object, the understanding and its effective application. Just as the understanding ~~unifies~~ unifies the manifold in the object by means of concepts, so reason unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, positing a certain collective unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding, which otherwise are concerned solely with ~~their~~ distributive unity.

644

672

I accordingly maintain that transeendental ideas never allow of any constitutive employment. When regarded in that mistaken manner, and therefore as supplying concepts of certain objects, they are but pseudo-rational, merely dialectical concepts. On the other hand, they have an excellent, and indeed indispensable ~~very~~ necessary, regulative employment, namely that of directing the understanding towards a certain goal upon ~~the~~ which the routes marked out by all ~~the~~ its rules converge, as upon their point of intersection. This point is, indeed, a mere idea, a focus imaginarius, from which, since it lies quite outside the bounds of possible experience, the concepts of the understanding do not in reality proceed; none the less it serves to give these concepts the greatest (possible) unity combined with the greatest (possible) extension. Hence arises the illusion that the lines have their source in a real object lying outside the field of empirically possible knowledge -- just as objects reflected in a mirror are seen behind it.

A 647 B 675 KS 535

The hypothetical employment of reason has, therefore, as its aim the systematic unity of the knowledge of understanding, and this unity is the criterion of the truth of its rules. The systematic unity (as a mere idea) is, however, only a projected unity, to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem only. This unity aids us in discovering a principle for the understanding in its manifold and special modes of employment, directing its attention to cases which are not given, and thus rendering it more coherent. (Illustrations follow: what we should call the maximum simplicity of hypothesis)

K CPR

Appearance (Erscheinung; not Schien = Illusion)

A 19 (B 33) KS 65 (Transcendental Aesthetic #1)

In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us. This again is only possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving impressions through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled sensibility. Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts. But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain characters, relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us.

B 34 - The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, as so far as we are
A 20 affected by it, is sensation. That intuition which is in relation to the object through sensation, is entitled empirical. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is entitled appearance.

That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its matter; but that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations, I term the form of appearance.

A 89 f B 121 f KS 123 f

(BL: Pure forms of sensibility are conditions constitutive of intuition and so appearances must conform to them; but categories of understanding do not enjoy this intimate relation; eg appearances might not conform to necessary nexus of causality)

A 115 ff KS 141 ff (Transcendental Deduction in A, section 3)

(BL: for objects to be objects for us, they must fall within synthetic unity of apperception; they do so inasmuch as productive imagination conjoins momentary intuitions in accord with categories of understanding; hence solution to problem of A 89 f)

B 207 f KS 201 f

(BL: because sensation is a matter of intensive degrees, in appearances the real is a matter of intensive degrees)

B xxx KS 24

(BL: proof, that pure reason properly deals only with appearances, from antinomy, announced)

A 490 ff B 518 ff KS 439-443

(Transcendental Idealism: our knowledge is of appearances, solution to antinomies)

A 498 ff B 526 ff KS 443 ff

(BL: if condition and conditioned are things themselves, then if one is given so also is the other; but if they are just appearances, then only a task is set)

A 505 B 533 KS 448

For an appearance is not something existing in itself, and its parts are first given ~~in~~ in and through the regress of the decomposing synthesis, a regress which is never given in absolute completeness, either as finite or as infinite.

(BL: disjunction: world finite or infinite, holds for things themselves not for appearances which are subjective entities that have to appear)

Substance

B 224f KS 213 (Proof of the first analogy of experience)

All appearances are in time; and in it alone, as substratum (as permanent form of inner intuition), can either coexistence or succession be represented. Thus the time in which all change of appearances has to be thought, remains and does not change. For it is ~~this~~ that in which, and as determinations of which, succession or coexistence can alone be represented. Now time cannot by itself be perceived. Consequently there must be found in the objects of perception, that is, in the appearances, the substratum which represents time in general; and all change or coexistence must, in being apprehended, be perceived in this substratum, and through the relation of the appearances to it. But the substratum of all that is real, that is, of all that belongs to the existence of things, is substance; and all that belongs to existence can be thought only as a determination of substance. Consequently the permanent, in relation to which alone all time-relations of appearances can be determined is substance in the (field of) appearance, that is, the real in appearance, and as the substrate of all change remains ever the same. And as it is thus unchangeable in its existence, its quantity in nature can be neither increased or diminished.

(on permanence of 'quantity of matter' as synthetic a priori, cf Introd. B 17 KS 54)

A 525 f B 553 f KS 460

... the concept of substance which is meant to be the subject of all compositeness....

But while this is true of a thing in itself, it does not hold of that which we entitle substance in the (field of) appearance. For this latter is not an absolute subject, but only an abiding image (beharrliches Bild) of sensibility; it is nothing at all save as an intuition, in which unconditionedness is never to be met with.

A 525 f B 553 f KS 460

In other words, the proof of the unity of the concept of substance is not derived from experience. For in that case, the concept of substance would be a mere empirical concept, and would not be a priori.

... every sensible object is dependent upon the subject, and is not an absolute subject. The unity of the concept of substance is not derived from experience, but is a priori. The unity of the concept of substance is not derived from experience, but is a priori.

A 525 f B 553 f KS 460

But the unity, which corresponds to substance in general, is applied to sensation. The unity, which corresponds to substance in general, is applied to sensation. The unity, which corresponds to substance in general, is applied to sensation.

K CPR A 223 B 270 KS 241

Reality

As regards reality, we obviously cannot think it in concreto, without calling experience to our aid. For reality is bound up with sensation, the matter of experience, not with that form of relation in regard to which we can, if we so choose, resort to a playful inventiveness.

A 225 B 273 KS 243

= .. the perception which supplies the content to the concept is the sole mark of actuality.. (in immediately known existence)

A 489 B 517 KS 438

Possible experience is that which ~~alone~~ can alone give reality to our concepts; in its absence a concept is a mere idea, without truth, that is, without relation to any object. The possible empirical concept is therefore the standard by which we must judge whether the idea is a mere idea and thought-entity, or whether it finds an object in the world.

A 147 B 186 KS 186

Now there certainly does remain in the pure concepts of understanding, even after the elimination of every sensible condition, a meaning; but it is purely logical, signifying only the ~~form~~ bare unity of the representations. The pure concepts can find no object, and so ~~it~~ can acquire no meaning which might yield a concept (knowledge) of some object. Substance, for instance, when the sensible determination of permanence is omitted would mean ~~only~~ simply a something which can be thought only as ~~a~~ subject, never as predicate of something else.

A 168 B 210 KS 203

.. the real in the (field of) appearance has always a magnitude (BL intensity)

A 172 B 214 KS 205

KS206

In other words, the proof of an empty space or of an empty time can never be derived from experience. For, in the first place, the complete absence of reality /from a sensible intuition can never itself be perceived...

... since every reality has its degree, which can diminish to nothing (the void) through infinite gradations without in any way altering the extensive magnitude of the appearance, there must be infinite degrees in which space and time may be filled.

A 175 B 217 KS 208

But the real, which corresponds to sensations in general, as opposed to negation = 0, represents only that something the very concept of which includes being, and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an empirical consciousness in general.

A 254 B 310 KS 271

KS272/

The concept of a noumenon -- that is, of ~~xx~~ a thing which ~~x~~ is not to be thought as object of the senses but as a thing in itself, solely through a pure understanding-- is not in any way contradictory. For we cannot assert of sensibility that it is the sole possible kind of intuition. Further, the/concept of a noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective ~~x~~ ~~xx~~ validity of sensible knowledge. The remaining things to which it does not apply, are entitled noumena, in order to show that this knowledge cannot extend its domain over everything which the understanding thinks. But none the less we are unable to comprehend how such noumena can be possible, and the domain that lies out beyond the sphere of appearances is for us empty. That is to say, we have an understanding ~~intuition~~ which problematically extends further, but we have no intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible intuition, through which objects outside the field of sensibility can be given, and through which the understanding can be employed assertorically beyond that ~~field~~ field. The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the presentations of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. At the same time it is no arbitrary invention; it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility, though it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility.

A 287 B343 f KS 292 f; A 290 B 347 KS 295

A 288 B 344 f KS 293 f

B345

A 289

Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, but does not thereby extend its own sphere. In the process of warning the latter that it must not presume to claim applicability to things-in-themselves but only to appearances, it does indeed think for itself an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object, which is the cause of appearance and therefore not itself appearance, and which ~~x~~ can be thought neither as quantity nor as reality nor as substance, etc. (because these concepts always require ~~x~~ sensible forms in which they determine ~~xx~~ an object). We are thus completely ignorant whether it is to be met within us or outside us, whether it would be at once removed with the cessation of sensibility, or whether in the absence of sensibility it would still remain. If we are pleased to name this object noumenon for the reason that its representation is not sensible, we are free to do so. But since we can apply (KS 294) to it none of the concepts of our understanding, the representation remains for us empty, and is of no service except to mark the limits of our sensible knowledge and to leave open a space which can fill neither through possible experience nor through pure understanding.

A 517 B 545 KS 455

Here, as in the cosmological questions, the regulative principle of reason is grounded on the proposition that in the empirical regress we can have no experience of an absolute limit, that is, no experience of any condition as being one that empirically is absolutely unconditioned.

A 530 B 559 KS 463

Hence in the mathematical connection of the series of appearances no other than a sensible condition is admissible, that is to say, none that is not itself a part of the series. On the other hand, in the dynamical series of sensible conditions, a heterogeneous condition, not itself part of the series, but purely intelligible, can be allowed.

A 531 B 559 KS 463 f.

Hence antinomy of dynamical series admits both opposite propositions being true.

A 509 B 542 KS 453

In neither case, whether the regress be in infinitum or in indefinitum, may the series of conditions be regarded as being given as infinite in the object. The series are not things in themselves, but only appearances, which, as conditions of one another, are given only in the regress itself. The question, therefore, is no longer how great this series of conditions be in itself, whether it be finite or infinite, for it is nothing in itself; but how we are to carry out the empirical regress, and how far we should continue it.

A 536 B 564 KS 466

For if appearances are things in themselves, freedom cannot be upheld. Nature will then be the complete and sufficient determining cause of every event. The condition of the event will be such as can be found only in the series of appearances; both it and its effect will be necessary in accordance with the law of nature. If on the other hand appearances are not taken for more than they actually are; if they are viewed not as things in themselves, but merely as representations, connected according (KS 467) to empirical laws, they must themselves have grounds which are not appearances. The effects of such an intelligible cause appear, and accordingly can be determined through other appearances, but its causality is not so determined.

A537
B565

A 413 B 440 KS 389

... reality in space, i.e., matter, is a conditioned...

Being

A 598 B 626 KS 504 f

'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not concept of something which could be added to the concept ~~x~~ of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of ~~x~~ a judgment. The proposition, 'God is omnipotent,' (KS 505) contains two concepts, each of which has its object -- God and omnipotence. The ~~small~~ small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If, now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among which is omnipotence) and say 'God is' or 'There is a God,' we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being an object that stands in relation to my concept. The ~~unambiguous~~ content of both must be one and the same; nothing can have been added to the concept, which expresses merely what is possible, by my thinking its object (through the expression 'it is') as given absolutely. Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than the merely possible. (Hundred thalers)

A599
B6267

A 18 178 B 220f KS 210 (see Affirmation, last entry)

A 225 B272 f KS 243

In the mere concept of a thing no mark (Charakter) of its existence is to be found. For thought it may be so complete that nothing which is required for thinking the thing with all its inner determinations is lacking to it, yet the existence has nothing to do with all this, but only with the question whether such a thing be so given to us that the perception of it can, if need be, precede the concept. For that the concept precedes the perception signifies the concept's mere possibility; the perception which supplies the content to the concept is the sole mark of actuality. We can also however know the existence of the thing prior to its perception and, consequently, comparatively speaking, in an apriori manner, if only it be bound up with certain perceptions, in accordance with the principles of their empirical connection (the analogies). For the existence of ~~nothing~~ the thing being thus bound up with our perceptions in a possible experience, we are able in the series of possible perceptions and under the guidance of the analogies to make the transition from our actual perception to the thing in question. Thus from the perception of the attracted iron filings we know the existence of a magnetic matter pervading all bodies... (cf A 226 B 279 KS 247)

B 422ff KS 378 note on I thing therefore I exist

K CPR Affirmation
245 & 263

A 246 KS 264 (omitted in B)

The logical functions of judgments in general, unity and plurality, assertion and denial, subject and predicate, cannot be defined without perpetrating a circle, since the definition must itself be a judgment, and so much already contain these functions. The pure categories are nothing but representations of things in general, so far as the manifold of their intuition must be thought through one or other of these logical functions. Magnitude is the determination which can be thought only through a judgment which has quantity (*iudicium commune*); reality is that determination which can be thought only through an affirmative judgment; substance is that which, in relation to intuition, must be the last subject of all other determinations. But what sort of thing it is that demands ~~the determination of~~ one of these functions rather than another, remains altogether undetermined. Thus, the categories, apart from the condition of sensible intuition, of which they contain the synthesis, have no relation to any determinate object, cannot therefore define any object, and so do not in themselves have the ~~transcendental~~ validity of objective concepts.

A 286 B 342 KS 292

For the condition of the objective employment of all our concepts of understanding is merely the mode of sensible intuition, by which objects are given to us; if we abstract from these objects, the concepts have no relation to any object.

A 574 f B 602 f KS 490

Transcendental affirmation is therefore entitled reality, because through it alone, and so far only as it reaches, are objects something (things), whereas its opposite, negation, signifies a mere want, and, so far as it alone is thought, represents the abrogation of all thinghood.

B 141 f KS 159 (Transcendental Deduction #19: The logical form of all judgments consists in the objective unity of the apperception of the concepts which they contain)

... I find that ~~a~~ judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception. This is what is intended by the copula 'is'. It is employed to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective.

Thus to say 'The body is heavy' is not merely to state that the two representations have always been conjoined in my perception, however often that perception be ~~repeated~~ repeated; what we are asserting is that they are combined in the object, no matter what the state of the subject may be.

A 27 B 43 KS 72

If we add to the concept of the subject of a judgment the limitation under which the judgment is made, the judgment is then unconditionally valid. The proposition, that all things are side by side in space, is valid under the limitation that these things are viewed as objects of our sensible intuition. If now I add the condition to the concept, and say that all things, as outer appearances, are side by side in space, the rule is valid universally and without limitation (B44 A 28). Our exposition therefore establishes the reality, that is, the objective validity, of space in respect of whatever can be presented to us outwardly as object, but also at the same time the ideality of space in respect of things when they are considered in themselves through reason, that is, without regard to the constitution of our sensibility.

A 178 B 221 KS 210

The manner in which something is apprehended in appearance can be so determined a priori that the rule of its synthesis can at once give, that is to say, can bring into being, this (element of) a priori intuition in every example that comes before us empirically. The existence of appearances cannot, however, be thus known a priori; and even granting that we could in any such manner contrive to infer that something exists, we could not ~~a~~ know determinately, could not, that is, anticipate the features through which its empirical intuition is distinguished from other intuitions.

A 158 B 197 KS 194

The highest principle of all synthetic judgments is therefore this: every object stands under the necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience.

Synthetic a priori judgments are thus possible when we relate the formal conditions of a a priori intuition, the synthesis of imagination and the necessary unity of this synthesis in a transcendental apperception, to a possible empirical knowledge in general. We then assert that the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and that for this reason they have objective validity in a synthetic appriori judgment.

A 151 B 191 KS 190

The principle of contradiction must therefore be recognised as being the universal and completely sufficient principle of all analytic knowledge; but beyond the sphere of analytic knowledge it has, as a sufficient criterion of truth, no authority and no field of application. The fact that no knowledge can be contrary to it without self-nullification, makes this principle a conditio sine qua non, but not a determining ground, of the truth of our (non-analytic) knowledge. Now in our critical enquiry it is only with the synthetic portion of our knowledge that we are concerned; and in regard to the truth of this kind of knowledge we can never look to the above principle for any positive information, though, of course, since it is inviolable, we must always be careful to conform to it.

B 146 KS 161 f.

/ Experience.

22 The Category has no other Application in Knowledge than to Objects of /

To think an object and to know an object are thus by no means the same thing. Knowledge involves two factors: first, (KS 162) the concept, through which an object in general is thought (the category); and secondly, the intuition, through which it is given. For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the ~~object~~ concept, the concept would still indeed be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it. So far as I could know, there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought could be applied. Now as the Aesthetic has shown, the only intuition possible to us is sensible; consequently, the thought of an object in general, by means of a pure concept of ~~the~~ understanding, can become knowledge for us only in so far as the concept is related to objects of the senses.

B 148 KS 163 #23

=The above proposition is of the greatest importance; for it determines the limits of the employment of the pure concepts of understanding in regard to objects, just as the Transcendental Aesthetic determined the limits of the employment of the pure form of our sensible intuition. Space and time, as conditions under which alone objects can possibly be given to us, are valid no further than for objects of the senses, and therefore only for experience. Beyond these limits they represent nothing; for they are only in the senses, and beyond them have no reality. The pure concepts of understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to objects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike ours, if only it be sensible and not intellectual. But this extension of concepts beyond our sensible intuition is of no advantage to us. For as concepts of objects they are then empty, and do not even enable us to judge of their objects whether or not they are possible. They are mere forms of thought without objective reality, since we have no intuition ~~at~~ at hand to which the synthetic unity of apperception, which constitutes the whole content of these forms, could be applied, and in being so applied determine an object. Only our sensible and empirical intuition can give to them body and meaning.

Transcendental Doctrine of Method.

Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason

Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic Employment. A 712f B 740

A 712 B 740 KS 576

713/741

Mathematics presents the most splendid example of the successful extension of pure reason, without the help of experience. Examples are contagious... Thus pure reason hopes to be able to extend its domain as successfully and securely in its transcendental as in its mathematical employment, especially when it resorts to the same method as has been of such obvious utility in mathematics. It is therefore highly important for us to know whether the method attaining apodeictic certainty which is called mathematical is identical with the method by which we endeavour to obtain the same certainty in philosophy, and which in that field would have to be called dogmatic.

714/742

Philosophical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from concepts; mathematical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from the construction of concepts. To construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition which corresponds to the concept. For the construction of a concept we therefore need a non-empirical intuition. The latter must, as intuition, be a single object, and yet none the less, as the construction of a concept (a universal representation), it must in its representation express universal validity for all possible intuitions which fall under the same concept. Thus I construct a triangle by representing the object which corresponds to this concept either by imagination alone, in pure intuition, or in accordance therewith also on paper, in empirical intuition -- in both cases completely a priori, without having borrowed the pattern from any experience. The single figure which we draw is empirical, and yet it serves to express the concept, without impairing its universality. For in this empirical intuition we consider only the act whereby we construct the concept, and abstract from the many determinations (for instance, the magnitude of the sides and of the angles), which are quite indifferent as not altering the concept 'triangle'.

Thus philosophical knowledge considers the particular only in the universal, mathematical knowledge the universal only in the particular, or even in the single instance, though still always a priori and by means of reason. Accordingly, just as this single object is determined by certain universal conditions of construction, so the object of the concept, to which the single object corresponds merely as its schema, must likewise be thought as universally determined.

715/743

The essential difference between these two kinds of knowledge through reason consists therefore in this formal difference, and does not depend on difference of their material objects. Those who propose to distinguish philosophy from (KS 578) mathematics by saying that the former has as its object quality only and the latter quantity only, have mistaken the effect for the cause. The form of mathematical knowledge is the cause why it is limited exclusively to quantities. For it is the concept of quantities only that allows of being constructed, that is, exhibited a priori in intuition; whereas qualities cannot be presented in any intuition that is not empirical. Consequently reason can obtain a knowledge of qualities only through concepts. No one can obtain an intuition corresponding to the concept of reality otherwise than from experience; we can never come into possession of it a priori out of our own resources, and prior to the empirical consciousness of reality. The shape of a cone we can form for ourselves in intuition, unassisted by any experience, according to its concept alone, but the colour of this cone must be previously given in some experience or other. I cannot represent in intuition the concept of a cause in general except in an example supplied by experience; and similarly with other concepts... (Philosophy treats of quantities; mathematics of qualities)... But though in such cases they have a common object, the mode in which reason handles that object is wholly different in philosophy and in mathematics. Philosophy confines itself to universal concepts; mathematics can achieve nothing by concepts alone but hastens at once to intuition, in which it considers the concept in concreto, though not empirically, but only in an intuition which it presents a priori, that is, which it has constructed, and in which whatever follows PTO

716/744

in
The Disciple of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic Employment.

A 717 B 745 KS 579

.... and thus in algebra by means of a symbolic construction, just as in geometry by means of an ostensive construction (the geometrical construction of the objects themselves), we succeed in arriving at results which discursive knowledge could never have reached by means of mere concepts.

718/746

Now what can be the reason of this radical difference in the fortunes of the philosopher and the mathematician, both of whom practise the art of reason, the one making his way by means of concepts the other by means of intuitions which he exhibits a priori in accordance with concepts? The cause is ~~x~~ evident from what has been said above, in our exposition of the (KS 580) fundamental transcendental doctrines. We are not here concerned with analytic propositions, which can be produced by mere analysis of concepts (in this the philosopher would certainly have the advantage over his rival), but with synthetic propositions, and indeed with just those synthetic propositions that ~~can~~ be known a priori. For I must not ~~think~~ restrict my attention to what I am actually thinking in my concept of a triangle (this is nothing more than the mere definition); I must pass beyond it to concepts which are not contained in this concept, but yet belong to it. Now this is impossible unless I determine my object in accordance with the conditions either of empirical or of pure intuition. The former would only give us an empirical proposition (based on the measurement of the angles), which not have universality, still less necessity; and so would not at all serve our purpose. The second method of procedure is the mathematical one, and in this case is the method of geometrical construction, by means of which I combine in a pure intuition (just as I do in empirical intuition) the manifold which belongs to the schema of a triangle in general, and therefore to its concept. It is by this method that ~~synthetic~~ universal synthetic propositions must be constructed.

719/747

It would therefore be quite futile for me to philosophise upon the triangle, that is, to think about discursively. I should not be able to advance = a single step beyond the definition, which is what I had to begin with. There is indeed a transcendental synthesis (framed) from concepts alone, a synthesis with which the philosopher is alone competent to deal; but it relates only to a thing in general, as defining the conditions under which the perception of it can belong to possible experience. But in mathematical problems there is no question of this, nor indeed of existence at all, but only of the properties of the objects in themselves, (that is to say), solely in so far as these properties are connected with the concept of the objects.

In the above example we have endeavoured only to make clear the great difference which exists between the discursive employment of reason in accordance with concepts and its intuitive employment by means of the construction of concepts. This naturally leads on to the question, what can be the cause (KS 581) which necessitates such a twofold employment of reason, and how ~~x~~ we are to recognise whether it is the first or the second method that is being employed.

720/748

All our knowledge relates, finally, to possible intuitions, for it is through them ~~concepts alone~~ that an object is given. Now an a priori concept that is, a concept which is not empirical, either already includes in itself a pure intuition (and if so, it can be constructed), or it includes nothing but the synthesis of possible intuitions which are not given a priori. In this latter case we can indeed make use of it in forming synthetic a priori judgments, but only discursively in accordance with concepts, never intuitively through the construction of the concept.

The only intuition that is given a priori is that of the mere form of appearances, space and time. A concept of space and time, as quanta, can be exhibited a priori in intuition, that is, constructed, either in respect of the quality (figure) of the quanta, or through number in their quantity only (the mere

con'd from previous sheet : Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Employment

A 720 B 748 KS 581

mere synthesis of the homogeneous manifold). But the matter of appearances, by which things are given us in space and time, can only be represented in perception, and therefore a posteriori. The only concept which represents a priori this empirical content of ~~the~~ appearances is the concept of a thing in general, and the a priori synthetic knowledge of this thing in general can give us nothing more than the mere rule of the synthesis of that which perception may give a posteriori. It can never ~~xx~~ yield an a priori intuition of the real object, since this must necessarily be empirical.

721/749 Synthetic propositions in regard to things in general, the intuition of which does not admit of being given a priori, are transcendental. Transcendental propositions can never be given through construction of concepts, but only in accordance with concepts that are a priori. They contain nothing but the ~~xx~~ rule according to which we are to seek empirically for a certain synthetic unity of that which is ~~xxx~~ incapable of intuitive representation a priori (that is, of perceptions). But these synthetic principles cannot exhibit a priori any one of their concepts in a specific instance; they can only do this a posteriori, by means of experience, which itself is possible only in conformity with these principles.

722/750 But if we are to judge synthetically with regard to a concept, we must go beyond this concept and appeal to the intuition in which it is given. For should we confine ourselves to what is contained in the concept, the judgment would be merely analytic, serving only as an explanation of the thought, in terms of what is actually contained in it. But I can pass from the concept to the corresponding pure or empirical intuition, in order to consider it in that intuition in concreto, and so to know, either a priori or a posteriori, what are the properties of the object of the concept. The a priori method gives us our rational and mathematical knowledge through the construction of the concept, the a posteriori method our merely empirical (~~mechanical~~) knowledge, which is incapable of yielding necessary and apodeictic propositions. Thus I might analyse my empirical concept of gold.... But if what is given me is the transcendental concept of a reality, substance, force, etc., it indicates neither an empirical nor a pure intuition, but only the synthesis of empirical intuitions, which, as being empirical, cannot be given a priori. And since the synthesis is thus unable to advance a priori, beyond the concept, to the corresponding intuition, the concept cannot yield any determining synthetic proposition, but only a principle of synthesis* of possible empirical intuitions. KS 583. A transcendental proposition is therefore synthetic knowledge through reason, in accordance with mere concepts; and it is discursive, in that while it is what alone makes possible any synthetic unity of empirical knowledge, it yet gives us no intuition a priori.

Self-knowledge

A 278 B334 KS 287

... it is not given to us to observe our own mind with any other intuition than that of inner sense;...

A 345 f B404 KS 331

'I' completely empty representation; mere transcendental subject of thoughts; not a concept but a bare consciousness that accompanies all concepts.

A 350 KS 334

We do not have and cannot have any knowledge whatsoever of any such subject. (ie the real subject that thinks)

B 422 KS 377

= The subject of the categories cannot by thinking the categories obtain a concept of itself as object of the categories.

B 409 KS 370

Indeed, it would be a great stumbling-block, or rather would be the one unanswerable objection, to our whole critique, if there were a possibility of proving a priori that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, and that consequently (as follows from the same mode of proof) personality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as separate and distinct from all matter. For by such procedure we should have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have entered into the field of noumena; and no one could then deny our right of advancing yet further in this domain, indeed of settling in it, and should our star prove auspicious, of establishing claims to permanent possession.

B 157 KS 168

On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, and therefore in the synthetic unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition. Now in order to know ourselves, there is required in addition to the act of thought, which brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate mode of intuition, whereby the manifold is given; it therefore follows that although my existence is not indeed appearance (still less mere illusion), the determination of my existence * can take place only in conformity with the form of inner sense, according to the special mode in which the manifold, which I combine, is given in inner intuition. Accordingly I have no knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself. See note B 157 f. KS 169.

Cf general note on the transition from rational psychology to cosmology B 428 f KS 381 f which is full on 'I think' 'I exist' *cf also B 152 ff KS 165 ff*

- * see following sheet for Kant's note at *

Self-knowledge

Transcendental Deduction (B). Note to B 157: 'the determination of my existence'²

B 157 KS 169

B 158

The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my existence. Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which I ~~exist~~ am to determine this existence, that is, the manifold belonging to it, is not thereby given. In order that it be given, self-intuition is required; and such intuition is conditioned by a given a priori form, namely, time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable (in me). Now since I do not have another self-intuition which gives the determining in me (I am conscious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of determination, as time does in the case of the determinable, I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the determination; and my existence is still only determinable sensibly, that is, as the existence of an appearance. But it is owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an intelligence.

Paralogisms of Pure Reason (B)

General Note on the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology.

B 428 KS 381

The proposition, 'I think' or 'I exist thinking', is an empirical proposition. Such a proposition, however, is conditioned by empirical intuition, and is therefore also conditioned by the object (that is, the self) which is thought (in its aspect) as appearance. It would consequently seem that on our theory the soul, even in thought, is completely transformed into appearance, and that in this way our consciousness itself, as being a mere illusion (Schein), must refer in fact to nothing.

B 429

Thought, taken by itself, is merely the logical function, and therefore the pure spontaneity of the combination of the manifold of a merely possible intuition, and does not exhibit the subject of consciousness as appearance; and this for the sufficient reason that thought takes no account whatsoever of the mode of intuition, whether it be sensible or intellectual. I thereby represent ~~me~~ myself to myself neither as I am nor as I appear to myself. I think myself only as I do any object in general from whose mode of intuition I abstract. If I here (KS 382) represent myself as subject of thoughts or as ground of thoughts, these modes of representation do not signify the categories of substance or of cause. For the categories are those functions of thought (of judgment) as already applied to our sensible intuition, such intuition being required if I seek to know myself. If on the other hand I would be conscious of myself simply as thinking, then since I am not considering how my own self may be given in intuition, the self may be mere appearance to me, the 'I' that thinks, but it is no mere appearance in so far as I think; in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself, although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.

B 430 B

The proposition, 'I think', is so far as it amounts to the assertion, 'I exist thinking', is no mere logical function, but determines the subject (which is then at the same time object) in respect of existence, and cannot take place without inner sense, the intuition of which presents the object not as thing in itself but merely as appearance. There is here, therefore, not simply spontaneity of thought, but also receptivity of intuition, that is, the thought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself. Now it is to this intuition that the thinking self would have to look for the conditions of the employment of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause, etc., if it is not merely to distinguish itself as object in itself, through the 'I', but is also to determine ~~itself~~ the mode of its existence, that is, to know itself as noumenon. This, however, is impossible, since the inner empirical intuition is sensible and yields only data of appearance, which nothing to the object of pure consciousness for the knowledge of its separate existence, but can serve only for the obtaining of experience.

K CPR A 320 B 376 f KS 314

representation (Vorstellung) == R

perception (Perception) = R + consciousness = P

sensation (Empfindung) = P as modification of the subject

knowledge (Erkenntnis) = P as objective = K

intuition (Anschauung) = K as immediate and single

concept (Begriff) = K as through mediation of a general feature = B ^{empirical}

notio n (Notio) = pure B in so far as origin in understanding alone ^{pure}

idea (Idee) = a concept formed from notions and transcending the possibility of experience; also named a concept of reason

A 633 B 661 KS 526 526

For the purposes of this inquiry, theoretical knowledge may be defined as knowledge of what is, practical knowledge as the representation of what ought to be. On this definition, the theoretical employment of reason is that by which I know a priori (as necessary) that something is, and the practical that by which it is known a priori what ought to happen.

A 634 B 662 ad fin; KS 527

Theoretical knowledge is speculative if it concerns an object, or those concepts of an object, which cannot be reached in any experience. It is so named to distinguish it from the knowledge of nature, which concerns only those objects or predicates of objects which can be given in a possible experience.

What about electromagnetic field vectors?

K CPR Transcendental

A 558 B 586 KS 479

For that inquiry, as it does not deal with concepts alone, would not have been transcendental

A 574 B 602 KS 489

When we consider all concepts, not merely logically, but transcendently, that is, with reference to such content as can be thought a priori as belonging to them...

A 115 B 25 KS 59 (Introduction)

I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with our mode of the knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori. A system of such concepts might be entitled transcendental philosophy. But that is still, at this stage, too large an undertaking. For since such a science must contain, with completeness, both kinds of a priori knowledge, it is, so far as our present purpose is concerned, much too comprehensive. We have to carry the analysis so far only as is indispensably necessary in ~~order~~ order to comprehend, in their whole extent, the principles of a priori synthesis, with which alone we are called upon to deal. (B 26). It is upon this enquiry, which should be entitled not a doctrine, but only a ~~critique~~ transcendental critique, that we are now engaged.

A 295 f B 352 f KS 298 f (transcendent vs immanent; tr..dent / tr..dental)

A 720 B 748 748 KS 581 (transcendental propositions; philosophy & mathematics)

Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic

1. The Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason A 642 ff B 670 ff KS 532 FF
2. The Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Pure Reason A 669 B 697 KS 549 ff.

A 663 B 691 KS 545

The remarkable feature of these principles (cf B685 A657: homogeneity variety affinity), and what in them alone concerns us, is that they seem to be transcendental, and that although they contain mere ideas for the guidance of the empirical employment of reason -- ideas which reason follows only as it were asymptotically, i.e., ever more closely without ever reaching them -- they yet possess, as synthetic a priori propositions, objective ~~xxx~~ but indeterminate validity, and serve as rules for possible experience. They can also be employed with great advantage in the elaboration of experience, (KS 546) as heuristic principles. A transcendental deduction of them cannot however be effected; in the case of the ideas, as we have shown above, such a deduction is never possible. (cf A 336 B 393 KS 324)

A664
B692

*

In the Transcendental Analytic* we have distinguished the dynamical principles of the understanding, as merely regulative principles of intuition, from the mathematical, which, as regards intuition, are constitutive. None the less these dynamical laws are constitutive in respect of experience, since they render the concepts, without which there can be no experience possible a priori. But principles of pure reason can never be constitutive in respect of empirical concepts; for since no schema of sensibility corresponding to them can ever be given, they can never have an object in concreto. If, then, we disallow such empirical employment of them, as constitutive principles, how are we to secure for them a regulative employment, and therewith some sort of objective validity, and what can we mean by such regulative employment?

The understanding is an object for reason, just as sensibility is for the understanding. It is the business of reason to render the unity of all possible empirical acts of the understanding systematic; just as it is of the understanding to connect the manifold of the appearances by means of concepts and to bring it under empirical laws. But the acts of the understanding are, without the schemata of sensibility, undetermined; just as the unity of reason is in itself undetermined, as regards the ~~unrestricted~~ conditions under which, and the extent to which, the understanding ought to combine its concepts in systematic fashion. But although we are unable to find in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of all concepts of the understanding, an analogon of such a schema must necessarily allow of being given. This analogon is the idea of the maximum in the division and unification of the knowledge of the understanding under one principle. ~~Wx~~ For what is greatest and absolutely complete can be determinately thought, all restricting conditions, which give rise to an indeterminate manifoldness, being left aside. Thus the idea of reason is an analogon of a schema of sensibility; but with this difference, that the application of the concepts of the understanding to the schema of reason does not yield knowledge of the object itself (as is the case in the application of ~~the~~ categories to their/sensible schemata), but only a rule or principle for the systematic unity of all employment of the understanding. Now since every principle which prescribes a priori to the understanding thoroughgoing unity in its employment, also holds, although only indirectly, of the object of experience, the principles of pure reason must also have objectivity in respect to that object, not however, in order to determine anything in it, but only in order to indicate the procedure whereby the empirical and determinate employment of the understanding can be brought into complete harmony with itself. This is achieved by bringing its employment, so far as may be possible, into connection with the principle of thoroughgoing unity, and by determining its procedure in the light of this principle. (hence maxims of reason)

A665
B693

KS 547

B694
A666

A 669 B 697 KS 549

The ideas of pure reason can never be dialectical in themselves; any deceptive illusion to which they give occasion must be due solely to their misemployment. For they arise from the very nature of our reason; and it is impossible that this highest tribunal of all the rights and claims of speculation should itself be the source of deceptions and illusions.

The Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason.

⁰
A 671 B 699 KS 550

There is a great difference between something being given to my reason as an object absolutely, or merely as an object in the idea. In the former case our concepts are employed to determine the object; in the latter ~~x~~ case there is in fact only a schema for which no object, not even a hypothetical one, is directly ~~x~~ given, and which only enables us to represent to ourselves other objects in an indirect manner, namely in their systematic unity, by means of their relation to this idea. Thus I say that the concept of a highest intelligence is a mere idea, that is to say, its objective reality is not to be taken as consisting in its referring directly to an object (for in that sense we should not be able to justify its objective ~~in~~ validity). It is only a schema constructed in accordance with the conditions of the greatest possible unity of reason -- the schema of the concept of a thing in general, which serves only to secure the greatest possible systematic unity in the empirical employment of our reason. We then, as it were, ~~derogate~~ derive the object of experience from the supposed object of this idea, viewed as the ground or cause of the object of ~~ex~~ experience. We declare for instance that the things of the world must be viewed as if they received their existence from a highest intelligence. The idea is thus really only a heuristic, not an ostensive concept. It does not show us how an object is constituted, but how, under its guidance, we should seek to determine the constitution and connection of the objects of experience. If, then, it can be shown that the three transcendental ideas (the psychological, the cosmological, and the theological), although they do not directly relate to, or determine, any object corresponding to them, none the less, as rules of the empirical employment of reason, lead us to systematic unity, under the presupposition of such an object in the idea; and that they thus contribute to the extension of empirical knowledge, without ever being in a position to run counter to it, we may conclude that it is a necessary maxim of reason to proceed always in accordance with such ideas. This, indeed, is the transcendental ~~due~~ deduction of all ideas of speculative reason, not as constitutive principles for the extension of our knowledge to more objects than experience can give, but as regulative principles of the systematic unity of the manifold of empirical knowledge in general, whereby this empirical (KS 551) knowledge is more adequately secured within its own limits and more effectively improved than would be possible, in the absence of such ideas, through the ~~x~~ employment merely of the ~~x~~ principles of the understanding. (EL: Kant proceeds to make this clearer by urging us to think just as if the mind were a simple substance etc, just as if the world were endless, just as if God existed; not that we show such things to be true, but rather that if we proceed as if they were, our inquiry into mind, the world, and phenomena generally will move more relentlessly towards systematic unity)

A 677 B 705 KS 554

The concept of reality, substance, causality, even that of necessity in existence, apart from their use in making possible the ~~mx~~ empirical knowledge of an object, have no meaning whatsoever, such as might serve to determine any object. They can be employed, therefore, to explain the possibility of things in the world of sense, but not to explain the possibility of the universe itself. Such a ground of explanation would have to be outside the world, and could not therefore be an object ~~mx~~ of a possible experience. For if the greatest possible empirical employment of my reason rests upon an idea... which... is yet indispensably necessary in order that we may approximate to the highest possible degree of empirical unity, I shall not only be entitled, but shall also be constrained, to realise this idea, that is, to posit for it a real object.../ This I do by representing all connections as if they were the ordinances of a supreme reason, of which our reason is but a faint copy.

A 679 B 707 KS 555

I think to myself merely the relation of a being, in itself completely unknown to me, to the greatest possible systematic unity of the universe, solely for the purpose of using it as a schema of the ~~xxxxxx~~ regulative principle of the greatest possible empirical employment of my reason.

a671
b699

A678
B706
KS555/

The Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason.

A 679 B 707 KS 555

If it be the transcendental object of our idea that we have in view, it is obvious that we cannot thus, in terms of the concepts of reality, substance, causality, etc., presuppose its reality in itself, since these concepts have not the least application to anything that is entirely distinct from the world of sense. The supposition which reason makes of a supreme being, as the highest cause, is therefore relative only; it is devised solely for the sake of ~~its~~ systematic unity in the world of sense, and is a mere something in idea, of which, as it may be in itself, we have no concept. This explains why, in relation to what is given to the senses as existing, we require the idea of a primordial being necessary in itself, and yet can never ~~find~~ form the slightest concept of it or of its absolute necessity.

A 680 B 708 KS 556

It is not a constitutive principle that enables us to determine anything in respect of its direct object, but only a merely regulative ~~xi~~ principle and maxim, to further and strengthen in infinitum (indeterminately) the empirical employment of reason...

A 682 B 710 KS 557

In short, this transcendental thing is only the schema of the regulative principle by which reason, so far as lies in its power, extends systematic unity over the whole field of experience.

A 683 B 711 KS 557

The simplicity and other properties of substance are intended to be only the schema of this regulative principle, and are not presupposed as being the actual ground of the properties of the soul

A 684 B 712 KS 558

All this will be best attained through such a schema, viewed as if it were a real being; indeed it is attainable in no other way. The psychological idea can signify nothing but the schema of a regulative concept. For were I to enquire whether the soul in itself is of ~~spiritual~~ spiritual nature, the question would have no meaning.

A 695 f B 723 f KS 565 f

If, in connection with a transcendental theology, we ask, first, whether there is anything distinct from the world, which contains the ground of the order of the world and of its connection in accordance with universal laws, the answer is that there undoubtedly is. For the world is a sum of appearances; and there must therefore be some transcendental ground of the appearances, that is, a ground which is thinkable only by the pure understanding. If secondly the question be, whether this being is substance, of the greatest reality, necessary, etc., (KS 566), we reply that this question is entirely without meaning. For all categories through which we can attempt to form a concept of such an object allow only of empirical employment, and have no meaning whatsoever when not applied to objects of possible experience, that is, to the world of sense.... If thirdly the question ~~is~~ be, whether we may not at least think this being, which is distinct from the world, in analogy with the objects of experience, the answer is: certainly, but only as an object in idea and not in reality, namely, only as being a substratum, to us unknown, of the systematic unity, order, and purposiveness of the arrangement of the world-- an idea which reason is constrained to form as the ~~xi~~ regulative principle of its investigation of nature. Nay more we may freely ... admit into this idea certain anthropomorphisms which are helpful to the principle in its regulative capacity.... But the question may still be pressed: Can we, on such grounds, assume a wise and omnipotent Author of the world? Undoubtedly we may; and we not only may, but must, do so. But do we then extend our knowledge beyond the field of possible experience? By no means. All that we have done is merely presuppose a something, a merely transcendental object, of which, as it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever... This idea is thus valid only in respect of the employment PTO

A 696
B 724

7
A 698
B 725

The Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason.

A 702 B 730 KS 569

Thus all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to concepts, and ends with ideas. Although in respect of all three elements it possesses a priori sources of knowledge, which on first consideration seem to scorn the limits of all experience, a thoroughgoing critique convinces us that reason, in its speculative employment, can never with these elements transcend the field of possible experience and that the proper vocation of this supreme faculty of knowledge is to use all methods, solely for the purpose of penetrating to the innermost secrets of nature, in accordance with every possible principle of unity -- that of ends being the most important -- but never to soar beyond its limits, outside of which there is for us nothing but ~~empty~~ empty space.

The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic Employment.

⁴
A72⁵ B752 KS584

725/753

The great success which attends reason in its mathematical employment quite naturally gives rise to the expectation that it, or at any rate its method, will have the same success in other fields as in that of quantity. For this method has the advantage of being able to realise all its concepts in intuitions, which it can provide a priori, and by which it becomes, so to speak master of nature; whereas pure philosophy in all at sea when it seeks through a priori discursive concepts to obtain insight in regard to the natural world, being unable to intuit a priori (and thereby to confirm) their reality.

A 726 B 754 KS 585

It therefore becomes necessary to cut away the last anchor of these fantastic hopes, that is, to show that the pursuit of the mathematical method cannot be of the least advantage in this kind of knowledge (unless it be in exhibiting more plainly the limitations of the method); and that mathematics (Messkunst) and philosophy, although in natural science they do, indeed, go hand in hand, are none the less so completely different, that the procedure of the one can never be imitated by the other.

A 727 B755 KS 585

I shall show that in philosophy the geometrician can by his method build only so many houses of cards, just as ~~the mathematician~~ in mathematics the employment of a philosophical method results only in mere talk.

A729 B 757 KS 587

There remain, therefore, no concepts which allow of definition, except only those which contain an arbitrary synthesis that admits of a priori construction. Consequently, mathematics is the only science that has definitions. (definitions in loose sense admitted in philosophy, just below) hence

A 730 B 758 KS 587

We shall confine ourselves simply to remarking that while philosophical definitions are never more than expositions of given concepts, mathematical definitions are constructions of concepts (KS 588), originally framed by the mind itself; and that while the former can be obtained only by analysis (the completeness of which is never apodeictically certain), the latter are produced synthetically.

A 736 B 764 KS 592

... The customary use of words thus confirms our interpretation of the term, namely, that only judgments derived from concepts can be called dogmatic, not those based on the construction of concepts.

737/765

Now in the whole domain of pure reason, in its merely speculative employment, there is not to be found a single synthetic judgment directly derived from concepts. For, as we have shown, ideas cannot form the basis of any objectively valid synthetic judgment. Through concepts of understanding pure reason does, indeed, establish secure principles, not however directly from concepts alone, but always only indirectly through relation of these concepts to something altogether contingent, namely, possible experience. When such experience (that is, something as object of possible experiences) is presupposed, these principles are indeed apodeictically certain; but in themselves, directly, they can never be known a priori. Thus no one can acquire insight into the proposition that everything that happens has its cause, merely from the concepts involved. It is not, therefore, a dogma, although from another point of view, namely, from that of the sole field of its possible employment, that is, experience, it can be proved with complete apodeictic certainty.....

Now if ~~the~~ in the speculative employment of pure reason there are no dogmas, to serve as its special subject-matter, all dogmatic methods, whether borrowed from the mathematical or specially invented, are as such inappropriate.

A 782 B 810 KS 621

If I am to pass a priori beyond the concept of an object, I can do so only with the help of some special guidance, supplied from outside this concept. In mathematics it is a priori synthesis that guides my synthesis; and thereby all our conclusions can be drawn immediately from pure intuition. In transcendental knowledge, so long as we are concerned only with concepts of the understanding, our guide is the possibility of experience. Such proof does not show that the given concept (for instance, of that which happens) leads directly to another concept (that of a cause); for such a transition would be a saltus which could not be justified. The proof proceeds by showing that experience itself, and therefore the object of experience, would be impossible without a connection of this kind. Accordingly, the proof must also at the same time show the possibility of arriving synthetically and a priori at some knowledge of things which was not contained in the concepts of them. Unless this requirement be met, the proofs, like steams ~~that~~ which break their banks, run wildly at random whithersoever the current of hidden association may chance to lead them.

783 / 811

A 785 B 813 KS 623

... it is indispensably necessary to have constantly at hand a criterion of the possibility of those synthetic propositions which are intended to prove more than experience yields. This criterion consists in the requirement that proof should not proceed directly to the desired predicate but only by means of a principle that will demonstrate the possibility of extending our given concept in an a priori manner to ideas, and of realising the latter.

Transcendental Doctrine of Method
Chapter II: The Canon of Pure Reason.

25

A 802 B 830 KS 633 (Footnote)

... do not belong to transcendental philosophy, which is exclusively concerned with a pure a priori modes of knowledge.

A 808 B 836 KS 637

(BL: practical ideas refer to real world, not as existing, but as to be realised)

Chapter III: The Architectonic of Pure Reason (art of constructing systems)

A 834 B 862 KS 654

The idea requires for its realisation a schema, that is, a constituent manifold and an order of its parts, both of which must be determined a priori from the principle defined by its end. The schema which is not devised in accordance with an idea, that is, in terms of the ~~xxx~~ ultimate aim of reason, but empirically in accordance with purposes that are contingently occasioned (the number of which cannot be foreseen) yields technical unity; whereas the schema which originates from an idea (in which reason propounds the ends a priori, and does not wait for them to be empirically given) serves as the basis of architectonic unity.....

834/862

No one attempts to establish a science unless he has an idea ~~xxx~~ upon which to base it. But in the working out of the science the schema, nay ~~x~~ even the definition, which at the start he first gave of the science, is very seldom adequate to his idea. For this idea ~~x~~ lies hidden in reason, like a germ in which the parts are still undeveloped and barely recognizable even under microscopic observation. Consequently since sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest, we must not explain and determine them according to the description which their founder gives of them, but in conformity with the idea which, out of the natural unity of the parts that we have assembled, we find to be grounded in reason itself.

A 837 B 865 KS 657 (pure intuition linked with infallibility)

A 836 B 864 KS 655

... all knowledge, subjectively regarded, is either historical or rational. Historical knowledge is cognitio ex datis; rational knowledge is cognitio ex principiis. However a mode of knowledge may ~~bx~~ originally be given, it is still, in relation to the individual who possesses it, simply historical, if he knows only so much of it as has been given to him from outside... whether through immediate experience or narration or... (KS 656) through instruction. Anyone therefore who has learnt... a system of philosophy, such as that of Wolff, although he may have all its principles, explanations, and proofs, together with the formal divisions of the whole body of doctrine, in his head and, so to speak, at his fingers' ends, has no more than a complete historical knowledge of the Wolffian philosophy. He knows and judges only what has been given him. If we dispute a definition, he does not know whence to obtain another. He has formed his mind on another's, and the imitative faculty is not the productive. In other words, his knowledge has not in him arisen out of reason, and although, objectively considered, it is indeed knowledge due to reason, it is yet, in its subjective character, merely historical. He has grasped and kept; that is, he has learnt well, and is merely a plaster-cast of a living man. Modes of rational knowledge which are rational objectively (that is, which can have their first origin solely in human reason) can be so entitled subjectively also, only when they have been derived from universal sources of reason, that is, from principles -- the sources from which there can also arise criticism, nay, even the rejection of what has been learnt.

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A 837 B 865 KS 656

All knowledge arising out of reason is derived either from concepts or from the construction of concepts. The former is called philosophical, the latter mathematical.

A 838 B 866 KS 657

Philosophy is the system of all philosophical knowledge. If we are to understand it by the archetype for the estimation of all attempts at philosophising... Thus regarded, philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science which nowhere exists in concreto, but to which, by many different paths, we attempt to approximate, until the true path, overgrown by the products of sensibility, has at last been discovered, and the image, hitherto so abortive, has achieved likeness to the archetype, so far as this is granted to (mortal) man.....

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Hitherto the concept of philosophy has been a merely scholastic concept -- a concept of a system of knowledge which is sought solely in its character as a science, and which has therefore in view only the systematic unity appropriate to science, and consequently no more than the logical perfection of knowledge. But there is likewise another concept of philosophy, a conceptus cosmicus, which has always formed the real basis of the term 'philosophy', especially when it has been as it were personified and its archetype represented in the ideal philosopher. On this view, philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (KS 658) (teleologia rationis humanae), and the philosopher is not an artificer in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of human reason. In this sense of the term it would be very vainglorious to entitle oneself a philosopher, and to pretend to have quailed the pattern which exists in the idea alone.

A 850 B 878 KS 665

Metaphysics, alike of nature and of morals, and especially that criticism of our adventurous and self-reliant reason which serves as an introduction of pro-paedeutic to metaphysics, alone properly constitutes what may be entitled philosophy, in the strict sense of the term. Its sole preoccupation is wisdom; and it seeks it by the path of science, which, once it has been trodden, can never be overgrown, and permits of no wandering. Mathematics, natural science, even our empirical knowledge, have a high value as means, for the most part, to contingent ends, but also, in the ultimate outcome, to ends that are necessary and essential to humanity. This latter service, however, they can discharge only as they are aided by a knowledge through reason from pure concepts, which, however we may choose to entitle it, is really nothing but metaphysics.

851/879

For the same reason metaphysics is also the full and complete development of human reason (die Vollendung aller Kultur). Quite apart from its influence as science in connection with certain specific ends, it is an indispensable discipline. For in dealing with reason it treats of those elements and highest maxims which must form the basis of the very possibility of some sciences, and of the use of all. That, as mere speculation, it serves rather to prevent errors than to extend knowledge, does not detract from its value. On the contrary this gives it dignity and authority, through that censorship which secures general order and harmony, and indeed the well-being of the scientific commonwealth, preventing those who labour courageously and fruitfully on its behalf from losing sight of the supreme end, the happiness of all mankind.