

1. Gratia operans: psychological to 1230
Aq. both metaphysical and psychological
later, psychology emptied out
- Verbum: after Aq. psychological analogy without psychology
- Insight: what is meant by saying intellect is intelligence
whether intellect is in fact intelligence
- Vs intellect as basically a metaphysical mechanism
only end-products (concepts judgements) within consciousness
- Intellect is inquiry, insight, formulation
critical reflection, grasp of VU, judgement
- Speak of intellect as of sight to blind
Speak of intellect as of sight to people who experience seeing
- Question is not whether understanding exists
but whether it is subsequent to concepts (grasping nexus)
or antecedent ground of concepts.

2. That question is question of fact: Euclid, equilateral, $r+r_2 > d > |r-r_2|$
internal angle

- We know without understanding*
Heuristic structure
visio descriptiva
What is common
to fire and the human
3. Is abstraction basically preconscious, or is basically insight +
~~mode~~ an intelligent disregard of irrelevant. Definition of circle.
 $\epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma = \alpha\tau\iota\omicron\nu \tau\omicron\upsilon \epsilon\iota\omega\alpha\iota = \tau\omicron \tau\iota \eta\upsilon \epsilon\iota\omega\alpha\iota$ - common matter, individual matter
- Notion of being: if preconscious abstraction, then abstraction of being
If abstraction intelligent, rests on understanding
then because we do not understand essence of being
not in entibus per participationem
not in ente per essentiam (beatific vision)
intentio entis \equiv Ar. wonder \equiv Aq. natural desire to know God by essence \equiv desire
conceptio entis (form and part matter -- ens quod, quo, an sit) *pure*
cognitio entis

5. Is not this a Kantian a priori?

Kantian a priori consists in judgements, concepts, absolutely independent of experience.

Intentio entis has occasion in experience; itself is independent; *fiat*
lumen intellectus nostri, participatio creata lucis increatae, potens omnia *facere*
Conceptio entis is essentially dependent: ens seen in essentia
Cognitio entis is essentially dependent: fulfilment of conditions in experi

In Thomist terms: not a priori et a posteriori, but natural, acquired, infused. Ar and Aq being and first principles known naturally.

Knowing is natural: by nature intellect grasps possibilities
but to know is to know being: an identity
 \therefore Knowing being is natural

6. Relativism a problem.

If basic concepts result from automatic unconscious process, they can vary only with variations in the nature of things. Basically there is evolution of concepts only in so far as there is evolution in things.

If all explanatory concepts result from acts of understanding, then for every development in understanding there is a development in consequent concepts. Concepts do not inhabit Plato's noetic heaven; they have dates; they vary with development of science (including the notion of science itself); they vary with philosophic schools, periods of decline and renewal in schools.

There is a history of ideas; there is room for a development of dogma (vs Marin Sola: development of dogma by metaphysical implication)

Relativism not answered by appealing to basic concepts that do not vary,
but by appealing to invariant structure in which concepts develop. Basic invariant structure = latent, problematic, explicit metaphysics.

Philosophy not a barrier dam to river of science
but the bed in which the river flows.

7. Difference in method, methodical criteria.

- a) Reach for the basic, immutable nuggets; grasp universal and necessary propositions; deduce the consequences. = Solid doctrine.
- b) If you understand, you probably don't know -- just a hypothesis
If you don't understand, you don't know -- understanding an essential component
- c) Self-appropriation of ~~an~~ self as empirically, intellectually, rationally conscious
Necessity, factual: I might not be intelligent but de facto I am
I might not be reasonable but de facto I am
I can't get round it
Universality: it holds in all my knowing;
structure of acts is also structure of contents
hence, metaphysics of proportionate being.

8. Different views on Objectivity.

de Tonquedec: knowing is looking; supposes distinction of subject and object; consists in adding presence of object to subject; is a seeing, intuiting, looking
intellect is a sort of spiritual eye; judgement is radically superfluous

intellect is not a sort of spiritual eye; insight is only per se infallible; rests on phantasm, image; but image may or may not coincide with relevant sense data; judgement is essential
as ens potentia, actu primo, actu secundo
so knowing potentia, actu primo, actu secundo

objectivity is not in terms of infallible look, but of experience, normative, absolute, principal -- the bridge is the absolute, win consciousness

9. Hence different significance to distinction btwn immanent & projected intelligibility.

- a) immanent objective because seen to be out there in object
projected: source is mind, projected upon, added to, object
- b) no doubt, that there are intelligibilities more easily grasped & others far more recondite (relativity, quantum theory, evolution)
theory of judgement: vulnerable and invulnerable insights
but issue is not out there but truth and falsity: unconditioned

parallel axiom, seemed immanent for over 20 centuries, but not absolutely true
if quantum theory true, then objective

10. Similarly, different opposition to Kantian thought

For Kant, intuition is essential to knowing, what puts knowing in relation to object

But intuition alone is not enough: a priori forms of sensibility, categories of understanding, ideas of reason.

- a) Kant is mistaken, because the whole of direct knowing is intuition
- b) Kant is mistaken, because he validates knowledge by appeal to intuition, to possible experience: that is what ties him down to this world, makes proof of existence of God impossible
The right validation of knowledge, criterion of valid knowledge, is truth, grasp of virtually unconditioned; though Kant incidentally acknowledges this, it is not followed through, else appeal to intuition (possible experience) would be eliminated systematically.

11. Different attitude to epistemology

- a) If knowing objectively is taking a good look and seeing what is there, then epistemological question does not really arise

2 You won't see any better because you argue about it; arguing is not seeing; it is additional movement from seen to unseen.

4 At most, epistemology is refuting wrong-headed adversaries by telling them that in fact you know.

3 If any difficulty about first look, then same about second super-look

Moreover, the fixity of basic concepts not only eliminates problem of relativism but combined with objectivity of look yields a plausible explanation of the real world of common sense; and common sense knows its real world without any philosophic help.

- b) If intellect is intelligence, if being is the objective of the pure desire to know, then there is an essential difference between the cognitional enterprise of common sense and of philosophy

World, Real world, is an analogous term: we all live in different worlds of our own.

Horizon set by Sorge, concern, interest; what's beyond it common sense could not care less.

Intellect as Intelligence

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Universe of being includes all that is truly in all real worlds; it is completely universal and completely concrete.

Correlative to pure desire to know, it is critical of common sense real worlds; it corrects them; it corrects the successive world views of scientists

Springing from the basis of all our knowing, it reduces to a common structure the disiecta membra of the sciences and of the many genera & species of common sense

12. Metaphysics seems just a scheme.

Either metaphysics is complete knowledge of all being (like beatific vision) or it is a particular department of a common aspect of all beings (Scotus, Hegel) or it is a grasp of ontological structure (a) in single beings (b) in their interrelations (universe)

If third, then 'just a scheme' seems an inevitable but not a reasonable objection.

Traditional metaphysics is just such a grasp of structure (internal constitutive causes, external final and efficient causes)

It differs from position in Insight

- a) later post-Thomist drop and do not replace world-view of Ar Ar (significant: Dante)
- b) cling to what is mistaken in Ar. physics
scientia est certa rerum cognitio non per praedicamenta sed per causas
- c) it does not realize ~~it~~ it possesses the form of all possible empirical science: theory verified in many instances; form act potency
- d) it is inadequate to problems of development: organic, psychic, intellectual, moral, historical

13 Different attitude towards the
a train - perspective — background — Entreef — world