

1. According to 'Insight' the name, being, denotes every aspect of everything: being is completely universal (absolutely everything) and completely concrete (every aspect of everything).

Further, our knowledge of being is analogous: we do not in this life know being by its essence, for such knowledge could not be had from any created being and it is not had from uncreated being; it could not be had from any created being because ens per participationem does not possess the essence of being it ~~cannot~~ not be had from uncreated being, for knowledge of the ens per essentiam by its essence is the beatific vision.

Neither of these views, I think, cause serious difficulty to a Thomist. But difficulty does arise when we scrutinize more closely the precise manner in which it is alleged that we know being.

2. First, what St. Thomas would call our similitudo participata lucis increatae, our intellectus qua potens omnia facere et fieri, ~~is~~ is not exclusively a metaphysical entity with metaphysical properties that account for the metaphysics of knowing.

On the contrary it is identified with the lumen intellectus nostri, with intelligence qua conscious and consciously operative, as (1) a drive (2) and illumination and (3) a control of the psychological operations by which we come to know being and advance in knowledge of being.

The account of intellect is not an account of some metaphysical sausage machine; the metaphysics is all there, but there is more and that is psychology.

3. Intelligence is a drive, a principle of movement, development. It is such a drive as 'the wonder that is the beginning of all science and philosophy' It is such a drive as the inquiry, the intellectual alertness that sustains all intellectual operation. It is the pure desire to know, and because that desire is unlimited, because we ask questions about absolutely everything, because we do not cease wondering until we arrive at the beatific vision, that desire, drive, is named the notion of being. It is the intentio entis, that ~~is~~ underlies every quid sit and every an sit.

4. Intelligence is further a principle of illumination.
From sense and insight we form concepts, universal (form and common matter) or particular (form and individual matter)

Of themselves sense and insight take us no further than the essence, the object of thought.

Only because of the illumination of the intentio entis, the finality of intellect, do we go beyond essence to being, beyond the object of thought to the object of knowledge, *from the part to the whole & to the part as part measure, measure*

It is at this point that the notion of the subsistent arises, that the distinction is to be made between the ens quod (which is the ultimate goal) and the ens quo, the part, that is the essence.

5. Intelligence finally is a control, a principle of critical reflection.
It is not enough to think of being, of ens; we want to know whether what is thought of truly is.

With the question, Is it, there arises the demand for the virtually unconditioned, and by that demand our rationality is engaged: we cannot but judge or surrender our rationality if the unconditioned is grasped; again, if the unconditioned is not grasped, then we cannot be both rational and elicit the judgement.

6. It will make the difficulty more obvious, if we add that the notion of objectivity is consonant with the notion of being.

Knowledge is not conceived as ultimately, radically, primarily, involving a distinction between subject and object and consisting in a presence of the object to the confronting, seeing, beholding, intuiting subject.

Rather knowledge is conceived as a perfection, a participation within us of the uncreated light, an intentional omnipotence.

In God there is no distinction between his self and his self-knowledge; truth of divine self-knowledge is not a similarity of subject and object (which supposes duality) but rather an absence of dissimilarity (1 16 5 2m)

In us there is a participation of divine knowledge which partly is from nature and partly acquired.

More particularly,

Objects are divided into agent objects (color to sight, sound to hearing, quidditas seu natura in materia corporali existens)

terminal objects (image to imagination, concept to insight, judgement to RU)

and final objects (imagined to imagination, being to intellect)

verum est medium in quo ens cognoscitur

I 3 4 ad God's esse known by knowing truth of proposition, Deus est; and mutatis mutandis everything known by knowing truth; ens potentia, forma, actu; knowing potentia forma actu

Hence, objectivity is a complex notion:

experiential: the givenness of data (as opposed to free images)

normative: the exigences of the pure desire to know

absolute: the virtually unconditioned; independence of other things et of the subject

principal: the bridge is the absolute; distinctions within the absolute realm of being

7. To make matters worse, there is so much stress of intelligence, insight, understanding,

there is far from any monopoly of knowledge conceded to common sense, (c-s comes in for some severe criticism)

that the universe of being appears to be distinct from what everyone means by the 'real world'

Whitehead: bifurcation of nature, two tables

Lonergan: things for us, in their relations to us

things in their relations to one another

The latter explanatory knowledge is given primacy in metaphysics; metaphysical analysis presupposes the transposition of descriptive knowledge into at least a heuristic explanatory structure.

8. The difficulties that arise are manifold

(a) The notion of being and of existence is from the mind; it is independent of experience; it is essentially a Kantian a priori category of understanding with not a little of the Kantian idea of reason (everything, unconditioned)

(b) Metaphysics is just an empty scheme; it is derived from the structure of knowing; to give it a content one must appeal to common sense and the sciences

(c) Concepts do not precede understanding but result from, express, understanding; but understanding develops in time; and so concepts develop in time; they are dated; hence knowing is a function of time, it is relative to time -- relativism

(d) There is no distinction between immanent and projected intelligibilities; between intelligence grasping the essence of the thing in the thing, and intelligence in its speculative employment working out what at best are probable theories.

(e) While there is a verbal coincidence with Thomism, there is a fundamental difference in content.

My universe of being is world for eggheads, known by answering questions; and that is not the real world of ordinary people

For me the real is being, being is what is known through true judgements, true judgements depend upon an immanent grasp of the unconditioned, not upon a confrontation an intuition of what really is out there.

For ordinary sane people, what is fundamental is ~~the~~ the real world which we all know with certitude; being may be bigger than the average man's real world, but it is an extension of it, not a quite different universe.

9. With regard to Kant, it is remarkable that in the name of genuine Thomism people forget the Thomist distinction between natural, acquired, and infused knowledge, and run off to Kant to base their case on his distinction between a priori and a posteriori judgements and concepts.

Prolegomena

Aristotle's Metaphysics opens with the statement that all men naturally desire to know; and Aquinas deduces that all men naturally ~~know~~ desire to know God by his essence.

Aristotle in his Metaphysics asserts that the principle of contradiction is naturally known, and Aquinas concludes that being is naturally known and that there is in man naturally the habitus principiorum (contradiction, whole greater than part)

For man knowing is natural; by nature he is equipped with an intellectus agens and possibilis

But to know ~~is~~ intellectually is to know being. Identity.
Therefore, to know being is natural.

In Kant, two components are necessary for our knowledge: Anschauung, which puts us in contact with an object; ~~Thought, which supplies the categories and~~ ~~ideas~~ and a priori forms, categories, and ideas (ideals).

Without intuitions the categories are empty; without categories the intuitions are blind.

He differs from the empiricists by not reducing the whole of valid knowledge to intuition -- de Tonquedec (G VanRiet, Epistemologie thomiste louvain 1946)

He differs from realists by not having an adequate theory of judgement, by not seeing that the one necessary and/condition of objective knowledge is truth, the unconditioned. Possible knowledge is limited to possible experience of this world.

suffi

For an empiricist, the trouble with Kant is his a priori; but the empiricist objection to Kant is not the right objection

Is notion of being ~~independent~~ knowledge that is independent of experience / in experience

- (a) Intentio entis is just question; it is not knowledge; but it has only occasion
- (b) conceptio entis: intellectual penetration of the conceived essence, which essentially depends upon ~~exists~~ experience.
- (c) cognitio entis: judgement depends on virtually unconditioned; which depends essentially on experience

10. Metaphysics is just an empty scheme; it depends on the structure of knowledge; to give it a content one must appeal to common sense, sciences.

Either metaphysics is actual knowledge of every aspect of everything, or it considers some aspect of all things in abstraction, or it is the concrete synthesis in the whole of possible human knowledge

It is not the first: that is divine knowledge

If it is the second, then 'being' is just an abstraction, and metaphysics is not the synthetic component in knowledge; and since that synthetic component is desperately needed, something else has to be invented to fulfil that function and exercise the role of queen of the sciences (Ar Aq vs Scotus Suarez Wolff)

If it is the third, then the objection in terms of empty scheme will be inevitable, but it won't be reasonable.

Common sense and science are knowledge of the real world, of being; they have to stand in some relation to metaphysics.

In a philosophy that just classifies and does not understand, metaphysics will be study of most abstract generality

In a philosophy that goes beyond description to explanation, metaphysics will be synthetic

Just an empty scheme without content: the scheme itself is a content and a remarkably rich one; it includes the relations between the sciences; fundamental notions that the sciences cannot investigate (elements, development)

Moreover, this schematic character regards proportionate being; from chapter XIX when being is considered in full range, all metaphysical theorems (participation, illimitation of act, &c, become operative.

11. If concepts are expression of understanding and understanding develops, then concepts are dated; knowledge is relative to time.

Vs Scotist view that concepts result automatically from essences of things; concepts are like Platonic ideas, outside time, in noetic heaven

Impossibility of intellectual history; no possible theory of development of dogma; if mistaken, then an out of date ghetto mistaken for eternal truth.

What are the facts?

They are complex: explanatory concepts in natural sciences and in details of human science develop in time; within process of hypothesis and verification; true even of ideals of science (things by their causes; law and system)

This flow of relative concepts (1) connected with fairly fixed descriptive concepts in terms of things in their relations to us (2) occurs within the invariant structure determined by self-appropriation, which (3) is isomorphic with the structure of metaphysics.

12. No distinction between immanent and projected intelligibilities.

There is an obvious distinction between them: insights that concretely hit the bull's-eye; acts of understanding of a Clerk-Maxwell, an Einstein, a Heisenberg
Further, valuable & invaluable insights

But the significance of the distinction is twofold: there is its significance for loose-minded empiricists; and there is its significance for realists.

For strict empiricists, the real is the given; and the given is to sense or consciousness.

Loose-minded empiricists further acknowledge the objective validity of immanent intelligibilities, but look with grave suspicion ~~at~~ on what they name projected intelligibilities (which come from the mind and may or may not be objective)

Realists put their weight on judgement, the unconditioned, truth.

No matter how immanent the intelligibility of the parallel axiom may have appeared for ~~over~~ twenty centuries, if it's not true, it's not objective

No matter how projected the quantum theory may appear, if it is ~~not~~ true it is objective.

Is verum the medium ~~in~~ in quo ens cognoscitur or is it not?

13. Being as presented in Insight does not coincide with the real world.

This is the real difficulty. Things are not what they were imagined to be, and one does not wish to risk a change.

Respect: How are you doing? What I can. I myself for many years tried to equate being with my real world, before learning to stand things the other way round

What do we mean by the real world and how is it related to universe of being?

- (a) Kohler, Sultan, free image.
- (b) Abschattung - Horizont: do not see University Seminary, West Baden College
- (c) World - total horizon (a') simply in terms of pure desire -- universe of being
(b') correlative to Sorge = in-der-Welt-sein
- (d) Many real worlds: children and adults
100% Americans and foreigners
doctors nurses orderlies undertakers
altar boys seminarians priests bishops
truck drivers politicians executives lawyers
novelists poets dreamers primitives neurotics psychoics
Contributor to Hibbert Journal ; schizophrenia
- (e) Why many? How are many possible?

The flow of consciousness is not determined uniquely by environment; you have to live at West Baden for seven years, but you do not have to think about it exclusively for 7

Flow: must integrate underlying neural organic manifold
must deal with environment, things and persons,
must be the sort of thing that can develop freely -- be oneself

Eisenhower: we have to be men
Existentialist: l'homme se definit par une exigence (not birth certificate)

(f) How is philosophy, metaphysics, universe of being related to global operative Sorge, Concern, will to live.

guided exclusively by the pure desire to know

hence, no limited horizon; includes all real worlds; criticizes, corrects, brings them into a single view (psychotics, primitives, novelists, men of common sense, physicists, chemists, biologists, psychologists, educators, priests)

hence, an explicit, special initiative (Socrates Plato Aristotle in history of Western civilization)

explicit, special initiative in each individual that brings philosophy; unless anew viewpoint, then never any real interest, serious grasp on philosophy

(g) Is there a conflict, tension, between Sorge - Welt and Pure Desire - Being

Conflict arises, not on level of Sorge-Welt, but within philosophy; for philosophies are many

but each individual knows de facto by experience, understanding, judgement individuals real worlds are constantly being brought into harmony with ~~real~~ universe of being; every true judgement; every rejection of error.

(h) what is the precise nature of the conflict?

without reaching a sufficient

(a') attempting to do philosophy ~~without reaching a sufficient~~ criticism of one's real world epistemology as a defence of what Santayana named animal faith

(b') an exaggerated criticism of the 'real world' (materialisms and idealisms)

(c') where (a') and (b') interact.

(i) what are the issues in the conflict?

reality: is the measure of being true judgement or is it the spontaneous real world
knowledge: is it taking a look or is it experiencing understanding judging
objectivity: is it seeing what is out there, or is it experiential normat absol princip

(j) issues systematized in positions, counter-positions, as method of metaphysics and as method of criticism of sciences and common sense