

Methodological. Not question of loyalty or betrayal of corporate price
AMDG and not AMG societatis Iesu, vel OP//true Suarez
Cannot be loyal to Soc if not more loyal to truth
I could not love you half so much

Development as a Fact.

- a Aquinas Summa cannot be used as text-book
- b Lombard to Aquinas in Comm in Sent; Lombard occasion.

Difference in questions raised
in terminology employed
in attitude towards terminology
manuals: systematic definitions of terms (700 years work)
Scotus: beginnings of listing different meanings
Aquinas: on each occasion draws necessary distinctions
no reason to suppose he developed some
purely rigorous scheme

Development in Aquinas a Fact.

- a Development down centuries is just sum of developments
within minds of individuals.
 - b The more significant and intelligent the individual,
the greater the development to be expected within the compass
of his works
- a' When Aq changes he mentions it (III 9 4 c)
Sometimes, C; regularly, videbimus.
 - b' Truth is eternal, always identical with itself.
Truth is in the mind.
Truth in the mind of God is eternal, C
Truth in the mind of men is something that develops
It cannot be wrapped up in a parcel and sold over the
philosophic or theological counter; you have to inquire,
scrutinize, think, study, strive -- or you are sounding brass
and tinkling cymbal -- the world's disgust with scholasticism
arises precisely from the parrots of scholasticism

Conclusions.

- a Useless to inquire into mind of Aquinas: disputabatur et
disputabitur.
Useless to ask Aq answer to our problems; he did not think
about them.
Useless to ask Aq answer to Aq problems, N.
- b You are asking about a problem in Aq when you asked-wh
show that Aq changed his mind on some issue and ask why he changed it
You are solving that problem when all your answer, its
concepts and their connections, come out of the text of Aquinas
Your answer cannot be complete: I cannot write an exact
history of the development of my own mind; much less of Aq
Your answer can be significant, settle general lines of
movement of thought, settle its own context.

Existence of problem of gratia operans for Aquinas.

I-II 111 2 c TS 322 f.

Gratia: : Actus interior
: Motus : exterior
: Habitus: Forma
: Operatio

In II Sent , d 26, q 1, a 5 sol TS 316.

Gratia sanctificans: : Gratum facit habentem
: Formaliter : Opus gratum reddit
: Effective : Inclinat ad actum interiorem
: Causat actum exteriorem

De Ver q 27 a 5 ad lm TS 321 of p 320 nka 148 for correction of text.

Gratia : : Iustificatio
: quilibet effectus div, vol. gratuita : op in libero arbitr
: donum habituale : formaliter
: effective

Differences

Sent: Actual grace neither operans nor cooperans
De Ver: Actual grace cooperans but not operans
Summa : Actual grace both operans and cooperans

b In all three works (Sent, De Ver, Summa) habitual grace not merely causes the forma meriti but also inclines to the performance of the act. Hence habitual grace has a psychological aspect of impulse as well as metaphysical aspect of supernaturality. This is directly opposed to later theologians' tendency to think of habitual grace as giving mere posse of supernatural acts without any inclination

Aquinas problem of gratia operans also problem of contemporaries.

St Albert TS 312 f.

a Explicitly: operans, possibility of merit
cooperans, as causing form of merit in act

b In context: grace also inclines to performance of act.

St. Bonaventure TS 313 f.

Habitual grace is called cooperans inasmuch as it is in the will and inclines the will to its act.

Habitual grace is called operans inasmuch as it is produced by God operating on the will prior to the will's own action.

1. Aquinas in Sentences combines the formal aspect emphasized by Albert with the psychological aspect emphasized by Bonaventure
To this he adds the distinction between internal and external acts derived from Augustine and the Lombard TS 315note127

2. Hence questions arise.

a Why were Albert Bonaventure Aquinas in Sent in same boat, emphasizing habitual grace, not thinking much of what later writers think of almost exclusively.

b Why did Aquinas add actual grace as cooperans in De Ver

c Why did Aquinas add actual grace as operans in Summa.

Augustine on gratia operans et cooperans. p 290 ff.

1. Why Augustine? Because cited by Aquinas, Lombard.
Where in Augustine? The cited work, De gratia et lib arbitrio
2. Nature of work
 - a Origin
 - a' Remotely: Pelagian heresy, series of positions in depth
No grace
If exists, then not necessary
If necessary, then law, knowl of law, nature, freedom, rem sins
If none of these, then given according to prior merits
If grace necessary for merit of good deeds, then given
according to merit of good will
 - b' Proximately: Monks at Hadrumetum
Read Augustine against Pelagians
Concluded: everything depends on grace; therefore no freedom
Later: no correction by superiors; De Correptione et Gratia
 - b Character of work. p 293
 - a' dogmatic: "... sic disputasse ut non magis ego quam divina
ipsa Scriptura vobiscum locuta sit"
there exists grace which is necessary for every good deed
there exists freedom
 - b' addressed to faith
if you do not understand, do not dispute; pray for light
 - c' ultimate problem of reconciliation
"O altitudo"
3. Doctrine.
 - a Pelagians distinguish between good will and good performance
Augustine distinguished btween operans causing good will
and cooperans causing good performance ; pluck out heart of stone
St Peter at Last Supper put in heart of flesh
St Peter at martyrdom
 - b division of grace
no distinction between habitual and actual DTC 6 1567 calce
vocation to celibacy, of St Paul
forgiveness regeneration justification child of God
power to avoid future sins, aid of God, moved by Spirit of God
faith operating thru charity; charity
any text appealed to without distinction
4. Problem.

How can God say "facite vobis" if grace is necessary; or
"dabo vobis" if free will is involved?
The will of man is always free but not always good; either
is is free from justice, and then evil; or liberated from sin,
and then it is good.
Liberty a free will b liberation from dominance of evil inclinat

Anselm, p. 294 ff.

1. Augustine: settling what was of faith
Anselm: fides quaerens intellectum a dealt with all the profoundest intellectual problems b dealt with them in dialectical, apriorist fashion, without sufficient positive basis c extremely brilliant but also little solidity.

2. Veritas: rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis
Iustitia: rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata
Libertas: potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem.
Gratia: causa rectitudinis
Gratia praeveniens: causa tou fieri (unica)
Gratia subsequens: causa tou conservari (principalis)
more

3. Anselm's libertas is/Augustine's liberation than freedom in sense of doing or not doing.

a the will cannot cause its own rectitude; it has to be right before it can do right; grace causes its rectitude

b the will without rectitude retains freedom, capacity of preserving rectitude it does not possess; just as man bound and blindfolded in dungeon "can see"

c freedom is not ability to sin; else God and blessed would not be free
again, sin is servitude; freedom is not ability to become slave

4. Anselm lacks distinction between natural and supernatural

a to work out theological method; difference from a priori reasoning; dependence on revelation

b to work out theory of freedom a' in natural order b' in conjunction with grace both as elevans and sanans.

5. Anselm lacks distinction between actual and habitual

a Baptized infants have remission of sins but have not faith operating through charity; latter is grace.

b This more probable view in 1201 AD; cf DB 410.

Peter Lombard, TS 297 ff.

1. Character of work.

a Denziger, Rouet, selected texts of SScr; collected and classified in 4 books of distinctions

b a source book of theological speculation (sapientis est ordinare) until 16th century

c not speculative, as Anselm; able to write down contradictory views culled from different sources.

2. Four states of human liberty (later of nature)

a Of liberty and not nature because philosophic theory of nature and supernatural not yet introduced.

b Garden of Eden: no difficulty in good; no impulsio to evil

c Fallen man: posse peccare et non posse non peccare etiam damnabiliter

d Regenerated man: posse non peccare et posse peccare

e Heaven: confirmation in grace; non posse peccare

3. Operative grace: what makes difference between "liberty of nature" and "liberty of grace"

Liberty of nature: velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem non invenio"

Liberty of grace: efficacious good will

Cooperative grace: carrying out efficacious good will.

b Operans and cooperans probably the same grace, which however is not inert but grows and increases.

c This one grace is a virtue: whether ~~ixix~~ a virtue is an internal act or else a quality is an obscure and disputed point left to the reader.

d It is faith with charity, justifying faith, faith in Xt.

4. In Lombard other elements which tend to change his position

a hominem semper et peccare et non peccare posse
grace not necessary to do some good acts

b liberty defined in two manners: free will is what does good with grace but does evil without grace
also, liberum de voluntate iudicium, inasmuch as negation of necessity, coercion; not not inasmuch as equilibrium, indifference to good or evil

c three states rather of nature than of liberty Eden&heaven
libertas a necessitate (always); a peccato (grace); a miseria//

d some problems solved by appeal to merit; ie grace necessary
not for act to be good but for act to be meritorious; undeveloped

Transition to Theorem of Supernatural.

1. All knew that grace beyond man's merits, deserts, rights; free gift of God; transcending in value any other gift

But this is not knowledge of supernatural as theorem;
cf. "going faster" and d^2s/dt^2

2. What is not a gift of God?

a Cardinal Laborans: gratia veri nominis
a' everything had at birth and received afterwards
b' everything had by elect at birth and received afterwards
c' virtues of the elect

b Radulphus Ardens
virtues before fall were all "naturalia"
virtues after fall are all "gratuita"

c Peter Abaelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, many others.
disjunction between charity and cupidity
fallen nature is crooked
without divine charity there are no virtues at all

d Basically, grace is conceived only psychologically
By fall understanding is darkened and will weakened
By grace understanding is enlightened and will strengthened

3. Emergence of supernatural habit.

a Stephen Langton: explains gratuitum by meritum
hence gratia gratum faciens

b Praepositinus: notes reason highest in nature; faith above reason

c Philip the Chancellor: recalls William of Auxerre's amor amicitiae erga Deum that is natural and distinct from charity
posits two entitatively disproporportionate orders
a' nature reason natural love of God

b' grace faith charity merit
d connects virtues "quibus recte vivitur" w our life in Xt
and order of grace faith charity merit
vivificari in Xto (grace) illuminari (faith) uniri (charity)
rectificari (justice)

4. Release of speculation on liberty.

a Until theorem of supernatural habit, as long as grace conceived psychologically and not confined to habit, theory of liberty ~~was~~ impossible without denying grace.

b Dom Lottin, from Philip begin treatises on liberty

c Albert and Thomas in Comm in Sent
grace properly is infused habit
no distinction between providence and actual grace
denial of moral impotence in name of liberty.

Position in Sentences of Aquinas.

1. Gratia gratum faciens.

- a Everyone had known of justification as "faith operating through charity" and as Augustine's virtues "quibus recte vivitur"
- b Sanctifying grace is distinct from virtues.
One mortal sin destroys sanctifying grace in soul but does not destroy all the virtues; eg faith hope.
Scotus hypothesis of identifying sanctifying grace and charity does not seem to be considered.
- c Sanctifying grace is one in one man
From one God, makes one man just, destroyed by one mortal sin
- d Augustine's distinctions between preventive and subsequent, operative and cooperative, refer to different effects of one and the same grace. Aq and Bonaventure.
- e Bon places this one grace in faculties; Aq in essence of soul.

2. Gratia gratis data.

- a Peter Lombard opposed it to gratia gratis dans, ie God; took it to mean faith operating through charity.
- b Aq in De Ver and Summa takes it as grace of public utility such as miracles, prophecies, charisms.
- c Intermediate period where it is just big sack holding everything
- a' St Albert; eight meanings; TS p 310 calce
- b' St Bonaventure: distinguishes it from human nature and from general concursus; finds it so common that no adult ever exists without it.
- c' St Thomas: includes ill health, external admonitions, external light that shone round St Paul and blinded him on way to Damascus. p 311.

Actual grace in Sentences.

1. Supernatural habit clearly and distinctly conceived.
Actual grace not clearly distinguished from divine providence.

a Division: either donum habituale or Deus gratis dans
2 d 28 q 1 a 1 ad 1m; a 4 c init.

b Pelagianism conceived as negation of necessity of supernatural habit for merit.

a' Without grace but not without God man can do good
2 d 28 q 1 a 1

b' A sinner can avoid future sins; *ibid* a 2
Non posse non peccare means that sins cannot be forgiven without grace.

c' One can observe the law. *ibid* a 3

d' One can prepare oneself for justification; *ibid* a 4.

2. These positions of Sentences later corrected.

a De Ver 24 a 12: necessity of grace for sinner to avoid future mortal sins.

b De Ver 24 a 15: conversion either external or internal grace; Semi-Pelagian position.
Quodl I a 7: internal grace necessary for conversion; opposite doctrine is Pelagian. Cf I-II 9 6 3m; 109 6; 111 2.

c De Ver 27 a 5 ad 3m: when you have habitual grace you have to pray for further grace; gratia cooperans.

Habitual Grace as Operans et Cooperans. Comm. in I-II 111 2 c fin.

1. The Nature of the Habit.

a Agere sequitur esse. The more perfect the esse, the more perfect the agere. But esse is more perfect, the more it is act and the less it is potency.

b God alone absolutely perfect in operation.
Angels, immaterial, mostly act, for the most part good.
Man, for most part evil; intellect is tabula rasa; will has to have virtues infused or acquired.
Hence, numerus stultorum infinitus, Eccl 1 15

c To straighten man out, actuation is required.
Difference between theory of this actuation in Sentences and later.

d Perfecting of man in Sentences. By habits.
Divine wisdom is rule of rectitude: either God intervenes to direct man aright in each act, or else God infuses into potencies the habits or forms whence spontaneously and naturally right action follows.

The method of continual divine intervention by movements from God would make man's actions right, but would leave man as bad as ever. Moreover such intervention smacks of violence.

The method of infusing habits not only makes the actions right but also makes man right.

e Perfecting man in the De Veritate.

Augustine says that when you have prevenient grace you must pray for subsequent grace. Hence dogmatically there is another grace besides habitual.

Hence need of correcting theory.

No habit can be a perfect rule of rectitude, and no set of habits. For agere sequitur esse; agere is perfect scdm quod esse is act; only God is pure act; therefore only God is source of perfect action.

Hence however perfect the habits a man may have, he still stands in need of divine aid and intervention.

Hence also later theory of gifts of Holy Ghost.

Gifts of SpS : infused virtues :: virtues in irrat : virt in rat

Virtues in rational part perfect part in which they are: thus prudence and wisdom perfect intellect; justice hope charity perfect will.

Virtues in irrational part perfect irascibile and concupiscibile, not as such, but inasmuch as it makes them prompt and ready to follow reason.

Infused virtues perfect (intellect and will of) man

Gifts of SpS make man prompt and ready to follow lead of SpS: Qui Spiritu Dei aguntur, ii sunt filii Dei.

f God is the sole ground of perfect action.

Man of himself is potency in rational order, always more probable that he will do wrong.

Man is made perfect, by virtues whence in maiori parte he will do right, and by inspirations of Holy Spirit whence in all things he may do right. Instrumentum Deo coniunctum.

Sentences tries to get along with only habits; De Ver adds cooperans gratia actualis.

2. Habitual grace as gratia sanans.

a In Lombard grace was mainly sanans; it is what ends the state of freedom in fallen man, posse peccare et non posse non peccare etiam damnabiliter. Aspect of merit incidental.

In Sentences supernatural habit as ground of merit holds centre of stage; people working out theories of human liberty; moral impotence denied.

In De Veritate moral impotence reaffirmed. Grace needed both because supernatural end, merit, and because without grace man cannot avoid sinning.

Change due to fuller study of St. Augustine: grace needed not only for forgiveness of past sin but also for avoidance of future sin; prayer, ne nos inducas in tentationem.

b Problem of moral impotence: how can it be inevitable true that man freely yet inevitably will sin.

a' Mistaken notion of freedom as perfect equilibrium of indifference, perpetually re-established at every tick of clock; to do anything all that is needed is to will it.

b' De facto we are creatures of habit.

Do not reduce each decision to the "cogito"; need a 30 day retreat, an annual 8 day retreat, two annual tridua, daily meditation and exams, and yet are a long way off from "indifference" which pertains to principium et fundamentum.

c' Habits are necessary.

Without any habits: bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu; statistical law of failure to do right if no habits.

We cannot maintain ourselves on level of perfection above that of our habits; we ~~do~~ can by meditating and resolving perform particular acts; to ascend Carmel by taking thought ends-up causes strain, break-down, worse than ever

d' Acts performed habitually are free.

Full advertence and full consent occur with respect to habitual actions; we do not deliberate whether we shall have dinner today; yet we eat our dinners freely; actus humanus

e' Hence vicious habit means that a when occasion arises and b there occurs no contrary deliberation and resolution then c man freely will sin. Either he follows habit or goes against it; following habit is free act and effortless; going against it requires deliberation and determination.

But man cannot constantly be deliberating and determining contrary to habit. Habits are necessary.

f' Same conclusion in case of single mortal sin: habit is entrenched disposition; single sin gives disposition which will have same effect as habit except no so hard to eradicate.

g' Objection: why should not single resistance give contrary disposition?

If from charity, ok but due to grace; if not from charity, then insufficient to provide right orientation; man still preferring creature to creator.

c Approach of De Malo. Not explicitly on moral impotence.

a' "diversa velle" not in sense of willing different things on different occasions with respect to different instances but in sense of changing one's will

b' has its root not in freedom - law of psychological continuity - but in fact that man is in natura mutabili this mutability disappears with death.

c' will may be changed in three ways
by advent of new knowledge
by change of dispositions outside will and intellect, eg passion ill health etc
by change effected by grace within will itself

d' without change in will itself, others are at least apt to be inefficacious (our addition)
Qualisquisque est talis finis videtur ei; habitus est quo quis utitur quando voluerit; there is a catch when habit is in will.

d Significance of Habitual Grace as Sanans.

a' Supernatural habits required for meritorious action
In Sentences, as in later works, supernatural habits not merely give forma meriti but also inclinatio ad opus bonum

b' But in Sentences supernatural habits give inclinatio only ad facilius posse not ad simpliciter posse
In De Veritate and later works habits are required ad formam meriti in singulis actibus absoluta necessitate ad opus bonum in serie actuum ad simpliciter posse

c' Sentences indicate, De Veritate and later still more emphatically affirm that human liberty is limited.
Never an impartial equilibrium, pure indifference; man is inclined more one way than another, and most of the time follows his inclinations.

d' Because human liberty is limited, there is room for grace to affect free acts without further limiting freedom.
Grace changes the antecedent inclination: De Ver 22 a 8.

e' The development of the notion of the supernatural habit had given a a pause during which speculation on liberty could develop b an obscuration of moral impotence without grace.

The De Veritate represents the beginning of the higher synthesis.

Habitual grace as a premotion.

1. 4 d 17 q 1 a 4 qc 2 TS 86
Does justification or do free acts precede?
Temporally, they are simultaneous.
Causally, distinguish
In material causality free acts are prior; in formal
causality justification is prior.
2. De Ver q 28 a 8
Free acts prior as dispositions to justification; posterior
as informed by grace of justification.
3. I-II 113 6 TS 82 ff
Infusion of grace is motio moventis; free acts are motus
mobilis; remission of sin is terminus motus.
Grace is prior not only to information of acts but also
to the acts themselves: duplex effectus, primus est esse;
secundus est operatio; calidum esse; calefacere.
4. Origin of change. TS 87 556 ff
Rom 9 lect 3: proof of instrumentality
CGent III 149 152 Motio moventis praecedit motum
mobilis ratione et causa. TS 558 ad 118
Refers to infusion of habitual grace, still the prima
gratia; first emergence of Pelagianism of denying divine
prevenience.
Bannezian use of text a misinterpretation.

Actual Grace ad Operans et Cooperans.

1. As cooperans.
Introduced in De Ver 27 5 lm 3m. Because Augustine and SScr taught that when one has preventent grace, one still needs subsequent grace; therefore not one grace in one man.
2. As operans
I-II lll 2 "praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum voluebat."
 - a' Such change of will in De Ver 22 8; cf De Malo 16 5 TS p 81
 - b' . But 2 d 28 l 4 Pelagian; external grace suffices.
 - c' De Ver 24 15 Semi-Pelagian: either external or internal
 - d' DGent III 149 152: Man an instrument; grace preventent; but the preventing grace seems to be habitual.
 - e' I 62 2 c et 3m.
Triple conversion: final in beatitude; meritorious when habitual grace given; preparatory by a movement.
 - f' Quodl I a 7: Pelagian to hold possibility of conversion without internal grace; Eudemian first mover.
 - g' De Malo 6 a 1; I-II 9 4
Distinction between exercise and specification of free act; exercise of act of willing end comes from outside, from God I-II 109 a 6; cf ad 3m grace.
 - h' I-II 109 6 c; lll 2 c; III 85 5 c. p 560
3. Nature of operation and concursus; divine efficacy.

Development of Concept of Free Will

1. Liberum arbitrium
Sent. not faculty distinct from intellect and will
but intellect and will combined
De Ver qq 22 24; I qq 82 83 on will and free choice respectively
I-II: 63 articles without mention of liberum arbi in titles
2. Non-coercion: act necessary but free
 - a Anselm: coercion and freedom compatible
 - b XII century: no coherent theory of freedom
 - c Sent. so far from non-coercion that moral impotence denied
 - d De Ver, De Pot, Pars Ia: incidental affirmations of nec yet free
God's will of excellence, procession of SpS, tendency to
beatitude in man, demonic fixity in evil, perhaps moral impotence
 - e Rejection in De Malo
3. Appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum: will passive potency
 - a Ar. in general; first mover
 - b Aq. primum appetibile;
inclinari vel non inclinari; moveri De Ver and Ia
man moves self by free choice
 - c distinction of specification and exercise; of end and means
specification from intellect
will of means in virtue of will of end
exercise of will of end from outside, from God De Mal 6; I-II 9
4. Essence of Freedom
 - a Objectively many ways to end De Ver
 - b Contingence of intellect's determination of counsel; not
demonstrative but dialectical or rhetorical syllogism Ia
 - c This counsel does not determine will De Malo I-II
 - d Will determines itself.
5. Essence of Freedom
 - a Bannez: 536 note 32
 - b ~~Will~~ Free man is "causa sui": meaning is final causality;
opposed to slave who is "propter bonum alterius"
 - c All four conditions required per se