

FR LONERGAN

1. Friday August 13th.

1. (Rev.S.W.Sykes) The question concerns whether there is a confessional presupposition to your method, despite your denial of one. Protestant experience since the Enlightenment has been that the historical study of Christian origins has had a profound effect on earlier assumptions about the permanence of central Christian doctrines. Does not the possibility of different accounts of Christian origins give rise to another important source of diversity in fundamental Christian doctrines (especially Christology) which might never be overcome?
2. (M.P.Gallagher) In your published paper on functional specialties you give first place in the section on communications to 'inter-disciplinary relations (of theology) with art, language, literature'. Would you expand or offer any guidelines for study in this area?
3. (Lelia Doolan) The notion of communications implied in your lecture seems strangely at odds with your awareness of the problems posed by postclassical science, art and scholarship. It appears to involve a mechanistic conception of the media of communication and of its effects (on a technological level) upon both the communicator, the communicated and the community. What do you regard as the role of the theological methodologist in preparing the Christian for the formative effects of the media - particularly broadcasting media - upon the community of communicator and those communicated with - in a common task of discovery?
4. Functional specialties seem to be for the theologian when he is doing theology. When the theologian has to teach theology to students, especially to those whose formal study of theology ends in the seminary, how should the functional specialties inform his teaching? In other words, what should he try to communicate to his students?
5. Would it be correct to describe Method in Theology as a philosophy of theology? And how would you guard against the danger that people might neglect the doing of theology for the sake of meta-theology?

- I. Is it true that anyone who is in love with God experiences God, i.e. His Grace, but that to thematize this experience is another matter? To put this in another way: is it not impossible to be in love with God and yet have no experience of this?
2. Yesterday Fr. Tyrrell asked about the relationship between religious experience and its proper articulation and thematization. In the light of that question is it not true that in the light of your present stress on value and conversion that an individual can only reflect accurately and adequately on the meaning of religious life and conversion to the extent that he is, in fact, converted? Would you please elaborate on this a bit?
3. What is common to the three kinds of conversion, ~~the~~^{and} what is the difference between the three? What are the data to which one would need to attend in order to understand religious conversion and moral conversion?
4. In your Existenz and Aggiornamento you speak about a distinction between being "substance" in Christ and being "subject" in Christ, and that one can gradually move from one state to the other. How does this relate to your present stress on religious development and in what in your present context does the movement from substance to subject consist?

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III

1. (from Fr. Gonzalez Morfin)

In one of your articles on Gratia Operans (TS 1942, p.573) you say about Aquinas: "the base of all these operations lay in the commentaries on Holy Writ and on Aristotle where, I think more than elsewhere, the wealth of the theologian and the stature of the philosopher stand revealed". Why do you think that such wealth and such stature stand revealed in those works more than elsewhere?

2. (from Fr. Sala)

I see that the meaning that a truth possesses in its own context can never be truthfully denied. I see that such a meaning can be grasped by men in another cultural context, insofar as they succeed in arriving at the primitive context. I would like you to expand on the continuity and relevance of an earlier dogma to a later and different context. One could say, for example, that the dogma of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist was true in the context of Trent. Basta! Now we think of the Eucharist in another context (no more a "cosmological" one); therefore the dogma of Trent is irrelevant for us, in spite of its absolute truth.

When the dogmatic definition is not just a heuristic one, but also a determinate content (determinate at the first level) e.g. Christ is Risen, Christ is "vere, realiter et substantiãliter" present) how do you understand the continuity and relevance of this content with regard to a different and later cultural context? Must the later and different context take over and appropriate this same defined content, or can it simply ignore it? If the first is the case, how?

Fr Crowe has argued against Professor Hamilton that we have to take over what was defined at Nicea and Chalcedon, however different our cultural context today is.